Kyodo News reported on July 6th that the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) is assessing the option to purchase two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers for BMD missions. The country’s current Aegis fleet consists of four Kongo-class destroyers. Combined with the commissioning of two Aegis-equipped destroyers currently under renovation, the new purchase would effectively double Japan’s Aegis fleet and make eight destroyers available for BMD missions in out years.
The MOD has not substantiated the reports as yet, and other Japanese media outlets are only softly echoing the Kyodo report. Still, the Abe administration’s public record would suggest that the reported purchase could become a legitimate policy direction.
For the Abe administration, the purchase could contribute to Japan’s economic revival in a substantial and high-profile way. A newly revitalized economy would also enable Mr. Abe to pursue his long-held objective of giving the Japanese Self Defense Forces sharper teeth. Historically, Japan’s defense budget is capped at one percent of GPD. If spending on massive new materiel, like destroyers, feeds Mr. Abe’s immediate economic priorities and contributes to continued GDP growth, the cap becomes less of a problem for the Abe administration and MOD budgeters.
A big push for expanded missile defense would also come at a time when regional security dynamics would bolster the political feasibility and defense strategic fit of new BMD naval assets. North Korea’s aggressive rhetoric and highly controversial missile tests unsettled many in Japan. The situation there has become less severe, but it was not until June 28th that the Japanese government relaxed its order to keep missile defense systems deployed and on-alert to counter a potential North Korean missile attack.
An aggressive posture on disputed territories by China could also warm the waters for big destroyer purchases. The 2013 White Paper stated bluntly that “there is a need to sufficiently consider the increased activity in the air and sea around Japan, including recent invasions of maritime territory and incursions into national airspace by China.” Combined with historically high approval of the Japanese Self Defense Forces among the Japanese public, and a general sentiment that the Maritime Self Defense Forces need to be better equipped following the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami, growing unease about China’s posture could make ship purchases more palatable.
All of this supports the feasibility of the potential purchase. Media reports indicate that the decision will be made public along with, or shortly after, the release of the updated National Defense Guidelines toward the end of the year. If it does proceed, the enhanced BMD capabilities mean several things for regional security.
First, regional powers will view the new Aegis-equipped destroyers as a part of the U.S. missile defense infrastructure as much as they will perceive them to be Japanese. When the Japanese government released the founding documents of the country’s missile defense program in 2003, plans for development and deployment explicitly noted the importance of the United States. Since then, the two countries have cooperated in ways that set the precedent for contemporary cooperative development programs. It is now difficult to see the Japanese BMD network as unrelated to the U.S. system.
Second, the Chinese government will view the expansion of Japan’s Aegis-equipped fleet as a countermeasure to its own missiles. The potential purchase has already been picked up by Xinhua, China's state-run news agency. In the byline of its reporting on the Aegis buy, Xinhua asks, "Is containing China the greater objective?" Beijing hopes the public will perceive that it is. In addition to feeding patriotic sentiment in the mainland, that conclusion also provides the Chinese government with a convenient justification for its own continued spending on military modernization.
Third, and most importantly for alliance planners in Washington and Tokyo, the purchase signals the direction the Abe administration is likely to take on giving the Japanese Self Defense Forces new muscle. An Aegis-equipped destroyer comes with a price tag of about 200 billion yen a piece, or about $2 billion at current exchange rates. Along with the increased spending of about $350 million in the administration's 2013 budget, the increased defense expenditure pushes Japan even further toward its pre-recession levels and closes the gap between spending levels as a percent of GNP and the historical “principle” cap at one percent.
Regardless of where the debate leads, the purchase of two new Aegis-equipped destroyers would deliver a powerful and not-so-subtle message to the international community. When Mr. Abe and the Japanese Diet increased Japan’s defense budget in 2013, they were not simply correcting their course to advance immediate economic objectives. All signs indicate the Abe administration is setting a new trajectory for Japan’s defense policy that will have far-reaching implications for the future of the Japanese Self Defense Forces.
Joshua Archer is a research associate with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Charles Oki/Released.
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Potential Purchase of Aegis Destroyers Marks a Trend for Japan's Defense Policy
August 1, 2013
Kyodo News reported on July 6th that the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) is assessing the option to purchase two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers for BMD missions. The country’s current Aegis fleet consists of four Kongo-class destroyers. Combined with the commissioning of two Aegis-equipped destroyers currently under renovation, the new purchase would effectively double Japan’s Aegis fleet and make eight destroyers available for BMD missions in out years.
The MOD has not substantiated the reports as yet, and other Japanese media outlets are only softly echoing the Kyodo report. Still, the Abe administration’s public record would suggest that the reported purchase could become a legitimate policy direction.
For the Abe administration, the purchase could contribute to Japan’s economic revival in a substantial and high-profile way. A newly revitalized economy would also enable Mr. Abe to pursue his long-held objective of giving the Japanese Self Defense Forces sharper teeth. Historically, Japan’s defense budget is capped at one percent of GPD. If spending on massive new materiel, like destroyers, feeds Mr. Abe’s immediate economic priorities and contributes to continued GDP growth, the cap becomes less of a problem for the Abe administration and MOD budgeters.
A big push for expanded missile defense would also come at a time when regional security dynamics would bolster the political feasibility and defense strategic fit of new BMD naval assets. North Korea’s aggressive rhetoric and highly controversial missile tests unsettled many in Japan. The situation there has become less severe, but it was not until June 28th that the Japanese government relaxed its order to keep missile defense systems deployed and on-alert to counter a potential North Korean missile attack.
An aggressive posture on disputed territories by China could also warm the waters for big destroyer purchases. The 2013 White Paper stated bluntly that “there is a need to sufficiently consider the increased activity in the air and sea around Japan, including recent invasions of maritime territory and incursions into national airspace by China.” Combined with historically high approval of the Japanese Self Defense Forces among the Japanese public, and a general sentiment that the Maritime Self Defense Forces need to be better equipped following the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami, growing unease about China’s posture could make ship purchases more palatable.
All of this supports the feasibility of the potential purchase. Media reports indicate that the decision will be made public along with, or shortly after, the release of the updated National Defense Guidelines toward the end of the year. If it does proceed, the enhanced BMD capabilities mean several things for regional security.
First, regional powers will view the new Aegis-equipped destroyers as a part of the U.S. missile defense infrastructure as much as they will perceive them to be Japanese. When the Japanese government released the founding documents of the country’s missile defense program in 2003, plans for development and deployment explicitly noted the importance of the United States. Since then, the two countries have cooperated in ways that set the precedent for contemporary cooperative development programs. It is now difficult to see the Japanese BMD network as unrelated to the U.S. system.
Second, the Chinese government will view the expansion of Japan’s Aegis-equipped fleet as a countermeasure to its own missiles. The potential purchase has already been picked up by Xinhua, China's state-run news agency. In the byline of its reporting on the Aegis buy, Xinhua asks, "Is containing China the greater objective?" Beijing hopes the public will perceive that it is. In addition to feeding patriotic sentiment in the mainland, that conclusion also provides the Chinese government with a convenient justification for its own continued spending on military modernization.
Third, and most importantly for alliance planners in Washington and Tokyo, the purchase signals the direction the Abe administration is likely to take on giving the Japanese Self Defense Forces new muscle. An Aegis-equipped destroyer comes with a price tag of about 200 billion yen a piece, or about $2 billion at current exchange rates. Along with the increased spending of about $350 million in the administration's 2013 budget, the increased defense expenditure pushes Japan even further toward its pre-recession levels and closes the gap between spending levels as a percent of GNP and the historical “principle” cap at one percent.
Regardless of where the debate leads, the purchase of two new Aegis-equipped destroyers would deliver a powerful and not-so-subtle message to the international community. When Mr. Abe and the Japanese Diet increased Japan’s defense budget in 2013, they were not simply correcting their course to advance immediate economic objectives. All signs indicate the Abe administration is setting a new trajectory for Japan’s defense policy that will have far-reaching implications for the future of the Japanese Self Defense Forces.
Joshua Archer is a research associate with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Charles Oki/Released.
