ver since the Israel-Hamas war started on 7 October, the issue of Palestinian refugees has become crucial among policymakers both inside and outside the region. Currently, about 2.2 million Palestinians are living in the Gaza Strip, and as the conflict intensifies, their future becomes increasingly uncertain. Whether the outcome consists of a form of a “two state” compromise or not will have a big impact on the severity of displacement. For example, if Israel were to maintain a military presence in the Gaza Strip, neighboring states, such as Jordan and Egypt, may receive pressure to accept the incoming flow of Palestinians.
The issue of Palestinian refugees has characterized the Israeli-Arab conflict since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948 when about 750,000 people were displaced after the Nakba (or, the “catastrophe"). Over the years, it has intertwined with broader geopolitical considerations involving many countries in the region, especially neighboring Egypt and Jordan.
Many Western governments and organizations, particularly the European Union, are pressuring Egypt to open its border with the Gaza Strip, but President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has ruled out this possibility. So far, only dozens of Palestinians—all with double passports—have been allowed to cross the Rafah border and escape from war.
In late October 2023, a leaked Israeli report began to circulate supporting a plan to temporarily host Palestinians in tent cities in Egypt until the reconstruction of basic infrastructures in the Gaza Strip. Yassin Ashour, an Egyptian political consultant on the Middle East, told The New Arab, “Egypt would never agree to a resettlement of Palestinian refugees... It would be permanent. It will never be temporary, as Israel suggests.” Additionally, the Foreign Minister of Egypt commented, "I see no reason why Egypt, which is hosting 9 million refugees—hosting them and providing their integration into our society at the considerable burden on our economy—should have to bear solely [the] additional influx of Gazans." However, the Foreign Minister’s statement is quite an exaggeration; data shows Egypt is hosting 9 million migrants, 300,000 of which are refugees—whereas Jordan currently hosts 3 million Palestinian refugees. Although, the statement does describe other factors at play in this issue.
Ideology, diplomacy, and economy are all factors influencing Arab leaders' wariness toward the Palestinians. Ideologically, accepting millions of refugees from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would imply, de facto, renouncing the construction of a Palestinian state when most every Middle Eastern country—including those that signed the Abraham Accords, like the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—supports the two-state solution. For example, weeks after the start of the war, al-Sisi reaffirmed its country's ideological commitment by declaring, "This is the cause of all causes, the cause of all Arabs...It is important that the [Palestinian] people remain steadfast and present on their land."
The two-state solution is a proposed coexistence framework based on the creation of two states for two peoples: one for the Jews and one for the Palestinians. The Arab countries that would be responsible for the refugees are in support of this because many of their economies are in crisis with rising unemployment and inflation, as well as prolonged growth. For example, Egypt and neighboring Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan do not have the resources to provide them with acceptable living conditions even in the short term.
Lastly, many countries fear that a full-scale Palestinian displacement could increase security threats. In Jordan, for example, the domestic debate is currently influenced by the concept of al-Watan al-Badil (the "Alternative Homeland"), an idea promoted by Israeli nationalist parties, now in the government, in which Jordan could become the only state for the Palestinians. However, over the decades, Jordan has faced many threats related to Palestinian terrorism such as the so-called Black September—a civil war between King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) between 1970 and 1971. In the conflict, more than 4,000 people died, and many others were injured.
In the last few weeks, Israeli leaders allegedly offered to write off a part of Egypt's external debt in exchange for accepting displaced Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. The proposal seems to have been firmly rejected because the Egyptian population could perceive this decision as supporting Israel's denial to create a Palestinian state—thus achieving the so-called one-state solution.
The political-military objective Israel wants to pursue in Gaza is crucial at this point. If the government of Netanyahu withdraws after destroying the Hamas operational network, the scale of Palestinian displacement could be limited. Conversely, if the destruction of infrastructure continues, the international community will be forced to facilitate the housing of a part of the Palestinian population in neighboring countries. For how long; however, is unknown.
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Palestinian Displacement from Egypt and Jordan’s Perspective
Palestinians in Gaza. Image by hosny salah from Pixabay
December 2, 2023
Around 2.2 million Palestinians currently live in the Gaza Strip, and many will likely become refugees. Egypt and Jordan are under pressure to prepare for an influx of refugees, but they fear any displaced Palestinians would quickly become permanent residents, writes Elia Preto Martini.
E
ver since the Israel-Hamas war started on 7 October, the issue of Palestinian refugees has become crucial among policymakers both inside and outside the region. Currently, about 2.2 million Palestinians are living in the Gaza Strip, and as the conflict intensifies, their future becomes increasingly uncertain. Whether the outcome consists of a form of a “two state” compromise or not will have a big impact on the severity of displacement. For example, if Israel were to maintain a military presence in the Gaza Strip, neighboring states, such as Jordan and Egypt, may receive pressure to accept the incoming flow of Palestinians.
The issue of Palestinian refugees has characterized the Israeli-Arab conflict since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948 when about 750,000 people were displaced after the Nakba (or, the “catastrophe"). Over the years, it has intertwined with broader geopolitical considerations involving many countries in the region, especially neighboring Egypt and Jordan.
Many Western governments and organizations, particularly the European Union, are pressuring Egypt to open its border with the Gaza Strip, but President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has ruled out this possibility. So far, only dozens of Palestinians—all with double passports—have been allowed to cross the Rafah border and escape from war.
In late October 2023, a leaked Israeli report began to circulate supporting a plan to temporarily host Palestinians in tent cities in Egypt until the reconstruction of basic infrastructures in the Gaza Strip. Yassin Ashour, an Egyptian political consultant on the Middle East, told The New Arab, “Egypt would never agree to a resettlement of Palestinian refugees... It would be permanent. It will never be temporary, as Israel suggests.” Additionally, the Foreign Minister of Egypt commented, "I see no reason why Egypt, which is hosting 9 million refugees—hosting them and providing their integration into our society at the considerable burden on our economy—should have to bear solely [the] additional influx of Gazans." However, the Foreign Minister’s statement is quite an exaggeration; data shows Egypt is hosting 9 million migrants, 300,000 of which are refugees—whereas Jordan currently hosts 3 million Palestinian refugees. Although, the statement does describe other factors at play in this issue.
Ideology, diplomacy, and economy are all factors influencing Arab leaders' wariness toward the Palestinians. Ideologically, accepting millions of refugees from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would imply, de facto, renouncing the construction of a Palestinian state when most every Middle Eastern country—including those that signed the Abraham Accords, like the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—supports the two-state solution. For example, weeks after the start of the war, al-Sisi reaffirmed its country's ideological commitment by declaring, "This is the cause of all causes, the cause of all Arabs...It is important that the [Palestinian] people remain steadfast and present on their land."
The two-state solution is a proposed coexistence framework based on the creation of two states for two peoples: one for the Jews and one for the Palestinians. The Arab countries that would be responsible for the refugees are in support of this because many of their economies are in crisis with rising unemployment and inflation, as well as prolonged growth. For example, Egypt and neighboring Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan do not have the resources to provide them with acceptable living conditions even in the short term.
Lastly, many countries fear that a full-scale Palestinian displacement could increase security threats. In Jordan, for example, the domestic debate is currently influenced by the concept of al-Watan al-Badil (the "Alternative Homeland"), an idea promoted by Israeli nationalist parties, now in the government, in which Jordan could become the only state for the Palestinians. However, over the decades, Jordan has faced many threats related to Palestinian terrorism such as the so-called Black September—a civil war between King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) between 1970 and 1971. In the conflict, more than 4,000 people died, and many others were injured.
In the last few weeks, Israeli leaders allegedly offered to write off a part of Egypt's external debt in exchange for accepting displaced Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. The proposal seems to have been firmly rejected because the Egyptian population could perceive this decision as supporting Israel's denial to create a Palestinian state—thus achieving the so-called one-state solution.
The political-military objective Israel wants to pursue in Gaza is crucial at this point. If the government of Netanyahu withdraws after destroying the Hamas operational network, the scale of Palestinian displacement could be limited. Conversely, if the destruction of infrastructure continues, the international community will be forced to facilitate the housing of a part of the Palestinian population in neighboring countries. For how long; however, is unknown.
