On April 19th, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo signed a historic treaty that will hopefully normalize relations between the two countries five years after the former Serbian province declared independence.
From February 2008 to the present, Belgrade has insisted it would not negotiate with what many in the country consider to be the cradle of the Serbian nation. Home to numerous Orthodox monasteries, the capital of the medieval Kingdom of Serbia (Prizren), and the eponymous battle against the Ottomans now central to Serbian mythology, Kosovo is not merely just another province of Serbia—hence, the resistance to simply let it secede like Montenegro did in 2006.
However, times have changed. Serbia's desire to join the European Union outweighs whatever sentimental value Kosovo holds. According to a poll conducted by television station B92 and Ipsos, 63 percent of Serbs acknowledge Kosovo as de-facto independent, and agree that at the very least the government should try to get their brethren in Kosovo the best deal possible.
Negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo over the fate of the Serb minority in Kosovo have gone on for a little over two years since the European Union started mediating talks in March 2011. The 15-point plan integrates four of Kosovo's northern Serb-majority municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic) into the rest of Kosovo's security structure. This means that although these four municipalities would be under the jurisdiction of the Kosovo national police, the force’s makeup would reflect that of the population, including commanding officers. The local court system would also answer to Kosovan law, but judges and other positions would be comprised of the local Serb population. However, the region would have autonomy over economic development, education, healthcare, and development.
Although Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić said that Serbia will make no attempts to block Kosovo's aspirations to join the European Union, Belgrade will not recognize Kosovo as an independent country. Doing so would cause, to put it mildly, an uproar among Serbian nationalists. Although the poll mentioned earlier does state that nearly two-thirds of those polled have accepted that Kosovo is, more or less, no longer under the jurisdiction of Serbia, one-third still believes Kosovo is not and should not be an independent country.
A potential stumbling block post-treaty is the implementation of said agreement. Serbian hardliners in the north of Kosovo are by and large opposed to the deal, as they still hope that North Kosovo will one day rejoin Serbia proper; the deal also means that the Serbian government will no longer send aid to North Kosovo, and they will have to rely on the Albanian-majority government in Pristina. Nevertheless, Serbia needed to make a choice in order to get the deal done, as the country hopes to edge its way towards the West.
With this treaty, the Serbian government under Dačić has taken the pragmatic route in getting a deal in place for Kosovo's Serb minority. The treaty represents a softening of Dačić's posture towards Kosovo in the past; four months after the Kosovo Police illegally crossed into North Kosovo In July 2011, Dačić declared that any attack on the Serbs of Kosovo would be treated as an attack on Serbia itself. His stance on the protection and well-being of Kosovan Serbs is still there, but it has evolved into a more nuanced, practical approach. Dačić knows full well that any conflict with Kosovo would isolate Serbia in the international community as well as derail their prospects for EU membership.
Which leads to the crux of the matter: any progress made on the Kosovo front by Serbia will reflect well on their application for EU membership. Despite the continuous downward spiral the Eurozone economy is in, the EU still offers the best economic security for Serbia, particularly in trade. With neighboring Croatia set to officially join the EU on July 1st, and fellow former Yugolsav republics Montenegro and Macedonia acquiring candidate status before Serbia, EU ascension is a high priority for Belgrade.
Serbia received full candidate status in March 2012, a full year after negotiations between Dačić and Kosovan Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi began. Negotiations with the European Council were agreed to start next month, provided progress was made regarding Kosovo, and with the treaty now signed, Serbia has taken another step closer to full European integration with a view of joining the EU by July 2015—16 years after the signing of the Kumanovo Treaty that ended the Kosovo War.
Frank Lopapa is a freelance writer focused on Mediterranean politics. A graduate of the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Frank possesses a Master of Arts in Diplomacy and International Relations, with specializations in International Security and Global Negotiation and Conflict Management.
Photo by Brigitte Djajasasmita (cc).
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Serbia Using Head, Not Heart, in New Kosovo Agreement
June 6, 2013
On April 19th, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo signed a historic treaty that will hopefully normalize relations between the two countries five years after the former Serbian province declared independence.
From February 2008 to the present, Belgrade has insisted it would not negotiate with what many in the country consider to be the cradle of the Serbian nation. Home to numerous Orthodox monasteries, the capital of the medieval Kingdom of Serbia (Prizren), and the eponymous battle against the Ottomans now central to Serbian mythology, Kosovo is not merely just another province of Serbia—hence, the resistance to simply let it secede like Montenegro did in 2006.
However, times have changed. Serbia's desire to join the European Union outweighs whatever sentimental value Kosovo holds. According to a poll conducted by television station B92 and Ipsos, 63 percent of Serbs acknowledge Kosovo as de-facto independent, and agree that at the very least the government should try to get their brethren in Kosovo the best deal possible.
Negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo over the fate of the Serb minority in Kosovo have gone on for a little over two years since the European Union started mediating talks in March 2011. The 15-point plan integrates four of Kosovo's northern Serb-majority municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic) into the rest of Kosovo's security structure. This means that although these four municipalities would be under the jurisdiction of the Kosovo national police, the force’s makeup would reflect that of the population, including commanding officers. The local court system would also answer to Kosovan law, but judges and other positions would be comprised of the local Serb population. However, the region would have autonomy over economic development, education, healthcare, and development.
Although Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić said that Serbia will make no attempts to block Kosovo's aspirations to join the European Union, Belgrade will not recognize Kosovo as an independent country. Doing so would cause, to put it mildly, an uproar among Serbian nationalists. Although the poll mentioned earlier does state that nearly two-thirds of those polled have accepted that Kosovo is, more or less, no longer under the jurisdiction of Serbia, one-third still believes Kosovo is not and should not be an independent country.
A potential stumbling block post-treaty is the implementation of said agreement. Serbian hardliners in the north of Kosovo are by and large opposed to the deal, as they still hope that North Kosovo will one day rejoin Serbia proper; the deal also means that the Serbian government will no longer send aid to North Kosovo, and they will have to rely on the Albanian-majority government in Pristina. Nevertheless, Serbia needed to make a choice in order to get the deal done, as the country hopes to edge its way towards the West.
With this treaty, the Serbian government under Dačić has taken the pragmatic route in getting a deal in place for Kosovo's Serb minority. The treaty represents a softening of Dačić's posture towards Kosovo in the past; four months after the Kosovo Police illegally crossed into North Kosovo In July 2011, Dačić declared that any attack on the Serbs of Kosovo would be treated as an attack on Serbia itself. His stance on the protection and well-being of Kosovan Serbs is still there, but it has evolved into a more nuanced, practical approach. Dačić knows full well that any conflict with Kosovo would isolate Serbia in the international community as well as derail their prospects for EU membership.
Which leads to the crux of the matter: any progress made on the Kosovo front by Serbia will reflect well on their application for EU membership. Despite the continuous downward spiral the Eurozone economy is in, the EU still offers the best economic security for Serbia, particularly in trade. With neighboring Croatia set to officially join the EU on July 1st, and fellow former Yugolsav republics Montenegro and Macedonia acquiring candidate status before Serbia, EU ascension is a high priority for Belgrade.
Serbia received full candidate status in March 2012, a full year after negotiations between Dačić and Kosovan Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi began. Negotiations with the European Council were agreed to start next month, provided progress was made regarding Kosovo, and with the treaty now signed, Serbia has taken another step closer to full European integration with a view of joining the EU by July 2015—16 years after the signing of the Kumanovo Treaty that ended the Kosovo War.
Frank Lopapa is a freelance writer focused on Mediterranean politics. A graduate of the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Frank possesses a Master of Arts in Diplomacy and International Relations, with specializations in International Security and Global Negotiation and Conflict Management.
Photo by Brigitte Djajasasmita (cc).
