Although the Arctic remains an unfamiliar area—almost a terra incognita to many southerners—it is on track to come to the forefront of world politics. In this context, it seems that, while everyone in Brussels is perfused with news streams from the Middle East, Africa, or Ukraine, the EU is starting to lag behind other non-Arctic competitors such as China, South Korea, or Japan, in the race for Arctic influence; the one geographical area that may truly rule Northern hemisphere geostrategic dynamics in the 21st century.
The Arctic’s Context
In the past decades, media coverage on Arctic stakes has almost exclusively revolved around climate change, potential slicks, and protected species. However, human issues now seem to grow in importance. They remind us that more than 4 million people actually live in the Arctic.
These local sovereignty issues have a greater impact when considered within their regional and global contexts. Greenland’s coming independence and the development of new transcontinental shipping routes are to be much more closely monitored by non-Arctic strategists and investors. Likewise, as Asian economies’ dependency on foreign natural resources continues to increase, the race for Arctic minerals and hydrocarbon resources is unlikely to cool down.
In this context, the EU has just as many stakes as China or the U.S. in the Arctic: opportunities to seize as so to provide new growth vectors to EU companies, as well as duties to fulfill vis-à-vis the EU neighboring countries. However, the EU has only one precarious window on the Arctic: Greenland.
The European Arctic is extremely complex—the result of a tripartite postcolonial sovereignty game. Denmark is a member-state of the EU, and Greenland remains a Danish autonomous overseas territory for now. However, since Greenland opted-out from the EU in 1985, it enjoys the same status within the EU as the uninhabited British and French Antarctic Territories: the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) status. The problem is, unlike the Antarctic, Greenland is inhabited. Moreover, Greenland is at the heart of Arctic developments, both from a geo-strategic and a geo-economic perspective.
Said differently, since Iceland and Norway are not EU members, Greenland is the EU’s only direct window on the Arctic; however, EU laws and policies do not apply to Greenland because of the OCT status. At the most, this status grants Greenland a relative proximity with Brussels lawmakers—notably through a formal representation office to the EU, via the OCT-EU forum, Greenlandic MPs at the Danish Parliament, and Denmark’s Arctic Ambassador. It also grants Greenland access to several EU development funds (FED).
Greenland welcomed the OCT-EU forum twice since its inception (2006 and 2012). At the latest reunion in December 2013 in Brussels, Greenland’s representative was unusually critical of Brussels’ action. In pointing out to the objectives outlined in the “How cool is green?” roadmap of 2012, Lida Skifte Lennert reaffirmed the need for a greater link between the EU and its OCTs—especially Greenland: “OCTs are global hubs of excellence—but this does not help much if only we know. This is knowledge to be shared and widespread.”
Lennert was right: for an ever-increasing number of policymakers, business strategists, and journalists around the world, the Arctic is seen as the new “El Dorado” and the EU should do much more to promote its only Arctic OCT, inside the EU as well as globally.
Indeed, be it for mining, energy, shipping or infrastructure, the world is looking at the High North as an emerging market of its own—especially in China, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. In this context, it is not an exaggeration to say that EU’s Arctic policy is very shy compared to its global competitors.
Greenland’s current relationship with the EU could be defined from a theoretical perspective as a balanced regional integration. However, Greenland wants more. Since its ability to claim full independence from Denmark depends on its ability to develop its economy, Greenland is a very volatile business territory from a soft power perspective.
Earlier this year, Greenland opened a diplomatic representation in Washington D.C. Aleqa Hammond’s party, Siumut, is pushing hard to open another in Beijing, China, as soon as next year.
Said differently, it is up to Brussels to level up its game in the Arctic and provide Greenland with what it looks for in its partnership with the EU. Otherwise, Brussels puts itself at the risk of seeing the Inuit Island drifting away from the European sphere of influence, and of losing its only Arctic coastal window.
Impact of the 2014 EU Parliament Arctic Resolution
Up to 2014, the European Commission and Parliament had produced only two policy statements on the Arctic, respectively in 2008 and 2011. In these texts, the EU finally recognized the Arctic as a distinct cultural area with its own issues, thus the need for Arctic specific policies.
By voting in a new resolution on the Arctic in March 2014, European MPs (MEPs) have clearly formulated where they would like the EU to orient its Arctic strategy towards. Yet, The EU's co-decision legislative procedure, the only one in which the EU Parliament has some bit of a real power, does not apply to EU foreign affairs.
Indeed, with all things regarding European foreign policy, the right of initiative remains in the hands of the Member States through the Council and the council of the EU. As such, any decision made under this intergovernmental mode requires unanimity of the Member States.
Therefore, the Parliament has no real decision-making competence; this resolution is a mere attempt of the Parliament to whistle at the Commission and the members States trying to set the new European Arctic policy agenda. In early June, Europeans will vote for a new Parliament. The EU Council, comprised only of heads of State and Governments, will then name the Commission’s President in a somehow similar fashion to the way Queen Elizabeth II names the British Prime Minister after a general election.
In this regard, no matter who gets the EU Commission’s Presidency, the incumbent Commission will have to quickly define the EU’s long-term Arctic strategy to fight its pressing non-Arctic competitors. Only one thing is sure now: the EU’s fate in the Arctic will clearly not be identical whether the Commission ends up in the hands of the socialists or the conservatives.
Mikå Mered is Arctic/Antarctic Policy Research Director, Institute for European Perspective & Security (IPSE–Paris, France); Victor Chauvet is Research Fellow, IPSE.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's July/August 2014 print edition.
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The Make-or-Break Year for the EU in the Arctic
August 6, 2014
Although the Arctic remains an unfamiliar area—almost a terra incognita to many southerners—it is on track to come to the forefront of world politics. In this context, it seems that, while everyone in Brussels is perfused with news streams from the Middle East, Africa, or Ukraine, the EU is starting to lag behind other non-Arctic competitors such as China, South Korea, or Japan, in the race for Arctic influence; the one geographical area that may truly rule Northern hemisphere geostrategic dynamics in the 21st century.
The Arctic’s Context
In the past decades, media coverage on Arctic stakes has almost exclusively revolved around climate change, potential slicks, and protected species. However, human issues now seem to grow in importance. They remind us that more than 4 million people actually live in the Arctic.
These local sovereignty issues have a greater impact when considered within their regional and global contexts. Greenland’s coming independence and the development of new transcontinental shipping routes are to be much more closely monitored by non-Arctic strategists and investors. Likewise, as Asian economies’ dependency on foreign natural resources continues to increase, the race for Arctic minerals and hydrocarbon resources is unlikely to cool down.
In this context, the EU has just as many stakes as China or the U.S. in the Arctic: opportunities to seize as so to provide new growth vectors to EU companies, as well as duties to fulfill vis-à-vis the EU neighboring countries. However, the EU has only one precarious window on the Arctic: Greenland.
The European Arctic is extremely complex—the result of a tripartite postcolonial sovereignty game. Denmark is a member-state of the EU, and Greenland remains a Danish autonomous overseas territory for now. However, since Greenland opted-out from the EU in 1985, it enjoys the same status within the EU as the uninhabited British and French Antarctic Territories: the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) status. The problem is, unlike the Antarctic, Greenland is inhabited. Moreover, Greenland is at the heart of Arctic developments, both from a geo-strategic and a geo-economic perspective.
Said differently, since Iceland and Norway are not EU members, Greenland is the EU’s only direct window on the Arctic; however, EU laws and policies do not apply to Greenland because of the OCT status. At the most, this status grants Greenland a relative proximity with Brussels lawmakers—notably through a formal representation office to the EU, via the OCT-EU forum, Greenlandic MPs at the Danish Parliament, and Denmark’s Arctic Ambassador. It also grants Greenland access to several EU development funds (FED).
Greenland welcomed the OCT-EU forum twice since its inception (2006 and 2012). At the latest reunion in December 2013 in Brussels, Greenland’s representative was unusually critical of Brussels’ action. In pointing out to the objectives outlined in the “How cool is green?” roadmap of 2012, Lida Skifte Lennert reaffirmed the need for a greater link between the EU and its OCTs—especially Greenland: “OCTs are global hubs of excellence—but this does not help much if only we know. This is knowledge to be shared and widespread.”
Lennert was right: for an ever-increasing number of policymakers, business strategists, and journalists around the world, the Arctic is seen as the new “El Dorado” and the EU should do much more to promote its only Arctic OCT, inside the EU as well as globally.
Indeed, be it for mining, energy, shipping or infrastructure, the world is looking at the High North as an emerging market of its own—especially in China, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. In this context, it is not an exaggeration to say that EU’s Arctic policy is very shy compared to its global competitors.
Greenland’s current relationship with the EU could be defined from a theoretical perspective as a balanced regional integration. However, Greenland wants more. Since its ability to claim full independence from Denmark depends on its ability to develop its economy, Greenland is a very volatile business territory from a soft power perspective.
Earlier this year, Greenland opened a diplomatic representation in Washington D.C. Aleqa Hammond’s party, Siumut, is pushing hard to open another in Beijing, China, as soon as next year.
Said differently, it is up to Brussels to level up its game in the Arctic and provide Greenland with what it looks for in its partnership with the EU. Otherwise, Brussels puts itself at the risk of seeing the Inuit Island drifting away from the European sphere of influence, and of losing its only Arctic coastal window.
Impact of the 2014 EU Parliament Arctic Resolution
Up to 2014, the European Commission and Parliament had produced only two policy statements on the Arctic, respectively in 2008 and 2011. In these texts, the EU finally recognized the Arctic as a distinct cultural area with its own issues, thus the need for Arctic specific policies.
By voting in a new resolution on the Arctic in March 2014, European MPs (MEPs) have clearly formulated where they would like the EU to orient its Arctic strategy towards. Yet, The EU's co-decision legislative procedure, the only one in which the EU Parliament has some bit of a real power, does not apply to EU foreign affairs.
Indeed, with all things regarding European foreign policy, the right of initiative remains in the hands of the Member States through the Council and the council of the EU. As such, any decision made under this intergovernmental mode requires unanimity of the Member States.
Therefore, the Parliament has no real decision-making competence; this resolution is a mere attempt of the Parliament to whistle at the Commission and the members States trying to set the new European Arctic policy agenda. In early June, Europeans will vote for a new Parliament. The EU Council, comprised only of heads of State and Governments, will then name the Commission’s President in a somehow similar fashion to the way Queen Elizabeth II names the British Prime Minister after a general election.
In this regard, no matter who gets the EU Commission’s Presidency, the incumbent Commission will have to quickly define the EU’s long-term Arctic strategy to fight its pressing non-Arctic competitors. Only one thing is sure now: the EU’s fate in the Arctic will clearly not be identical whether the Commission ends up in the hands of the socialists or the conservatives.
Mikå Mered is Arctic/Antarctic Policy Research Director, Institute for European Perspective & Security (IPSE–Paris, France); Victor Chauvet is Research Fellow, IPSE.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's July/August 2014 print edition.
