During the fragile presidency of Isabel Martínez de Perón from 1974 to 1976, the Anticommunist Alliance of Argentina was born. A paramilitary coalition empowered by the rising influence of the military, the Triple Alliance slowly began to eliminate the “left-wing subversion” of the Argentine populace. When the political climate was ripe, Isabel was ousted in on March 24, 1976, and the military dictatorship was declared over Argentine radio.
The goal of the dictatorship was not just to eliminate political opposition; it was to directly influence the values and ideas that would shape Argentina’s future. The National Reorganization Process—or, “the Process,” as it had become known—was meant to gain control of the state by silencing the claims of the workers, students, and middle class sectors through repression. The dictatorship censored the media, striped down the education system, intervened in social organizations, dissolved political parties, and detained the opposition. The detained were distributed throughout 650 clandestine locations nation wide—centers similar to the Nazi concentration camps—some of which were in plain view in the middle of major Argentine cities.
This clandestine repression was organized in 4 steps: kidnapping, torture, detention, and execution of the opposition and the “suspicious.” “Work groups” of about three people were sent with orders to kidnap individuals and bring them to the clandestine centers. There, the detainees would be tortured for information and held in captivity before many were killed and their bodies disappeared. In total, estimates show that about 30,000 people were disappeared or killed from 1975 to 1983, with the majority of the kidnappings taking place between 1976 and 1978. Declassified and leaked documents of governments all over the continent confirm that during this time, South American dictatorships were working in concert to eradicate political opposition—a plan known as Operation Condor. In this way, the dictatorships claimed they would discipline society, reorder economies, and exterminate the “guerrilla.” However, it was accepted well before 1983 that the vast majority of those detained were innocent and unarmed.
The coordination of Operation Condor is often attributed to the education that almost all of the era’s South American dictators received in the United States. During the Cold War, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, now known as Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), was tasked with teaching anti-communist counterinsurgency training to Latin American government personnel. Although these teachings coincided with the timeline of the human rights atrocities in the Southern Cone, WHINSEC maintains that the school is not accountable for the actions of students outside the classroom. What this does tell, though, is the direct influence the United States has had on human rights in Latin American. After President Carter was elected, support for the junta faltered and in 1979 the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights came to Argentina.
However, this is not to say that Argentine society is not also culpable for the emergence of such a dictatorship or for the return of democracy years later. The Argentine people—with a few exceptions—were both the victims and the accomplices in this reign of terror. “They must have done something” (“algo habrán hecho”) became the most commonly used phrase among bystanders witnessing these kidnappings. The Catholic Church also played a role, sharing information from confessionals with the government and hiding victims from the Commission. But little by little, human rights organizations such as the Mothers of May Plaza (las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo) began to make international waves. From such efforts, more attention was given to the issue as it was happening, and the Commission was compelled to verify the complaints.
As expected, the Commission made the clandestine centers panic and much of the evidence of state sponsored terrorism was destroyed. However when the Commission arrived, hundreds of Argentine families lined up to denounce the dictatorship and its actions. This led to the publication of the first report that verified the human rights violations of the junta. The Argentine dictatorship called this period of human rights abuses the “Dirty War,” but Argentines today argue that what happened during those seven years was nothing like a war. The methods used to suppress “subversion” were indeed “dirty,” but there were no two groups in confrontation.
During the dictatorship, most nations understood terrorism as the actions of an individual. It was not easily understood that the “individual” committing these crimes against humanity was the Argentine state itself. The lack of understanding surrounding the aggressor and the “war” misnomer that was attached to the period only deepened the harm done. In an effort to make sense of what had happened once the dictatorship ended in 1983, the “Theory of Two Demons” emerged. This maintained the idea that there were in fact two opposing sides to the conflict, which in some way justified the state’s severe and oppressive response. Soon after, in the late 1980s, more human rights movements in Argentina started to gain momentum, and the idea of the “victim” became more widespread. This painted a picture of the state as the heavy-handed aggressor and “the disappeared” (los desaparecidos) as the powerless target. Then in 1995, the Children for the Identity and Justice Against Forgetting and Silence (HIJOS) shifted the paradigm altogether. The dead and disappeared were not only remembered as victims, but as people and as activists; with lives and hopes for a better Argentina.
Still today, though, many do not wish to remember the dead and disappeared as strong political activists that may have posed a threat to the dictatorship. While this does not in any way justify the atrocities committed by the junta from 1976 to 1983, there are organizations in Argentina that wish to discuss the activism exercised by those victims, some armed, others not. Such political activism during that period is no longer looked down upon—as it had been immediately after the dictatorship—but it may be too fresh in the minds of Argentines to consider that the state was indeed trying to combat what it saw as subversion.
The current Argentine education system addresses the historical perspective of the dictatorship, discussing what happened and why it was done. But now Argentina is working on understanding the regional and international implications of the dictatorship and the impact Argentines have on the memory of those who never returned home. Overall, it seems that the role of the international community during this period is generally idealized. There’s no prescription for human rights abuses. The UN can only intervene in cases involving signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or when there is an ethnically motivated conflict. From 1976 to 1983, the systematic disappearing and murder of Argentineans was politically motivated, and Argentina was not a signatory to the Declaration. Even if the international community had known about what was happening all over the Southern Cone—and many argue that it did—Argentines are doubtful that much would have been done to prevent it.
Today, justice for the disappeared is the one common link between all Argentine administrations. But in the Spanish language, there is no word for “accountability.” Ernesto Cussianovich, professor at the University of Palermo, argues that because the word does not exist here, neither does the concept. Thus the people responsible for these disappearances will not be held accountable. The word desaparecidos, or disappeared, however, is a word that resonates with all Argentines. It is a word that carries history, memories, shame, and sometimes hope for the future.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2014 print edition.
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The “Dirty War” That Was Less War and More Dirty
November 24, 2014
During the fragile presidency of Isabel Martínez de Perón from 1974 to 1976, the Anticommunist Alliance of Argentina was born. A paramilitary coalition empowered by the rising influence of the military, the Triple Alliance slowly began to eliminate the “left-wing subversion” of the Argentine populace. When the political climate was ripe, Isabel was ousted in on March 24, 1976, and the military dictatorship was declared over Argentine radio.
The goal of the dictatorship was not just to eliminate political opposition; it was to directly influence the values and ideas that would shape Argentina’s future. The National Reorganization Process—or, “the Process,” as it had become known—was meant to gain control of the state by silencing the claims of the workers, students, and middle class sectors through repression. The dictatorship censored the media, striped down the education system, intervened in social organizations, dissolved political parties, and detained the opposition. The detained were distributed throughout 650 clandestine locations nation wide—centers similar to the Nazi concentration camps—some of which were in plain view in the middle of major Argentine cities.
This clandestine repression was organized in 4 steps: kidnapping, torture, detention, and execution of the opposition and the “suspicious.” “Work groups” of about three people were sent with orders to kidnap individuals and bring them to the clandestine centers. There, the detainees would be tortured for information and held in captivity before many were killed and their bodies disappeared. In total, estimates show that about 30,000 people were disappeared or killed from 1975 to 1983, with the majority of the kidnappings taking place between 1976 and 1978. Declassified and leaked documents of governments all over the continent confirm that during this time, South American dictatorships were working in concert to eradicate political opposition—a plan known as Operation Condor. In this way, the dictatorships claimed they would discipline society, reorder economies, and exterminate the “guerrilla.” However, it was accepted well before 1983 that the vast majority of those detained were innocent and unarmed.
The coordination of Operation Condor is often attributed to the education that almost all of the era’s South American dictators received in the United States. During the Cold War, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, now known as Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), was tasked with teaching anti-communist counterinsurgency training to Latin American government personnel. Although these teachings coincided with the timeline of the human rights atrocities in the Southern Cone, WHINSEC maintains that the school is not accountable for the actions of students outside the classroom. What this does tell, though, is the direct influence the United States has had on human rights in Latin American. After President Carter was elected, support for the junta faltered and in 1979 the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights came to Argentina.
However, this is not to say that Argentine society is not also culpable for the emergence of such a dictatorship or for the return of democracy years later. The Argentine people—with a few exceptions—were both the victims and the accomplices in this reign of terror. “They must have done something” (“algo habrán hecho”) became the most commonly used phrase among bystanders witnessing these kidnappings. The Catholic Church also played a role, sharing information from confessionals with the government and hiding victims from the Commission. But little by little, human rights organizations such as the Mothers of May Plaza (las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo) began to make international waves. From such efforts, more attention was given to the issue as it was happening, and the Commission was compelled to verify the complaints.
As expected, the Commission made the clandestine centers panic and much of the evidence of state sponsored terrorism was destroyed. However when the Commission arrived, hundreds of Argentine families lined up to denounce the dictatorship and its actions. This led to the publication of the first report that verified the human rights violations of the junta. The Argentine dictatorship called this period of human rights abuses the “Dirty War,” but Argentines today argue that what happened during those seven years was nothing like a war. The methods used to suppress “subversion” were indeed “dirty,” but there were no two groups in confrontation.
During the dictatorship, most nations understood terrorism as the actions of an individual. It was not easily understood that the “individual” committing these crimes against humanity was the Argentine state itself. The lack of understanding surrounding the aggressor and the “war” misnomer that was attached to the period only deepened the harm done. In an effort to make sense of what had happened once the dictatorship ended in 1983, the “Theory of Two Demons” emerged. This maintained the idea that there were in fact two opposing sides to the conflict, which in some way justified the state’s severe and oppressive response. Soon after, in the late 1980s, more human rights movements in Argentina started to gain momentum, and the idea of the “victim” became more widespread. This painted a picture of the state as the heavy-handed aggressor and “the disappeared” (los desaparecidos) as the powerless target. Then in 1995, the Children for the Identity and Justice Against Forgetting and Silence (HIJOS) shifted the paradigm altogether. The dead and disappeared were not only remembered as victims, but as people and as activists; with lives and hopes for a better Argentina.
Still today, though, many do not wish to remember the dead and disappeared as strong political activists that may have posed a threat to the dictatorship. While this does not in any way justify the atrocities committed by the junta from 1976 to 1983, there are organizations in Argentina that wish to discuss the activism exercised by those victims, some armed, others not. Such political activism during that period is no longer looked down upon—as it had been immediately after the dictatorship—but it may be too fresh in the minds of Argentines to consider that the state was indeed trying to combat what it saw as subversion.
The current Argentine education system addresses the historical perspective of the dictatorship, discussing what happened and why it was done. But now Argentina is working on understanding the regional and international implications of the dictatorship and the impact Argentines have on the memory of those who never returned home. Overall, it seems that the role of the international community during this period is generally idealized. There’s no prescription for human rights abuses. The UN can only intervene in cases involving signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or when there is an ethnically motivated conflict. From 1976 to 1983, the systematic disappearing and murder of Argentineans was politically motivated, and Argentina was not a signatory to the Declaration. Even if the international community had known about what was happening all over the Southern Cone—and many argue that it did—Argentines are doubtful that much would have been done to prevent it.
Today, justice for the disappeared is the one common link between all Argentine administrations. But in the Spanish language, there is no word for “accountability.” Ernesto Cussianovich, professor at the University of Palermo, argues that because the word does not exist here, neither does the concept. Thus the people responsible for these disappearances will not be held accountable. The word desaparecidos, or disappeared, however, is a word that resonates with all Argentines. It is a word that carries history, memories, shame, and sometimes hope for the future.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2014 print edition.
