limate change is one of humanity's most troubling issues, impacting agriculture, public health, living conditions, and politics. The rising temperature particularly affects the Middle East, which recorded a rise twice as high as in the rest of the world. In the region, there are both some of the biggest polluters—Saudi Arabia and Iran—and other countries dealing with concerning weather conditions even without large amounts of CO2 emissions—Libya and Lebanon.
Thus, the choice of the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh for hosting the 2022 Conference of the Parties (COP27) holds symbolic significance for the future of an entire region. The current energy crisis, however, has reduced the expectations for possibly binding climate commitments made by the parties involved at the end of the event. In other words, governments will probably set aside their environmental goals to meet short-term needs. Many European countries, for example, have declared their willingness to reopen coal-fired power plants as a temporary measure for this winter.
Despite the political outcome of COP27, the climate crisis persists in affecting the Middle East. In recent years, higher temperatures resulted in less water availability for local countries, making river control one of the most coveted targets for governments and terrorist groups. Data confirm this trend. The region hosts 12 out of 17 water-stressed countries worldwide, with a cost of up to 6% of GDP by 2050. As warned by the United Nations, the most affected sector will be agriculture, with crop production expected to drop by 30% by 2025.
The Nile river basin is a significant crisis area, combining environmental concerns and diplomatic ambitions. In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced the creation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile headwater, an infrastructure project aiming to generate hydroelectric power for the country. The Egyptian government immediately contested it, fearing Ethiopia might control the river's flow and arbitrarily reduce the stream flowing at the mouth. Both parties failed to find an agreement to regulate the issue, and some events almost fueled an armed conflict outbreak. In late 2021, for example, Addis Ababa accused Cairo of explicitly supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front, a rebel group that has tried to disrupt the dam's construction. The risk of escalation remains high.
Similar trends currently affect the area once called ancient Mesopotamia. Here, Turkey controls approximately 90% of the Euphrates waters and 44% of the Tigris, two rivers that flow in the neighboring countries Syria and Iraq. Many blame Ankara for developing a series of dams to exert extensive control over the two rivers, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people being deprived of fresh water. Different factors explain the Turkish choice to weaponize this natural resource. On the Syrian side, Ankara aims to undermine the Kurds, an ethnic group that claims an autonomous region in its southeastern area. More domestic considerations have driven an aggressive Turkish water policy on the Iraqi side. Haider al-Abadi, the former Iraqi prime minister, summarized it, arguing that "the whole issue is political and electoral, and Turkey is trying to use it to win the votes of its farmers."
These cases underline that the water issue has broad impacts on agriculture, the economy, and politics. While some countries, such as Ethiopia or Turkey, tried to obtain authority over this resource, others are still failing to respond to the water needs of their population. Earlier this year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a report highlighting some structural issues that restrain the ability of governments to implement effective policies, includingpoor investments, lack of infrastructure, and marginalization of civil society.
In addition, some research stressed the role played by climate-related factors in fostering the Arab spring in the Levant. The Syrian 2007 drought, for example, pushed thousands of people to the main cities' suburbs, where they found inadequate health and food infrastructures. The inability of the al-Assad regime to respond to this public emergency in the years that followed fueled popular discontent, paving the way for civil society unrest in Syria in 2011.
The internal displacement in Syria also helped the Islamic State conquer new territories. After the civil war outbreak, the al-Assad regime lost some important cities, such as Aleppo and Raqqa, to ISIS. Once established as a "proto-state," this terrorist group succeeded in weaponizing the streams of water. They exerted power over the Tabqa dam, a central hub for the whole country's water supply, using it as a coercive tool against the opponents or gaining local communities' recognition as political authority.
Syria's weaknesses are common to many other countries in the region. According to the IMF, the Middle East needs an investment of 3.3% of GDP per year to adapt local infrastructures and economies to climate change. Many vulnerable low-income countries do not have adequate resources to invest, and many governments still prioritize the fight against poverty or sustaining inadequate healthcare facilities. For this reason, foreign aid played—and still plays—a significant role.
Many international organizations, such as the World Bank, have implemented projects to improve agriculture, water use, and infrastructure. In addition to the capital provided, the World Bank transfers precious know-how and technologies, which often are missing in low- and middle-income countries. Also, intergovernmental accords, such as the one recently signed between Israel and Bahrain, could boost agriculture capabilities. All these efforts aim to stabilize the region's food security, a goal shared by all countries.
In conclusion, the risks connected to global warming will probably increase in the coming years. Diplomatic clashes, armed conflicts, and water and food supply chain disruption will intensify if the international community and the local governments fail to find long-term solutions to climate change. The region's two most troubling issues are a lack of economic resources and political cooperation. For this reason, every actor involved will have a significant role in addressing a problem—climate change—that is multilateral by its nature.
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The War for Water in the Middle East
Photo by Chip Vincent via Unsplash.
November 15, 2022
Climate change is particularly harsh in how it affects the Middle East. In recent years, higher temperatures have meant less water availability for the region, making river control one of the most coveted targets for governments and terrorist groups, writes Elia Preto Martini.
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limate change is one of humanity's most troubling issues, impacting agriculture, public health, living conditions, and politics. The rising temperature particularly affects the Middle East, which recorded a rise twice as high as in the rest of the world. In the region, there are both some of the biggest polluters—Saudi Arabia and Iran—and other countries dealing with concerning weather conditions even without large amounts of CO2 emissions—Libya and Lebanon.
Thus, the choice of the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh for hosting the 2022 Conference of the Parties (COP27) holds symbolic significance for the future of an entire region. The current energy crisis, however, has reduced the expectations for possibly binding climate commitments made by the parties involved at the end of the event. In other words, governments will probably set aside their environmental goals to meet short-term needs. Many European countries, for example, have declared their willingness to reopen coal-fired power plants as a temporary measure for this winter.
Despite the political outcome of COP27, the climate crisis persists in affecting the Middle East. In recent years, higher temperatures resulted in less water availability for local countries, making river control one of the most coveted targets for governments and terrorist groups. Data confirm this trend. The region hosts 12 out of 17 water-stressed countries worldwide, with a cost of up to 6% of GDP by 2050. As warned by the United Nations, the most affected sector will be agriculture, with crop production expected to drop by 30% by 2025.
The Nile river basin is a significant crisis area, combining environmental concerns and diplomatic ambitions. In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced the creation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile headwater, an infrastructure project aiming to generate hydroelectric power for the country. The Egyptian government immediately contested it, fearing Ethiopia might control the river's flow and arbitrarily reduce the stream flowing at the mouth. Both parties failed to find an agreement to regulate the issue, and some events almost fueled an armed conflict outbreak. In late 2021, for example, Addis Ababa accused Cairo of explicitly supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front, a rebel group that has tried to disrupt the dam's construction. The risk of escalation remains high.
Similar trends currently affect the area once called ancient Mesopotamia. Here, Turkey controls approximately 90% of the Euphrates waters and 44% of the Tigris, two rivers that flow in the neighboring countries Syria and Iraq. Many blame Ankara for developing a series of dams to exert extensive control over the two rivers, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people being deprived of fresh water. Different factors explain the Turkish choice to weaponize this natural resource. On the Syrian side, Ankara aims to undermine the Kurds, an ethnic group that claims an autonomous region in its southeastern area. More domestic considerations have driven an aggressive Turkish water policy on the Iraqi side. Haider al-Abadi, the former Iraqi prime minister, summarized it, arguing that "the whole issue is political and electoral, and Turkey is trying to use it to win the votes of its farmers."
These cases underline that the water issue has broad impacts on agriculture, the economy, and politics. While some countries, such as Ethiopia or Turkey, tried to obtain authority over this resource, others are still failing to respond to the water needs of their population. Earlier this year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a report highlighting some structural issues that restrain the ability of governments to implement effective policies, includingpoor investments, lack of infrastructure, and marginalization of civil society.
In addition, some research stressed the role played by climate-related factors in fostering the Arab spring in the Levant. The Syrian 2007 drought, for example, pushed thousands of people to the main cities' suburbs, where they found inadequate health and food infrastructures. The inability of the al-Assad regime to respond to this public emergency in the years that followed fueled popular discontent, paving the way for civil society unrest in Syria in 2011.
The internal displacement in Syria also helped the Islamic State conquer new territories. After the civil war outbreak, the al-Assad regime lost some important cities, such as Aleppo and Raqqa, to ISIS. Once established as a "proto-state," this terrorist group succeeded in weaponizing the streams of water. They exerted power over the Tabqa dam, a central hub for the whole country's water supply, using it as a coercive tool against the opponents or gaining local communities' recognition as political authority.
Syria's weaknesses are common to many other countries in the region. According to the IMF, the Middle East needs an investment of 3.3% of GDP per year to adapt local infrastructures and economies to climate change. Many vulnerable low-income countries do not have adequate resources to invest, and many governments still prioritize the fight against poverty or sustaining inadequate healthcare facilities. For this reason, foreign aid played—and still plays—a significant role.
Many international organizations, such as the World Bank, have implemented projects to improve agriculture, water use, and infrastructure. In addition to the capital provided, the World Bank transfers precious know-how and technologies, which often are missing in low- and middle-income countries. Also, intergovernmental accords, such as the one recently signed between Israel and Bahrain, could boost agriculture capabilities. All these efforts aim to stabilize the region's food security, a goal shared by all countries.
In conclusion, the risks connected to global warming will probably increase in the coming years. Diplomatic clashes, armed conflicts, and water and food supply chain disruption will intensify if the international community and the local governments fail to find long-term solutions to climate change. The region's two most troubling issues are a lack of economic resources and political cooperation. For this reason, every actor involved will have a significant role in addressing a problem—climate change—that is multilateral by its nature.
