ities, organized collectively around transnational municipal networks, have sought for decades to carve out a formal role for themselves within global and regional governance structures. Early municipalist visionaries, such as Emile Vinck, the first secretary general of the International Union of Local Authorities (forebear of UCLG), attempted a century ago to forge an organic bond with the League of Nations. Today, the slogan "listen to cities" resonates loudly in most United Nations conferences and pervades the campaigns around which the international municipalism movement has coalesced.
In a moment when the multilateral order is crying for a branch-and-root reform, it seems timely to ask how a formal role for subnational governments within the current global and regional governance architecture could be established. And there is no lack of proposals here. Among the most prominent proposals is the institutionalization of a mechanism for a permanent and structured dialogue between cities, regions and national governments within the UN system, one which would involve the upgrading of the World Assembly of Local and Regional Governments. Yet, could such a formal link become something more than just a symbolic presence? And more importantly, how should such an instrument be organized to be genuinely representative of the heterogeneous reality of local and regional governments?
The case study of European Committee of the Regions (CoR), deemed the most advanced institutional mechanism worldwide for giving local and regional governments a voice in international policymaking, throws some light on this question. Set up in 1994, following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the CoR was conceived as a supranational body of consultative nature, that could guarantee cities and regions a formal say in the European Union's (EU) policy and law-making.
Now a fixture of the EU's institutional makeup, the CoR hinges on a threefold rationale. First, the logic of multilevel governance, implying responsibility being shared between the different tiers of government concerned with a given EU policy. This is particularly noticeable in the fields of public health, education, employment, social policy, economic and social cohesion, transport, telecommunications, energy networks and climate change, where the opinion of the CoR is mandatory (albeit not binding). Second, the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that decisions must be taken at the level of government best serving the public interest – as close as possible to citizens. It should be noted that over 60% of decisions taken at the European level have a direct local impact and that roughly 70% of EU legislation is implemented by local and regional authorities. And third, the willingness to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the Union by bridging the gap between the EU's institutions and citizens. Being the closest governmental level to people, it is expected that local and regional authorities could play a crucial role here. To be sure, the non-binding advisory character of the CoR is one of its most conspicuous and severe structural weaknesses. Yet, assessing its representativeness is equally essential, for its arguably dysfunctional membership model may be strongly related to its poor effectiveness in delivering on its mandate. The committee was designed as a political assembly composed of 329 locally and regionally elected representatives, appointed by national delegations and grouped according to their political affiliation. Unsurprisingly, many divisions cut across this membership scheme; and that is precisely the crux of the matter.
The landscape of subnational governments in Europe is a complex and heterogeneous one. It includes territorial entities as diverse as municipalities, provinces, departments, counties, sub-state federated units, and regions. The most obvious dividing line is the one between the local and regional level, although disparities within these two groups are also significant. For instance, representatives from regions that have mostly administrative powers (e.g., most French departments) hold significantly fewer competences than those with legislative powers and a greater degree of autonomy (like Scotland or Catalonia). Oftentimes this entails the latter feeling more interpellated by the decisions taken in Brussels, as they have responsibilities comparable to those of Member States for transposing and implementing the European legislation.
For its part, the local level encompasses over 87,000 municipalities. Under this category, metropolis such as Paris, Milan and Barcelona coexist with small and medium-sized towns of less than 2,000 inhabitants (29 percent of all municipalities in Europe) with whom they have little in common. The ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic in large cities, when contrasted with the lower impact in more rural settings, is a glaring example of such disparity. Yes, containing the spread of disease in densely populated urban areas is significantly more challenging, but major cities have also been among the hardest hit areas by the ensuing economic and social crisis. As a result, today Europe’s major cities are in dire need of resources to build back better.
Tellingly, city calls to get direct access to the funds provided by EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility have not been channeled through the CoR, which is playing a relatively marginal role in this negotiation. Instead, Europe’s most prominent mayors have collectively addressed a letter to the EU institutions and favored networking spaces like Eurocities to build up their advocacy messages. This is but one example of the largest cities showing scant interest in the CoR and seeking alternative avenues to influence EU policymaking and make their voice heard. Interestingly, a parallel situation exists globally, where cities like London, Tokyo and New York often prioritize club politics and engagement in spaces restricted to their equally sized peers (i.e., Urban20, C40 Cities and the likes).
No doubt CoR’s degree of heterogeneity hinders establishing a single cohesive and functional model of local and regional representation at the EU level. However, urban diversity is not an exclusive feature of the European context, as attested by the fact that there is no universal agreement on what a city is, nor a common understanding of the idea of urbanity that comes with it. Therefore, it must be assumed that the multi-colored and multi-sized "local and regional voice" will hardly ever be adequately represented by a single assembly attempting to fit all shapes, sizes, and levels of jurisdictions. And this applies both to the regional and to the global governance arrangements. Now, is there any alternative, more suitable model?
Looking beyond the EU institutions, the bicameral system of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (not to be confused with the European Council) merits consideration. The Congress's mandate is to strengthen local and regional democracy in its 47-member states, uphold human rights and promote local self-government. In similar fashion to the CoR, the Congress works as an advisory assembly of 648 elected officials which fosters consultation and political dialogue between central, intermediary and municipal governments. Yet, it operates under a dual structure: the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions.
Even if the policy relevance of the Council of Europe cannot be equated with that of the European Union, several lessons can be extracted from its model. To start with, a compelling advantage of any bicameral system is that it enhances pluralist participation and representation. It also allows discussions to be grounded on the differing local and regional challenges and daily realities. Hence, attaining higher levels of homogeneity within these spaces would surely improve not only its representativeness, but also its usefulness. While the bicameral model may not be the panacea (larger European cities are also absent from the Congress), the international municipalist movement would surely benefit from giving serious thought to multi-chamber schemes of representation when calling for a formal seat at the global table.
Editor’s Note: This channel is a collaboration between the Diplomatic Courier and the Great Powers and Urbanization Project. This essay builds on the debates held during the digital Workshop “Cities in Global and Regional Governance: from Multilateralism to Multistakeholderism?” organized by CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) in October 2020.
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Towards Formal Representation of Cities & Regions: Lessons from the EU
Photo by Robert Alondo via Unsplash.
March 15, 2021
C
ities, organized collectively around transnational municipal networks, have sought for decades to carve out a formal role for themselves within global and regional governance structures. Early municipalist visionaries, such as Emile Vinck, the first secretary general of the International Union of Local Authorities (forebear of UCLG), attempted a century ago to forge an organic bond with the League of Nations. Today, the slogan "listen to cities" resonates loudly in most United Nations conferences and pervades the campaigns around which the international municipalism movement has coalesced.
In a moment when the multilateral order is crying for a branch-and-root reform, it seems timely to ask how a formal role for subnational governments within the current global and regional governance architecture could be established. And there is no lack of proposals here. Among the most prominent proposals is the institutionalization of a mechanism for a permanent and structured dialogue between cities, regions and national governments within the UN system, one which would involve the upgrading of the World Assembly of Local and Regional Governments. Yet, could such a formal link become something more than just a symbolic presence? And more importantly, how should such an instrument be organized to be genuinely representative of the heterogeneous reality of local and regional governments?
The case study of European Committee of the Regions (CoR), deemed the most advanced institutional mechanism worldwide for giving local and regional governments a voice in international policymaking, throws some light on this question. Set up in 1994, following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the CoR was conceived as a supranational body of consultative nature, that could guarantee cities and regions a formal say in the European Union's (EU) policy and law-making.
Now a fixture of the EU's institutional makeup, the CoR hinges on a threefold rationale. First, the logic of multilevel governance, implying responsibility being shared between the different tiers of government concerned with a given EU policy. This is particularly noticeable in the fields of public health, education, employment, social policy, economic and social cohesion, transport, telecommunications, energy networks and climate change, where the opinion of the CoR is mandatory (albeit not binding). Second, the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that decisions must be taken at the level of government best serving the public interest – as close as possible to citizens. It should be noted that over 60% of decisions taken at the European level have a direct local impact and that roughly 70% of EU legislation is implemented by local and regional authorities. And third, the willingness to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the Union by bridging the gap between the EU's institutions and citizens. Being the closest governmental level to people, it is expected that local and regional authorities could play a crucial role here. To be sure, the non-binding advisory character of the CoR is one of its most conspicuous and severe structural weaknesses. Yet, assessing its representativeness is equally essential, for its arguably dysfunctional membership model may be strongly related to its poor effectiveness in delivering on its mandate. The committee was designed as a political assembly composed of 329 locally and regionally elected representatives, appointed by national delegations and grouped according to their political affiliation. Unsurprisingly, many divisions cut across this membership scheme; and that is precisely the crux of the matter.
The landscape of subnational governments in Europe is a complex and heterogeneous one. It includes territorial entities as diverse as municipalities, provinces, departments, counties, sub-state federated units, and regions. The most obvious dividing line is the one between the local and regional level, although disparities within these two groups are also significant. For instance, representatives from regions that have mostly administrative powers (e.g., most French departments) hold significantly fewer competences than those with legislative powers and a greater degree of autonomy (like Scotland or Catalonia). Oftentimes this entails the latter feeling more interpellated by the decisions taken in Brussels, as they have responsibilities comparable to those of Member States for transposing and implementing the European legislation.
For its part, the local level encompasses over 87,000 municipalities. Under this category, metropolis such as Paris, Milan and Barcelona coexist with small and medium-sized towns of less than 2,000 inhabitants (29 percent of all municipalities in Europe) with whom they have little in common. The ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic in large cities, when contrasted with the lower impact in more rural settings, is a glaring example of such disparity. Yes, containing the spread of disease in densely populated urban areas is significantly more challenging, but major cities have also been among the hardest hit areas by the ensuing economic and social crisis. As a result, today Europe’s major cities are in dire need of resources to build back better.
Tellingly, city calls to get direct access to the funds provided by EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility have not been channeled through the CoR, which is playing a relatively marginal role in this negotiation. Instead, Europe’s most prominent mayors have collectively addressed a letter to the EU institutions and favored networking spaces like Eurocities to build up their advocacy messages. This is but one example of the largest cities showing scant interest in the CoR and seeking alternative avenues to influence EU policymaking and make their voice heard. Interestingly, a parallel situation exists globally, where cities like London, Tokyo and New York often prioritize club politics and engagement in spaces restricted to their equally sized peers (i.e., Urban20, C40 Cities and the likes).
No doubt CoR’s degree of heterogeneity hinders establishing a single cohesive and functional model of local and regional representation at the EU level. However, urban diversity is not an exclusive feature of the European context, as attested by the fact that there is no universal agreement on what a city is, nor a common understanding of the idea of urbanity that comes with it. Therefore, it must be assumed that the multi-colored and multi-sized "local and regional voice" will hardly ever be adequately represented by a single assembly attempting to fit all shapes, sizes, and levels of jurisdictions. And this applies both to the regional and to the global governance arrangements. Now, is there any alternative, more suitable model?
Looking beyond the EU institutions, the bicameral system of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (not to be confused with the European Council) merits consideration. The Congress's mandate is to strengthen local and regional democracy in its 47-member states, uphold human rights and promote local self-government. In similar fashion to the CoR, the Congress works as an advisory assembly of 648 elected officials which fosters consultation and political dialogue between central, intermediary and municipal governments. Yet, it operates under a dual structure: the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions.
Even if the policy relevance of the Council of Europe cannot be equated with that of the European Union, several lessons can be extracted from its model. To start with, a compelling advantage of any bicameral system is that it enhances pluralist participation and representation. It also allows discussions to be grounded on the differing local and regional challenges and daily realities. Hence, attaining higher levels of homogeneity within these spaces would surely improve not only its representativeness, but also its usefulness. While the bicameral model may not be the panacea (larger European cities are also absent from the Congress), the international municipalist movement would surely benefit from giving serious thought to multi-chamber schemes of representation when calling for a formal seat at the global table.
Editor’s Note: This channel is a collaboration between the Diplomatic Courier and the Great Powers and Urbanization Project. This essay builds on the debates held during the digital Workshop “Cities in Global and Regional Governance: from Multilateralism to Multistakeholderism?” organized by CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) in October 2020.
