he war in Ukraine has given NATO a new dynamic, but its conclusion will only raise more questions. For now, the old allies are back together with a sense of transatlantic solidarity unseen since the aftermath of September 2001. This is no small feat when considering where the alliance was just a year and a half ago following the disastrously handled Afghanistan withdrawal. NATO, which had been described by Emmanuel Macron as “brain-dead” just four years ago, has greatly benefited from this renewed transatlantic solidarity, with its primary raison d’être re-affirmed and its boundaries unexpectedly enlarged to cover Finland and, hopefully soon, Sweden.
NATO’s sudden rejuvenation doesn’t mean we can be complacent. Alliances are not ends in themselves, and there will one day be an end to the war in Ukraine. Whatever its terms, peace will lead to a different situation from the status quo ante, and NATO will have to recalibrate its mission. While a Russian collapse or regime change would be a dramatic signal that NATO needs to reconsider its identity to remain viable, fundamental changes will be in the cards even in less dramatic scenarios.
NATO’s Shifting Internal Dynamics
The North Atlantic Alliance’s raison d’être was famously described by NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay in the 1950s: “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” It is clear today that NATO has succeeded at all those tasks—including keeping “the Germans down” (militarily)—but times are changing. Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014 (and even before) Americans have called on Germans (and more largely Europeans) to re-arm. Since 2022, it seems that this demand is finally being taken seriously in Berlin. If Germany is to re-arm, even within NATO and to keep the Americans in, this would undoubtedly introduce new dynamics within Europe, and more largely within the transatlantic relationship.
“Keeping the Americans in and the Russians out” therefore seems to be the future mission of a NATO in which Europeans will have to take a fairer share of their defense burden. In an enlarged alliance, this will lead to new questions. With the enlargement to Finland and soon Sweden, NATO’s contours will coincide with those of the European Union (EU), at least on the eastern flank. What does a fair share of the burden mean between the U.S. and Europe? What does that mean for Europe’s (and the U.S.’) defense industry? If Europeans are to take a fairer share of the burden, they will need to develop their defense industry, but doing this will mean a tougher competition for the U.S. defense industry in Europe. After all, NATO’s article 5 is not article F-35, and while many Europeans will want to continue to use U.S. platforms, one might reasonably assume they will want to boost their own armaments industry with their public money.
The war in Ukraine and the expansion to Finland (hopefully soon to be joined by Sweden) also underscore the question of membership for Ukraine, undoubtedly on top of the agenda at the Vilnius NATO summit of July 12-13. Integration should definitely be on the table, and a Membership Accession Plan (MAP) put forward, as integrating Ukraine would be consistent with the goal of keeping Russia out of Europe. Ukraine is currently single handedly doing just that, with the support of NATO. Russia’s actions over the past 15 years shows the gray zones that we agreed to at and after the NATO Bucharest summit of 2008 are only inviting Russia to export instability and insecurity to Europe. Thus, NATO should not miss yet another opportunity to pursue its objective of keeping the Russians out.
NATO’s Evolving Challenges
Such an expansion presents strategic and logistical challenges. The alliance would then have a long, continuous border with Russia from the North of Norway to Mariupol and the Kerch Strait. Securing such a long land border is a major security challenge.
These land challenges shouldn’t overshadow NATO’s naval challenges. Russia will still maintain a strong naval presence, including from bases in Syria. NATO will need to refocus on securing its southern flank as well, particularly given that China and Iran have both made inroads toward the Mediterranean in recent years.
Answering the question of whether it is NATO’s job to keep China out (of Europe) carries challenges of its own.If the answer is affirmative, then much more effort will have to be put on naval and political presence in the Mediterranean, which could prove worrisome for NATO members sharing land borders with Russia. Whatever the answer, a NATO at 32 members or more will be bigger but also more exposed, and this will require some strategic choices that will not necessarily satisfy everyone.
Many of those choices will fall on the U.S., the uncontested leader of an alliance whose very goal is to keep it in Europe. It is difficult to imagine America retreating from the continent after having put much stake in supporting Ukraine during the war. But the U.S. will have to answer serious questions of its own about NATO’s evolving objectives. Should it resolve to help defend Europe from both Russia and China? Should that defense be purely military or also geo-economic (which some allies might find objectionable)? Should NATO look to extend its operations still further? And can any of these expanded objectives be sold to the Finns and Swedes who got into NATO for protection against Russia but not to seek adventures outside of Europe?
In a world where resources remain limited and challenges for the West will only multiply, all these questions will be back to the forefront of NATO’s agenda once the war ends. It is often said that even though they often are only catalysts of larger dynamics preceding them, great wars always mark a rupture in history’s long continuum, and ask new questions and challenges to alliances and nation-states. NATO will have to face these questions after the war, and it will do so more successfully if it can anticipate them today.
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NATO’s Post-Ukraine War Identity Still a Question
Image via Adobe Stock
July 8, 2023
The war in Ukraine has revitalized NATO with a renewed sense of purpose, but the alliance cannot be complacent. Instead, NATO must recalibrate its mission to reflect shifting internal dynamics as well as an evolving external threat environment, writes IRI's Thibault Muzergues.
T
he war in Ukraine has given NATO a new dynamic, but its conclusion will only raise more questions. For now, the old allies are back together with a sense of transatlantic solidarity unseen since the aftermath of September 2001. This is no small feat when considering where the alliance was just a year and a half ago following the disastrously handled Afghanistan withdrawal. NATO, which had been described by Emmanuel Macron as “brain-dead” just four years ago, has greatly benefited from this renewed transatlantic solidarity, with its primary raison d’être re-affirmed and its boundaries unexpectedly enlarged to cover Finland and, hopefully soon, Sweden.
NATO’s sudden rejuvenation doesn’t mean we can be complacent. Alliances are not ends in themselves, and there will one day be an end to the war in Ukraine. Whatever its terms, peace will lead to a different situation from the status quo ante, and NATO will have to recalibrate its mission. While a Russian collapse or regime change would be a dramatic signal that NATO needs to reconsider its identity to remain viable, fundamental changes will be in the cards even in less dramatic scenarios.
NATO’s Shifting Internal Dynamics
The North Atlantic Alliance’s raison d’être was famously described by NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay in the 1950s: “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” It is clear today that NATO has succeeded at all those tasks—including keeping “the Germans down” (militarily)—but times are changing. Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014 (and even before) Americans have called on Germans (and more largely Europeans) to re-arm. Since 2022, it seems that this demand is finally being taken seriously in Berlin. If Germany is to re-arm, even within NATO and to keep the Americans in, this would undoubtedly introduce new dynamics within Europe, and more largely within the transatlantic relationship.
“Keeping the Americans in and the Russians out” therefore seems to be the future mission of a NATO in which Europeans will have to take a fairer share of their defense burden. In an enlarged alliance, this will lead to new questions. With the enlargement to Finland and soon Sweden, NATO’s contours will coincide with those of the European Union (EU), at least on the eastern flank. What does a fair share of the burden mean between the U.S. and Europe? What does that mean for Europe’s (and the U.S.’) defense industry? If Europeans are to take a fairer share of the burden, they will need to develop their defense industry, but doing this will mean a tougher competition for the U.S. defense industry in Europe. After all, NATO’s article 5 is not article F-35, and while many Europeans will want to continue to use U.S. platforms, one might reasonably assume they will want to boost their own armaments industry with their public money.
The war in Ukraine and the expansion to Finland (hopefully soon to be joined by Sweden) also underscore the question of membership for Ukraine, undoubtedly on top of the agenda at the Vilnius NATO summit of July 12-13. Integration should definitely be on the table, and a Membership Accession Plan (MAP) put forward, as integrating Ukraine would be consistent with the goal of keeping Russia out of Europe. Ukraine is currently single handedly doing just that, with the support of NATO. Russia’s actions over the past 15 years shows the gray zones that we agreed to at and after the NATO Bucharest summit of 2008 are only inviting Russia to export instability and insecurity to Europe. Thus, NATO should not miss yet another opportunity to pursue its objective of keeping the Russians out.
NATO’s Evolving Challenges
Such an expansion presents strategic and logistical challenges. The alliance would then have a long, continuous border with Russia from the North of Norway to Mariupol and the Kerch Strait. Securing such a long land border is a major security challenge.
These land challenges shouldn’t overshadow NATO’s naval challenges. Russia will still maintain a strong naval presence, including from bases in Syria. NATO will need to refocus on securing its southern flank as well, particularly given that China and Iran have both made inroads toward the Mediterranean in recent years.
Answering the question of whether it is NATO’s job to keep China out (of Europe) carries challenges of its own.If the answer is affirmative, then much more effort will have to be put on naval and political presence in the Mediterranean, which could prove worrisome for NATO members sharing land borders with Russia. Whatever the answer, a NATO at 32 members or more will be bigger but also more exposed, and this will require some strategic choices that will not necessarily satisfy everyone.
Many of those choices will fall on the U.S., the uncontested leader of an alliance whose very goal is to keep it in Europe. It is difficult to imagine America retreating from the continent after having put much stake in supporting Ukraine during the war. But the U.S. will have to answer serious questions of its own about NATO’s evolving objectives. Should it resolve to help defend Europe from both Russia and China? Should that defense be purely military or also geo-economic (which some allies might find objectionable)? Should NATO look to extend its operations still further? And can any of these expanded objectives be sold to the Finns and Swedes who got into NATO for protection against Russia but not to seek adventures outside of Europe?
In a world where resources remain limited and challenges for the West will only multiply, all these questions will be back to the forefront of NATO’s agenda once the war ends. It is often said that even though they often are only catalysts of larger dynamics preceding them, great wars always mark a rupture in history’s long continuum, and ask new questions and challenges to alliances and nation-states. NATO will have to face these questions after the war, and it will do so more successfully if it can anticipate them today.
