ensions are rising in Eastern Europe with Belarusian President Alexandre Lukashenko’s use of “hybrid warfare” provoking an immigration crisis on Poland’s border, as well as Russia’s worrisome troop buildup near the Ukrainian border. Vladimir Putin has been accused by the United States and the European Union of orchestrating, or at least playing a large role, in both of these issues.
To make sense of Russian tactics it is important to keep their strategic objectives in mind. One will see with close observation that all of Russia’s actions are intended to support its main strategic objectives. Regionally, Russia seeks to maintain its dominance in its so-called sphere of influence and diminish western influence both inside and around Russia. Internationally, it is to establish a more multipolar world order where other great powers such as Russia and China are free to manage their own sphere of privileged interests, where the United States is no longer the sole hegemon and liberal democracy is no longer seen as the dominant paradigm. In this world, autocrats can be free to govern their own lands without scrutiny from the West nor pressure to change.
In order to try and achieve these goals, Russia often resorts to the use of “hybrid” attacks to de-stabilize the EU and the U.S. through information warfare and cyber-attacks. The aim is to weaken the unity of the West from within by increasing polarization, which would lead to relative gains for Russia in its desire for a shift in world power dynamics and norms. But Putin’s possible involvement in Lukashenko’s migrant crisis has been argued to mark a “dangerous escalation in his hybrid war” against the West. Additionally, Russia also still resorts to the use of conventional military tactics to achieve its goals, as seen through its military incursions in Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria. But if one looks carefully, these military incursions were generally pursued with relative restraint and Russia’s potential use of conventional military capabilities should not be overblown.
To take the war in Ukraine as an example, the conflict in the Donbass region was largely focused on the front line and did not escalate to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2018, when Russia closed the Kerch Strait and Ukraine tried to force ships through it, even though Russia captured three Ukrainian boats both sides eventually worked to resolve the issue. Today, concerns are spreading across the U.S. foreign policy community, the CIA, the military, and other branches of government about an imminent attack on Ukraine. The Chief of the Ukrainian Intelligence Agency even said that this attack should happen by January or February of 2022. Despite these alarm bells, such a military incursion is unlikely to happen for multiple reasons.
Thanks to continued U.S. support, the Ukrainian army today is much more experienced and modernized than it was in 2014. A war with Ukraine at this point in time would be extremely costly and would only be to Russia’s detriment. Actions such as these would alienate Russia from Europe and make any movement on sanctions relief impossible. Invading Ukraine is simply not in Russia’s interest as opposed to continuing to hold key sections of Ukraine. Putin now has control over the strategic port of Sebastopol, giving him access to the Black Sea. Moreover, destabilizing Ukraine by supporting the rebels in the East allowed him to possess control over Ukraine’s prospects of western integration into NATO or even the EU. Ukraine cannot join these institutions with an open conflict within its territory. Even if Ukraine pushes to end the war through the implementation of the Minsk agreement, the Donbas could be granted enough autonomy to veto future moves towards European integration due to the nature of the accords. These actions were and continue to remain in Russia’s interests, but opting for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine today is not only expensive and time-consuming, but would lead to great losses. The same would apply for the case of a limited intervention. Russia does not have the support of Ukrainians West of the Donbas for any such invasion, which greatly increases the risk calculus. Conversely, the population of Crimea and eastern Ukraine welcomed the Russians. Also, it is important to acknowledge that Putin can achieve many of his objectives without invading, through the use of hybrid tactics, by pressuring Ukraine and NATO, and fracturing the unity of response between allies.
As an overall trend since April of this year, the Russians have been augmenting their troop presence near borders with potential conflict. After April’s dramatic augmentation of troops near the border with Ukraine, Putin eventually deescalated the situation. But while many troops returned to their previous positions, a lethal force was retained in the region according to NATO’s special operations adviser to Ukraine. This shows that Russia’s troop augmentation tactic is both part of an overall change in strategy for greater troop presence in the longer term around potential conflict zones for deterrence purposes, as well as a sudden temporary tactic to scare off its opponents. Just as in April, today’s augmentation of troops is a signal from Russia to remind Ukraine and the West that Russia holds escalation dominance in the region. This tactic is meant to instill fear in the hopes that Ukraine and its Western partners reassess their risk calculus before acting in a way that would aggravate Russia.
The Kremlin has expressed its annoyance with the activities of the NATO alliance near its borders. It has warned that expanding the alliance’s presence in Ukraine would constitute a crossing of Russia’s so-called "red lines.” Putin has complained about the U.S. navy’s Black Sea military exercises, the continued militarization of Ukraine and the presence of American and British military personnel. He has expressed concern about the issuing of drones to Ukraine, one of which was used to shell Donbass separatist positions. He also argues that the Minsk process has stalled due to Kyiv’s subservience to the U.S. Despite these frustrations, Putin denies the intention to invade and instead welcomes the alarm from the EU and the U.S. as proof that his actions finally received their attention, claiming they do not generally take his “red lines” seriously enough.
Russia wants a neutral Ukraine and will go to great lengths to try and achieve that aim. The West, on the other hand, will only go so far to support Ukraine. The troops at the border are a symbol of this fact. Some analysts argue that Putin could try to secure a land route between eastern Ukraine and Crimea and that the next few months are a unique moment to act due to Europe’s energy crunch and unlikelihood to impose further sanctions on Russia. In addition, the rising cost of energy would provide Russia with the additional funds it would need for military operations. Some would also argue that this could be one of Putin’s attempts to make another “heroic move” such as the annexation of Crimea so he can leave behind a clear legacy. But the legacy of a hero has already been established for him, and irrational acts of imperialism would have very little popular support, especially considering the declining living standards in the last decade. In Russia, Putin is known to have restored Russia’s greatness both at home and abroad and stood up to the West in the name of its foreign and domestic policy priorities. In other words, going to war with Ukraine for no apparent reason aside from imperial ambitions would hamper rather than bolster Putin’s legacy.
If Putin had wanted to secure further parts of Ukraine, he would have already attempted this in the initial Russian incursion of Eastern Ukraine. It seems unusual to change the war’s strategic objectives seven years later. The only scenarios in which Russia would pursue a rational military operation in Ukraine would be if the country were on the brink of joining NATO or if the Ukrainians initiated a first attack onto Russian territory. But, as former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili incorrectly assumed, the United States did not come to Georgia’s aid in its war with Russia in 2008, nor would it come to the aid of Ukraine if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky decided to heroically take back the Donbass with miscalculated confidence.
Some analysts have argued that Lukashenko’s orchestration of a migrant crisis on Poland’s border was intended to distract from Putin’s troop buildup on the border with Ukraine and escalate his “hybrid war” on the West. The US and the EU have accused the Kremlin of complicity in both of these matters. While there is no proof that Putin orchestrated the migrant crisis, Lukashenko’s actions seem to come straight out of the Kremlin’s playbook, albeit executed with a total lack of subtlety. The idea behind these tactics is to hold up a mirror to the EU and expose its internal vulnerabilities. Lukashenko’s objective was also to attract their attention in possibly re-negotiating his predicament as an unrecognized President with sanctions imposed on his regime. In this situation, Lukashenko has been inciting asylum seekers from war zones in the Middle East to travel to Belarus only to push them to enter countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, and more recently Poland. Lukashenko’s goals are for the EU to recognize him as the legitimate President of Belarus after fraudulent elections last year, and to remove sanctions placed on him which have been continuously increasing since the elections for a variety of reasons including gross human rights’ violations on peaceful protestors.
Through his actions, one thing he did achieve was to get Angela Merkel on the phone twice after a year of having been ignored by the EU, which ended his period of isolation. Moreover, the EU agreed to pay a £590,000 aid payment to help the migrants on the Belarussian border. Part of this aid package was destined for the Belarus Red Cross, which critics have expressed concern about as it is run by the regime’s health minister. These actions in essence gave Lukashenko some form of legitimacy. Either way, they ultimately diffused the crisis as many migrants returned to Belarus and some even back to the Middle East.
As mentioned above, through this act of hybrid warfare, Lukashenko, much like Putin enjoys doing, exposed the vulnerabilities of the European Union. Through this predicament, the EU was put into a position where it had to navigate supporting Poland’s tough reaction even if it meant undermining EU and International Law where migrants seeking asylum must be allowed in for asylum claims. In addition, it had to support Poland’s stance despite the fact that the EU and Poland are currently involved in their own battle over Poland’s unlawful judiciary system. Poland is now being fined 1 million euros per day until it agrees with the ruling of the European Court of Justice to suspend the activity of its own Supreme Court due to its lack of independence.
In the end, the EU’s tough stance proved necessary to be in unison with Poland and its decision to close off its borders to the migrants. This was an act of hybrid war that deserved a strong response. Unfortunately, the migrants were the pawns and suffered as a result. The aid package provided relief and allowed the Europeans to save face on the humanitarian front. But Lukashenko achieved a partial victory through his actions as he managed to cause a disturbance and inserted himself at the forefront of European politics. Banning further flights to transport migrants from the Middle East was an appropriate move, as was a new round of sanctions on Belarus.
While Putin may be a mastermind at inciting “hybrid attacks” against the West to de-stabilize it and weaken it from within, Russian military buildup should not sound the alarm bell and lead to further escalation between the East and the West. Increasing escalation is dangerous for all parties and dialogue should be encouraged in its place. Without coming up with a clear plan to deescalate the conflict in Ukraine and resolve the main political issue at hand—the fate of the Russian-backed separatist zones—U.S. and European rhetoric on supporting Ukraine is simply not sufficient.
In the longer-term perspective, the West needs to build better societal resilience against future “hybrid attacks.” In this case, the EU should stop allowing itself to be such an easy target for Putin and Lukashenko and fix their asylum laws and build more societal resilience to de-stabilizing propaganda. The EU should either liberalize its immigration policy or work toward a more effective system. While the future will continue to be filled with various forms of hybrid attacks, military disasters will only occur as a result of escalation and miscalculation.
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Troubles in Eastern Europe
Image via Adobe Stock.
December 20, 2021
Tensions on the EU's eastern border in Poland and Ukraine are highlighting how vulnerable the EU is to the hybrid style of warfare being wielded by Russia and Belarus, writes Professor of National Security Suzanne Loftus.
T
ensions are rising in Eastern Europe with Belarusian President Alexandre Lukashenko’s use of “hybrid warfare” provoking an immigration crisis on Poland’s border, as well as Russia’s worrisome troop buildup near the Ukrainian border. Vladimir Putin has been accused by the United States and the European Union of orchestrating, or at least playing a large role, in both of these issues.
To make sense of Russian tactics it is important to keep their strategic objectives in mind. One will see with close observation that all of Russia’s actions are intended to support its main strategic objectives. Regionally, Russia seeks to maintain its dominance in its so-called sphere of influence and diminish western influence both inside and around Russia. Internationally, it is to establish a more multipolar world order where other great powers such as Russia and China are free to manage their own sphere of privileged interests, where the United States is no longer the sole hegemon and liberal democracy is no longer seen as the dominant paradigm. In this world, autocrats can be free to govern their own lands without scrutiny from the West nor pressure to change.
In order to try and achieve these goals, Russia often resorts to the use of “hybrid” attacks to de-stabilize the EU and the U.S. through information warfare and cyber-attacks. The aim is to weaken the unity of the West from within by increasing polarization, which would lead to relative gains for Russia in its desire for a shift in world power dynamics and norms. But Putin’s possible involvement in Lukashenko’s migrant crisis has been argued to mark a “dangerous escalation in his hybrid war” against the West. Additionally, Russia also still resorts to the use of conventional military tactics to achieve its goals, as seen through its military incursions in Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria. But if one looks carefully, these military incursions were generally pursued with relative restraint and Russia’s potential use of conventional military capabilities should not be overblown.
To take the war in Ukraine as an example, the conflict in the Donbass region was largely focused on the front line and did not escalate to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2018, when Russia closed the Kerch Strait and Ukraine tried to force ships through it, even though Russia captured three Ukrainian boats both sides eventually worked to resolve the issue. Today, concerns are spreading across the U.S. foreign policy community, the CIA, the military, and other branches of government about an imminent attack on Ukraine. The Chief of the Ukrainian Intelligence Agency even said that this attack should happen by January or February of 2022. Despite these alarm bells, such a military incursion is unlikely to happen for multiple reasons.
Thanks to continued U.S. support, the Ukrainian army today is much more experienced and modernized than it was in 2014. A war with Ukraine at this point in time would be extremely costly and would only be to Russia’s detriment. Actions such as these would alienate Russia from Europe and make any movement on sanctions relief impossible. Invading Ukraine is simply not in Russia’s interest as opposed to continuing to hold key sections of Ukraine. Putin now has control over the strategic port of Sebastopol, giving him access to the Black Sea. Moreover, destabilizing Ukraine by supporting the rebels in the East allowed him to possess control over Ukraine’s prospects of western integration into NATO or even the EU. Ukraine cannot join these institutions with an open conflict within its territory. Even if Ukraine pushes to end the war through the implementation of the Minsk agreement, the Donbas could be granted enough autonomy to veto future moves towards European integration due to the nature of the accords. These actions were and continue to remain in Russia’s interests, but opting for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine today is not only expensive and time-consuming, but would lead to great losses. The same would apply for the case of a limited intervention. Russia does not have the support of Ukrainians West of the Donbas for any such invasion, which greatly increases the risk calculus. Conversely, the population of Crimea and eastern Ukraine welcomed the Russians. Also, it is important to acknowledge that Putin can achieve many of his objectives without invading, through the use of hybrid tactics, by pressuring Ukraine and NATO, and fracturing the unity of response between allies.
As an overall trend since April of this year, the Russians have been augmenting their troop presence near borders with potential conflict. After April’s dramatic augmentation of troops near the border with Ukraine, Putin eventually deescalated the situation. But while many troops returned to their previous positions, a lethal force was retained in the region according to NATO’s special operations adviser to Ukraine. This shows that Russia’s troop augmentation tactic is both part of an overall change in strategy for greater troop presence in the longer term around potential conflict zones for deterrence purposes, as well as a sudden temporary tactic to scare off its opponents. Just as in April, today’s augmentation of troops is a signal from Russia to remind Ukraine and the West that Russia holds escalation dominance in the region. This tactic is meant to instill fear in the hopes that Ukraine and its Western partners reassess their risk calculus before acting in a way that would aggravate Russia.
The Kremlin has expressed its annoyance with the activities of the NATO alliance near its borders. It has warned that expanding the alliance’s presence in Ukraine would constitute a crossing of Russia’s so-called "red lines.” Putin has complained about the U.S. navy’s Black Sea military exercises, the continued militarization of Ukraine and the presence of American and British military personnel. He has expressed concern about the issuing of drones to Ukraine, one of which was used to shell Donbass separatist positions. He also argues that the Minsk process has stalled due to Kyiv’s subservience to the U.S. Despite these frustrations, Putin denies the intention to invade and instead welcomes the alarm from the EU and the U.S. as proof that his actions finally received their attention, claiming they do not generally take his “red lines” seriously enough.
Russia wants a neutral Ukraine and will go to great lengths to try and achieve that aim. The West, on the other hand, will only go so far to support Ukraine. The troops at the border are a symbol of this fact. Some analysts argue that Putin could try to secure a land route between eastern Ukraine and Crimea and that the next few months are a unique moment to act due to Europe’s energy crunch and unlikelihood to impose further sanctions on Russia. In addition, the rising cost of energy would provide Russia with the additional funds it would need for military operations. Some would also argue that this could be one of Putin’s attempts to make another “heroic move” such as the annexation of Crimea so he can leave behind a clear legacy. But the legacy of a hero has already been established for him, and irrational acts of imperialism would have very little popular support, especially considering the declining living standards in the last decade. In Russia, Putin is known to have restored Russia’s greatness both at home and abroad and stood up to the West in the name of its foreign and domestic policy priorities. In other words, going to war with Ukraine for no apparent reason aside from imperial ambitions would hamper rather than bolster Putin’s legacy.
If Putin had wanted to secure further parts of Ukraine, he would have already attempted this in the initial Russian incursion of Eastern Ukraine. It seems unusual to change the war’s strategic objectives seven years later. The only scenarios in which Russia would pursue a rational military operation in Ukraine would be if the country were on the brink of joining NATO or if the Ukrainians initiated a first attack onto Russian territory. But, as former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili incorrectly assumed, the United States did not come to Georgia’s aid in its war with Russia in 2008, nor would it come to the aid of Ukraine if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky decided to heroically take back the Donbass with miscalculated confidence.
Some analysts have argued that Lukashenko’s orchestration of a migrant crisis on Poland’s border was intended to distract from Putin’s troop buildup on the border with Ukraine and escalate his “hybrid war” on the West. The US and the EU have accused the Kremlin of complicity in both of these matters. While there is no proof that Putin orchestrated the migrant crisis, Lukashenko’s actions seem to come straight out of the Kremlin’s playbook, albeit executed with a total lack of subtlety. The idea behind these tactics is to hold up a mirror to the EU and expose its internal vulnerabilities. Lukashenko’s objective was also to attract their attention in possibly re-negotiating his predicament as an unrecognized President with sanctions imposed on his regime. In this situation, Lukashenko has been inciting asylum seekers from war zones in the Middle East to travel to Belarus only to push them to enter countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, and more recently Poland. Lukashenko’s goals are for the EU to recognize him as the legitimate President of Belarus after fraudulent elections last year, and to remove sanctions placed on him which have been continuously increasing since the elections for a variety of reasons including gross human rights’ violations on peaceful protestors.
Through his actions, one thing he did achieve was to get Angela Merkel on the phone twice after a year of having been ignored by the EU, which ended his period of isolation. Moreover, the EU agreed to pay a £590,000 aid payment to help the migrants on the Belarussian border. Part of this aid package was destined for the Belarus Red Cross, which critics have expressed concern about as it is run by the regime’s health minister. These actions in essence gave Lukashenko some form of legitimacy. Either way, they ultimately diffused the crisis as many migrants returned to Belarus and some even back to the Middle East.
As mentioned above, through this act of hybrid warfare, Lukashenko, much like Putin enjoys doing, exposed the vulnerabilities of the European Union. Through this predicament, the EU was put into a position where it had to navigate supporting Poland’s tough reaction even if it meant undermining EU and International Law where migrants seeking asylum must be allowed in for asylum claims. In addition, it had to support Poland’s stance despite the fact that the EU and Poland are currently involved in their own battle over Poland’s unlawful judiciary system. Poland is now being fined 1 million euros per day until it agrees with the ruling of the European Court of Justice to suspend the activity of its own Supreme Court due to its lack of independence.
In the end, the EU’s tough stance proved necessary to be in unison with Poland and its decision to close off its borders to the migrants. This was an act of hybrid war that deserved a strong response. Unfortunately, the migrants were the pawns and suffered as a result. The aid package provided relief and allowed the Europeans to save face on the humanitarian front. But Lukashenko achieved a partial victory through his actions as he managed to cause a disturbance and inserted himself at the forefront of European politics. Banning further flights to transport migrants from the Middle East was an appropriate move, as was a new round of sanctions on Belarus.
While Putin may be a mastermind at inciting “hybrid attacks” against the West to de-stabilize it and weaken it from within, Russian military buildup should not sound the alarm bell and lead to further escalation between the East and the West. Increasing escalation is dangerous for all parties and dialogue should be encouraged in its place. Without coming up with a clear plan to deescalate the conflict in Ukraine and resolve the main political issue at hand—the fate of the Russian-backed separatist zones—U.S. and European rhetoric on supporting Ukraine is simply not sufficient.
In the longer-term perspective, the West needs to build better societal resilience against future “hybrid attacks.” In this case, the EU should stop allowing itself to be such an easy target for Putin and Lukashenko and fix their asylum laws and build more societal resilience to de-stabilizing propaganda. The EU should either liberalize its immigration policy or work toward a more effective system. While the future will continue to be filled with various forms of hybrid attacks, military disasters will only occur as a result of escalation and miscalculation.
