s NATO members gather to discuss the future of the alliance, the question of management versus command of national armed forces deserves further examination. Experts are debating where the line between running the Ministries of National Defense and commanding the military by politicians should be marked. In democracies today, the mission and tasks of armed forces rarely raise questions of democratic institutional resilience. Yet there is still no consensus over how to interpret the issue of civilian, democratic control over a nation’s armed forces.
This lack of consensus about what civilian control over the military should look like can blur the line between management and command. Indeed, today there are numerous publications which compare military command to management. There is some utility to such analogies, but these can contribute to misunderstanding of the critical differences between command and management, which at some level can become dangerous. Management is defining what should be done while command is answering how it should be done. Blurring the lines between these discrete roles could lead to entrusting one individual with both, which in turn risks that individual’s subjective view prevailing, whereas security issues require reality checks and the application of objective measures.
Management, Command Divide Remains Critical to NATO’s Identity
The importance of this discussion should not be underestimated, particularly at a time when active war is being waged on NATO’s eastern flank. Discussing the line between civilian and military control of a nation’s armed forces is as crucial today as it was thirty years ago when, after the Warsaw Pact's collapse, the question of security guarantees for its former members arose. Getting this right is critical both to ensuring militaries run efficiently and that democratic institutions remain resilient.
When Poland and other states in Central and Eastern Europe declared their desire to join NATO three decades ago, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin responded with the concept of "Partnership for Peace" as a proposal for the Alliance to sign a defense cooperation agreement with the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. One of the six key aspects of this proposal was how civilian political institutions related to national militaries.
In 2000, Poland and the U.S. were again joined in their efforts to bring established and aspiring democracies together in a global initiative of Community of Democracies, including among its 19 principles that civilian, democratic control over the military be established and preserved. A memento from those who have lived through the experience of a post-Soviet military impact zone was included among the founding stones to be set in any democracy.
Today, the original fears of excessive military interference in the state’s functioning faced in the 1990’s can be put aside ad acta in most democratic states. Yet it is still important that we seek solutions that consolidate democratic institutions in the functioning of the state in keeping with NATO collective defense requirements. Today’s professional officer cadre in democratic countries has an increased awareness of the importance of democratic institutions, informed by modernized military education and interaction with international colleagues. This should allow for increased trust of military professionals as we seek the most effective balance between managing national ministries of defense and command of the armed forces.
Central and Eastern European governments should look to the example of NATO members such as the U.S., UK, Canada, and France—where the highest command authority is not part of its government administration but rather works in full cooperation with these structures.
NATO, as a unique global military and political structure, can play a crucial role in helping design these structures through sharing a consistent experience of its prominent members in establishing full authority and responsibility of the civilian leaders over the area of national defense while striking the right balance between the political needs and the professional military command.
The experience of NATO members demonstrates this balance is best achieved through assigning civilian authorities with the responsibility of determining the missions for the army, shaping the development of the armed forces, determining the size and structure of forces, and allocate funds for national security. NATO member experiences have also illustrated how best to systematically separate military and civilian structures. Finally, NATO member state best practice has established a standard of protecting the apolitical character of national armed forces. NATO militaries are not intended to carry out any political activities, whether managerial or related to elections or political parties. Nor should NATO militaries be involved in policing functions or maintaining domestic security during times of peace.
It is, after all, not by accident that already in 1949, the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty solemnly confirmed in the preamble to their joint obligations determination to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Those having then in mind the creation of a military and political alliance made a powerful, unquestionable and timeless, as it was proved, link with democracy.
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Protecting the State from the Army, Protecting the Army from Politicians
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July 12, 2023
As NATO members discuss the future identity of the alliance, delegates should consider the question of management versus command of armed forces. Democracy demands civilian control of the military, but civilians are not suited to command, and the line is often blurred, writes Dr. Miroslaw Rozanski.
A
s NATO members gather to discuss the future of the alliance, the question of management versus command of national armed forces deserves further examination. Experts are debating where the line between running the Ministries of National Defense and commanding the military by politicians should be marked. In democracies today, the mission and tasks of armed forces rarely raise questions of democratic institutional resilience. Yet there is still no consensus over how to interpret the issue of civilian, democratic control over a nation’s armed forces.
This lack of consensus about what civilian control over the military should look like can blur the line between management and command. Indeed, today there are numerous publications which compare military command to management. There is some utility to such analogies, but these can contribute to misunderstanding of the critical differences between command and management, which at some level can become dangerous. Management is defining what should be done while command is answering how it should be done. Blurring the lines between these discrete roles could lead to entrusting one individual with both, which in turn risks that individual’s subjective view prevailing, whereas security issues require reality checks and the application of objective measures.
Management, Command Divide Remains Critical to NATO’s Identity
The importance of this discussion should not be underestimated, particularly at a time when active war is being waged on NATO’s eastern flank. Discussing the line between civilian and military control of a nation’s armed forces is as crucial today as it was thirty years ago when, after the Warsaw Pact's collapse, the question of security guarantees for its former members arose. Getting this right is critical both to ensuring militaries run efficiently and that democratic institutions remain resilient.
When Poland and other states in Central and Eastern Europe declared their desire to join NATO three decades ago, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin responded with the concept of "Partnership for Peace" as a proposal for the Alliance to sign a defense cooperation agreement with the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. One of the six key aspects of this proposal was how civilian political institutions related to national militaries.
In 2000, Poland and the U.S. were again joined in their efforts to bring established and aspiring democracies together in a global initiative of Community of Democracies, including among its 19 principles that civilian, democratic control over the military be established and preserved. A memento from those who have lived through the experience of a post-Soviet military impact zone was included among the founding stones to be set in any democracy.
Today, the original fears of excessive military interference in the state’s functioning faced in the 1990’s can be put aside ad acta in most democratic states. Yet it is still important that we seek solutions that consolidate democratic institutions in the functioning of the state in keeping with NATO collective defense requirements. Today’s professional officer cadre in democratic countries has an increased awareness of the importance of democratic institutions, informed by modernized military education and interaction with international colleagues. This should allow for increased trust of military professionals as we seek the most effective balance between managing national ministries of defense and command of the armed forces.
Central and Eastern European governments should look to the example of NATO members such as the U.S., UK, Canada, and France—where the highest command authority is not part of its government administration but rather works in full cooperation with these structures.
NATO, as a unique global military and political structure, can play a crucial role in helping design these structures through sharing a consistent experience of its prominent members in establishing full authority and responsibility of the civilian leaders over the area of national defense while striking the right balance between the political needs and the professional military command.
The experience of NATO members demonstrates this balance is best achieved through assigning civilian authorities with the responsibility of determining the missions for the army, shaping the development of the armed forces, determining the size and structure of forces, and allocate funds for national security. NATO member experiences have also illustrated how best to systematically separate military and civilian structures. Finally, NATO member state best practice has established a standard of protecting the apolitical character of national armed forces. NATO militaries are not intended to carry out any political activities, whether managerial or related to elections or political parties. Nor should NATO militaries be involved in policing functions or maintaining domestic security during times of peace.
It is, after all, not by accident that already in 1949, the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty solemnly confirmed in the preamble to their joint obligations determination to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Those having then in mind the creation of a military and political alliance made a powerful, unquestionable and timeless, as it was proved, link with democracy.
