When it comes to questions of territorial sovereignty, Taiwan has never been shy about making bold, even antagonistic accusations against the Chinese mainland. Cyber territory is no exception. According to a report lately published by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, the PRC is behind a growing number of cyberintrusions targeting its government and corporate networks—more than a million during the first half of this year alone.
To many, the accusations are not surprising. It is well known that China has been aggressively evolving its Integrated Network Electronic Warfare strategy for over a decade now. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) created a sizable cyberwarfare unit in the mid 1990s. Since then, it has purportedly used computer hacking and viruses to target political, economic and military assets in Taiwan and a host of other countries, including the United States. A report prepared for the U.S.-China Security Review Commission by Northrop Grumman claims that Chinese state-affiliated and state-sponsored entities appear to be responsible for a growing number of cyberintrusions in the United States. According to the defense contractor, numerous intrusions seem to be probing for vulnerabilities in America’s telecommunications supply chain and critical infrastructure systems.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has taken note. While making deep cuts to other programs, it has proposed a plan in its 2013 budget recommendation, sent to the Legislative Yuan for approval, that would see its information warfare strategy expanded over the next five years. The plan calls for the Communication Electronics and Information Bureau to be augmented by a new special task force able to prevent and control malicious attacks on military and civilian networks. The task force would be set up and trained in an experimental facility that simulates cyberattacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure: its electrical power grid, natural gas and petroleum pipelines, nuclear power facilities, water treatment plants, railways, and highways.
It remains unclear to what extent the PLA or ministries of the Chinese government are behind the rising incidents of hacking in Taiwan and other countries. The U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive says that “Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage” via the internet, and that the U.S. has been subjected to an “onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China.” Google, Lockheed, DuPont, and several major multinational oil companies believe they have fallen victim to Chinese hacking and lost valuable technological, scientific, and trade secrets as a result.
But much of the evidence implicating the Chinese government—the evidence made public, at least—remains circumstantial. Establishing linkages between network intrusions and a Chinese state-sanctioned directive is difficult, even when intrusions are detected and monitored. Identifying a perpetrator is becoming more elusive with the proliferation of civilian hacker groups in China, the world’s biggest cybercommunity, and also with the advent of increasingly sophisticated portable IT devices that make it harder to pinpoint the source of an attack. In 2009, researchers from the Munk Institute in Toronto, Canada, released a report in which they claim to have discovered a large-scale international hacking operation with apparent—though not conclusive—connections to PLA command and control. Beijing denies any involvement, calling such accusations unfounded and attributing China-based cyberattacks to civilian “hacktivists” or American propaganda.
Industrial cyberespionage, of course, is not the same thing as cyberwarfare. Nevertheless, observers feel that China’s movements on this field are a good gauge of its cyberwarfare capabilities and intentions. Not only do the two share similar technical foundations, but China seems to have decidedly integrated cyberwarfare into its economic development program. Economic development is itself considered a key component in the PRC’s longer-term national defense strategy, a deterrent to foreign encroachment on its territorial claims and global economic interests, as well as a way to legitimize and sustain one-party rule.
Taiwan’s cyberwarfare plan follows in the footsteps of additional funding that the U.S. has earmarked for military, intelligence, and homeland security programs set up to counter a perceived threat from China. It is also part of a broader push to modernize Taiwan’s military by enhancing asymmetrical warfare capabilities. These capabilities include improved all-frequency electronic detection, mobile land-based long-range surface-to-surface and ballistic missiles redesigned for enhanced precision, and a new generation of attack helicopters for littoral and beachhead defense. They also include multi-functional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) built in response to China’s new Yilong UAV, which the PLA claims is superior to the U.S. Predator. Taiwan flew a drone aircraft for the first time earlier this year on the Hualien coast during an electronic warfare exercise.
Taiwan’s foray into cyberwarfare is meant to alter the risk calculus of any future conventional cross-Strait conflict. When Taiwan announced in 1999 that it had established a committee to examine the concept of information warfare, some four years after Beijing deployed its cyber task force, it stated that it would not use cyberattack capabilities to initiate an offensive. These capabilities would serve only as a balance-of-power deterrent, conceptualized (too optimistically, perhaps) within the doctrinal framework of something akin to mutually assured destruction.
The thinking among military strategists in Beijing is quite different. Some see a cyberattack against the “renegade province” as a potential instrument of precipitating a national crisis in Taiwan that would open up an opportunity to prosecute a more efficient invasion using conventional forces, thereby bringing about the island’s political reunification with the mainland.
It remains to be seen how Taiwan’s cyberwarfare gambit might affect political and economic relations with the PRC. Members of Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party are drawing political capital from the National Security Bureau’s report already, claiming it proves that Beijing is actively preparing for a military strike. But Beijing’s relations with Taipei have stabilized somewhat since Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang party came to power in 2008 on a platform of improving trade, investment, and tourism with the mainland. Ma’s re-election in January for a second four-year term suggests that the Taiwanese electorate presently has a diminished desire to see its government take a politically provocative stance towards China.
Taiwan, of course, may have to reconsider opening up core telecommunications services to investment from the mainland in light of this damning report. Ironically, however, it makes little difference whether or not legislators in Taipei entertain the question of integrating cyberwarfare into the nation’s overall strategy of information warfare. The initiation of public debate on the issue has already, unintentionally or by design, made it part of Taiwan’s information warfare campaign.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2012 print edition.
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Taipei’s Cyberwarfare Gambit
November 28, 2012
When it comes to questions of territorial sovereignty, Taiwan has never been shy about making bold, even antagonistic accusations against the Chinese mainland. Cyber territory is no exception. According to a report lately published by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, the PRC is behind a growing number of cyberintrusions targeting its government and corporate networks—more than a million during the first half of this year alone.
To many, the accusations are not surprising. It is well known that China has been aggressively evolving its Integrated Network Electronic Warfare strategy for over a decade now. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) created a sizable cyberwarfare unit in the mid 1990s. Since then, it has purportedly used computer hacking and viruses to target political, economic and military assets in Taiwan and a host of other countries, including the United States. A report prepared for the U.S.-China Security Review Commission by Northrop Grumman claims that Chinese state-affiliated and state-sponsored entities appear to be responsible for a growing number of cyberintrusions in the United States. According to the defense contractor, numerous intrusions seem to be probing for vulnerabilities in America’s telecommunications supply chain and critical infrastructure systems.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has taken note. While making deep cuts to other programs, it has proposed a plan in its 2013 budget recommendation, sent to the Legislative Yuan for approval, that would see its information warfare strategy expanded over the next five years. The plan calls for the Communication Electronics and Information Bureau to be augmented by a new special task force able to prevent and control malicious attacks on military and civilian networks. The task force would be set up and trained in an experimental facility that simulates cyberattacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure: its electrical power grid, natural gas and petroleum pipelines, nuclear power facilities, water treatment plants, railways, and highways.
It remains unclear to what extent the PLA or ministries of the Chinese government are behind the rising incidents of hacking in Taiwan and other countries. The U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive says that “Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage” via the internet, and that the U.S. has been subjected to an “onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China.” Google, Lockheed, DuPont, and several major multinational oil companies believe they have fallen victim to Chinese hacking and lost valuable technological, scientific, and trade secrets as a result.
But much of the evidence implicating the Chinese government—the evidence made public, at least—remains circumstantial. Establishing linkages between network intrusions and a Chinese state-sanctioned directive is difficult, even when intrusions are detected and monitored. Identifying a perpetrator is becoming more elusive with the proliferation of civilian hacker groups in China, the world’s biggest cybercommunity, and also with the advent of increasingly sophisticated portable IT devices that make it harder to pinpoint the source of an attack. In 2009, researchers from the Munk Institute in Toronto, Canada, released a report in which they claim to have discovered a large-scale international hacking operation with apparent—though not conclusive—connections to PLA command and control. Beijing denies any involvement, calling such accusations unfounded and attributing China-based cyberattacks to civilian “hacktivists” or American propaganda.
Industrial cyberespionage, of course, is not the same thing as cyberwarfare. Nevertheless, observers feel that China’s movements on this field are a good gauge of its cyberwarfare capabilities and intentions. Not only do the two share similar technical foundations, but China seems to have decidedly integrated cyberwarfare into its economic development program. Economic development is itself considered a key component in the PRC’s longer-term national defense strategy, a deterrent to foreign encroachment on its territorial claims and global economic interests, as well as a way to legitimize and sustain one-party rule.
Taiwan’s cyberwarfare plan follows in the footsteps of additional funding that the U.S. has earmarked for military, intelligence, and homeland security programs set up to counter a perceived threat from China. It is also part of a broader push to modernize Taiwan’s military by enhancing asymmetrical warfare capabilities. These capabilities include improved all-frequency electronic detection, mobile land-based long-range surface-to-surface and ballistic missiles redesigned for enhanced precision, and a new generation of attack helicopters for littoral and beachhead defense. They also include multi-functional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) built in response to China’s new Yilong UAV, which the PLA claims is superior to the U.S. Predator. Taiwan flew a drone aircraft for the first time earlier this year on the Hualien coast during an electronic warfare exercise.
Taiwan’s foray into cyberwarfare is meant to alter the risk calculus of any future conventional cross-Strait conflict. When Taiwan announced in 1999 that it had established a committee to examine the concept of information warfare, some four years after Beijing deployed its cyber task force, it stated that it would not use cyberattack capabilities to initiate an offensive. These capabilities would serve only as a balance-of-power deterrent, conceptualized (too optimistically, perhaps) within the doctrinal framework of something akin to mutually assured destruction.
The thinking among military strategists in Beijing is quite different. Some see a cyberattack against the “renegade province” as a potential instrument of precipitating a national crisis in Taiwan that would open up an opportunity to prosecute a more efficient invasion using conventional forces, thereby bringing about the island’s political reunification with the mainland.
It remains to be seen how Taiwan’s cyberwarfare gambit might affect political and economic relations with the PRC. Members of Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party are drawing political capital from the National Security Bureau’s report already, claiming it proves that Beijing is actively preparing for a military strike. But Beijing’s relations with Taipei have stabilized somewhat since Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang party came to power in 2008 on a platform of improving trade, investment, and tourism with the mainland. Ma’s re-election in January for a second four-year term suggests that the Taiwanese electorate presently has a diminished desire to see its government take a politically provocative stance towards China.
Taiwan, of course, may have to reconsider opening up core telecommunications services to investment from the mainland in light of this damning report. Ironically, however, it makes little difference whether or not legislators in Taipei entertain the question of integrating cyberwarfare into the nation’s overall strategy of information warfare. The initiation of public debate on the issue has already, unintentionally or by design, made it part of Taiwan’s information warfare campaign.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2012 print edition.
