hile both Ukraine and Russia have stated their strategic objectives in the conflict, those have neither informed nor aligned national resources or capacity to effectively pursue those outcomes. Both have failed to define a roadmap to arrive at some achievable end state.
Volodymyr Zelensky has stated the objective of retaking all Ukrainian territory lost to Russia since 2014 and removing every Russian soldier from Ukraine. The former, certainly, is measurable and realistic, but the latter is neither measurable, nor specific enough to qualify as a strategic objective.
Russia, for its part, has made clear its strategic objectives: the “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine,” and “the necessary conditions, despite the presence of state borders, to strengthen us as a whole.” Sustaining the conflict through attrition still essentially keeps Moscow’s strategic calculus intact; or more bluntly, Moscow’s has doubled down on its indefensible position. This shows that Russia recognizes its fundamentally flawed military planning and task organization has no chance of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation, and instead aligns its resources to sustain the fight for as long as possible, believing attrition undermines Western willpower.
Further, the factors at play in this evolving conflict will force a decisive point sooner than later, and Kyiv, with explicit Western involvement, must outline the definitive resolution for the conflict's end state. In short, “tell me how this ends.”
These are the facts of the crisis:
- Russian leaders likely presume and fear losing occupied territory up to its own borders, yet key locations like Crimea will prove to be the decisive point which affects the ultimate stage of this confrontation.
- The West has not effectively incentivized Russia to give up this wayward endeavor, prompting Moscow to entrench itself, literally and figuratively, in eastern Ukraine, because it believes this to be a contest of wills.
- Russia likely sees no alternative that doesn’t re-create the shameful conditions of a withdrawal, and Western grand strategy has failed to recognize Moscow’s agency in any declared end state.
- This war has already produced a functional “win” for NATO and Ukraine: an effective denial of Ukraine’s wholesale Russian seizure, NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, and a rejuvenated European investment in collective defense and military modernization.
With these facts at hand, strategists may extrapolate some likely outcomes. First, Ukrainian forces, bolstered by continued Western military aid, are all but certain to push the front to the Ukraine-Russia border, though success by the end of 2023 is no guarantee. This is predictable as Russia contends with flagging capabilities and ineffective combat performance. But the domestic control of Putin’s regime must not be underestimated, and sustained aggression should be presumed, given the ambiguity of ways and means to conclude the conflict.
Second, that poor performance will compound for Russian forces who inexplicably rely on strategic tools to influence tactical problems, proving the decisive overmatch of Western military capabilities and limited adaptiveness of the Russian military. Yet Western aid is not limitless, as industrial capacity still has not risen to the level of demand, making time and speed in this forthcoming offensive the most critical dynamic to consider. A protracted war serves Russian objectives, and Moscow appears willing to pay the price of attrition.
Third, the persistent Ukrainian advance through Russian lines will result in a key phase gate arriving: the point in time where Russia will no longer accept the status quo of losing face, forces, and influence over potential outcomes. This is when and where the West and Kyiv should have already determined— and committed— to a clear route towards an end state that recognizes Russia’s calculus and incentivizes Moscow to accept a West-driven outcome.
Acceptable Outcomes
The strategic ambiguity of both Moscow and Kyiv for the regional balance of power post-conflict provides no scope or parameters in place for this war to end. Again, this crisis has already provided explicit strategic “wins” such as NATO expansion and improved European collective security. Thus, Ukraine’s NATO enrollment seems closer than ever before, pending the conclusion of this conflict. But that is a significant loss for Moscow’s strategic goals, which must be considered.
Ukraine’s post-conflict success shouldn’t necessarily mean immediate NATO membership; bilateral and multilateral security cooperation engagements and treatises, in the mold of U.S. “Major Non-NATO Ally Status” like Taiwan or Australia is, and should be, a serious consideration for Ukraine in the aftermath of this conflict.
Kyiv’s continued solicitation for more military aid, when previous requests for increased technology are repeatedly answered, remains a factor. While the West has aligned in whole to support Kyiv, delaying the counter-offensive until now for myriad reasons including demands for more weapons undermines the Zelensky regime in establishing itself as a legitimate, credible force for stability and a potential NATO partner.
Ukraine’s military has been largely built on the fly since February 2022, now resembling something much closer to a NATO member than the residual Soviet military state. Ensuring the efficacy of the new Ukrainian military through future bilateral and multilateral security cooperation between Ukraine and other European/Atlantic partners—not necessarily meaning NATO enrollment—is achievable and deters further Russian aggression. It also circumvents the NATO-based cause for escalation by Moscow.
Even if Ukraine membership to the alliance is delayed or upheld, other dynamics likely to prove untenable for Moscow that must be considered.
Solutions to the conflict center around the reclamation of sovereign Ukrainian territory, still held by Russia. Crimea, and its (rightful) return to Ukraine possession would likely prove a decisive and unacceptable Russian “loss;” the disputed annex remains the figurative and literal bridge which Moscow won’t permit the conflict to cross due to its positioning, cultural relevance, and maritime access. Crimea’s return to Ukraine possession, which leases Russian use of the maritime access, is one option that isn’t being discussed. This entices Russia to consider how it can influence the end state while setting conditions for amending its wayward policies and potentially establishes future reconstructive collaboration.
The Benefit of Clear Ways and Means
Assuring any outcome based on Kyiv’s objectives will depend on continued military and security cooperation. The future is all but certain to see increased security integration between Ukraine and NATO members, almost assuredly meaning U.S. and NATO military personnel cooperation. The changing security architecture across Europe calls for increased integration and deepening partnerships in the era of strategic competition, suggesting Ukraine’s potential as a force for stability and integration in European circles. Ukraine can expand its regional collective partnerships and it does not necessarily require immediate or near-term NATO membership.
A solution which aligns security apparatuses across NATO with an emerging Ukraine and built on de-escalatory off-ramps for Moscow has incredible potential. But any effort to resolve this conflict must recognize that Russia has influence over the outcome, despite increasing military disadvantage. Navigating those adversarial objectives first requires the West and Kyiv define a cohesive strategy for an achievable outcome which considers Moscow’s strategic ambitions while not rewarding Russian aggression.
The path to this stable outcome—one which clearly signals to Moscow how the West envisions this conflict’s terminus but acknowledges this is not a one-sided issue—ensures Ukraine’s emergence into a solidified Europe and provides a means for Russia to avoid total ruin. The closing phase gate for this grand strategy is not far beyond the summer offensive, but the complexity of this need has left its definition undeclared.
Western leaders need only to recognize the opportunity exists to “tell us how this ends” and make it achievable by aligning the institutional, diplomatic, and security resources and the willpower to do so by properly incentivizing the players in this great game.
a global affairs media network
The Roadmap to a Successful Ending in Ukraine
Landscape photo of a sunset in the Ukraine countryside. Image by Loyloy Thal from Pixabay
June 19, 2023
The strategic ambiguity of Moscow and Kyiv about what a post-conflict balance of power looks like makes it difficult to build a roadmap toward a sustained end of hostilities in Ukraine. This strategic ambiguity actually gives Western leaders a chance to "tell us how this ends," writes Ethan Brown.
W
hile both Ukraine and Russia have stated their strategic objectives in the conflict, those have neither informed nor aligned national resources or capacity to effectively pursue those outcomes. Both have failed to define a roadmap to arrive at some achievable end state.
Volodymyr Zelensky has stated the objective of retaking all Ukrainian territory lost to Russia since 2014 and removing every Russian soldier from Ukraine. The former, certainly, is measurable and realistic, but the latter is neither measurable, nor specific enough to qualify as a strategic objective.
Russia, for its part, has made clear its strategic objectives: the “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine,” and “the necessary conditions, despite the presence of state borders, to strengthen us as a whole.” Sustaining the conflict through attrition still essentially keeps Moscow’s strategic calculus intact; or more bluntly, Moscow’s has doubled down on its indefensible position. This shows that Russia recognizes its fundamentally flawed military planning and task organization has no chance of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation, and instead aligns its resources to sustain the fight for as long as possible, believing attrition undermines Western willpower.
Further, the factors at play in this evolving conflict will force a decisive point sooner than later, and Kyiv, with explicit Western involvement, must outline the definitive resolution for the conflict's end state. In short, “tell me how this ends.”
These are the facts of the crisis:
- Russian leaders likely presume and fear losing occupied territory up to its own borders, yet key locations like Crimea will prove to be the decisive point which affects the ultimate stage of this confrontation.
- The West has not effectively incentivized Russia to give up this wayward endeavor, prompting Moscow to entrench itself, literally and figuratively, in eastern Ukraine, because it believes this to be a contest of wills.
- Russia likely sees no alternative that doesn’t re-create the shameful conditions of a withdrawal, and Western grand strategy has failed to recognize Moscow’s agency in any declared end state.
- This war has already produced a functional “win” for NATO and Ukraine: an effective denial of Ukraine’s wholesale Russian seizure, NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, and a rejuvenated European investment in collective defense and military modernization.
With these facts at hand, strategists may extrapolate some likely outcomes. First, Ukrainian forces, bolstered by continued Western military aid, are all but certain to push the front to the Ukraine-Russia border, though success by the end of 2023 is no guarantee. This is predictable as Russia contends with flagging capabilities and ineffective combat performance. But the domestic control of Putin’s regime must not be underestimated, and sustained aggression should be presumed, given the ambiguity of ways and means to conclude the conflict.
Second, that poor performance will compound for Russian forces who inexplicably rely on strategic tools to influence tactical problems, proving the decisive overmatch of Western military capabilities and limited adaptiveness of the Russian military. Yet Western aid is not limitless, as industrial capacity still has not risen to the level of demand, making time and speed in this forthcoming offensive the most critical dynamic to consider. A protracted war serves Russian objectives, and Moscow appears willing to pay the price of attrition.
Third, the persistent Ukrainian advance through Russian lines will result in a key phase gate arriving: the point in time where Russia will no longer accept the status quo of losing face, forces, and influence over potential outcomes. This is when and where the West and Kyiv should have already determined— and committed— to a clear route towards an end state that recognizes Russia’s calculus and incentivizes Moscow to accept a West-driven outcome.
Acceptable Outcomes
The strategic ambiguity of both Moscow and Kyiv for the regional balance of power post-conflict provides no scope or parameters in place for this war to end. Again, this crisis has already provided explicit strategic “wins” such as NATO expansion and improved European collective security. Thus, Ukraine’s NATO enrollment seems closer than ever before, pending the conclusion of this conflict. But that is a significant loss for Moscow’s strategic goals, which must be considered.
Ukraine’s post-conflict success shouldn’t necessarily mean immediate NATO membership; bilateral and multilateral security cooperation engagements and treatises, in the mold of U.S. “Major Non-NATO Ally Status” like Taiwan or Australia is, and should be, a serious consideration for Ukraine in the aftermath of this conflict.
Kyiv’s continued solicitation for more military aid, when previous requests for increased technology are repeatedly answered, remains a factor. While the West has aligned in whole to support Kyiv, delaying the counter-offensive until now for myriad reasons including demands for more weapons undermines the Zelensky regime in establishing itself as a legitimate, credible force for stability and a potential NATO partner.
Ukraine’s military has been largely built on the fly since February 2022, now resembling something much closer to a NATO member than the residual Soviet military state. Ensuring the efficacy of the new Ukrainian military through future bilateral and multilateral security cooperation between Ukraine and other European/Atlantic partners—not necessarily meaning NATO enrollment—is achievable and deters further Russian aggression. It also circumvents the NATO-based cause for escalation by Moscow.
Even if Ukraine membership to the alliance is delayed or upheld, other dynamics likely to prove untenable for Moscow that must be considered.
Solutions to the conflict center around the reclamation of sovereign Ukrainian territory, still held by Russia. Crimea, and its (rightful) return to Ukraine possession would likely prove a decisive and unacceptable Russian “loss;” the disputed annex remains the figurative and literal bridge which Moscow won’t permit the conflict to cross due to its positioning, cultural relevance, and maritime access. Crimea’s return to Ukraine possession, which leases Russian use of the maritime access, is one option that isn’t being discussed. This entices Russia to consider how it can influence the end state while setting conditions for amending its wayward policies and potentially establishes future reconstructive collaboration.
The Benefit of Clear Ways and Means
Assuring any outcome based on Kyiv’s objectives will depend on continued military and security cooperation. The future is all but certain to see increased security integration between Ukraine and NATO members, almost assuredly meaning U.S. and NATO military personnel cooperation. The changing security architecture across Europe calls for increased integration and deepening partnerships in the era of strategic competition, suggesting Ukraine’s potential as a force for stability and integration in European circles. Ukraine can expand its regional collective partnerships and it does not necessarily require immediate or near-term NATO membership.
A solution which aligns security apparatuses across NATO with an emerging Ukraine and built on de-escalatory off-ramps for Moscow has incredible potential. But any effort to resolve this conflict must recognize that Russia has influence over the outcome, despite increasing military disadvantage. Navigating those adversarial objectives first requires the West and Kyiv define a cohesive strategy for an achievable outcome which considers Moscow’s strategic ambitions while not rewarding Russian aggression.
The path to this stable outcome—one which clearly signals to Moscow how the West envisions this conflict’s terminus but acknowledges this is not a one-sided issue—ensures Ukraine’s emergence into a solidified Europe and provides a means for Russia to avoid total ruin. The closing phase gate for this grand strategy is not far beyond the summer offensive, but the complexity of this need has left its definition undeclared.
Western leaders need only to recognize the opportunity exists to “tell us how this ends” and make it achievable by aligning the institutional, diplomatic, and security resources and the willpower to do so by properly incentivizing the players in this great game.
