n August 2021, the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan after a 20–year insurgency following the U.S.–led invasion of 2001. At that time, the Taliban regime was supporting Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. When they returned to power, the Taliban reassured the international community they were eager to fight terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban have reneged on these promises because they rely on many terrorist groups to maintain control of the country. This situation has hurt their ties with Central Asian countries such as China and Russia.
The majority of Central Asian countries, especially those not sharing a border with Afghanistan, like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, engaged with the Taliban after their return to power. Their realpolitik approach aims to provide the Taliban with political support in exchange for commitments to restore security in Afghanistan. However, according to the 2023 Global Terrorism Index, terrorist incidents, fatalities, and injuries have increased in Afghanistan compared with the previous year.
Kazakhstan, for example, has been looking for new partners since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and sees Afghanistan as a strategic hub for connecting to the South Asian market. Its security concerns are limited because it does not directly share borders with Afghanistan. Last year, Kazakhstan made significant efforts to improve bilateral ties by accrediting Taliban envoys and removing the Taliban from its list of banned organizations.
On the contrary, the Taliban has long sheltered members of Jamaat Ansarullah, a terrorist group aiming to overthrow the neighboring Tajikistan state. That's why the Tajiki government proposed establishing a security belt around Afghanistan during a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) meeting in 2023—a request later rejected by the Taliban.
Great powers like China and Russia have experienced similar troubled relations with the Taliban. Beijing is concerned with groups like the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) that have built their strongholds in Afghanistan. China granted political support to the Taliban—such as accepting their ambassador to Beijing—in exchange for the pledge to fight these groups. Moscow also strengthened economic ties, especially in trade and investments, with the Taliban. Russia hopes the Taliban can counter ISIS–K, which is the only terrorist group that the Taliban is actively fighting. However, data shows that ISIS–K attacks in Afghanistan have become more deadly and destructive since the Taliban's return in August 2021.
Overall, all these countries have avoided strong condemnation of the Taliban's human rights abuses, especially those against women and minority groups. Instead, they tried to reduce the insecurity level in Afghanistan, which is the real issue influencing the Taliban's regional role at the moment. Afghanistan's domestic market is too poor, and its leadership is unreliable to boost bilateral trade significantly or develop infrastructure projects that capitalize on the country's strategic location connecting Central to Southern Asia—even if the Trans–Afghan railway linking Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan is currently under evaluation.
Taliban–Central Asia ties will most likely evolve along this pattern in the short term, even if there are no signals that the Taliban will make a serious effort to restore order in Afghanistan. The Taliban have reneged on their promises and indirectly increased the level of insecurity in the region due to their reliance on domestic terror groups like Al Qaeda to maintain political and military control over Afghanistan. In fact, their very existence is directly linked to destabilizing groups in their territory. Improving relations with Central Asian countries would thus mean decreasing control over internal affairs, a risk that the Taliban does not seem willing to take—at least in the short term.
a global affairs media network
The Taliban’s return, broken promises, and evolving Central Asian ties
May 7, 2024
The Taliban promised to fight terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, but has failed to live up to that promise. This failure comes despite political support from Central Asian neighbors who have hoped to make the Taliban a partner in combating terrorist networks, writes Elia Preto Martini.
I
n August 2021, the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan after a 20–year insurgency following the U.S.–led invasion of 2001. At that time, the Taliban regime was supporting Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. When they returned to power, the Taliban reassured the international community they were eager to fight terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban have reneged on these promises because they rely on many terrorist groups to maintain control of the country. This situation has hurt their ties with Central Asian countries such as China and Russia.
The majority of Central Asian countries, especially those not sharing a border with Afghanistan, like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, engaged with the Taliban after their return to power. Their realpolitik approach aims to provide the Taliban with political support in exchange for commitments to restore security in Afghanistan. However, according to the 2023 Global Terrorism Index, terrorist incidents, fatalities, and injuries have increased in Afghanistan compared with the previous year.
Kazakhstan, for example, has been looking for new partners since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and sees Afghanistan as a strategic hub for connecting to the South Asian market. Its security concerns are limited because it does not directly share borders with Afghanistan. Last year, Kazakhstan made significant efforts to improve bilateral ties by accrediting Taliban envoys and removing the Taliban from its list of banned organizations.
On the contrary, the Taliban has long sheltered members of Jamaat Ansarullah, a terrorist group aiming to overthrow the neighboring Tajikistan state. That's why the Tajiki government proposed establishing a security belt around Afghanistan during a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) meeting in 2023—a request later rejected by the Taliban.
Great powers like China and Russia have experienced similar troubled relations with the Taliban. Beijing is concerned with groups like the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) that have built their strongholds in Afghanistan. China granted political support to the Taliban—such as accepting their ambassador to Beijing—in exchange for the pledge to fight these groups. Moscow also strengthened economic ties, especially in trade and investments, with the Taliban. Russia hopes the Taliban can counter ISIS–K, which is the only terrorist group that the Taliban is actively fighting. However, data shows that ISIS–K attacks in Afghanistan have become more deadly and destructive since the Taliban's return in August 2021.
Overall, all these countries have avoided strong condemnation of the Taliban's human rights abuses, especially those against women and minority groups. Instead, they tried to reduce the insecurity level in Afghanistan, which is the real issue influencing the Taliban's regional role at the moment. Afghanistan's domestic market is too poor, and its leadership is unreliable to boost bilateral trade significantly or develop infrastructure projects that capitalize on the country's strategic location connecting Central to Southern Asia—even if the Trans–Afghan railway linking Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan is currently under evaluation.
Taliban–Central Asia ties will most likely evolve along this pattern in the short term, even if there are no signals that the Taliban will make a serious effort to restore order in Afghanistan. The Taliban have reneged on their promises and indirectly increased the level of insecurity in the region due to their reliance on domestic terror groups like Al Qaeda to maintain political and military control over Afghanistan. In fact, their very existence is directly linked to destabilizing groups in their territory. Improving relations with Central Asian countries would thus mean decreasing control over internal affairs, a risk that the Taliban does not seem willing to take—at least in the short term.
