ecretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly hailed NATO as the “most successful Alliance in history.” But, at their upcoming summit in Madrid, NATO heads of state and government will face serious challenges, from America’s weariness with Europe’s tendency to “trade away” geopolitical differences to tensions over Turkey’s efforts to block Finland and Sweden’s membership bids. Will transactional politics taint this summit—and NATO’s future?
To say that Russia’s war on Ukraine has upended European security and shaken NATO from its stupor is to state the obvious. The relative certainty that defined the world order over the last few decades has given way to great-power conflict and the specter of nuclear annihilation. Finland and Sweden’s applications for NATO membership represent not only a break from their own traditions of neutrality, but also the end of the post-Cold War era.
NATO’s priorities for the next decade, to be embodied in its next Strategic Concept—set to be adopted at this month’s gathering—are supposed to reflect this new reality. For example, it is expected to mention China for the first time. In another first, all of NATO’s Pacific partners (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) will attend the summit, as will Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This is in line with calls—made, for example, by the United Kingdom—to create a more “global NATO” that boosts security in the Indo-Pacific region.
But can NATO’s newfound ambition withstand what increasingly looks like a protracted war of attrition in Ukraine, with the energy-market mayhem and economic turmoil it has engendered? Russia President Vladimir Putin is betting that the answer is “no,” and it might not be a bad bet. Despite bold early announcements by NATO allies, including promises of major defense-spending increases by many European countries, political fissures along the usual fault lines have already emerged.
French diplomatic activism and German dithering have become increasingly intolerable to the United States, which is determined not to allow a repeat of the debacle involving Nord Stream 2, the gas pipeline (now suspended) that left Germany dependent on Russian supplies. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains staunchly opposed to consider the membership bids of Finland and Sweden, owing to their history of hosting members of Kurdish groups that Turkey considers terrorists, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the U.S. and the European Union also have classified as a terrorist organization.
To be sure, this is far from the first controversy Turkey has generated within NATO; just last year, Turkey, defying the U.S., agreed to purchase more S-400 missiles from Russia. But, as former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it in an unusually candid interview, Erdoğan’s stonewalling on NATO expansion—motivated in no small part by the desire to extract concessions from the U.S.—can be resolved.
Turkey’s intransigence is thus unlikely to derail the summit. But a decision on Finland and Sweden’s applications should be made soon; history shows—not least in Ukraine—that ambiguity over NATO membership can be worse than a flat-out rejection.
More broadly, Alliance members must not allow grandstanding and political horse-trading to take precedence over addressing the real challenges NATO faces, including streamlining a tangled command structure, adjusting its defense and deterrence posture, and resolving military shortfalls and operational challenges. Crucially, NATO must upgrade its tools to reflect the changing nature of warfare, which now is shaped as much by cyberattacks and—as the Ukraine war clearly shows—by disinformation as by guns and tanks.
The first steps toward meeting these imperatives must be made in Madrid. Of course, no single summit or text could resolve NATO’s deficiencies and meet its lofty goals, from reaffirming shared values to enhancing resilience, especially with a conventional conflict raging on its eastern doorstep. But the Madrid summit can—and must—cement NATO’s unity and lay the foundations for a more robust and revitalized Alliance.
As NATO’s main engine, the U.S. has a crucial role to play in delivering this outcome. But European countries must also do their part, mustering the unity, vision, and will to develop its hard-power capabilities. We must do this not in the name of the dream of strategic autonomy, but to enhance NATO’s capabilities and clout. While Europeans are understandably wary of another “America First” leader—whether Donald Trump or an acolyte—coming to power in the U.S., the fact remains that it is in Europe’s self-interest to help the U.S. reclaim its leading role on the world stage.
NATO has been on life support for years, and reviving it will be no easy feat. But the Alliance’s faculties remain very much intact, and with a concerted effort, it can be truly worthy of Stoltenberg’s praise. While rivals like China might still call it a remnant of the Cold War, they will still think twice—or more often—before challenging it. If NATO leaders fail, however, the West would be put at a serious strategic disadvantage.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022.
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Reawakening NATO
Photo via Pixabay.
July 1, 2022
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shaken NATO from its stupor, giving new impetus to the Alliance as leaders met in Madrid for its summit this week. However, political fissures are already forming, and reviving NATO will be no easy feat, writes former foreign minister of Spain Ana Palacio.
S
ecretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly hailed NATO as the “most successful Alliance in history.” But, at their upcoming summit in Madrid, NATO heads of state and government will face serious challenges, from America’s weariness with Europe’s tendency to “trade away” geopolitical differences to tensions over Turkey’s efforts to block Finland and Sweden’s membership bids. Will transactional politics taint this summit—and NATO’s future?
To say that Russia’s war on Ukraine has upended European security and shaken NATO from its stupor is to state the obvious. The relative certainty that defined the world order over the last few decades has given way to great-power conflict and the specter of nuclear annihilation. Finland and Sweden’s applications for NATO membership represent not only a break from their own traditions of neutrality, but also the end of the post-Cold War era.
NATO’s priorities for the next decade, to be embodied in its next Strategic Concept—set to be adopted at this month’s gathering—are supposed to reflect this new reality. For example, it is expected to mention China for the first time. In another first, all of NATO’s Pacific partners (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) will attend the summit, as will Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This is in line with calls—made, for example, by the United Kingdom—to create a more “global NATO” that boosts security in the Indo-Pacific region.
But can NATO’s newfound ambition withstand what increasingly looks like a protracted war of attrition in Ukraine, with the energy-market mayhem and economic turmoil it has engendered? Russia President Vladimir Putin is betting that the answer is “no,” and it might not be a bad bet. Despite bold early announcements by NATO allies, including promises of major defense-spending increases by many European countries, political fissures along the usual fault lines have already emerged.
French diplomatic activism and German dithering have become increasingly intolerable to the United States, which is determined not to allow a repeat of the debacle involving Nord Stream 2, the gas pipeline (now suspended) that left Germany dependent on Russian supplies. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains staunchly opposed to consider the membership bids of Finland and Sweden, owing to their history of hosting members of Kurdish groups that Turkey considers terrorists, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the U.S. and the European Union also have classified as a terrorist organization.
To be sure, this is far from the first controversy Turkey has generated within NATO; just last year, Turkey, defying the U.S., agreed to purchase more S-400 missiles from Russia. But, as former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it in an unusually candid interview, Erdoğan’s stonewalling on NATO expansion—motivated in no small part by the desire to extract concessions from the U.S.—can be resolved.
Turkey’s intransigence is thus unlikely to derail the summit. But a decision on Finland and Sweden’s applications should be made soon; history shows—not least in Ukraine—that ambiguity over NATO membership can be worse than a flat-out rejection.
More broadly, Alliance members must not allow grandstanding and political horse-trading to take precedence over addressing the real challenges NATO faces, including streamlining a tangled command structure, adjusting its defense and deterrence posture, and resolving military shortfalls and operational challenges. Crucially, NATO must upgrade its tools to reflect the changing nature of warfare, which now is shaped as much by cyberattacks and—as the Ukraine war clearly shows—by disinformation as by guns and tanks.
The first steps toward meeting these imperatives must be made in Madrid. Of course, no single summit or text could resolve NATO’s deficiencies and meet its lofty goals, from reaffirming shared values to enhancing resilience, especially with a conventional conflict raging on its eastern doorstep. But the Madrid summit can—and must—cement NATO’s unity and lay the foundations for a more robust and revitalized Alliance.
As NATO’s main engine, the U.S. has a crucial role to play in delivering this outcome. But European countries must also do their part, mustering the unity, vision, and will to develop its hard-power capabilities. We must do this not in the name of the dream of strategic autonomy, but to enhance NATO’s capabilities and clout. While Europeans are understandably wary of another “America First” leader—whether Donald Trump or an acolyte—coming to power in the U.S., the fact remains that it is in Europe’s self-interest to help the U.S. reclaim its leading role on the world stage.
NATO has been on life support for years, and reviving it will be no easy feat. But the Alliance’s faculties remain very much intact, and with a concerted effort, it can be truly worthy of Stoltenberg’s praise. While rivals like China might still call it a remnant of the Cold War, they will still think twice—or more often—before challenging it. If NATO leaders fail, however, the West would be put at a serious strategic disadvantage.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022.
