Iraq, a decade after the U.S. led invasion and one year after the end of the U.S. occupation, is undeniably grappling with not merely an escalating sectarian crisis between the Shia-led partnership government and an increasingly disaffected Sunni minority, but also with an intensifying ethnic crisis with an increasingly defiant and heavily armed Kurdish Region.
In 1991 Saudi Arabia fiercely resisted the toppling of Saddam’s regime and played a major role in pressurising the U.S. to turn its back on the popular uprising against Saddam’s tyrannical regime. In 2003, however, Saudi Arabia’s immense influence in the U.S. was dramatically weakened due to the decisive role played by Saudi nationals in the 9/11 atrocities in the heart of the U.S.
Ever since the ousting of Saddam’s regime in 2003, the Saudi regime has adamantly refused to recognise the new democratic system in Iraq and has been steadfastly determined not to have any diplomatic representation in Baghdad. Among the real underlying reasons behind the Saudi regime’s conspicuously emphatic hostility towards the fledgling democracy in Iraq, was and still is its deeply entrenched fear that the success of democracy in Iraq is an immensely harmful precedent which would undoubtedly inspire its own people. Another reason is the deeply rooted hatred towards the Shia, which explains its fierce refusal to come to terms with the inescapable reality that the Shia in Iraq constitute the indisputable majority. The Saudi regime also accuses Nouri Al Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the Shia-led Central Government (CG) of giving Iran a free hand to dramatically intensify its influence in Iraq.
Since the bitterly contested 2010 national elections, the heavily Sunni-dominated Iraqiya bloc-which enjoys the full blown support of both Saudi Arabia and Qatar-has persistently accused Al Maliki and the Shia-dominated National Alliance of hijacking the elections, despite the patently unambiguous Federal Court’s ruling permitting the formation of the biggest bloc inside parliament. The Saudi King left absolutely no doubt where his sympathies lie, underlining his unequivocal backing to the Iraqiya bloc by personally meeting its head, Ayad Allawi, immediately before and after the elections. It is doubtless that the U.S. final withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, which coincided with the arrest warrant issued against Tariq Al Hashimi, Iraq’s Sunni Vice President, provided Saudi Arabia and Qatar with a golden opportunity to ramp up the message that Sunni discrimination would dramatically escalate.
Despite the enormous geopolitical concessions made by the Iraqi government on its stance towards Syria and Bahrain–before the Arab League summit held in Baghdad, in April 2012–to specifically appease the Saudi regime, it nonetheless decided to appoint its ambassador in Jordan as a non-resident ambassador to Iraq, reiterating the same old message that Iraq is far too insecure and unstable. But, even more disparaging, was the Saudis' and Qataris' decision to restrict their representation to low level delegations. As part of the Saudi and Qatari relentless efforts to ratchet up sectarian tensions in Iraq, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jassim not only asserted that Qatar’s low level participation was aimed at highlighting Qatar’s fierce objection to the marginalisation of Sunnis in Iraq, but, to add insult to injury, the Qatari PM and afterwards Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal also offered Al Hashimi a formal red-carpet reception in Doha and Riyadh, even while he–found guilty and handed a death sentence–was facing terrorism allegations. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been working tirelessly to break up the Shia-Kurdish strategic alliance in Iraq, replacing it by a Turkish strategic alliance with the Kurdish Region (KR), headed by Massoud Barzani. This has unquestionably not only dramatically bolstered the position of the KR in its tense confrontation with the CG over land and oil, but also ramped up ethnic tensions.
Against this backdrop of growing sectarian tension, in December 2012 the arrest of nine bodyguards for Iraq’s Sunni Finance Minister, Rafe Al Essawi, and his accusations to the CG of marginalising the Sunni population, sparked protests that swept the Sunni-dominated provinces of Anbar, Nainawa, Salah Al Deen, and Deyala. Although the protests started spontaneously, they were swiftly taken over by a number of the Iraqiya bloc leaders and hard-line Sunni clerics, who are closely connected to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And amid Iraqiya’s strenuous attempts to win over Muqtada Al Sadr’s unarguably vital endorsement, to ensure that the protests spreads far beyond the Sunni provinces, it scrambled to replace the menacingly sectarian slogans with patriotic ones. Beyond a doubt, former Saddam Vice President Izzat Ibrahim’s ringing endorsement of the protests, followed by Al Qaida’s spokesman’s ominous call on the protesters to take up arms, made it absolutely inconceivable for any Shia leader, let alone Al Sadr, to urge the Shia to join the protests. Indeed, the demonstrations that took place in Shia areas were by contrast highly supportive of Al Maliki’s government and have categorically refused any alterations to either the terrorism or the Justice and accountability laws.
The principal accusation of deliberately discriminating against the Sunni minority leveled at the CG holds no water for the following reasons: First, while the Sunni minority has persistently been in power since 1920, during the Baathist era and specifically under Saddam’s rule, Sunnis were almost exclusively calling the shots in Iraq. No wonder, the Sunnis regard the prominent positions–Vice President, Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister, and seven more ministries–given to them as woefully inadequate.
Second, with the exception of the single clash, which occurred on January 35, 2013–five weeks after the protests commenced–between the army and the protesters that caused the death of eight protesters, the army has consistently been extremely patient and extraordinarily lenient. In comparison, the army was by far much harsher in dealing with protests in Shia areas like Basra, Al Nasriya, and Al Diwaniyah.
Third, in stark contrast to Sunni claims that Article 4 of the terrorism law has persistently been exploited to unfairly target them, the fact is that it was the Shia cities of Basra, Amarah, and Sadr City that experienced, in 2008, the harshest crack down and the strictest implementation of anti-terror laws. Finally, in an unprecedented move, the CG swiftly established three committees headed by highly influential officials to meet protesters' demands, including the release of thousands of prisoners and the return of thousands to their jobs or pensions. The protesters, however, have not only insisted that none of their demands have been fulfilled, but dramatically ramped up their demands, calling for scraping the constitution and toppling Al Maliki’s CG. This without doubt underlines that there are internal and external parties spurring these protests not merely to persist but to dramatically escalate.
The internal parties include Iraqiya leaders, namely the speaker of the parliament Usama Al Nujayfi, the Finance Minister, and the head of bloc in Parliament, Salman Al Jumaili, are desperately attempting to revive their popularity by portraying themselves as being targeted for standing up to the CG. They are also using these protests to pile the pressure on Al Maliki to force him to resign, and, above all, hoping to regain lost ground to Al Maliki, whose tough stance against the KR has undoubtedly bolstered his popularity with Sunni Arabs. Second, these protests are certainly music to Brazani’s ears, who has been increasingly alarmed by Al Maliki’s growing popularity among the Sunni-Arabs in the disputed areas.
The external parties include Al Qaida, which views the on-going protests as a golden opportunity for more radicalisation and ultimately an upsurge in recruitment. Just as important to Al Qaida is exploiting the army’s reluctance to tackle terrorist suspects in the Sunni provinces–fearing the ready-made accusation of targeting Sunnis–to re-activate the safe-havens that originally existed in the Sunni provinces.
For Saudi Arabia these protests are a dream come true. The Saudi Kingdom is increasingly using Iraq’s turmoil to convince its people that democracy eventually leads to instability, insecurity, and ultimately civil war. It is also seeking not merely to fend off any potential challenge by a democratic Iraq to its leadership of the Arab World, but also to ostracize Iraq by trumpeting these Sunni protests as irrefutable evidence that Iraq is adopting a sectarian policy against the Sunnis. Moreover, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are exploiting the protests in Iraq as a highly effective tool to divert the CG's attention away from pursuing a diplomatic solution in Syria, as well as placating Iraq’s strident opposition to the Saudi and Qatari concerted effort to not just finance and arm the Syrian opposition–namely the extremist and hard-line Wahhabi Salafi, Jabhat Al Nusra, which is essentially Al Qaida’s branch in Syria–but also pay salaries to the insurgents. In addition, both the Saudis and Qataris are using the protests to keeps Iraq’s CG far too busy to prop up the Syrian regime. The Saudi regime is taking advantage of these protests and the sectarian strife it is deliberately stoking–in Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain–to stave of dissent in its Sunni heartland by demonstrating that it is not just the guardian of Sunni Islam, but also at the forefront of combating an existential threat from the Shia, namely Iran.
The sectarian ethnic conflicts, protests, Turkey’s open hostility and a revitalised Al Qaida are all an integral part of a modified last ditch attempt spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to achieve their overarching goal of destabilising and ultimately dismantling the fledgling democracy in Iraq. Yet, alarmingly, even if this ferocious all-out assault fails to restore minority rule, which is almost certainly the case, then Saudi Arabia and Qatar are implacably determined to throw their support behind the Sunnis drive to establish a Sunni Regional Government, which is similar to the KR but under Saudi and Qatari complete control. If Saudi Arabia and Qatar cannot have all of Iraq back, they are hell-bent on taking part of it for now.
Zayd Alisa is a political analyst and commentator on Middle East Affairs. A human rights activist for twenty five years, he has actively promoted democracy and freedom of expression in Iraq and the Arab world.
Photo: James Gordon (cc).
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Saudi Arabia and Qatar Ratcheting Up Sectarian and Ethnic Tensions In Iraq
April 1, 2013
Iraq, a decade after the U.S. led invasion and one year after the end of the U.S. occupation, is undeniably grappling with not merely an escalating sectarian crisis between the Shia-led partnership government and an increasingly disaffected Sunni minority, but also with an intensifying ethnic crisis with an increasingly defiant and heavily armed Kurdish Region.
In 1991 Saudi Arabia fiercely resisted the toppling of Saddam’s regime and played a major role in pressurising the U.S. to turn its back on the popular uprising against Saddam’s tyrannical regime. In 2003, however, Saudi Arabia’s immense influence in the U.S. was dramatically weakened due to the decisive role played by Saudi nationals in the 9/11 atrocities in the heart of the U.S.
Ever since the ousting of Saddam’s regime in 2003, the Saudi regime has adamantly refused to recognise the new democratic system in Iraq and has been steadfastly determined not to have any diplomatic representation in Baghdad. Among the real underlying reasons behind the Saudi regime’s conspicuously emphatic hostility towards the fledgling democracy in Iraq, was and still is its deeply entrenched fear that the success of democracy in Iraq is an immensely harmful precedent which would undoubtedly inspire its own people. Another reason is the deeply rooted hatred towards the Shia, which explains its fierce refusal to come to terms with the inescapable reality that the Shia in Iraq constitute the indisputable majority. The Saudi regime also accuses Nouri Al Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the Shia-led Central Government (CG) of giving Iran a free hand to dramatically intensify its influence in Iraq.
Since the bitterly contested 2010 national elections, the heavily Sunni-dominated Iraqiya bloc-which enjoys the full blown support of both Saudi Arabia and Qatar-has persistently accused Al Maliki and the Shia-dominated National Alliance of hijacking the elections, despite the patently unambiguous Federal Court’s ruling permitting the formation of the biggest bloc inside parliament. The Saudi King left absolutely no doubt where his sympathies lie, underlining his unequivocal backing to the Iraqiya bloc by personally meeting its head, Ayad Allawi, immediately before and after the elections. It is doubtless that the U.S. final withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, which coincided with the arrest warrant issued against Tariq Al Hashimi, Iraq’s Sunni Vice President, provided Saudi Arabia and Qatar with a golden opportunity to ramp up the message that Sunni discrimination would dramatically escalate.
Despite the enormous geopolitical concessions made by the Iraqi government on its stance towards Syria and Bahrain–before the Arab League summit held in Baghdad, in April 2012–to specifically appease the Saudi regime, it nonetheless decided to appoint its ambassador in Jordan as a non-resident ambassador to Iraq, reiterating the same old message that Iraq is far too insecure and unstable. But, even more disparaging, was the Saudis' and Qataris' decision to restrict their representation to low level delegations. As part of the Saudi and Qatari relentless efforts to ratchet up sectarian tensions in Iraq, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jassim not only asserted that Qatar’s low level participation was aimed at highlighting Qatar’s fierce objection to the marginalisation of Sunnis in Iraq, but, to add insult to injury, the Qatari PM and afterwards Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal also offered Al Hashimi a formal red-carpet reception in Doha and Riyadh, even while he–found guilty and handed a death sentence–was facing terrorism allegations. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been working tirelessly to break up the Shia-Kurdish strategic alliance in Iraq, replacing it by a Turkish strategic alliance with the Kurdish Region (KR), headed by Massoud Barzani. This has unquestionably not only dramatically bolstered the position of the KR in its tense confrontation with the CG over land and oil, but also ramped up ethnic tensions.
Against this backdrop of growing sectarian tension, in December 2012 the arrest of nine bodyguards for Iraq’s Sunni Finance Minister, Rafe Al Essawi, and his accusations to the CG of marginalising the Sunni population, sparked protests that swept the Sunni-dominated provinces of Anbar, Nainawa, Salah Al Deen, and Deyala. Although the protests started spontaneously, they were swiftly taken over by a number of the Iraqiya bloc leaders and hard-line Sunni clerics, who are closely connected to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And amid Iraqiya’s strenuous attempts to win over Muqtada Al Sadr’s unarguably vital endorsement, to ensure that the protests spreads far beyond the Sunni provinces, it scrambled to replace the menacingly sectarian slogans with patriotic ones. Beyond a doubt, former Saddam Vice President Izzat Ibrahim’s ringing endorsement of the protests, followed by Al Qaida’s spokesman’s ominous call on the protesters to take up arms, made it absolutely inconceivable for any Shia leader, let alone Al Sadr, to urge the Shia to join the protests. Indeed, the demonstrations that took place in Shia areas were by contrast highly supportive of Al Maliki’s government and have categorically refused any alterations to either the terrorism or the Justice and accountability laws.
The principal accusation of deliberately discriminating against the Sunni minority leveled at the CG holds no water for the following reasons: First, while the Sunni minority has persistently been in power since 1920, during the Baathist era and specifically under Saddam’s rule, Sunnis were almost exclusively calling the shots in Iraq. No wonder, the Sunnis regard the prominent positions–Vice President, Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister, and seven more ministries–given to them as woefully inadequate.
Second, with the exception of the single clash, which occurred on January 35, 2013–five weeks after the protests commenced–between the army and the protesters that caused the death of eight protesters, the army has consistently been extremely patient and extraordinarily lenient. In comparison, the army was by far much harsher in dealing with protests in Shia areas like Basra, Al Nasriya, and Al Diwaniyah.
Third, in stark contrast to Sunni claims that Article 4 of the terrorism law has persistently been exploited to unfairly target them, the fact is that it was the Shia cities of Basra, Amarah, and Sadr City that experienced, in 2008, the harshest crack down and the strictest implementation of anti-terror laws. Finally, in an unprecedented move, the CG swiftly established three committees headed by highly influential officials to meet protesters' demands, including the release of thousands of prisoners and the return of thousands to their jobs or pensions. The protesters, however, have not only insisted that none of their demands have been fulfilled, but dramatically ramped up their demands, calling for scraping the constitution and toppling Al Maliki’s CG. This without doubt underlines that there are internal and external parties spurring these protests not merely to persist but to dramatically escalate.
The internal parties include Iraqiya leaders, namely the speaker of the parliament Usama Al Nujayfi, the Finance Minister, and the head of bloc in Parliament, Salman Al Jumaili, are desperately attempting to revive their popularity by portraying themselves as being targeted for standing up to the CG. They are also using these protests to pile the pressure on Al Maliki to force him to resign, and, above all, hoping to regain lost ground to Al Maliki, whose tough stance against the KR has undoubtedly bolstered his popularity with Sunni Arabs. Second, these protests are certainly music to Brazani’s ears, who has been increasingly alarmed by Al Maliki’s growing popularity among the Sunni-Arabs in the disputed areas.
The external parties include Al Qaida, which views the on-going protests as a golden opportunity for more radicalisation and ultimately an upsurge in recruitment. Just as important to Al Qaida is exploiting the army’s reluctance to tackle terrorist suspects in the Sunni provinces–fearing the ready-made accusation of targeting Sunnis–to re-activate the safe-havens that originally existed in the Sunni provinces.
For Saudi Arabia these protests are a dream come true. The Saudi Kingdom is increasingly using Iraq’s turmoil to convince its people that democracy eventually leads to instability, insecurity, and ultimately civil war. It is also seeking not merely to fend off any potential challenge by a democratic Iraq to its leadership of the Arab World, but also to ostracize Iraq by trumpeting these Sunni protests as irrefutable evidence that Iraq is adopting a sectarian policy against the Sunnis. Moreover, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are exploiting the protests in Iraq as a highly effective tool to divert the CG's attention away from pursuing a diplomatic solution in Syria, as well as placating Iraq’s strident opposition to the Saudi and Qatari concerted effort to not just finance and arm the Syrian opposition–namely the extremist and hard-line Wahhabi Salafi, Jabhat Al Nusra, which is essentially Al Qaida’s branch in Syria–but also pay salaries to the insurgents. In addition, both the Saudis and Qataris are using the protests to keeps Iraq’s CG far too busy to prop up the Syrian regime. The Saudi regime is taking advantage of these protests and the sectarian strife it is deliberately stoking–in Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain–to stave of dissent in its Sunni heartland by demonstrating that it is not just the guardian of Sunni Islam, but also at the forefront of combating an existential threat from the Shia, namely Iran.
The sectarian ethnic conflicts, protests, Turkey’s open hostility and a revitalised Al Qaida are all an integral part of a modified last ditch attempt spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to achieve their overarching goal of destabilising and ultimately dismantling the fledgling democracy in Iraq. Yet, alarmingly, even if this ferocious all-out assault fails to restore minority rule, which is almost certainly the case, then Saudi Arabia and Qatar are implacably determined to throw their support behind the Sunnis drive to establish a Sunni Regional Government, which is similar to the KR but under Saudi and Qatari complete control. If Saudi Arabia and Qatar cannot have all of Iraq back, they are hell-bent on taking part of it for now.
Zayd Alisa is a political analyst and commentator on Middle East Affairs. A human rights activist for twenty five years, he has actively promoted democracy and freedom of expression in Iraq and the Arab world.
Photo: James Gordon (cc).
