t is an open secret that Serbia—a militarily neutral country that most Western media often portray as a Russian ally—indirectly supplies Ukraine with weapons. While the Kremlin turns a blind eye to such Belgrade’s actions, the United States and the European Union strongly encourage the southeastern European nation to continue distancing itself from Moscow. But how does that affect Serbia’s population?
On 6 July 2023, following tensions in northern Kosovo, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic announced his plans to sign a decision on banning the further export of ammunition and weapons, because, in his view, “the vital national interest of the country is currently threatened.”
“Everything must be prepared in case of aggression against the Republic of Serbia,” Vucic said, after a long speech on the situation in northern Kosovo, where tensions between ethnic Serbs, who make up the majority of the population in the region, and the ethnic Albanian-dominated Kosovo police, remain high.
Under the current geopolitical circumstances, any aggression against Serbia—a country that is deeply in the Western sphere of influence—remains extremely improbable. A crisis in northern Kosovo may eventually lead to low-scale clashes between the ethnic Serbs and the ethnic Albanians, but a major war in the region where NATO has some 4,200 troops, remains highly unlikely. Thus, Serbia’s temporary ban on weapons and ammunition exports—imposed on 14 July—does not mean that Belgrade will start preparing its army for a potential conflict in Kosovo.
Instead, Vucic seems to seek to assure his voters that Serbia will preserve its military neutrality, declared in 2007, as well as friendly relations with Russia. Recent polls clearly suggest that the vast majority of Serbs still see Russia as a friendly country, and that they continue to perceive Western nations that have recognized Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia as enemies. Vucic, therefore, likely attempts to balance his ambitions to remain on a pro-EU political course with his voters’ strong pro-Russian sentiment. That is why a potential arms export embargo will likely serve to create an illusion that Serbia does not intend to continue indirectly arming Ukraine.
In reality, if Belgrade decides to halt export of ammunition and weapons, it will shoot itself in the foot. According to the official statistics, in 2021 the total Serbian arms export reached $1.23 billion, 52 percent of which accounted for weapons exported to the United States. Other countries, according to reports, to which Serbia sold its arms this year are NATO members Turkey and Slovakia.
“I’m not a fool. I am aware that some of the arms might end up in Ukraine”, Vucic stressed in early June.
Russia, through the country’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, expressed its “grave concerns” over Belgrade’s actions. The Kremlin did not even attempt to threaten Serbia for its indirect military cooperation with Kyiv. Moscow seems to have given Belgrade the green light to continue selling weapons and ammunition to third parties, quite aware that it will end up in Ukraine. Therefore, the problem for Vucic is not the Kremlin, but the fact that the Serbian population does not support such a policy.
When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Serbia immediately suspended all military drills with foreign partners. To this day, the Balkan nation has not participated in any military exercises with Russia and its allies. In the past, the southeastern European country would hold joint military maneuvers with both Russia and NATO, although the balance was overwhelmingly in favor of the U.S.-dominated alliance. However, on 16-30 June 2023 Serbia held Platinum Wolf 2023 international tactical drills with NATO countries, which means Belgrade has effectively ended its moratorium on any international drills.
For the United States, such a Serbian government’s decision means the country has “made a choice to be a part of the West.” More importantly, the American ambassador to Belgrade, Christopher Hill, recently emphasized that Serbia and the United States are like “two friends who at some point parted ways, but who are now together again.”
However, the U.S. seems to be using a “stick and carrot strategy” vis-à-vis Serbia. On 11 July Washington decided to place Aleksandar Vulin, a longtime politician and current head of the Serbian intelligence agency, on the American sanction list for his alleged ties with the Kremlin. Such a decision likely represents a method of pressure on Vucic, who will now have to find a way to get rid of his ally, and additionally strengthen Serbia’s relations with the West.
Some Serbian opposition parties, on the other hand, strongly (rhetorically) oppose the nation’s “decoupling” from Russia. They claim that the Platinum Wolf 2023 exercises with NATO illustrate Serbia’s “foreign policy U-turn,” and accuse the government of abandoning the nation’s military neutrality. Vucic is, therefore, in a rather difficult position. He is pursuing pro-Western policy, while large segments of Serbian society expect him to take a stance which, if not pro-Russian, is at least neutral.
Thus, Vucic’s decision to suspend arms export will likely have the same fate as the moratorium on military drills—the government will implement it for a while, and then it will continue doing business as usual.
Politically, Serbia will undoubtedly continue strengthening ties with the West, and turning its back on Russia. Vucic’s short meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky in Moldova on 2 June 2023, during the summit of the European Political Community, was a clear indication that Belgrade does not see itself as a Russian ally.
Finally, despite a strong pro-Russian sentiment at home, Vucic is expected to continue pursuing this policy of “pro-Western neutrality.”
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Serbia’s Strategy of ‘Pro-Western Neutrality’
Image by Stevan Aksentijevic from Pixabay
July 17, 2023
While Serbia's government has been supporting Ukraine with indirect shipments of weapons and ammunition—and Russia has turned a blind eye to this—Serbia's population doesn't support this pro-Ukraine policy. This leaves a delicate balancing act for Serbia's government, writes Nikola Mikovic.
I
t is an open secret that Serbia—a militarily neutral country that most Western media often portray as a Russian ally—indirectly supplies Ukraine with weapons. While the Kremlin turns a blind eye to such Belgrade’s actions, the United States and the European Union strongly encourage the southeastern European nation to continue distancing itself from Moscow. But how does that affect Serbia’s population?
On 6 July 2023, following tensions in northern Kosovo, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic announced his plans to sign a decision on banning the further export of ammunition and weapons, because, in his view, “the vital national interest of the country is currently threatened.”
“Everything must be prepared in case of aggression against the Republic of Serbia,” Vucic said, after a long speech on the situation in northern Kosovo, where tensions between ethnic Serbs, who make up the majority of the population in the region, and the ethnic Albanian-dominated Kosovo police, remain high.
Under the current geopolitical circumstances, any aggression against Serbia—a country that is deeply in the Western sphere of influence—remains extremely improbable. A crisis in northern Kosovo may eventually lead to low-scale clashes between the ethnic Serbs and the ethnic Albanians, but a major war in the region where NATO has some 4,200 troops, remains highly unlikely. Thus, Serbia’s temporary ban on weapons and ammunition exports—imposed on 14 July—does not mean that Belgrade will start preparing its army for a potential conflict in Kosovo.
Instead, Vucic seems to seek to assure his voters that Serbia will preserve its military neutrality, declared in 2007, as well as friendly relations with Russia. Recent polls clearly suggest that the vast majority of Serbs still see Russia as a friendly country, and that they continue to perceive Western nations that have recognized Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia as enemies. Vucic, therefore, likely attempts to balance his ambitions to remain on a pro-EU political course with his voters’ strong pro-Russian sentiment. That is why a potential arms export embargo will likely serve to create an illusion that Serbia does not intend to continue indirectly arming Ukraine.
In reality, if Belgrade decides to halt export of ammunition and weapons, it will shoot itself in the foot. According to the official statistics, in 2021 the total Serbian arms export reached $1.23 billion, 52 percent of which accounted for weapons exported to the United States. Other countries, according to reports, to which Serbia sold its arms this year are NATO members Turkey and Slovakia.
“I’m not a fool. I am aware that some of the arms might end up in Ukraine”, Vucic stressed in early June.
Russia, through the country’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, expressed its “grave concerns” over Belgrade’s actions. The Kremlin did not even attempt to threaten Serbia for its indirect military cooperation with Kyiv. Moscow seems to have given Belgrade the green light to continue selling weapons and ammunition to third parties, quite aware that it will end up in Ukraine. Therefore, the problem for Vucic is not the Kremlin, but the fact that the Serbian population does not support such a policy.
When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Serbia immediately suspended all military drills with foreign partners. To this day, the Balkan nation has not participated in any military exercises with Russia and its allies. In the past, the southeastern European country would hold joint military maneuvers with both Russia and NATO, although the balance was overwhelmingly in favor of the U.S.-dominated alliance. However, on 16-30 June 2023 Serbia held Platinum Wolf 2023 international tactical drills with NATO countries, which means Belgrade has effectively ended its moratorium on any international drills.
For the United States, such a Serbian government’s decision means the country has “made a choice to be a part of the West.” More importantly, the American ambassador to Belgrade, Christopher Hill, recently emphasized that Serbia and the United States are like “two friends who at some point parted ways, but who are now together again.”
However, the U.S. seems to be using a “stick and carrot strategy” vis-à-vis Serbia. On 11 July Washington decided to place Aleksandar Vulin, a longtime politician and current head of the Serbian intelligence agency, on the American sanction list for his alleged ties with the Kremlin. Such a decision likely represents a method of pressure on Vucic, who will now have to find a way to get rid of his ally, and additionally strengthen Serbia’s relations with the West.
Some Serbian opposition parties, on the other hand, strongly (rhetorically) oppose the nation’s “decoupling” from Russia. They claim that the Platinum Wolf 2023 exercises with NATO illustrate Serbia’s “foreign policy U-turn,” and accuse the government of abandoning the nation’s military neutrality. Vucic is, therefore, in a rather difficult position. He is pursuing pro-Western policy, while large segments of Serbian society expect him to take a stance which, if not pro-Russian, is at least neutral.
Thus, Vucic’s decision to suspend arms export will likely have the same fate as the moratorium on military drills—the government will implement it for a while, and then it will continue doing business as usual.
Politically, Serbia will undoubtedly continue strengthening ties with the West, and turning its back on Russia. Vucic’s short meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky in Moldova on 2 June 2023, during the summit of the European Political Community, was a clear indication that Belgrade does not see itself as a Russian ally.
Finally, despite a strong pro-Russian sentiment at home, Vucic is expected to continue pursuing this policy of “pro-Western neutrality.”
