.
Generating waves between Greece and Turkey, the Aegean Sea’s notoriously disputed borders continue plaguing both countries financially and diplomatically. Progressing into its fourth decade, strife concerning ownership of the area between the two nations’ mainlands survives as a fundamental component of their diplomatic relations.
Defining the Aegean Sea’s territories proves immensely challenging. Greece and Turkey recognize different air and nautical boundaries, resulting in inevitable and frequent conflict.
Legally, Greece owns ten miles of airspace above the Aegean Sea but only six miles of nautical territory. The disparity between air and water ownership causes animosity between the two countries. Both states seek equalization of Greece’s territory within and above the Sea, but preach different interpretations of modern solutions. Greece asserts that their nautical ownership matches their ten miles of airspace, while Turkey argues that Greece’s airspace matches Greece’s six miles of nautical territory.
Turkey’s determination to prevent Greek expansion of the Aegean Sea stems from Turkey’s comparatively minuscule ownership of the area. Greece controls more than six times as much of the Sea than Turkey, rendering further Greek domination seemingly unnecessary by Turkish standards. Predictably, the disputed area will either assume Greek ownership or remain international territory, the latter pleasing Turkey.
From the Greek perspective, Greece asserts their entitlement of extended barriers from an article conceived during the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea allowing for 12 total miles of nautical sea ownership. Though Greece’s present claim seeks expansion of 10 total miles, Turkey fears extending Greece’s barriers creates opportunity for future Greek assumption of 12 miles, as allowed by the 30 year doctrine.
Cycling back to references of this rivalry’s longevity, in 1976 Greece and Turkey welcomed their first severe disagreement that threatened to generate mass bloodshed. Three years prior, Greece discovered oil on the coast of Thassos, a northern Aegean island, amidst a steep rise in oil prices. Turkey asserted its desire to utilize the island and its oil, but Greece disputed Turkey’s territorial qualification to exploit the area.
Finally, in 1976, Turkey dispatched the now famous ship, Sismik I, to explore the contested and oil rich continental shelf. Due to the area’s financial capacity, the expedition nearly triggered an arms conflict between Greece and Turkey. On the brink of war, the two nations sought assistance from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). After three years of hefty deliberation, the ICJ determined that it lacked the jurisdiction to determine who the area and its resources belonged to. Thus, territorial confusion continued.
Nearly a decade later, Turkey revisited previous ambitions of exploring the disputed continental shelf. Greece’s Prime Minister, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, declared Turkey’s planned endeavor a cause of war and ordered the Greek armed forces to maintain high alert status. Fearing armed combat, the United States and NATO intervened, convincing Turkey to cancel their expedition.
Strife continued in January 1996 when the two nations again sought to claim portions of the Aegean sea lacking clearly defined territories. These conflicts, over a cluster of rocks known to Turkey as Kardak and Greece as Imia, resulted in the two countries fighting to mount their flags as displays of ownership. Though United States intervention eased the conflict, the issue of ownership remains unresolved.
For the first time since the 1970s, the 2000s thrived as the first decade not tarnished by extreme clashes between the two nations. However, recent conflict between Turkey and Greece reveals the likely end of a period lacking severe contention over Sea ownership.
On July 15, six Turkish military aircrafts entered disputed airspace over the north, central, and southern Aegean Sea 20 times in formation. Of these, two aircrafts carried military equipment and artillery. While Greece claims Turkey flew in Greek airspace, Turkey claims their military aircrafts flew in international territory. The international community, however, views Turkey’s flights as clear aggression against Greece.
Beyond aggravating international diplomacy, airspace conflicts between the two NATO countries proves financially detrimental. Both nations spend notable portions of their GDPs on military spending to dissuade and counter advances from another.
For 2015, NATO predicts Greek expenditure of 2.4 percent of Greece’s GDP on defense. Despite the nation’s financial crisis, Greece spends a larger portion of its GDP on military than almost any other NATO state. In 2009, for example, Greece spent 3.1 percent of its GDP on armaments, while the average European state spent a fractional 1.7 percent.
Though Turkey spends less than its aggressor across the Sea, Turkey also provides more funding to its military than the average NATO state and credits its need for hefty military spending to countering Greek advances. However, Turkey’s decline in military spending since 2010 reveals the nation’s potential willingness to engage more peacefully with Greece.
Mid-July’s conflict between Greece and Turkey regarding disputed territories reminds the international community of ongoing friction between the two nations. With the recent incident and historical trials in mind, focusing on revising relations between the two, supposed NATO allies, proves crucial. Though surely problematic, establishing concrete Aegean Sea boundaries remains essential for preventing armed conflict and limiting unnecessary expenditures.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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The High Seas of Diplomacy
November 13, 2015
Generating waves between Greece and Turkey, the Aegean Sea’s notoriously disputed borders continue plaguing both countries financially and diplomatically. Progressing into its fourth decade, strife concerning ownership of the area between the two nations’ mainlands survives as a fundamental component of their diplomatic relations.
Defining the Aegean Sea’s territories proves immensely challenging. Greece and Turkey recognize different air and nautical boundaries, resulting in inevitable and frequent conflict.
Legally, Greece owns ten miles of airspace above the Aegean Sea but only six miles of nautical territory. The disparity between air and water ownership causes animosity between the two countries. Both states seek equalization of Greece’s territory within and above the Sea, but preach different interpretations of modern solutions. Greece asserts that their nautical ownership matches their ten miles of airspace, while Turkey argues that Greece’s airspace matches Greece’s six miles of nautical territory.
Turkey’s determination to prevent Greek expansion of the Aegean Sea stems from Turkey’s comparatively minuscule ownership of the area. Greece controls more than six times as much of the Sea than Turkey, rendering further Greek domination seemingly unnecessary by Turkish standards. Predictably, the disputed area will either assume Greek ownership or remain international territory, the latter pleasing Turkey.
From the Greek perspective, Greece asserts their entitlement of extended barriers from an article conceived during the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea allowing for 12 total miles of nautical sea ownership. Though Greece’s present claim seeks expansion of 10 total miles, Turkey fears extending Greece’s barriers creates opportunity for future Greek assumption of 12 miles, as allowed by the 30 year doctrine.
Cycling back to references of this rivalry’s longevity, in 1976 Greece and Turkey welcomed their first severe disagreement that threatened to generate mass bloodshed. Three years prior, Greece discovered oil on the coast of Thassos, a northern Aegean island, amidst a steep rise in oil prices. Turkey asserted its desire to utilize the island and its oil, but Greece disputed Turkey’s territorial qualification to exploit the area.
Finally, in 1976, Turkey dispatched the now famous ship, Sismik I, to explore the contested and oil rich continental shelf. Due to the area’s financial capacity, the expedition nearly triggered an arms conflict between Greece and Turkey. On the brink of war, the two nations sought assistance from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). After three years of hefty deliberation, the ICJ determined that it lacked the jurisdiction to determine who the area and its resources belonged to. Thus, territorial confusion continued.
Nearly a decade later, Turkey revisited previous ambitions of exploring the disputed continental shelf. Greece’s Prime Minister, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, declared Turkey’s planned endeavor a cause of war and ordered the Greek armed forces to maintain high alert status. Fearing armed combat, the United States and NATO intervened, convincing Turkey to cancel their expedition.
Strife continued in January 1996 when the two nations again sought to claim portions of the Aegean sea lacking clearly defined territories. These conflicts, over a cluster of rocks known to Turkey as Kardak and Greece as Imia, resulted in the two countries fighting to mount their flags as displays of ownership. Though United States intervention eased the conflict, the issue of ownership remains unresolved.
For the first time since the 1970s, the 2000s thrived as the first decade not tarnished by extreme clashes between the two nations. However, recent conflict between Turkey and Greece reveals the likely end of a period lacking severe contention over Sea ownership.
On July 15, six Turkish military aircrafts entered disputed airspace over the north, central, and southern Aegean Sea 20 times in formation. Of these, two aircrafts carried military equipment and artillery. While Greece claims Turkey flew in Greek airspace, Turkey claims their military aircrafts flew in international territory. The international community, however, views Turkey’s flights as clear aggression against Greece.
Beyond aggravating international diplomacy, airspace conflicts between the two NATO countries proves financially detrimental. Both nations spend notable portions of their GDPs on military spending to dissuade and counter advances from another.
For 2015, NATO predicts Greek expenditure of 2.4 percent of Greece’s GDP on defense. Despite the nation’s financial crisis, Greece spends a larger portion of its GDP on military than almost any other NATO state. In 2009, for example, Greece spent 3.1 percent of its GDP on armaments, while the average European state spent a fractional 1.7 percent.
Though Turkey spends less than its aggressor across the Sea, Turkey also provides more funding to its military than the average NATO state and credits its need for hefty military spending to countering Greek advances. However, Turkey’s decline in military spending since 2010 reveals the nation’s potential willingness to engage more peacefully with Greece.
Mid-July’s conflict between Greece and Turkey regarding disputed territories reminds the international community of ongoing friction between the two nations. With the recent incident and historical trials in mind, focusing on revising relations between the two, supposed NATO allies, proves crucial. Though surely problematic, establishing concrete Aegean Sea boundaries remains essential for preventing armed conflict and limiting unnecessary expenditures.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
