ohn Quincy Adams almost certainly never envisioned the sheer complexity of the future global security environment when he delivered his “monsters abroad” speech while serving as U.S. Secretary of State. The speech is often misunderstood in its targeted audience and motivations, and its narrative remains a compelling modern discourse when considering the role of power, liberty, tyranny, and new potentials of hegemony versus inter- and independence between states.
There may be two positions taken on the question of the speech’s implications and the demands of American national security in the modern age. The first is that the implications and demands do remain consistent—"she is the well-wisher to freedom and independence for all”—no better outcome could the United States, and our liberal partners abroad, hope for than the continued spread of democratic ideals and the rejection of authoritarianism. Alternatively, a position that considers the nature and reality of the threats to a cooperative world order, an order ideally led by the example of the United States, is one relentlessly encroached upon through bad actors employing increasingly complex destabilizing efforts in a variety of domains.
The speed of these threats, combined with the evolution of old challengers, and the addition of new dangers are key considerations. The threats facing the U.S. today: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, non-state actors in terror and criminal syndicates, the proliferation of digital (cyber) and information arenas of competition, as well as the perpetual danger of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), are beyond the worst hazards that John Quincy Adams might have imagined. Direct confrontation with the most prominent of monsters, such as Chinese and Russian competitors, though possible, remains marginal. It is in the shadow of these “monsters” where the calculus of American national security has changed.
America in the World of Changing Ideals
Some may assert that it was the position of Mr. Adams to argue vehemently against interference by the United States in the conflicts of other nations—certainly an interesting and appealing alternative to a United States who recently extricated itself from its longest war in Afghanistan, a war that cost the lives of 2,365 U.S. service members while also responsible for 20,149 casualties. Scholars and policy theorists might also suggest Mr. Adams arguing in favor of absolute isolationism; yet the very ideal of liberal, democratic principles which promote cooperation and liberty could not be supported by a hermit kingdom, nor was that the aim of the preceding generation. The founders (including his father, John Adams) risked their lives and futures for the idea of government of the people, with eyes to the horizon of a world built on Smithian economic cooperation and a universal pursuit of individual liberties. The love of liberty was then—and generally remains—absolute, as do those who wish to see its flame snuffed out in the name of realist politics (Russia) or technocratic ascendency (China).
At the time of Mr. Adams speech, Europe was reeling from the Napoleonic wars, and Latin America was embroiled in revolutionary upheaval as a result of the changing power brokerage across the Atlantic. In that era of global polities and power projection, the act of war took considerably longer in terms of marshalling resources, legitimizing cause, and case-building. Further, establishing the end-state goals and objectives of a confrontation was foundational in any conflict strategy—the lack of such ends-based strategy is the one great failure in the Global War on Terror. Today, conflict takes place in microcosms, particularly within the digital domain, at speeds unthinkable in the world of ideals Mr. Adams argued for. The ideals of wishing for freedom and independence remain the bedrock of American liberalized thought, but the dangers to such have expounded in scope and diversity.
Those monsters remain firmly fixated on knocking the United States from its precarious perch as Polemarch of the liberty-starved world. The term “Polemarch” is not used here for salience; the original entries of the title in Ancient Greece are ascribed to a “war leader”—polemos [war] and archos [ruler]—whose duty was to lead the defense of a city-state at the behest of the king, the senate (in the case of the Roman use of the title), or the people. The United States is firmly established as the pinnacle of liberal democracy, and with that status—an example for other states seeking independence—comes the burden of standing up to the threat of global hegemony. Our position has not been helped by our own seeming imperialism—the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan with no clear end state goals, and a presence based on short term policy decisions, undermined the legitimacy of those missions long before their operational terminus—which means that the world now wonders at the constancy of American partnerships.
The Monsters and their Shadows
American constancy is particularly vulnerable at a time when Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been touted as a lucrative engagement, alternative and superior to the sometimes-chaotic endeavor of self-determination, democratic enterprise, and free-market participation. The BRI serves as the tendrils of China’s shadow, with no shortage of vectors to undermine American interests locally and internationally through economic coercion, intellectual property theft, and the widely reported development of artificial islands in the South Pacific to interfere with international trade and intimidate U.S. partners in the region, notably Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Russia, knowing its force projection prowess remains inferior to American and NATO military might, instead seeks to insulate its borders and foment liminal discord within the shadows of the once-vaunted Cold War Bear; private military contractors (PMCs) in the payroll of Moscow have been identified in Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine, and all along former Soviet-bloc states. Cyber and disinformation remain Russia’s most effective subversive play, highlighted by confirmed interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, according to unanimous assertions made by the Office for the Director of National Intelligence during congressional testimony.
In short, the monsters are no longer rightly considered ‘abroad’; be it a condition of an ever-shrinking world of digital connectivity, or other rapid evolutions in the wires, railways, sea and air routes, roads, and economic dependencies. The monsters—specifically, the shadows where they can inflict the greatest harm—are regularly infringing on American interests. If not specifically and exclusively in our domestic affairs, then in the cause of democracy and independence of our partners and allies.
Perhaps in the time when two oceans and a truly isolated polar region restrained the reach of our rivals and adversaries, could the notion that complex and gradual threats to liberal democracy be ignored, as in the time of Mr. Adams’ speech. Today the United States faces unprecedented danger as the shadows spread from Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and the murkier world of stateless organized agents of violence. To wit, this affects more those states whose ambitions are no less than self-determination, seeking prosperity through competitive systems of economic exchange, and an option at independent governance. Those shadows of malicious and realist actors abroad should not be expected to stand idly by as the world moves to deepen its interconnected productivity, but rather maneuver through the shadows of the world order to intimidate vulnerable young states into their sphere of influence.
A Guiding Principle of World Engagement
“Her glory is not dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of mind. She has a spear and a shield, but the motto upon her shield is Freedom, Independence, Peace. This has been her declaration: this has been, as far as her necessary intercourse with the rest of mankind would permit, her practice.” So long as a threat to liberty remains, the United States must always be prepared to defend its sovereignty and champion the sovereignty of independent states and nations abroad. She should not seek confrontation, precisely as John Quincy Adams asserted, but she must always be ready to shine the light of liberty and defend it at all costs.
There is no doubt that there are monsters abroad, whose shadows continually encroach upon the liberal order at its weakest points. However, in the paradigm of the 21st century, the terrible price of conflict between the U.S. and those monsters is too dramatic to be considered likely, unless the ultimatum between democracy and tyranny is laid at the feet of Lady Liberty. The true threat then, resides in the shadows cast by those monsters. What the U.S. has proven, particularly in its use of the clandestine and intelligence bodies of national security, is that efforts to play in the shadows by the same absence of rules and conduct will only undermine those interests.
Rather, a strategy that promotes liberal ideals, a beacon of prosperity pointed straight into the shadows, bolstered by a strong and ready national defense—whose only function is to defend the way of life we hold dear, without “enlisting under other banners than her own”—is the implication which should guide the present and future American policy in response to Mr. Adams question.
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The Monsters and the Shadows of the 21st Century
Photo via Pixabay.
October 21, 2021
The “monsters” infringing on American interests and the cause of democracy and independence are ubiquitous—a condition accelerated because of an ever-shrinking world of digital connectivity and other rapid evolutions.
J
ohn Quincy Adams almost certainly never envisioned the sheer complexity of the future global security environment when he delivered his “monsters abroad” speech while serving as U.S. Secretary of State. The speech is often misunderstood in its targeted audience and motivations, and its narrative remains a compelling modern discourse when considering the role of power, liberty, tyranny, and new potentials of hegemony versus inter- and independence between states.
There may be two positions taken on the question of the speech’s implications and the demands of American national security in the modern age. The first is that the implications and demands do remain consistent—"she is the well-wisher to freedom and independence for all”—no better outcome could the United States, and our liberal partners abroad, hope for than the continued spread of democratic ideals and the rejection of authoritarianism. Alternatively, a position that considers the nature and reality of the threats to a cooperative world order, an order ideally led by the example of the United States, is one relentlessly encroached upon through bad actors employing increasingly complex destabilizing efforts in a variety of domains.
The speed of these threats, combined with the evolution of old challengers, and the addition of new dangers are key considerations. The threats facing the U.S. today: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, non-state actors in terror and criminal syndicates, the proliferation of digital (cyber) and information arenas of competition, as well as the perpetual danger of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), are beyond the worst hazards that John Quincy Adams might have imagined. Direct confrontation with the most prominent of monsters, such as Chinese and Russian competitors, though possible, remains marginal. It is in the shadow of these “monsters” where the calculus of American national security has changed.
America in the World of Changing Ideals
Some may assert that it was the position of Mr. Adams to argue vehemently against interference by the United States in the conflicts of other nations—certainly an interesting and appealing alternative to a United States who recently extricated itself from its longest war in Afghanistan, a war that cost the lives of 2,365 U.S. service members while also responsible for 20,149 casualties. Scholars and policy theorists might also suggest Mr. Adams arguing in favor of absolute isolationism; yet the very ideal of liberal, democratic principles which promote cooperation and liberty could not be supported by a hermit kingdom, nor was that the aim of the preceding generation. The founders (including his father, John Adams) risked their lives and futures for the idea of government of the people, with eyes to the horizon of a world built on Smithian economic cooperation and a universal pursuit of individual liberties. The love of liberty was then—and generally remains—absolute, as do those who wish to see its flame snuffed out in the name of realist politics (Russia) or technocratic ascendency (China).
At the time of Mr. Adams speech, Europe was reeling from the Napoleonic wars, and Latin America was embroiled in revolutionary upheaval as a result of the changing power brokerage across the Atlantic. In that era of global polities and power projection, the act of war took considerably longer in terms of marshalling resources, legitimizing cause, and case-building. Further, establishing the end-state goals and objectives of a confrontation was foundational in any conflict strategy—the lack of such ends-based strategy is the one great failure in the Global War on Terror. Today, conflict takes place in microcosms, particularly within the digital domain, at speeds unthinkable in the world of ideals Mr. Adams argued for. The ideals of wishing for freedom and independence remain the bedrock of American liberalized thought, but the dangers to such have expounded in scope and diversity.
Those monsters remain firmly fixated on knocking the United States from its precarious perch as Polemarch of the liberty-starved world. The term “Polemarch” is not used here for salience; the original entries of the title in Ancient Greece are ascribed to a “war leader”—polemos [war] and archos [ruler]—whose duty was to lead the defense of a city-state at the behest of the king, the senate (in the case of the Roman use of the title), or the people. The United States is firmly established as the pinnacle of liberal democracy, and with that status—an example for other states seeking independence—comes the burden of standing up to the threat of global hegemony. Our position has not been helped by our own seeming imperialism—the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan with no clear end state goals, and a presence based on short term policy decisions, undermined the legitimacy of those missions long before their operational terminus—which means that the world now wonders at the constancy of American partnerships.
The Monsters and their Shadows
American constancy is particularly vulnerable at a time when Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been touted as a lucrative engagement, alternative and superior to the sometimes-chaotic endeavor of self-determination, democratic enterprise, and free-market participation. The BRI serves as the tendrils of China’s shadow, with no shortage of vectors to undermine American interests locally and internationally through economic coercion, intellectual property theft, and the widely reported development of artificial islands in the South Pacific to interfere with international trade and intimidate U.S. partners in the region, notably Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Russia, knowing its force projection prowess remains inferior to American and NATO military might, instead seeks to insulate its borders and foment liminal discord within the shadows of the once-vaunted Cold War Bear; private military contractors (PMCs) in the payroll of Moscow have been identified in Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine, and all along former Soviet-bloc states. Cyber and disinformation remain Russia’s most effective subversive play, highlighted by confirmed interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, according to unanimous assertions made by the Office for the Director of National Intelligence during congressional testimony.
In short, the monsters are no longer rightly considered ‘abroad’; be it a condition of an ever-shrinking world of digital connectivity, or other rapid evolutions in the wires, railways, sea and air routes, roads, and economic dependencies. The monsters—specifically, the shadows where they can inflict the greatest harm—are regularly infringing on American interests. If not specifically and exclusively in our domestic affairs, then in the cause of democracy and independence of our partners and allies.
Perhaps in the time when two oceans and a truly isolated polar region restrained the reach of our rivals and adversaries, could the notion that complex and gradual threats to liberal democracy be ignored, as in the time of Mr. Adams’ speech. Today the United States faces unprecedented danger as the shadows spread from Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and the murkier world of stateless organized agents of violence. To wit, this affects more those states whose ambitions are no less than self-determination, seeking prosperity through competitive systems of economic exchange, and an option at independent governance. Those shadows of malicious and realist actors abroad should not be expected to stand idly by as the world moves to deepen its interconnected productivity, but rather maneuver through the shadows of the world order to intimidate vulnerable young states into their sphere of influence.
A Guiding Principle of World Engagement
“Her glory is not dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of mind. She has a spear and a shield, but the motto upon her shield is Freedom, Independence, Peace. This has been her declaration: this has been, as far as her necessary intercourse with the rest of mankind would permit, her practice.” So long as a threat to liberty remains, the United States must always be prepared to defend its sovereignty and champion the sovereignty of independent states and nations abroad. She should not seek confrontation, precisely as John Quincy Adams asserted, but she must always be ready to shine the light of liberty and defend it at all costs.
There is no doubt that there are monsters abroad, whose shadows continually encroach upon the liberal order at its weakest points. However, in the paradigm of the 21st century, the terrible price of conflict between the U.S. and those monsters is too dramatic to be considered likely, unless the ultimatum between democracy and tyranny is laid at the feet of Lady Liberty. The true threat then, resides in the shadows cast by those monsters. What the U.S. has proven, particularly in its use of the clandestine and intelligence bodies of national security, is that efforts to play in the shadows by the same absence of rules and conduct will only undermine those interests.
Rather, a strategy that promotes liberal ideals, a beacon of prosperity pointed straight into the shadows, bolstered by a strong and ready national defense—whose only function is to defend the way of life we hold dear, without “enlisting under other banners than her own”—is the implication which should guide the present and future American policy in response to Mr. Adams question.
