fter losing influence in regions that have traditionally been in Russia’s geopolitical orbit, namely Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the Kremlin is attempting to achieve some success in strengthening its positions in Africa. Several African nations are reportedly seeking to join BRICS—an economic bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—while Moscow appears to be building a counterweight to Western influence in some African nations.
Unlike Eastern European and Central Asian countries, no African nations see Russia as an enemy, a potential hegemon, or a former colonizer. Such a position could give Moscow a certain leverage over former European colonial powers that still aim to preserve their influence in some African states. Quite aware of that, the European Union refuses to directly pressure African countries to “choose a side” in the war in Ukraine, and openly admits it cannot prevent them from trading with Russia. This, however, does not mean the EU will give up its efforts to limit Russia’s presence in Africa.
Following Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s first African tour in January 2023, the EU High Representative Josep Borell flew to South Africa and Botswana, where he held a number of bilateral meetings with local leaders. Also, on 20 January 2023, United States Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen kicked off her African tour, which indicates that what the Kremlin calls “the collective West” is unlikely to allow Russia to easily strengthen its positions in Africa.
But in early February, Lavrov traveled to Africa again, for the second time in ten days, allegedly aiming to ease Moscow’s diplomatic isolation due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Some Russian experts, however, argue that the Kremlin’s interests in Africa are mostly geoeconomic.
Irina Abramova, director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said, “The United States has pledged $55 billion in economic aid to African countries. Why shouldn't Russia declare that we will give them more – 60 billion, or even 70 billion?”. She pointed out that Russia could promise Africa gold and assets ($300 billion) that were frozen by the West.
As a result, in her view, African nations will begin to demand the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the unfreezing of its assets. The problem for the Kremlin, however, is the fact that African nations do not have the political weight needed to force the Western powers to change their policy regarding Russia. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, Moscow cannot count on African nations’ significant help when it comes to the fate of its frozen assets. Moreover, it remains unclear why Russia did not withdraw $300 billion from the West prior to its invasion of Ukraine.
Economically, Russia’s cooperation with Africa is rather modest. The trade balance between the Russian Federation and all African countries amounted to only $18 billion in 2021, while the total bilateral trade turnover between China and Africa reached $254.3 billion. Politically, most African nations refused to condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine, but that does not mean that they have supported the Kremlin’s actions in the Eastern European country. Eritrea was the only African country to vote against the United Nations General Assembly resolution demanding Russia withdraw its military forces from Ukraine. The Kremlin now seeks to increase its influence in the northeast African country. According to Lavrov, the Massawa port in Eritrea drew Russia's interest due to its transit capabilities, as Russia aims to take advantage of the port's logistics potential.
This may be easier said than done, especially given Russia’s failed attempt to open a naval base in neighboring Sudan in 2020 and 2021. But in spite of that, Moscow seems to have revived its ambitious plans, although it is highly uncertain if the Sudanese authorities will eventually agree to host a Russian base. Nevertheless, the Kremlin aims to strengthen military cooperation with African countries. Russia and China plan to hold naval drills in South Africa from 17-27 February 2023, a move that,purely from a military perspective, makes very little sense for Moscow given its military remains bogged down in Ukraine.
More importantly, amid the Ukraine war, where Russia cannot establish air superiority, the Kremlin is providing Mali with warplanes and helicopters. The African nation, for its part, undoubtedly appreciates Moscow’s move. In September 2022, the country’s military-appointed prime minister, Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, saluted "the exemplary and fruitful cooperation between Mali and Russia," while Lavrov emphasized on 7 February 2023 that the Kremlin will “continue helping Mali improve its military capabilities.”
Although Bamako could be drawn into Russia’s geopolitical orbit, the Western African nation is not in a position to practically help Moscow in the global arena. To Russia, Mali could become just another client state, especially given that the Russian Wagner Group likely can’t exploit its mineral resources there (as it reportedly does in the Central African Republic), despite its activities in the country. That is one of the reasons why some Ukrainian experts argue that Lavrov’s visit to African countries was useless.
Still, the Kremlin will almost certainly try to draw as many African countries as possible into its zone of influence. Russia’s authorities have already started preparations for the Russia-Africa Summit that is expected to take place in July in St. Petersburg. Belarus, Moscow’s only ally in Europe, could also participate in the event, especially given that the country’s President Alexander Lukashenko recently visited Zimbabwe, aiming to boost "strong cooperation" with the African nation.
Meanwhile, Russia will likely attempt to open schools, culture centers and other institutions where young Africans can study the Russian language, although it remains questionable if Moscow will manage to benefit from such actions. Finally, the West will almost certainly continue countering Russia’s growing geopolitical ambitions in Africa.
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The Russo-Western Battle for Influence in Africa
Mossel Bay, South Africa. Photo by Trey Smith on Unsplash
February 17, 2023
Russia has been losing influence in many of its traditional geopolitical hubs, and has responded by seeking to grow its influence in Africa. While the Kremlin has some real opportunities, it is unlikely this influence will be enough to help Russia achieve key strategic goals, writes Nikola Mikovic.
A
fter losing influence in regions that have traditionally been in Russia’s geopolitical orbit, namely Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the Kremlin is attempting to achieve some success in strengthening its positions in Africa. Several African nations are reportedly seeking to join BRICS—an economic bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—while Moscow appears to be building a counterweight to Western influence in some African nations.
Unlike Eastern European and Central Asian countries, no African nations see Russia as an enemy, a potential hegemon, or a former colonizer. Such a position could give Moscow a certain leverage over former European colonial powers that still aim to preserve their influence in some African states. Quite aware of that, the European Union refuses to directly pressure African countries to “choose a side” in the war in Ukraine, and openly admits it cannot prevent them from trading with Russia. This, however, does not mean the EU will give up its efforts to limit Russia’s presence in Africa.
Following Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s first African tour in January 2023, the EU High Representative Josep Borell flew to South Africa and Botswana, where he held a number of bilateral meetings with local leaders. Also, on 20 January 2023, United States Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen kicked off her African tour, which indicates that what the Kremlin calls “the collective West” is unlikely to allow Russia to easily strengthen its positions in Africa.
But in early February, Lavrov traveled to Africa again, for the second time in ten days, allegedly aiming to ease Moscow’s diplomatic isolation due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Some Russian experts, however, argue that the Kremlin’s interests in Africa are mostly geoeconomic.
Irina Abramova, director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said, “The United States has pledged $55 billion in economic aid to African countries. Why shouldn't Russia declare that we will give them more – 60 billion, or even 70 billion?”. She pointed out that Russia could promise Africa gold and assets ($300 billion) that were frozen by the West.
As a result, in her view, African nations will begin to demand the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the unfreezing of its assets. The problem for the Kremlin, however, is the fact that African nations do not have the political weight needed to force the Western powers to change their policy regarding Russia. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, Moscow cannot count on African nations’ significant help when it comes to the fate of its frozen assets. Moreover, it remains unclear why Russia did not withdraw $300 billion from the West prior to its invasion of Ukraine.
Economically, Russia’s cooperation with Africa is rather modest. The trade balance between the Russian Federation and all African countries amounted to only $18 billion in 2021, while the total bilateral trade turnover between China and Africa reached $254.3 billion. Politically, most African nations refused to condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine, but that does not mean that they have supported the Kremlin’s actions in the Eastern European country. Eritrea was the only African country to vote against the United Nations General Assembly resolution demanding Russia withdraw its military forces from Ukraine. The Kremlin now seeks to increase its influence in the northeast African country. According to Lavrov, the Massawa port in Eritrea drew Russia's interest due to its transit capabilities, as Russia aims to take advantage of the port's logistics potential.
This may be easier said than done, especially given Russia’s failed attempt to open a naval base in neighboring Sudan in 2020 and 2021. But in spite of that, Moscow seems to have revived its ambitious plans, although it is highly uncertain if the Sudanese authorities will eventually agree to host a Russian base. Nevertheless, the Kremlin aims to strengthen military cooperation with African countries. Russia and China plan to hold naval drills in South Africa from 17-27 February 2023, a move that,purely from a military perspective, makes very little sense for Moscow given its military remains bogged down in Ukraine.
More importantly, amid the Ukraine war, where Russia cannot establish air superiority, the Kremlin is providing Mali with warplanes and helicopters. The African nation, for its part, undoubtedly appreciates Moscow’s move. In September 2022, the country’s military-appointed prime minister, Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, saluted "the exemplary and fruitful cooperation between Mali and Russia," while Lavrov emphasized on 7 February 2023 that the Kremlin will “continue helping Mali improve its military capabilities.”
Although Bamako could be drawn into Russia’s geopolitical orbit, the Western African nation is not in a position to practically help Moscow in the global arena. To Russia, Mali could become just another client state, especially given that the Russian Wagner Group likely can’t exploit its mineral resources there (as it reportedly does in the Central African Republic), despite its activities in the country. That is one of the reasons why some Ukrainian experts argue that Lavrov’s visit to African countries was useless.
Still, the Kremlin will almost certainly try to draw as many African countries as possible into its zone of influence. Russia’s authorities have already started preparations for the Russia-Africa Summit that is expected to take place in July in St. Petersburg. Belarus, Moscow’s only ally in Europe, could also participate in the event, especially given that the country’s President Alexander Lukashenko recently visited Zimbabwe, aiming to boost "strong cooperation" with the African nation.
Meanwhile, Russia will likely attempt to open schools, culture centers and other institutions where young Africans can study the Russian language, although it remains questionable if Moscow will manage to benefit from such actions. Finally, the West will almost certainly continue countering Russia’s growing geopolitical ambitions in Africa.
