The Nobel Committee’s awarding of the Peace Prize to the European Union was met in some quarters with astonishment. After all, why reward the institution whose hastily-formed currency union now threatens to plunge the Western World into recession? (At least it was not a prize in economics.)
Others, including the Nobel Committee, pointed out that the European Union has done more to advance the cause of world peace than most anything in the 20th or 21st centuries. Sure, the institution is now teetering on the brink. But after millions dead and nations laid to waste in the first half of the 20th century, the integration of Europe’s fragmented nation-states in the latter half has brought a weary continent some unprecedented tranquility.
And they’re right—except about the unprecedented part.
Current European Union
When the European Union was founded, it was not the European Union. It all started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between France, Germany, Italy and the Low Countries—an economic union formed with the intent to, in the words of France’s foreign minister Robert Schuman, "make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible."
The ECSC was formed in 1952 and lasted until 2002, though the unity it brought paled in comparison to what it inspired: The framework drawn up then set the stage for the European Economic Community (EEC)—which joined European economies even further—and the European Union in 1993, which brought considerable integration to the political organs of the continent’s various nation-states. As the Iron Curtain retreated and Moscow’s influence waned, the European Union expanded east; now only a few nations remain outside of the organization.
Nevertheless, this has meant peace for Europe, and allowed two generations to live without knowing war like their parents and grandparents did.
It is not that this is unremarkable, but this extended season of peace, concurrent with pan-European frameworks is not something without precedent. Similarly, the current era of peace cannot be misconstrued to mean that war is over for good. Europe has always gone through cycles of devastation, introspection, attempts at integration, and (just before all hell breaks loose) the prevailing sense that there is no way all hell could again break loose.
Indeed, it may be this false perception that has doomed Europe to Great War after Great War over the centuries—the calm before the storm. We are in the midst of an extended period of calm, and an intense period of integration. But to keep it going, we must study how some of the more recent periods ended.
Concert of Europe
Aside from the post-World Wars, the best example of a “long peace” can be found in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. Europe had just come through an exhausting period of upheaval, with the French Revolution and Battle of Waterloo bookending twenty-five years of near-constant conflict touching every single European state.
At this time, integration took the form of an alliance between Europe’s major powers. Organized by the Austrian statesman Klaus von Metternich, the Concert of Europe involved the victorious Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and the restored French monarchy—and by proxy, their satellites. At Congresses in the three decades after Waterloo, the informal organization smoothed over diplomatic squabbles that would previously have led to hostilities. Among these were differences over Belgium’s violent secession from the Netherlands, Greek independence from the Turks, and intervention in an early Spanish Civil War.
Mid-Century Conflict
It was the Revolutions of 1848 that ended this comity.
The Concert’s goal was to avoid war, and in order to do so, it sought to clamp down on the liberalism that had collapsed the old order, and the nationalism that had driven Napoleon’s takeover. By 1848, the memory of the Napoleonic Wars had faded, and radical ideas again took hold from Paris to Frankfurt to Budapest. Europe’s states survived intact, but the concessions of Europe’s monarchies made the Concert system essentially defunct.
The Crimean War, which pitted Britain, France and Turkey against Russia, was the first test in which the Concert failed—and miserably so. About 600,000 died in two and a half years, ending a forty-year period without major war. For two decades afterwards, Central Europe found itself a battleground for nationalist interests, without any central authority or consensus acting as a check on entropy.
Bismarckian System
Chaos reigned until the 1871 entry of a unified Germany as a balancing juggernaut. Concerned about his country’s vulnerable geographic position in Europe and eager to maintain its recent gains, Otto von Bismarck built the eponymous “Bismarckian System”—a web of alliances and understandings, mostly running through Berlin.
This period also coincided with the Scramble for Africa. The Congress of Berlin formally set the “rules” for European expansion into Africa, and by the turn of the century, what had been the so-called “dark” continent was now carved up. It was through this safety valve of controlled competition over Africa that Europe saw another forty-year period without any major power war. Of course, by 1914, Bismarck’s network of alliances had been sorted out into two camps. Four years and eighteen million deaths later, Europe lay in ruins—an entirely unexpected outcome by policymakers who thought a repeat of the lengthy Napoleonic Wars impossible.
Interwar Period
They were wrong, and by the end of the Great War, it was colloquially called “The War To End All Wars.” To provide some assurance that they were not really so sick as to go through the same thing again in twenty years, the League of Nations was born. Since the interwar period was the apex of Europe’s near-total global influence, it can be said that in some ways the League was a proto-European Union—especially since the United States took no part.
It gets a bad rap, but the League was more successful than is commonly acknowledged. Unlike after Waterloo, there was a sudden fragmentation of four major empires: German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian. Redrawing the map this time would be slightly more difficult, but through League Mandates, plebiscites, and interventions—both threatened and undertaken—the League managed to put out all the brush fires in the Great War’s wake.
There were still more good-faith showings of internationalism in those years. Often forgotten is the Kellogg-Briand Pact, an international renunciation of war. Obviously by 1939, that was no longer the case. But the League still accomplished its mission for a good fifteen years, much like the Concert did before and the EU does now. The difference? Since Versailles was more punitive than stabilizing, the undertaking was short-lived.
Post-World War II
It is logical to think that after World War II, the length of peace and the breadth of the follow-on institutions would be just as massive as the conflict itself.
But there were certainly other factors at work. European manpower resources having been depleted like almost never before, it fell to the U.S. and USSR to fill in the gap. This, of course, led to the Cold War—an ideological struggle that almost wholly trumped nationalism, putting the states of Europe into two clearly-defined teams. It was this rigid framework that allowed for the institutional hardening of pan-Europeanism, and not the other way around. Had World War II been concluded without outside intervention—and the stakes those powers claimed—it is easy to imagine yet another rerun again after the obligatory “breather”. Of course, that intervention did happen. And what began with a free trade agreement is now a continent-wide confederation.
Undeniably, there are significant differences between the modern European Union and its informal predecessors. It involves more more nations, and more bureaucracy, which means bureaucratic inertia. And, perhaps most of all, a hegemon is currently guaranteeing its cohesion. Though the threat of Soviet invasion no longer exists, Europe’s current reliance on the United States for defense means that the continent’s powers are, in the conventional sense, disarmed.
But even official confederations collapse if their constituent parts believe union is no longer in their interest. The large amount of autonomy retained by European Union members makes this a realistic possibility if things get rough. Obviously, it is a whole new ballgame should the Eurozone crisis break the EU, but there are some historical lessons to bear in mind as well:
Should the youth of Spain, Italy, Greece, or another budget-busted country blame Germany or France for their “lost generation”, we are suddenly in a similar dynamic to that post-Versailles. As World War II becomes a far-distant memory with the inevitable passing of that generation, the lessons learned from that time have to potential to be forgotten as well—just note the rising of ultra-nationalist parties in Greece and Hungary.
Should the United States pull back its military umbrella, Europe will again be responsible for its own defense. This means cutbacks to beloved social programs and a higher density of “native” arms on the continent—a Pandora’s box this generation has no experience with.
But the future is not fated to be divisive. A generation of Europeans with no memory of world war has not coincided with a non-Eurocentric world in centuries, so individual European states may find it better to stick together than to fall apart. Europe’s aging population represents a reversal of a classic war-inducing demographic dynamic, and it is a challenge European states are all facing together. And then we have an unexpected, new issue: Should the influx of Muslim immigration unify “Old” Europe against the new, the fractures of the 21st century may be across class and religious lines rather than geographic borders, which creates a whole host of problems on its own.
These factors may breathe a new relevance into the organization. Although history is a guide, there are no permanent cycles. If the EU can retain the relevance and structural “help” it has had, peace will probably continue as it facilitates Europe’s advance into the 21st century. If not, peace cannot be taken for granted.
Steve Keller is chief editor at the geostrategic consultancy firm Wikistrat and a freelance columnist. A graduate of Vassar College, he specializes in American politics and the history and legacy of imperialism. He is currently working on an international relations simulation game for the social media age.
This article was originally published in the special annual G8 Summit 2013 edition and The Official ICC G20 Advisory Group Publication. Published with permission.
Photo: Rock Cohen (cc).
a global affairs media network
The European Unions: Cycles of History
June 26, 2013
The Nobel Committee’s awarding of the Peace Prize to the European Union was met in some quarters with astonishment. After all, why reward the institution whose hastily-formed currency union now threatens to plunge the Western World into recession? (At least it was not a prize in economics.)
Others, including the Nobel Committee, pointed out that the European Union has done more to advance the cause of world peace than most anything in the 20th or 21st centuries. Sure, the institution is now teetering on the brink. But after millions dead and nations laid to waste in the first half of the 20th century, the integration of Europe’s fragmented nation-states in the latter half has brought a weary continent some unprecedented tranquility.
And they’re right—except about the unprecedented part.
Current European Union
When the European Union was founded, it was not the European Union. It all started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between France, Germany, Italy and the Low Countries—an economic union formed with the intent to, in the words of France’s foreign minister Robert Schuman, "make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible."
The ECSC was formed in 1952 and lasted until 2002, though the unity it brought paled in comparison to what it inspired: The framework drawn up then set the stage for the European Economic Community (EEC)—which joined European economies even further—and the European Union in 1993, which brought considerable integration to the political organs of the continent’s various nation-states. As the Iron Curtain retreated and Moscow’s influence waned, the European Union expanded east; now only a few nations remain outside of the organization.
Nevertheless, this has meant peace for Europe, and allowed two generations to live without knowing war like their parents and grandparents did.
It is not that this is unremarkable, but this extended season of peace, concurrent with pan-European frameworks is not something without precedent. Similarly, the current era of peace cannot be misconstrued to mean that war is over for good. Europe has always gone through cycles of devastation, introspection, attempts at integration, and (just before all hell breaks loose) the prevailing sense that there is no way all hell could again break loose.
Indeed, it may be this false perception that has doomed Europe to Great War after Great War over the centuries—the calm before the storm. We are in the midst of an extended period of calm, and an intense period of integration. But to keep it going, we must study how some of the more recent periods ended.
Concert of Europe
Aside from the post-World Wars, the best example of a “long peace” can be found in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. Europe had just come through an exhausting period of upheaval, with the French Revolution and Battle of Waterloo bookending twenty-five years of near-constant conflict touching every single European state.
At this time, integration took the form of an alliance between Europe’s major powers. Organized by the Austrian statesman Klaus von Metternich, the Concert of Europe involved the victorious Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and the restored French monarchy—and by proxy, their satellites. At Congresses in the three decades after Waterloo, the informal organization smoothed over diplomatic squabbles that would previously have led to hostilities. Among these were differences over Belgium’s violent secession from the Netherlands, Greek independence from the Turks, and intervention in an early Spanish Civil War.
Mid-Century Conflict
It was the Revolutions of 1848 that ended this comity.
The Concert’s goal was to avoid war, and in order to do so, it sought to clamp down on the liberalism that had collapsed the old order, and the nationalism that had driven Napoleon’s takeover. By 1848, the memory of the Napoleonic Wars had faded, and radical ideas again took hold from Paris to Frankfurt to Budapest. Europe’s states survived intact, but the concessions of Europe’s monarchies made the Concert system essentially defunct.
The Crimean War, which pitted Britain, France and Turkey against Russia, was the first test in which the Concert failed—and miserably so. About 600,000 died in two and a half years, ending a forty-year period without major war. For two decades afterwards, Central Europe found itself a battleground for nationalist interests, without any central authority or consensus acting as a check on entropy.
Bismarckian System
Chaos reigned until the 1871 entry of a unified Germany as a balancing juggernaut. Concerned about his country’s vulnerable geographic position in Europe and eager to maintain its recent gains, Otto von Bismarck built the eponymous “Bismarckian System”—a web of alliances and understandings, mostly running through Berlin.
This period also coincided with the Scramble for Africa. The Congress of Berlin formally set the “rules” for European expansion into Africa, and by the turn of the century, what had been the so-called “dark” continent was now carved up. It was through this safety valve of controlled competition over Africa that Europe saw another forty-year period without any major power war. Of course, by 1914, Bismarck’s network of alliances had been sorted out into two camps. Four years and eighteen million deaths later, Europe lay in ruins—an entirely unexpected outcome by policymakers who thought a repeat of the lengthy Napoleonic Wars impossible.
Interwar Period
They were wrong, and by the end of the Great War, it was colloquially called “The War To End All Wars.” To provide some assurance that they were not really so sick as to go through the same thing again in twenty years, the League of Nations was born. Since the interwar period was the apex of Europe’s near-total global influence, it can be said that in some ways the League was a proto-European Union—especially since the United States took no part.
It gets a bad rap, but the League was more successful than is commonly acknowledged. Unlike after Waterloo, there was a sudden fragmentation of four major empires: German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian. Redrawing the map this time would be slightly more difficult, but through League Mandates, plebiscites, and interventions—both threatened and undertaken—the League managed to put out all the brush fires in the Great War’s wake.
There were still more good-faith showings of internationalism in those years. Often forgotten is the Kellogg-Briand Pact, an international renunciation of war. Obviously by 1939, that was no longer the case. But the League still accomplished its mission for a good fifteen years, much like the Concert did before and the EU does now. The difference? Since Versailles was more punitive than stabilizing, the undertaking was short-lived.
Post-World War II
It is logical to think that after World War II, the length of peace and the breadth of the follow-on institutions would be just as massive as the conflict itself.
But there were certainly other factors at work. European manpower resources having been depleted like almost never before, it fell to the U.S. and USSR to fill in the gap. This, of course, led to the Cold War—an ideological struggle that almost wholly trumped nationalism, putting the states of Europe into two clearly-defined teams. It was this rigid framework that allowed for the institutional hardening of pan-Europeanism, and not the other way around. Had World War II been concluded without outside intervention—and the stakes those powers claimed—it is easy to imagine yet another rerun again after the obligatory “breather”. Of course, that intervention did happen. And what began with a free trade agreement is now a continent-wide confederation.
Undeniably, there are significant differences between the modern European Union and its informal predecessors. It involves more more nations, and more bureaucracy, which means bureaucratic inertia. And, perhaps most of all, a hegemon is currently guaranteeing its cohesion. Though the threat of Soviet invasion no longer exists, Europe’s current reliance on the United States for defense means that the continent’s powers are, in the conventional sense, disarmed.
But even official confederations collapse if their constituent parts believe union is no longer in their interest. The large amount of autonomy retained by European Union members makes this a realistic possibility if things get rough. Obviously, it is a whole new ballgame should the Eurozone crisis break the EU, but there are some historical lessons to bear in mind as well:
Should the youth of Spain, Italy, Greece, or another budget-busted country blame Germany or France for their “lost generation”, we are suddenly in a similar dynamic to that post-Versailles. As World War II becomes a far-distant memory with the inevitable passing of that generation, the lessons learned from that time have to potential to be forgotten as well—just note the rising of ultra-nationalist parties in Greece and Hungary.
Should the United States pull back its military umbrella, Europe will again be responsible for its own defense. This means cutbacks to beloved social programs and a higher density of “native” arms on the continent—a Pandora’s box this generation has no experience with.
But the future is not fated to be divisive. A generation of Europeans with no memory of world war has not coincided with a non-Eurocentric world in centuries, so individual European states may find it better to stick together than to fall apart. Europe’s aging population represents a reversal of a classic war-inducing demographic dynamic, and it is a challenge European states are all facing together. And then we have an unexpected, new issue: Should the influx of Muslim immigration unify “Old” Europe against the new, the fractures of the 21st century may be across class and religious lines rather than geographic borders, which creates a whole host of problems on its own.
These factors may breathe a new relevance into the organization. Although history is a guide, there are no permanent cycles. If the EU can retain the relevance and structural “help” it has had, peace will probably continue as it facilitates Europe’s advance into the 21st century. If not, peace cannot be taken for granted.
Steve Keller is chief editor at the geostrategic consultancy firm Wikistrat and a freelance columnist. A graduate of Vassar College, he specializes in American politics and the history and legacy of imperialism. He is currently working on an international relations simulation game for the social media age.
This article was originally published in the special annual G8 Summit 2013 edition and The Official ICC G20 Advisory Group Publication. Published with permission.
Photo: Rock Cohen (cc).
