Saudi Arabia’s decision to turn down a coveted seat on the United Nation’s Security Council appears curiously at odds with the value it places on status. For years, however, the Kingdom has maintained a foreign policy that is ambivalent and remains mysteriously apathetic on a number of regional and international issues. Whatever the various factors that informed its decision, the move could be misinterpreted as a reluctance to be actively involved in global affairs.
Saudi Arabia, along with Chad, Chile, Lithuania, and Nigeria, was elected in October as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a two-year term. The 193-member U.N. General Assembly held a secret ballot to choose replacements for five outgoing members. Competition was fierce, with success depending on winning two-thirds of the votes cast. Within hours of the outcome, the Saudi Foreign Ministry released a statement rejecting its inclusion in the exclusive group. It denounced the Security Council’s failure to restrain Syrian President Bashar-Al-Assad’s brutality against his own people. It also pointed to the unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict as an example of the Council’s inefficacy, saying that “the mechanisms of action and double standards existing in the Security Council prevent it from performing its duties.”
Diplomatic observers were left dumbfounded. Some countries have lobbied for years to win a seat on the Security Council—Saudi Arabia among them. The Saudis were, reportedly, already preparing special diplomats for the job. That the Saudi Foreign Ministry was not immediately convened after the vote to consider its response is telling. It must have made the decision beforehand, possibly as early as September when it refused to address the annual General Assembly. Saudi Arabia’s rejection of a seat is intended to rebuff China and, especially, Russia for abusing their veto powers over Syria. It also seems calculated to reinvigorate debate on extending veto powers to states beyond the “P5,” or the five permanent members of the Council.
“Given that the kingdom had avidly prepared for getting the Council seat for years, some are scratching their heads,” said Dr. Steffen Hertog, a Middle East expert at the London School of Economics and Politics. Observers like Hertog wonder why Saudi Arabia chose not to try to effect change from within after accepting the seat. The Saudi Foreign Ministry has yet to offer any statement that would help to clarify this. Setting aside the question of veto powers, non-permanent members are not as peripheral in policy-making as the Saudis seem to think. Non-permanent members can call a meeting of the Security Council at any time. And the rotational presidency of the Council helps non-permanent members leverage extra pressure.
The pro-Saudi Muslim world views this decision in two ways. Some laud Saudi Arabia’s strength in resisting the temptation to join such a dysfunctional club that allows power to be concentrated in five elite members. “This might boost the Kingdom’s image among those already on its side especially Sunni and anti-Iranian regimes in the region,” Hertog noted. Others, however, are disappointed to watch it forego its rightful leadership position as a voice for Muslims. Many regard Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s birth place and the true guardian of Muslim peoples around the world.
Nations unfriendly to the Kingdom interpret the decision differently: as evidence that the Sunni Royal family is no good for Shia Muslims. The Syrian conflict has reached a point where Assad is unlikely to be ousted from power without Western military intervention. “Allowing the ruling regime in Syria to kill and burn its people using chemical weapons,” the official Saudi statement read, “while the world stands idly by, without applying deterrent sanctions against the Damascus regime, is also irrefutable evidence and proof of the inability of the Security Council to carry out its duties and responsibilities.” Saudi Arabia has no problem with strikes to neutralize the Assad regime. The veiled message for Iran, the Kingdom’s biggest threat, is clear, since the same statement expresses frustration over the U.N.’s failure to make the Middle East a nuclear free zone.
Saudi Arabia has missed an opportunity to contribute to both the decision-making process on Syria and to Security Council reform. The Soviet Union made the same blunder in 1950, when it boycotted the Security Council and subsequently had no say in military action in Korea.
Surely, it is not possible to play the game standing on the sidelines. In time, Saudi Arabia will learn the cost of rejecting a seat. By then, however, it may find itself in an awkward position with a diminished ability to engage other states.
Arafat Kabir is an observer of national and global politics, foreign policy and diplomacy. A native of Bangladesh, his works have appeared in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the Diplomatic Courier, International Policy Digest, The Diplomat, and other publications. Multilingual, Arafat is a member of Young Professional in Foreign Policy. Follow him @ArafatKabirUpol.
Photo: Michelle Lee (cc).
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Saudi Arabia’s Decision to Rebuff the U.N. Security Council
November 21, 2013
Saudi Arabia’s decision to turn down a coveted seat on the United Nation’s Security Council appears curiously at odds with the value it places on status. For years, however, the Kingdom has maintained a foreign policy that is ambivalent and remains mysteriously apathetic on a number of regional and international issues. Whatever the various factors that informed its decision, the move could be misinterpreted as a reluctance to be actively involved in global affairs.
Saudi Arabia, along with Chad, Chile, Lithuania, and Nigeria, was elected in October as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a two-year term. The 193-member U.N. General Assembly held a secret ballot to choose replacements for five outgoing members. Competition was fierce, with success depending on winning two-thirds of the votes cast. Within hours of the outcome, the Saudi Foreign Ministry released a statement rejecting its inclusion in the exclusive group. It denounced the Security Council’s failure to restrain Syrian President Bashar-Al-Assad’s brutality against his own people. It also pointed to the unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict as an example of the Council’s inefficacy, saying that “the mechanisms of action and double standards existing in the Security Council prevent it from performing its duties.”
Diplomatic observers were left dumbfounded. Some countries have lobbied for years to win a seat on the Security Council—Saudi Arabia among them. The Saudis were, reportedly, already preparing special diplomats for the job. That the Saudi Foreign Ministry was not immediately convened after the vote to consider its response is telling. It must have made the decision beforehand, possibly as early as September when it refused to address the annual General Assembly. Saudi Arabia’s rejection of a seat is intended to rebuff China and, especially, Russia for abusing their veto powers over Syria. It also seems calculated to reinvigorate debate on extending veto powers to states beyond the “P5,” or the five permanent members of the Council.
“Given that the kingdom had avidly prepared for getting the Council seat for years, some are scratching their heads,” said Dr. Steffen Hertog, a Middle East expert at the London School of Economics and Politics. Observers like Hertog wonder why Saudi Arabia chose not to try to effect change from within after accepting the seat. The Saudi Foreign Ministry has yet to offer any statement that would help to clarify this. Setting aside the question of veto powers, non-permanent members are not as peripheral in policy-making as the Saudis seem to think. Non-permanent members can call a meeting of the Security Council at any time. And the rotational presidency of the Council helps non-permanent members leverage extra pressure.
The pro-Saudi Muslim world views this decision in two ways. Some laud Saudi Arabia’s strength in resisting the temptation to join such a dysfunctional club that allows power to be concentrated in five elite members. “This might boost the Kingdom’s image among those already on its side especially Sunni and anti-Iranian regimes in the region,” Hertog noted. Others, however, are disappointed to watch it forego its rightful leadership position as a voice for Muslims. Many regard Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s birth place and the true guardian of Muslim peoples around the world.
Nations unfriendly to the Kingdom interpret the decision differently: as evidence that the Sunni Royal family is no good for Shia Muslims. The Syrian conflict has reached a point where Assad is unlikely to be ousted from power without Western military intervention. “Allowing the ruling regime in Syria to kill and burn its people using chemical weapons,” the official Saudi statement read, “while the world stands idly by, without applying deterrent sanctions against the Damascus regime, is also irrefutable evidence and proof of the inability of the Security Council to carry out its duties and responsibilities.” Saudi Arabia has no problem with strikes to neutralize the Assad regime. The veiled message for Iran, the Kingdom’s biggest threat, is clear, since the same statement expresses frustration over the U.N.’s failure to make the Middle East a nuclear free zone.
Saudi Arabia has missed an opportunity to contribute to both the decision-making process on Syria and to Security Council reform. The Soviet Union made the same blunder in 1950, when it boycotted the Security Council and subsequently had no say in military action in Korea.
Surely, it is not possible to play the game standing on the sidelines. In time, Saudi Arabia will learn the cost of rejecting a seat. By then, however, it may find itself in an awkward position with a diminished ability to engage other states.
Arafat Kabir is an observer of national and global politics, foreign policy and diplomacy. A native of Bangladesh, his works have appeared in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the Diplomatic Courier, International Policy Digest, The Diplomat, and other publications. Multilingual, Arafat is a member of Young Professional in Foreign Policy. Follow him @ArafatKabirUpol.
Photo: Michelle Lee (cc).
