The Arab Spring has now reached the authoritarian and notoriously repressive Syria, long thought immune to such large scale protests and riots that have now shaken the hold of Bashar al Assad’s Baathist regime.
As the Syrian security services oppress demonstrations with Ghaddafi style brutality, the world and particularly the United States are put in the now familiar position of what stance should be taken in response the Syrian regime’s repression. The measures in question would be whether policy changes should be implemented in the event that protests intensify even further or if the Assad regime were to fall. What needs to be understood first, however, are the historical, cultural, and geographic differences between Syria and the Arab Spring’s previous authoritarian victims: Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Fully understanding these differences will allow the United States and the international community to craft a new Syria policy that will prepare national and international security for the possibilities that arise from a full blown Syrian uprising.
The Assad regime has been in power for 48 years, a family from the Alawite religious minority running a Sunni Muslim majority country that sits at the heart of the Near East and its web of conflicts. It has kept a lid on dissent via intimidation, indoctrination, and brutal force, the latter of which was seen during the Hama crackdown in 1982. The Assad regime has made Syria’s foreign policy deeply anti-Western, anti-Israeli, and pro-Iranian, funding terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah for decades. It has also played a major role in the chaos that reigned over neighboring Lebanon during its long civil war in the 1980s, occupying that country for over two decades.
Syria’s geographic position is extremely significant when looking at the unrest sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. Bordering the regions closest to U.S. ally Israel, as well as Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, the unraveling of the Assad regime will undoubtedly be messy, as regional neighbors could be drawn into the fray. Moreover, the sectarian makeup of Syria is much different than those of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. While Egypt possesses a sizeable Christian minority, most Coptic Christians were not closely allied to former President Hosni Mubarak. Therefore, Christians were never a particular target that the majority of the Egyptian population could turn against. In the case of Libya, Ghaddafi’s family and tribe were favored in running all major political, economic and defense posts within his regime, thus the potential for a tribal conflict taking root once the rebels manage to depose Libya’s infamous dictator does exist. A conflict such as this would likely be bloody, yet would remain tribal and localized.
Assad’s Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam composes 12% of the Syrian population. The Alawites maintain strong support from the Christian community, and other smaller minorities that further make up 13% of Syria’s population. If Assad’s regime were to be toppled, the Alawites and Christians could find themselves targeted by the majority of the population, opening dangerous sectarian rifts within the country. These religious minorities have everything to lose should Assad’s grip weaken further, so it should be expected that they will defend the regime fiercely. The tribal makeup of Syria’s social structure and the deep class divisions, based along sectarian lines, add a new dynamic that combines the instability of Libya, Yemen, and Egypt into one volatile mix. This potential was on display in the multi religious city of Latakia in recent weeks
President Obama, along with the international community, must approach the Syrian uprising as they did with others in recent months, which was with cautious optimism. Unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, Bashar al Assad’s regime is one of the most anti-American and anti-Western regimes in the world. His removal from power would provide Syria with a historic opportunity to enter the global economy, and open up its population to the potential political, social, and cultural wealth that a non-authoritarian system could bring. It would also effectively break Iran’s foothold in the region, and leave Hezbollah isolated and vulnerable, potentially kick starting the Arab-Israeli peace process into a new direction.
Assad’s removal could equally push Syria into a period of intense instability that could take on sectarian overtones and provide great challenges for the Syrian people and the region. With no strong opposition parties, and a lack of homegrown non-governmental organizations operating on the ground, Syria is more prone than Egypt to enter a cycle of violence. The potential for Islamists to take advantage of the situation is quite possible considering they are the most repressed under Assad’s regime and also have the potential to unify the tribal elements of the country under the banner of Islam. If such a scenario were to take place, the implications for Syria’s minorities, and for neighboring Lebanon and Israel would be grave.
The Assad regime, in a desperate attempt to hold onto power could intensify its crackdown, prompting calls for a no fly zone, sanctions, and international intervention, which in turn could be met with a wave of terror unleashed by Assad via Hezbollah and Hamas onto the region. These developments would inevitably draw Lebanon and Israel into the power vacuum that would ensue should he be toppled. These scenarios are very real and the United States must prepare for Syria’s potential descent into violence since its geographic proximity to some of the region’s most unstable or fragile societies with deep historical grievances could have a major impact on U.S. national security and our interests in the region.
Syria’s uprising is still in its preliminary stages, which gives the international community time to craft a policy in dealing with the aforementioned situations that could result once the uprising matures. The United States along with a coalition composed of the European Union and France, the latter of which has warmed up to the Assad regime in recent years can put pressure on Assad to implement real reforms if he wants to avoid the chaos that could result should he continue to ignore the growing protest movement.
Turkey and Jordan, despite their reluctance to be involved in the intervention in Libya, have a vital interest in making sure Syria does not slip into chaos and become another Iraq right on their doorstep. Saudi Arabia, afraid of seeing another authoritarian regime fall in the region, also has an interest in at least keeping stability in Syria should the protest movement become irreversible, and has much at stake should the violence spread to neighboring Lebanon, where the Saudis have huge financial, political, and ideological investments. A fragmented and violent Syria would leave these neighbors overwhelmed and prompt them to join the Europeans and the U.S. in remedying the situation.
The first order of business would be to pressure Assad into completely lifting the despised emergency laws in place, fulfilling a main demand of the protesters. Doing so would ease the internal pressure on Assad and much to his delight; prevent calls from the international community for intervention. Furthermore, the results of the international tribunal investigating the assassination of Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri should not be forgotten. Should the tribunal issue indictments against Bashar al Assad himself, or key individuals within his ruling circle, the result would be immense pressure placed on him from the international community and a point of leverage in negotiations if Assad fails to lift the emergency laws and halt the killings of protesters.
Should Assad initiate Hamas style massacres against his own people, the U.S., UN, and the EU could issue targeted sanctions against individuals in his regime and security services engaged in human rights violations, along with tightening existing sanctions against Syria proper. Such sanctions would further hurt Syria since it lacks the natural resources of its neighbors and relies on imports of food and energy needs. If the uprising takes on a sectarian nature, then Syria’s neighbors and possibly the Arab League would be forced to engage Assad’s regime militarily to prevent mass atrocities from taking place and reduce the chances of the instability spreading into a regional conflagration. The risks that arise from not using the military option against Assad far outweigh complacency in the event that Syria’s uprising takes a turn for the worst and involves mass atrocities.
Weighing these various options should help the United States and the international community to contain a full blown Syrian uprising, avoiding its morphing into a sectarian free for all, and protect our vital interests in the region such as the security of Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The end result of a weakened Assad regime could also prove very beneficial to the U.S. and Israel if managed correctly and carefully.
a global affairs media network
The Damascus Spring
April 16, 2011
The Arab Spring has now reached the authoritarian and notoriously repressive Syria, long thought immune to such large scale protests and riots that have now shaken the hold of Bashar al Assad’s Baathist regime.
As the Syrian security services oppress demonstrations with Ghaddafi style brutality, the world and particularly the United States are put in the now familiar position of what stance should be taken in response the Syrian regime’s repression. The measures in question would be whether policy changes should be implemented in the event that protests intensify even further or if the Assad regime were to fall. What needs to be understood first, however, are the historical, cultural, and geographic differences between Syria and the Arab Spring’s previous authoritarian victims: Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Fully understanding these differences will allow the United States and the international community to craft a new Syria policy that will prepare national and international security for the possibilities that arise from a full blown Syrian uprising.
The Assad regime has been in power for 48 years, a family from the Alawite religious minority running a Sunni Muslim majority country that sits at the heart of the Near East and its web of conflicts. It has kept a lid on dissent via intimidation, indoctrination, and brutal force, the latter of which was seen during the Hama crackdown in 1982. The Assad regime has made Syria’s foreign policy deeply anti-Western, anti-Israeli, and pro-Iranian, funding terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah for decades. It has also played a major role in the chaos that reigned over neighboring Lebanon during its long civil war in the 1980s, occupying that country for over two decades.
Syria’s geographic position is extremely significant when looking at the unrest sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. Bordering the regions closest to U.S. ally Israel, as well as Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, the unraveling of the Assad regime will undoubtedly be messy, as regional neighbors could be drawn into the fray. Moreover, the sectarian makeup of Syria is much different than those of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. While Egypt possesses a sizeable Christian minority, most Coptic Christians were not closely allied to former President Hosni Mubarak. Therefore, Christians were never a particular target that the majority of the Egyptian population could turn against. In the case of Libya, Ghaddafi’s family and tribe were favored in running all major political, economic and defense posts within his regime, thus the potential for a tribal conflict taking root once the rebels manage to depose Libya’s infamous dictator does exist. A conflict such as this would likely be bloody, yet would remain tribal and localized.
Assad’s Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam composes 12% of the Syrian population. The Alawites maintain strong support from the Christian community, and other smaller minorities that further make up 13% of Syria’s population. If Assad’s regime were to be toppled, the Alawites and Christians could find themselves targeted by the majority of the population, opening dangerous sectarian rifts within the country. These religious minorities have everything to lose should Assad’s grip weaken further, so it should be expected that they will defend the regime fiercely. The tribal makeup of Syria’s social structure and the deep class divisions, based along sectarian lines, add a new dynamic that combines the instability of Libya, Yemen, and Egypt into one volatile mix. This potential was on display in the multi religious city of Latakia in recent weeks
President Obama, along with the international community, must approach the Syrian uprising as they did with others in recent months, which was with cautious optimism. Unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, Bashar al Assad’s regime is one of the most anti-American and anti-Western regimes in the world. His removal from power would provide Syria with a historic opportunity to enter the global economy, and open up its population to the potential political, social, and cultural wealth that a non-authoritarian system could bring. It would also effectively break Iran’s foothold in the region, and leave Hezbollah isolated and vulnerable, potentially kick starting the Arab-Israeli peace process into a new direction.
Assad’s removal could equally push Syria into a period of intense instability that could take on sectarian overtones and provide great challenges for the Syrian people and the region. With no strong opposition parties, and a lack of homegrown non-governmental organizations operating on the ground, Syria is more prone than Egypt to enter a cycle of violence. The potential for Islamists to take advantage of the situation is quite possible considering they are the most repressed under Assad’s regime and also have the potential to unify the tribal elements of the country under the banner of Islam. If such a scenario were to take place, the implications for Syria’s minorities, and for neighboring Lebanon and Israel would be grave.
The Assad regime, in a desperate attempt to hold onto power could intensify its crackdown, prompting calls for a no fly zone, sanctions, and international intervention, which in turn could be met with a wave of terror unleashed by Assad via Hezbollah and Hamas onto the region. These developments would inevitably draw Lebanon and Israel into the power vacuum that would ensue should he be toppled. These scenarios are very real and the United States must prepare for Syria’s potential descent into violence since its geographic proximity to some of the region’s most unstable or fragile societies with deep historical grievances could have a major impact on U.S. national security and our interests in the region.
Syria’s uprising is still in its preliminary stages, which gives the international community time to craft a policy in dealing with the aforementioned situations that could result once the uprising matures. The United States along with a coalition composed of the European Union and France, the latter of which has warmed up to the Assad regime in recent years can put pressure on Assad to implement real reforms if he wants to avoid the chaos that could result should he continue to ignore the growing protest movement.
Turkey and Jordan, despite their reluctance to be involved in the intervention in Libya, have a vital interest in making sure Syria does not slip into chaos and become another Iraq right on their doorstep. Saudi Arabia, afraid of seeing another authoritarian regime fall in the region, also has an interest in at least keeping stability in Syria should the protest movement become irreversible, and has much at stake should the violence spread to neighboring Lebanon, where the Saudis have huge financial, political, and ideological investments. A fragmented and violent Syria would leave these neighbors overwhelmed and prompt them to join the Europeans and the U.S. in remedying the situation.
The first order of business would be to pressure Assad into completely lifting the despised emergency laws in place, fulfilling a main demand of the protesters. Doing so would ease the internal pressure on Assad and much to his delight; prevent calls from the international community for intervention. Furthermore, the results of the international tribunal investigating the assassination of Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri should not be forgotten. Should the tribunal issue indictments against Bashar al Assad himself, or key individuals within his ruling circle, the result would be immense pressure placed on him from the international community and a point of leverage in negotiations if Assad fails to lift the emergency laws and halt the killings of protesters.
Should Assad initiate Hamas style massacres against his own people, the U.S., UN, and the EU could issue targeted sanctions against individuals in his regime and security services engaged in human rights violations, along with tightening existing sanctions against Syria proper. Such sanctions would further hurt Syria since it lacks the natural resources of its neighbors and relies on imports of food and energy needs. If the uprising takes on a sectarian nature, then Syria’s neighbors and possibly the Arab League would be forced to engage Assad’s regime militarily to prevent mass atrocities from taking place and reduce the chances of the instability spreading into a regional conflagration. The risks that arise from not using the military option against Assad far outweigh complacency in the event that Syria’s uprising takes a turn for the worst and involves mass atrocities.
Weighing these various options should help the United States and the international community to contain a full blown Syrian uprising, avoiding its morphing into a sectarian free for all, and protect our vital interests in the region such as the security of Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The end result of a weakened Assad regime could also prove very beneficial to the U.S. and Israel if managed correctly and carefully.
