By projecting Imran Khan as the new leader of the masses, the Generals are trying to kill many birds with one stone. Khan, too ambitious and eager a candidate, is not averse to towing the military line. Khan's main problem is that despite the charisma and the crowd that he seems to draw, he doesn’t have any political base to launch a credible campaign to oust a more experienced, resourceful and networked party like Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Khan, being a Pashtun, can draw some votes in the Pashtun-dominated areas, but in a country divided sharply on sectarian and ethnic lines, it is too much to expect Khan to gain enough support in the Punjabi heartland to stake a claim for Islamabad. The Sindh area is also not likely to go his way as Pashtuns are pitted against Punjabis, Mohajirs, and Sindhis in cities like Karachi. Khan cannot hope to overthrow the domination of Altaf Hussain however much support he could garner from the military.
It is in Punjab that Khan will find his way blocked by satraps like the Sharif family, the Chaudhary's, and the Punjabi leaders of PPP. The Sharifs have ruled Punjab for quite some time and remain a powerful entity despite their tug of war with Kayani and his men. Similarly the Chaudhary brothers and their kin control vast real estate in Punjab and have considerable clout although politically they have not been able to gain much after their heydays during the Musharraf regime.
In short, Khan has no chance on his own to come to Islamabad. So he desperately needs the army, which in a way is as desperate to use him to revive its lost honour. Kayani could have taken over the regime and fixed up things for the army and its strategic interests in controlling Pakistan. But Kayani is too shrewd for his own good. He knows that there is no hope for Pakistan to regain its lost economic impulse. The society has never been so polarized on ethnic and sectarian lines. There are audible grumblings within the troops and officer corps about Kayani’s relationship with the U.S. and the drone attacks.
Kayani is acutely aware of the fact that it was under his watch that Pakistan had become a failing state primarily due to the wrong policies followed by the army and his refusal to turn it around. The fact that Pakistan is more insecure both in terms of economy and security than ever before leaves not much chance for Kayani to play around. He had seen how his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf - in many ways more powerful than Kayani at one point of time - was hounded out of the country by a strong, vitriolic public opinion. Rarely had been a general so humiliated since Niazi and Yahya Khan after the 1971 defeat and surrender.
So Kayani is not going to take over despite what the "memogate" seems to suggest. Since Imran Khan on his own cannot win an election, Kayani and his men have thought of making him a caretaker Prime Minister. The "memogate" in fact fits into this puzzle. President Asif Zardari had to be discredited and forced to quit, paving the way for the collapse of the PPP government. This will give the army a role to play in the politics which Kayani said he will abstain from. But rarely has a general been more politically astute than Kayani after Zia. Once the PPP government falls, Kayani can step in and install a caretaker government for the sake of stability of the country till the next elections could be conducted.
With a caretaker government led by a malleable and rookie Imran Khan, the army leadership can play its game of neutralizing the Sharifs, marginalize the Zardari clan, and create a coalition government on the lines of Musharraf. This way Kayani and his men can effectively counter the growing civilian demand for more accountability from the military leadership about their conduct, blame Zardari for all the ills that have befallen on Pakistan in the last five years and regain control of the country without being held accountable for its acts of omission and commission.
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Pakistan Army Looks to a New Leader
December 14, 2011
By projecting Imran Khan as the new leader of the masses, the Generals are trying to kill many birds with one stone. Khan, too ambitious and eager a candidate, is not averse to towing the military line. Khan's main problem is that despite the charisma and the crowd that he seems to draw, he doesn’t have any political base to launch a credible campaign to oust a more experienced, resourceful and networked party like Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Khan, being a Pashtun, can draw some votes in the Pashtun-dominated areas, but in a country divided sharply on sectarian and ethnic lines, it is too much to expect Khan to gain enough support in the Punjabi heartland to stake a claim for Islamabad. The Sindh area is also not likely to go his way as Pashtuns are pitted against Punjabis, Mohajirs, and Sindhis in cities like Karachi. Khan cannot hope to overthrow the domination of Altaf Hussain however much support he could garner from the military.
It is in Punjab that Khan will find his way blocked by satraps like the Sharif family, the Chaudhary's, and the Punjabi leaders of PPP. The Sharifs have ruled Punjab for quite some time and remain a powerful entity despite their tug of war with Kayani and his men. Similarly the Chaudhary brothers and their kin control vast real estate in Punjab and have considerable clout although politically they have not been able to gain much after their heydays during the Musharraf regime.
In short, Khan has no chance on his own to come to Islamabad. So he desperately needs the army, which in a way is as desperate to use him to revive its lost honour. Kayani could have taken over the regime and fixed up things for the army and its strategic interests in controlling Pakistan. But Kayani is too shrewd for his own good. He knows that there is no hope for Pakistan to regain its lost economic impulse. The society has never been so polarized on ethnic and sectarian lines. There are audible grumblings within the troops and officer corps about Kayani’s relationship with the U.S. and the drone attacks.
Kayani is acutely aware of the fact that it was under his watch that Pakistan had become a failing state primarily due to the wrong policies followed by the army and his refusal to turn it around. The fact that Pakistan is more insecure both in terms of economy and security than ever before leaves not much chance for Kayani to play around. He had seen how his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf - in many ways more powerful than Kayani at one point of time - was hounded out of the country by a strong, vitriolic public opinion. Rarely had been a general so humiliated since Niazi and Yahya Khan after the 1971 defeat and surrender.
So Kayani is not going to take over despite what the "memogate" seems to suggest. Since Imran Khan on his own cannot win an election, Kayani and his men have thought of making him a caretaker Prime Minister. The "memogate" in fact fits into this puzzle. President Asif Zardari had to be discredited and forced to quit, paving the way for the collapse of the PPP government. This will give the army a role to play in the politics which Kayani said he will abstain from. But rarely has a general been more politically astute than Kayani after Zia. Once the PPP government falls, Kayani can step in and install a caretaker government for the sake of stability of the country till the next elections could be conducted.
With a caretaker government led by a malleable and rookie Imran Khan, the army leadership can play its game of neutralizing the Sharifs, marginalize the Zardari clan, and create a coalition government on the lines of Musharraf. This way Kayani and his men can effectively counter the growing civilian demand for more accountability from the military leadership about their conduct, blame Zardari for all the ills that have befallen on Pakistan in the last five years and regain control of the country without being held accountable for its acts of omission and commission.
