ecent clashes in northern Kosovo have—at least to a certain extent—destabilized the region. Following the 24 September 2023 shootout between masked Serb gunmen and ethnic Albanian-dominated Kosovo police, it became obvious that the Kosovo frozen conflict can easily escalate and turn hot. But how likely is such an outcome?
Fears of another war in Europe have started to grow after a group of around 30 heavily armed Serbs stormed the village of Banjska, in northern Kosovo, battling police and barricading themselves into the Serbian Orthodox monastery. The armed group was led by Milan Radoicic, the deputy leader of Serb List, a Belgrade-backed party representing ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo. To this day, it remains unclear what their military and political goals were.
Pristina accused Belgrade of direct involvement in deadly clashes, claiming that Serbia aimed to “annex northern Kosovo,” and described Radoicic’s actions as the “act of aggression.” Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, on the other hand, said that the Serbs from the north of Kosovo have rebelled, as they did not want to “suffer Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti's terror anymore.” Serbia insists the gunmen acted on their own, while NATO—deployed to Kosovo as a result of the 1999 war—called on both Belgrade and Pristina to return to the negotiating table to resolve their issues to prevent violence.
Six days after the clashes, on 01 October 2023, the United States, as the major foreign power operating in the Balkans, warned of an “unprecedented” Serbian military build-up near the Kosovo frontier. Following Vucic’s talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Serbia’s leader pointed out that Belgrade has pulled some of its troops back from territories near Kosovo. Washington welcomed such a move, although the situation in the region has still not got back to normal.
Kosovo’s authorities expect Belgrade to hand over ethnic Serb gunmen to Pristina, and have called on the West to impose sanctions on Serbia over its alleged involvement in the 24 September 2023 clashes. On 05 October 2023, during the European leaders’ summit in Grenada, Spain, Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani refused to hold talks with Vucic “unless sanctions were imposed against Belgrade.” Given that Spain, along with Serbia and four EU members—Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus—does not recognize Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally declared independence, it is not very probable that the European Union will sanction Belgrade over the Banjska shooting. Moreover, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has openly ruled out imposing sanctions on Serbia, which suggests it is unlikely the EU would reach consensus on the matter.
That, however, does not mean that some of the most influential Western actors will stop pressuring Serbia to ease tensions in the region.
“Serbia has an obligation to unequivocally call for a renunciation of violence,” said German Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Kathrin Deschauer, emphasizing that “further steps towards de-escalation must now be taken.”
Berlin, as well as other Western powers, is expected to continue demanding that Serbia implement the EU plan to normalize relations with Pristina. The problem for Belgrade, however, is that the EU proposal represents Serbia’s implicit recognition of Kosovo. For instance, Article 4 of the EU plan clearly states that “Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organization,” which is a de facto recognition of Kosovo’s statehood.
But since Serbia is widely seen as a party responsible for the armed provocations in northern Kosovo, Vucic’s room for political maneuver has become increasingly narrow. As a result, he might have to speed up the process of the implementation of the Ohrid agreement that he refused to sign, although he has reportedly accepted it verbally. According to U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill, the agreement reached in North Macedonia’s city of Ohrid on 18 March 2023 is “legally binding even without signatures”. Thus, Belgrade will almost certainly have to continue normalizing relations with Pristina, a move that could have an impact on Vucic’s positions at home, especially if he decides to hold early elections in December.
Given that most Serbs would oppose [Serbian-language link] Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo—even if that would be the key condition for Serbia’s EU membership—Vucic will have a hard time balancing the country’s EU aspirations with the growing anti-Western sentiment. More importantly, it remains rather questionable if Belgrade still has a firm control over the Serbian political parties and movements in northern Kosovo, where the Serbs make up the majority of the population. It is not a secret that many of them feel betrayed by Vucic’s deals with Pristina, which means that, in the foreseeable future, another round of local low-scale clashes should not be ruled out.
In an attempt to prevent such an outcome, Serbian Ambassador to the United States Marko Djuric recently said that “NATO should take charge in the north of Kosovo instead of (Kosovo Prime Minister Albin) Kurti’s special forces.” But from Kurti’s perspective, such an action would significantly limit Pristina’s control over northern Kosovo. He is, therefore, unlikely to make any moves that could be portrayed as a concession to Belgrade, especially given Western unclear position regarding Serbia’s involvement in the Banjska clashes.
Thus, for the foreseeable future, the situation in the region is expected to remain tense.
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On Northern Kosovo, Escalation or Normalization of Relations?
Batlava Lake, near the border of Kosovo and Serbia. Photo by Edin Murati on Unsplash
October 17, 2023
There are fears that recent clashes in northern Kosovo could destabilize the region and introduce the possibility of another war in Europe. However, some of the most influential Western actors are pressuring Serbia to normalize relations rather than escalate tensions, writes Nikola Mikovic.
R
ecent clashes in northern Kosovo have—at least to a certain extent—destabilized the region. Following the 24 September 2023 shootout between masked Serb gunmen and ethnic Albanian-dominated Kosovo police, it became obvious that the Kosovo frozen conflict can easily escalate and turn hot. But how likely is such an outcome?
Fears of another war in Europe have started to grow after a group of around 30 heavily armed Serbs stormed the village of Banjska, in northern Kosovo, battling police and barricading themselves into the Serbian Orthodox monastery. The armed group was led by Milan Radoicic, the deputy leader of Serb List, a Belgrade-backed party representing ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo. To this day, it remains unclear what their military and political goals were.
Pristina accused Belgrade of direct involvement in deadly clashes, claiming that Serbia aimed to “annex northern Kosovo,” and described Radoicic’s actions as the “act of aggression.” Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, on the other hand, said that the Serbs from the north of Kosovo have rebelled, as they did not want to “suffer Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti's terror anymore.” Serbia insists the gunmen acted on their own, while NATO—deployed to Kosovo as a result of the 1999 war—called on both Belgrade and Pristina to return to the negotiating table to resolve their issues to prevent violence.
Six days after the clashes, on 01 October 2023, the United States, as the major foreign power operating in the Balkans, warned of an “unprecedented” Serbian military build-up near the Kosovo frontier. Following Vucic’s talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Serbia’s leader pointed out that Belgrade has pulled some of its troops back from territories near Kosovo. Washington welcomed such a move, although the situation in the region has still not got back to normal.
Kosovo’s authorities expect Belgrade to hand over ethnic Serb gunmen to Pristina, and have called on the West to impose sanctions on Serbia over its alleged involvement in the 24 September 2023 clashes. On 05 October 2023, during the European leaders’ summit in Grenada, Spain, Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani refused to hold talks with Vucic “unless sanctions were imposed against Belgrade.” Given that Spain, along with Serbia and four EU members—Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus—does not recognize Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally declared independence, it is not very probable that the European Union will sanction Belgrade over the Banjska shooting. Moreover, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has openly ruled out imposing sanctions on Serbia, which suggests it is unlikely the EU would reach consensus on the matter.
That, however, does not mean that some of the most influential Western actors will stop pressuring Serbia to ease tensions in the region.
“Serbia has an obligation to unequivocally call for a renunciation of violence,” said German Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Kathrin Deschauer, emphasizing that “further steps towards de-escalation must now be taken.”
Berlin, as well as other Western powers, is expected to continue demanding that Serbia implement the EU plan to normalize relations with Pristina. The problem for Belgrade, however, is that the EU proposal represents Serbia’s implicit recognition of Kosovo. For instance, Article 4 of the EU plan clearly states that “Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organization,” which is a de facto recognition of Kosovo’s statehood.
But since Serbia is widely seen as a party responsible for the armed provocations in northern Kosovo, Vucic’s room for political maneuver has become increasingly narrow. As a result, he might have to speed up the process of the implementation of the Ohrid agreement that he refused to sign, although he has reportedly accepted it verbally. According to U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill, the agreement reached in North Macedonia’s city of Ohrid on 18 March 2023 is “legally binding even without signatures”. Thus, Belgrade will almost certainly have to continue normalizing relations with Pristina, a move that could have an impact on Vucic’s positions at home, especially if he decides to hold early elections in December.
Given that most Serbs would oppose [Serbian-language link] Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo—even if that would be the key condition for Serbia’s EU membership—Vucic will have a hard time balancing the country’s EU aspirations with the growing anti-Western sentiment. More importantly, it remains rather questionable if Belgrade still has a firm control over the Serbian political parties and movements in northern Kosovo, where the Serbs make up the majority of the population. It is not a secret that many of them feel betrayed by Vucic’s deals with Pristina, which means that, in the foreseeable future, another round of local low-scale clashes should not be ruled out.
In an attempt to prevent such an outcome, Serbian Ambassador to the United States Marko Djuric recently said that “NATO should take charge in the north of Kosovo instead of (Kosovo Prime Minister Albin) Kurti’s special forces.” But from Kurti’s perspective, such an action would significantly limit Pristina’s control over northern Kosovo. He is, therefore, unlikely to make any moves that could be portrayed as a concession to Belgrade, especially given Western unclear position regarding Serbia’s involvement in the Banjska clashes.
Thus, for the foreseeable future, the situation in the region is expected to remain tense.
