The negotiations of the Partnership Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union started in 2007, was re-defined as the Association Agreement in September 2008, and was practically ready for signing by the end of 2009. Following the election of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych, the process slowed down, and since 2011 the issue has gradually become a hot contest between Russia and the West. Finally, in a dramatic eleventh hour move, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov suspended the preparation for signing of the Agreement on November 22nd, demanding outrageous financial aid from the European Union.
As long as Ukraine remains unaffiliated with the European Union, Russia retains a chance of restoring the Russian Empire in some scope; as soon as Ukraine makes a decisive step in the direction of the West, this chance will be lost for Russia for good. Russia is fighting to prevent such development, and is pressuring Ukraine to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The main show stopper for signing the Association Agreement are changes in the political system and practices made by President Viktor Yanukovych. One of the products of these changes was the imprisonment of his key opponent, former Prime Minister Julia Tymoshenko. Now, the status of the Agreement is balancing on the edge.
Divided Nation
The elections in Ukraine show a clear divide between eastern and southern Ukraine, and the rest of the country. The South and East vote for Communists and the Party of Regions, while the rest of the country consistently votes for parties with European values.
This divide is usually attributed to the dominance of the Russian language in the east and south, while Ukrainian prevails in the west and center of Ukraine. A joint 2013 study by the Kiev Institute of Sociology and Moscow's Levada-Centre showed that 80 percent of Ukrainians (66 percent in western Ukraine, 80 percent in the south, and 93 percent in the east) have favorable opinion about Russians. Nevertheless the divide is obvious. According to a 2007 poll by the Razumkov Center, 44.5 percent of the people in the south and 40.8 percent in the east self-identify as belonging to the Soviet or Russian cultural tradition, while these numbers are 6.7 percent in the west, 20.7 percent in the center, and 29.5 percent country-wide. A March 2013 poll by the Rating agency showed that 56 percent in the east and 53 percent in the south regret that Soviet Union fell apart, while the same belief in the west reached only 17 percent. Furthermore, 36 percent in the east and 33 percent in the south want a return to a planned economy, while the same belief in the west was at 19 percent. Historically, the heavy industry of eastern and southern Ukraine reported directly to Moscow, and in many cases had privileged status; this status was lost in 1991.
What Russia Missed
The overall favorable perception of Russia gave its re-integration plans a good head start. Nevertheless, support for independence from Russia in Ukraine is now at 65 percent and growing, while disapproval of independence is 17.9 percent and falling. Something obviously went wrong for Russia. For whatever reason, Russian leadership decided that bashing Ukraine on TV on a daily basis, breaking industrial cooperation agreements, and other scare tactics will bring Ukraine closer to Russia. In May 2013, 31 percent of Ukrainians still wanted to join the Customs Union, and 41.7 percent wanted to join the European Association Agreement.
The balance changed dramatically after Russia imposed sanctions on Ukrainian chocolate, and started a customs war early in September. The reaction in Ukraine was nearly unanimous resentment of Russia—according to the Express-Poll, conducted by GfK Ukraine in October 2013, 51 percent of Ukrainians now support European association, and only 14 percent support joining the Customs Union. The massive demonstrations in support of the European choice, which followed Azarov's decicion to suspend preparations for the Vilnius Summit, are the best proof of Ukrainian public opinion.
What the European Union Missed
Yanukovych’s presidency also had a good start with the European Association. He was welcomed as an equal by the leaders of the West, but during the following four years there has been no any substantial progress in establishing the understanding and cooperation between European and Ukrainian leadership.
What western leaders failed to take into account in its policies is Yanukovych's background and mentality. Yanukovych grew up in an environment where only brutal force mattered. He has served two jail sentences: for robbery and violence. Later he made a career as a metallurgy worker, mechanic, and then manager of the large public transit garage. From 1996 to 2002, he served as the Governor of the Donetsk region. These years were the bloodiest and the most violent period of the criminal-driven redistribution of assets in the region; Yanukovych and the regional government presided over these processes. The only values that mattered during that time were muscle and cash. Starting as he did, and growing to become the Governor, then Prime Minister, and then the President is a career to be proud of, but most of it unfolded in a deeply criminalized region, and by the local rules most of the time. It made Yanukovych into a tough, ruthless, and authoritarian ruler, whose base personal values are very far from the European ones. The indicative fact about Yanukovych's mentality is that even in his public appearances he occasionally uses criminal slang.
The influential members of the Party of Regions sincerely do not believe that European values are for real—that there are problems which cannot be solved by bribes, and that there can be any reasons to go in politics or public service besides abusing power to make more money. Within this philosophy, imprisonment of political opponents is natural in Ukraine; this philosophy was openly expressed by a raising star of the Party of Regions, Nikolai Levchenko, in the 2010 German documentary, The Other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk. The jail sentence for Julia Tymoshenko is simply the practical implementation of the principles of the Party of Regions.
Such a counterpart in negotiations usually perceives soft handling as a kind of weakness, and the longer the he faces no consequences for breaking promises, the more self-confident he gets. The long consultations and numerous hints of sanctions, which never materialized, served exactly such a goal. As recently as on November 24th, one of the leaders of the Party of Regions, Mikhail Chechetov, bragged in his TV interview, that “strong man” Yanukovych forced the compromise on the European leaders. This has made Yanukovych over-confident, and prompted him to blackmail Europe at the last moment by suspending preparations for signing the Association Agreement.
Nevertheless, there are still fears that influence Yanukovych. He is afraid of Julia Tymoshenko, who could oust him from power; he is afraid of Ukrainian billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, who bankrolled his career, and who needs closer relations with Europe; he is afraid of Russia and Vladimir Putin; and he is maybe still somewhat concerned about the possible freezing of his foreign assets. Yanukovych’s policies are the result of his fears and greed; Ukraine's European aspirations play a secondary role.
Scenarios for Ukraine
There are three options for Ukraine now: 1) join the Customs Union; 2) join the European Association Agreement; 3) stay as it is. Bringing Ukraine into the Customs Union is Russia’s goal. However, the real participation of Ukraine in this is hardly a realistic option. It will be difficult for the Russian economy to sustain the economic integration with a country that is one-third the size of Russia’s population and has a per-capita income $3500 compared to Russia's $22,700. Unfortunately the ‘stay’ option also has a serious downside. The country's economy is in recession, and the government has mismanaged a series of projects. The “bullet trains” which the government bought from Hundai turned out to be suburban electric trains, which are not usable for long-distance high speed travel. In 2012, three big Ukrainian oil refineries were forced to stop production because they could not compete with the flood of contraband gas, which government did not want to stop.
Ukraine’s trade balance has fallen to a deficit of $900 million per month; the total national debt grew from $40 billion at the end of 2009 to $69 billion in April 2013, and external debt grew by 48 percent. At the same time the net worth of the oldest son of Victor Yanukovych surpassed $500 million.
The key functions of the state are eroding for the fourth year in a row, as the government uses law enforcement to defend the interests of the individual members of the ruling group. The Party of Regions turned to using gangs to attack political rallies (such as the May 18th rally in Kyiv) while police are directed to help and protect the thugs. Now only 1 percent of Ukrainians fully trust the police; a stunning 70 percent do not trust the police at all. The public approval of the judicial system is 30 percent, and disapproval is 60 percent; 15 percent of Ukrainians consider lynching as the only way to find justice. The crime rate has grown over 200 percent since 2012. Customs are deeply corrupt; according to the independent studies in 2012 the amount of bribes paid by the custom brokers exceeded $200 million. It is not a surprise that Interpol reported that smuggling of heavy narcotics from Ukraine to Europe doubled between 2010 and 2012, reaching 10 percent share in the traffic of the heavy drugs to EU countries.
Under the current leadership, Ukraine risks evolving into a failed state at the intersection of the major European transport corridors, with giant weapons arsenals, and no functional government, law enforcement, or control mechanisms. The European Association, if it happens, will slow down this process, but will not make governance more effective. The problem is not the competence of public servants, but the entire system of the government encouraging corruption. The only real solution to the problem is to have a strong, democratic opposition in Ukraine. The necessary precondition for such a scenario is the release of opposition leader Julia Tymoshenko, and her participation in elections. There is also a growing demand for a radical opposition in Ukraine. This niche can be taken by Tymoshenko, but in her absence it is gradually filled by the ultra-nationalist party Svoboda, adding urgency to her release.
a global affairs media network
Ukraine at a Divergence Point
November 27, 2013
The negotiations of the Partnership Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union started in 2007, was re-defined as the Association Agreement in September 2008, and was practically ready for signing by the end of 2009. Following the election of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych, the process slowed down, and since 2011 the issue has gradually become a hot contest between Russia and the West. Finally, in a dramatic eleventh hour move, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov suspended the preparation for signing of the Agreement on November 22nd, demanding outrageous financial aid from the European Union.
As long as Ukraine remains unaffiliated with the European Union, Russia retains a chance of restoring the Russian Empire in some scope; as soon as Ukraine makes a decisive step in the direction of the West, this chance will be lost for Russia for good. Russia is fighting to prevent such development, and is pressuring Ukraine to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The main show stopper for signing the Association Agreement are changes in the political system and practices made by President Viktor Yanukovych. One of the products of these changes was the imprisonment of his key opponent, former Prime Minister Julia Tymoshenko. Now, the status of the Agreement is balancing on the edge.
Divided Nation
The elections in Ukraine show a clear divide between eastern and southern Ukraine, and the rest of the country. The South and East vote for Communists and the Party of Regions, while the rest of the country consistently votes for parties with European values.
This divide is usually attributed to the dominance of the Russian language in the east and south, while Ukrainian prevails in the west and center of Ukraine. A joint 2013 study by the Kiev Institute of Sociology and Moscow's Levada-Centre showed that 80 percent of Ukrainians (66 percent in western Ukraine, 80 percent in the south, and 93 percent in the east) have favorable opinion about Russians. Nevertheless the divide is obvious. According to a 2007 poll by the Razumkov Center, 44.5 percent of the people in the south and 40.8 percent in the east self-identify as belonging to the Soviet or Russian cultural tradition, while these numbers are 6.7 percent in the west, 20.7 percent in the center, and 29.5 percent country-wide. A March 2013 poll by the Rating agency showed that 56 percent in the east and 53 percent in the south regret that Soviet Union fell apart, while the same belief in the west reached only 17 percent. Furthermore, 36 percent in the east and 33 percent in the south want a return to a planned economy, while the same belief in the west was at 19 percent. Historically, the heavy industry of eastern and southern Ukraine reported directly to Moscow, and in many cases had privileged status; this status was lost in 1991.
What Russia Missed
The overall favorable perception of Russia gave its re-integration plans a good head start. Nevertheless, support for independence from Russia in Ukraine is now at 65 percent and growing, while disapproval of independence is 17.9 percent and falling. Something obviously went wrong for Russia. For whatever reason, Russian leadership decided that bashing Ukraine on TV on a daily basis, breaking industrial cooperation agreements, and other scare tactics will bring Ukraine closer to Russia. In May 2013, 31 percent of Ukrainians still wanted to join the Customs Union, and 41.7 percent wanted to join the European Association Agreement.
The balance changed dramatically after Russia imposed sanctions on Ukrainian chocolate, and started a customs war early in September. The reaction in Ukraine was nearly unanimous resentment of Russia—according to the Express-Poll, conducted by GfK Ukraine in October 2013, 51 percent of Ukrainians now support European association, and only 14 percent support joining the Customs Union. The massive demonstrations in support of the European choice, which followed Azarov's decicion to suspend preparations for the Vilnius Summit, are the best proof of Ukrainian public opinion.
What the European Union Missed
Yanukovych’s presidency also had a good start with the European Association. He was welcomed as an equal by the leaders of the West, but during the following four years there has been no any substantial progress in establishing the understanding and cooperation between European and Ukrainian leadership.
What western leaders failed to take into account in its policies is Yanukovych's background and mentality. Yanukovych grew up in an environment where only brutal force mattered. He has served two jail sentences: for robbery and violence. Later he made a career as a metallurgy worker, mechanic, and then manager of the large public transit garage. From 1996 to 2002, he served as the Governor of the Donetsk region. These years were the bloodiest and the most violent period of the criminal-driven redistribution of assets in the region; Yanukovych and the regional government presided over these processes. The only values that mattered during that time were muscle and cash. Starting as he did, and growing to become the Governor, then Prime Minister, and then the President is a career to be proud of, but most of it unfolded in a deeply criminalized region, and by the local rules most of the time. It made Yanukovych into a tough, ruthless, and authoritarian ruler, whose base personal values are very far from the European ones. The indicative fact about Yanukovych's mentality is that even in his public appearances he occasionally uses criminal slang.
The influential members of the Party of Regions sincerely do not believe that European values are for real—that there are problems which cannot be solved by bribes, and that there can be any reasons to go in politics or public service besides abusing power to make more money. Within this philosophy, imprisonment of political opponents is natural in Ukraine; this philosophy was openly expressed by a raising star of the Party of Regions, Nikolai Levchenko, in the 2010 German documentary, The Other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk. The jail sentence for Julia Tymoshenko is simply the practical implementation of the principles of the Party of Regions.
Such a counterpart in negotiations usually perceives soft handling as a kind of weakness, and the longer the he faces no consequences for breaking promises, the more self-confident he gets. The long consultations and numerous hints of sanctions, which never materialized, served exactly such a goal. As recently as on November 24th, one of the leaders of the Party of Regions, Mikhail Chechetov, bragged in his TV interview, that “strong man” Yanukovych forced the compromise on the European leaders. This has made Yanukovych over-confident, and prompted him to blackmail Europe at the last moment by suspending preparations for signing the Association Agreement.
Nevertheless, there are still fears that influence Yanukovych. He is afraid of Julia Tymoshenko, who could oust him from power; he is afraid of Ukrainian billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, who bankrolled his career, and who needs closer relations with Europe; he is afraid of Russia and Vladimir Putin; and he is maybe still somewhat concerned about the possible freezing of his foreign assets. Yanukovych’s policies are the result of his fears and greed; Ukraine's European aspirations play a secondary role.
Scenarios for Ukraine
There are three options for Ukraine now: 1) join the Customs Union; 2) join the European Association Agreement; 3) stay as it is. Bringing Ukraine into the Customs Union is Russia’s goal. However, the real participation of Ukraine in this is hardly a realistic option. It will be difficult for the Russian economy to sustain the economic integration with a country that is one-third the size of Russia’s population and has a per-capita income $3500 compared to Russia's $22,700. Unfortunately the ‘stay’ option also has a serious downside. The country's economy is in recession, and the government has mismanaged a series of projects. The “bullet trains” which the government bought from Hundai turned out to be suburban electric trains, which are not usable for long-distance high speed travel. In 2012, three big Ukrainian oil refineries were forced to stop production because they could not compete with the flood of contraband gas, which government did not want to stop.
Ukraine’s trade balance has fallen to a deficit of $900 million per month; the total national debt grew from $40 billion at the end of 2009 to $69 billion in April 2013, and external debt grew by 48 percent. At the same time the net worth of the oldest son of Victor Yanukovych surpassed $500 million.
The key functions of the state are eroding for the fourth year in a row, as the government uses law enforcement to defend the interests of the individual members of the ruling group. The Party of Regions turned to using gangs to attack political rallies (such as the May 18th rally in Kyiv) while police are directed to help and protect the thugs. Now only 1 percent of Ukrainians fully trust the police; a stunning 70 percent do not trust the police at all. The public approval of the judicial system is 30 percent, and disapproval is 60 percent; 15 percent of Ukrainians consider lynching as the only way to find justice. The crime rate has grown over 200 percent since 2012. Customs are deeply corrupt; according to the independent studies in 2012 the amount of bribes paid by the custom brokers exceeded $200 million. It is not a surprise that Interpol reported that smuggling of heavy narcotics from Ukraine to Europe doubled between 2010 and 2012, reaching 10 percent share in the traffic of the heavy drugs to EU countries.
Under the current leadership, Ukraine risks evolving into a failed state at the intersection of the major European transport corridors, with giant weapons arsenals, and no functional government, law enforcement, or control mechanisms. The European Association, if it happens, will slow down this process, but will not make governance more effective. The problem is not the competence of public servants, but the entire system of the government encouraging corruption. The only real solution to the problem is to have a strong, democratic opposition in Ukraine. The necessary precondition for such a scenario is the release of opposition leader Julia Tymoshenko, and her participation in elections. There is also a growing demand for a radical opposition in Ukraine. This niche can be taken by Tymoshenko, but in her absence it is gradually filled by the ultra-nationalist party Svoboda, adding urgency to her release.
