iracy and terrorist organizations at the southern gates of the Red Sea are not a new phenomenon. Recent Houthi attacks on Israeli shipping, however, aim not for plunder, ransom, or political demands. The perpetrators seek only propaganda victories, a far more dangerous goal and one without the ability to be mitigated by diplomatic appeasement. Filming the seizure of an Israeli-owned ship is, however, merely the first step in the broader aim of introducing large-scale instability to global shipping and earning the Houthi rebel group a degree of public recognition – both in Yemen and around the world.
Bab al-Mandeb Strait, located 1,400 miles south of the Suez Canal, is the third most important shipping lane in the world. Only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, the strait connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and abuts two regions of ongoing conflicts – the Horn of Africa and South Arabia. In the years since the northern tribal groups affiliated with the Houthi movement seized Yemen’s capital of Sana’a in 2014, numerous attacks have been perpetrated against civilian shipping passing through the southern Red Sea. The western Yemeni port of Hodeidah has become a staging ground for attacks against vessels, regardless of nationality. Houthi militias have undertaken naval mining as far as 50 miles from the strait and have effectively deployed explosive drone boats, fast-attack craft, and land-based tactical rockets. The past weeks have demonstrated sophisticated capabilities in aerial drone technology and helicopter landings, in addition to suspicions of submersible capabilities. While the Houthi military threat to Red Sea shipping may seem unprecedented, it is in fact a long-standing source of tension in a region that has witnessed outbreaks of war over freedom-of-navigation rights.
Beginning in the 1950s, Israeli access to the Red Sea has repeatedly been threatened by regional enemies. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser took measures to restrict Israeli shipping in the area, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the June 1967 War, in part a conflict over naval navigation rights. During the early 1970s, Palestinian and other terrorist organizations established a base of operations in the southern Yemeni port city of Aden and targeted Israel-bound ships passing through Bab al-Mandeb. Subsequently, Egyptian and Yemeni troops coordinated to bar Israeli shipping from the southern gates of the Red Sea, a threat that remained until after the normalization of Israeli-Egyptian relations in 1977. With the rise to power of the Houthi movement in Yemen in 2014, the threat to Red Sea freedom of navigation has once again become a serious matter of concern. Driven by the infamous slogan of “Death to America! Death to Israel!”, Houthis militias have periodically attacked Israeli shipping, while Israeli maritime forces have intervened to prevent Iranian weapons shipments to Houthi militias. This confrontation has reached a crescendo in recent weeks with an increased number of rockets and naval attacks emanating from Yemeni territory.
Houthi hijacking of high-freeboard ships by helicopter and low-freeboard ships by sea, will undoubtedly serve to increase security costs and naval insurance premiums in the short term. More concerning, however, are the long-term consequences of wide-scale instability and militarization in the southern Red Sea. When the Ever Given container ship ran aground on the banks of Suez Canal in 2021, a single week of blocked shipping cost global markets billions of dollars. An extended period of conflict near the waters of Bab al-Mandeb will cause a far more significant financial impact on global commerce, not only by increasing the cost of shipping, but by redirecting the maritime routes entirely. The closure of the Suez Canal from 1967-75, for example, led to the development of larger and more versatile fleets that could transport oil and goods around the Cape of Good Hope at less than the cost of a smaller ship traversing the Suez Canal. The era of the supertanker ultimately decreased Suez Canal traffic by 50%. Unchecked Houthi militancy and the threat of a brewing Red Sea naval conflict may lead to similar consequences for Red Sea shipping that extend far beyond 2023.
A strong defensive posture coordinated by the United States and other naval powers with a presence in the region is the most effective route towards ensuring immediate Red Sea maritime security. International naval carriers in the region have demonstrated the capability of counteracting small-scale military strikes and mid-range rockets launched from the Yemeni coast. Since its first military intervention in Yemen in 2015, the UAE has secured strategic naval outposts, positioning themselves as guarantors of regional naval security. UAE military bases on the Socotra archipelago in the Indian Ocean and Perim Island in Bab al-Mandeb continue to serve as strategic assets for monitoring maritime traffic in the region and are an essential component in efforts to combat Houthi attacks on civilian vessels passing through the Red Sea.
Defensive measures cannot, however, bring about a permanent solution to Red Sea insecurity. Houthi militias continue to mount Red Sea attacks, both against Israeli shipping and other national civilian vessels. as part of a propaganda campaign and to pressure the international community to recognize Houthi power and authority in South Arabia. Such measures have given Houthi representatives leverage in recent negotiations with Saudi Arabia, aimed at securing an end to an 8-year civil war in Yemen. The inability to combat Houthi militancy, coupled with the diplomatic normalization of the group and the unintentional legitimacy offered to its continued rule in Sana’a, has only served to embolden the Houthis and by extension other Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East. Rather than offer the Houthis political recognition, the international community should ultimately recognize the unfortunate fact that even when faced with the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, Houthi leadership would rather invest treasure and human capital in seeking a propaganda victory against Israel than feed its own population. Such a group should not be normalized, nor should they be invited to the negotiating table as an equal and legitimate partner for Yemeni leadership. To do so would risk dragging the southern Red Sea through years of conflict and anarchy, with costly repercussions for global commerce.
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The Perils of Red Sea Piracy and Propaganda
Red Sea, near Egypt. Image by Юлия Прохоренко from Pixabay
December 15, 2023
Unlike previous instances of piracy in the south Red Sea, attacks by Houthi militias in the Red Sea today are largely about propaganda. This is difficult to combat and has long-term consequences for maritime security in the region, writes Harvard’s Asher Orkaby, Ph.D.
P
iracy and terrorist organizations at the southern gates of the Red Sea are not a new phenomenon. Recent Houthi attacks on Israeli shipping, however, aim not for plunder, ransom, or political demands. The perpetrators seek only propaganda victories, a far more dangerous goal and one without the ability to be mitigated by diplomatic appeasement. Filming the seizure of an Israeli-owned ship is, however, merely the first step in the broader aim of introducing large-scale instability to global shipping and earning the Houthi rebel group a degree of public recognition – both in Yemen and around the world.
Bab al-Mandeb Strait, located 1,400 miles south of the Suez Canal, is the third most important shipping lane in the world. Only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, the strait connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and abuts two regions of ongoing conflicts – the Horn of Africa and South Arabia. In the years since the northern tribal groups affiliated with the Houthi movement seized Yemen’s capital of Sana’a in 2014, numerous attacks have been perpetrated against civilian shipping passing through the southern Red Sea. The western Yemeni port of Hodeidah has become a staging ground for attacks against vessels, regardless of nationality. Houthi militias have undertaken naval mining as far as 50 miles from the strait and have effectively deployed explosive drone boats, fast-attack craft, and land-based tactical rockets. The past weeks have demonstrated sophisticated capabilities in aerial drone technology and helicopter landings, in addition to suspicions of submersible capabilities. While the Houthi military threat to Red Sea shipping may seem unprecedented, it is in fact a long-standing source of tension in a region that has witnessed outbreaks of war over freedom-of-navigation rights.
Beginning in the 1950s, Israeli access to the Red Sea has repeatedly been threatened by regional enemies. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser took measures to restrict Israeli shipping in the area, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the June 1967 War, in part a conflict over naval navigation rights. During the early 1970s, Palestinian and other terrorist organizations established a base of operations in the southern Yemeni port city of Aden and targeted Israel-bound ships passing through Bab al-Mandeb. Subsequently, Egyptian and Yemeni troops coordinated to bar Israeli shipping from the southern gates of the Red Sea, a threat that remained until after the normalization of Israeli-Egyptian relations in 1977. With the rise to power of the Houthi movement in Yemen in 2014, the threat to Red Sea freedom of navigation has once again become a serious matter of concern. Driven by the infamous slogan of “Death to America! Death to Israel!”, Houthis militias have periodically attacked Israeli shipping, while Israeli maritime forces have intervened to prevent Iranian weapons shipments to Houthi militias. This confrontation has reached a crescendo in recent weeks with an increased number of rockets and naval attacks emanating from Yemeni territory.
Houthi hijacking of high-freeboard ships by helicopter and low-freeboard ships by sea, will undoubtedly serve to increase security costs and naval insurance premiums in the short term. More concerning, however, are the long-term consequences of wide-scale instability and militarization in the southern Red Sea. When the Ever Given container ship ran aground on the banks of Suez Canal in 2021, a single week of blocked shipping cost global markets billions of dollars. An extended period of conflict near the waters of Bab al-Mandeb will cause a far more significant financial impact on global commerce, not only by increasing the cost of shipping, but by redirecting the maritime routes entirely. The closure of the Suez Canal from 1967-75, for example, led to the development of larger and more versatile fleets that could transport oil and goods around the Cape of Good Hope at less than the cost of a smaller ship traversing the Suez Canal. The era of the supertanker ultimately decreased Suez Canal traffic by 50%. Unchecked Houthi militancy and the threat of a brewing Red Sea naval conflict may lead to similar consequences for Red Sea shipping that extend far beyond 2023.
A strong defensive posture coordinated by the United States and other naval powers with a presence in the region is the most effective route towards ensuring immediate Red Sea maritime security. International naval carriers in the region have demonstrated the capability of counteracting small-scale military strikes and mid-range rockets launched from the Yemeni coast. Since its first military intervention in Yemen in 2015, the UAE has secured strategic naval outposts, positioning themselves as guarantors of regional naval security. UAE military bases on the Socotra archipelago in the Indian Ocean and Perim Island in Bab al-Mandeb continue to serve as strategic assets for monitoring maritime traffic in the region and are an essential component in efforts to combat Houthi attacks on civilian vessels passing through the Red Sea.
Defensive measures cannot, however, bring about a permanent solution to Red Sea insecurity. Houthi militias continue to mount Red Sea attacks, both against Israeli shipping and other national civilian vessels. as part of a propaganda campaign and to pressure the international community to recognize Houthi power and authority in South Arabia. Such measures have given Houthi representatives leverage in recent negotiations with Saudi Arabia, aimed at securing an end to an 8-year civil war in Yemen. The inability to combat Houthi militancy, coupled with the diplomatic normalization of the group and the unintentional legitimacy offered to its continued rule in Sana’a, has only served to embolden the Houthis and by extension other Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East. Rather than offer the Houthis political recognition, the international community should ultimately recognize the unfortunate fact that even when faced with the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, Houthi leadership would rather invest treasure and human capital in seeking a propaganda victory against Israel than feed its own population. Such a group should not be normalized, nor should they be invited to the negotiating table as an equal and legitimate partner for Yemeni leadership. To do so would risk dragging the southern Red Sea through years of conflict and anarchy, with costly repercussions for global commerce.
