his analysis continues the research on the role of Special Operations forces in the Great Powers Competition construct of the 21st century. The following will expound on traditional special operations core competencies, which include countering weapons of mass destruction, unconventional warfare, and preparation of the battlespace for mass conventional forces introduction. Following, an explanation for the necessity for transitioning away from counter-terror mission sets (direct action) and revitalizing enterprise proficiency in a denied construct. Finally, this space will correlate the ongoing efforts to modernize the defense departments command and control architecture through the Advanced Battle Management System, arguing for the need to combine this new command and control system with proficiency in the aforementioned core competencies as a low-tech counter to denied environments.
Obsoletion in Crossover
As previous entries have specified here, the paradigm of the global counter-terrorism conflict has led to a consolidation of the roster of special operations units into the direct-action mission set. The Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations manual defines the direct-action mission as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments”. While this mission became the banner for special operations in the war on terror, it is a myopic exclusion of existing core competencies that define the enterprise’s myriad of capabilities.
Early notable participants in the war on terror were drawn from the breadth of the defense departments special operations teams—U.S. Army Special Forces teams (of “12 Strong” fame), U.S. Navy SEALs, (“Lone Survivor”), and the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment (“Objective Rhino”). The U.S. Air Force’s Special Tactics community has been involved in every aspect of the war's special operations effort, by way of multiple line units embedded with joint partners. Additionally, the intelligence community and its clandestine services have been deeply involved in the conflict since its opening days. Further, the Marines had critical roles throughout the conflict despite not having a formal special operations component until later in the war, chiefly the responsibility for Fallujah in Iraq and Helmand in Afghanistan, two of the bloodiest environs in theater.
It is important to identify the traditional (read: doctrinal) core competencies of these units, in order to better explain the amalgamation into the direct-action obsession over the previous two decades. The crossover of these specialized units drove the special operations efforts throughout the conflict, which has now resulted in a GPC vulnerability.
U.S. Army Special Forces
Often referred to by the “green beret” moniker, these Operational Detachment Alpha, or ODA Teams, cover a variety of mission sets unique to the conflict in which they are deployed. Core competencies include Security Force Assistance—training and developing partner-nation security forces against geographic and institutional instability; Unconventional Warfare—the cornerstone of Special Forces, creating and developing an insurgent force to overthrow a government through guerilla warfare; Special Reconnaissance—data collection in politically sensitive environments; as well as counter-insurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, and Direct-Action. Despite a full tool-kit and team-specific task-organization to these specialties, the preponderance of Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have all trended towards the Direct-Action mission.
U.S. Navy SEALs
Decidedly similar to their Army counterparts, SEAL teams operate across similar mission sets mentioned above, but often oriented towards a maritime theme. The baseline and traditional nature of their specialized training centers on underwater demolitions, and as land-locked Afghanistan dictated, this required a significant adaptation of skills for these teams, but one resulting in a direct-action emphasis.
75th Ranger Regiment
The U.S. Army’s premier light infantry (airborne) component. The primary responsibility of the regiment involves Joint Forcible Entry, or Airfield seizure, which enables the bulk of a conventional force access to a denied strategic theater. The invasion of Grenada in 1983, dubbed “Operation Urgent Fury”, is still replicated annually by the Ranger Regiment as part of its repeating training cycle. Despite this key competency, the Regiment adapted to the demands of the global war on terror and became one of the key players in the direct-action mission, along with its deeply embedded U.S. Air Force Special Warfare partners.
MARSOF
The Marine Corps special operations contingent has gone through multiple developmental iterations, but is built along similar doctrinal organization as its Special Forces and SEAL equivalents. Unique to the MARSOF construct is a specific mission dedication for Preparation of the Environment, oriented against its amphibious mobility force requirements. Despite this, the Marines have conducted themselves with equal fervor in counter-terror and direct-action missions along GWOT fault lines.
Air Force Special Warfare
The role of the Special Tactics operators is uniquely joint in its organization. As experts in air power, these operators core competencies include global access, search and rescue, special reconnaissance, and precision strike as a means of enabling the other joint special operations units to conduct their missions. These Air Commandos primarily integrate air power into the ground scheme of maneuver, and while independent operators, they are task organized to attach directly to their joint special operations partner teams as force multipliers.
By doctrine, there are only two units whose core missions graft primarily towards counter-terrorism and its often close-ties to WMD counter proliferation: the highly secretive ‘tier one’ units of the Joint Special Operations Command. These units include the Navy’s Special Warfare Developmental Group (“DEVGRU"), the Army’s Combat Applications Group (“DELTA FORCE”), and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron. By doctrine, these units are specifically arrayed against terrorist threats stemming from the heyday of airplane hijackings in the late 20th century and the failed Iran hostage rescue mission of 1980 (Operation EAGLE CLAW). While the missions of these units are highly classified, some glimpses into their direct-action expertise have seen the light of day by way of the Osama Bin Laden raid in 2011, and the raid to eliminate Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.
What unfolded over the 18 years of conflict in the locales of Afghanistan and Iraq were special mission units employed near-exclusively in the direct-action capacity, often to the exclusion of their assorted core competencies. As covered previously, operating in a counter-terror paradigm relies on uncontested battlespace, meaning supremacy across all domains, with an established support architecture absent the constraint of denial by a competent adversary.
In order to array proper strategic influence against rival powers such as the Chinese Communist Party and Russia’s liminal destabilizing efforts, the special operations enterprise must retract from this wholesale engagement in the direct-action arena, and re-invigorate expertise in the above core competencies, in preparation (and hopeful deterrence) against the outbreak of hostilities in regions abroad.
Of particular value will be the enterprise regaining its prioritization of unconventional warfare, likely for the function of retaking a compromised Taiwan from PLA invasion, or responding to Russian interference in satellite locales such as Venezuela, Ukraine, or sites in Africa vulnerable to such interference. Special reconnaissance, global access, joint forcible entry, and preparation of the environment will be of equal value for introduction of mass conventional forces, as the special operations enterprise cannot fight the next war on its own, nor as the main effort as the war on terror devolved into. As future environments of conflict are all but certain to be denied, the need for special operations to perform these roles in a limited command and control (technology dependent) manner is even more critical.
Modernized Command and Control and Low-Tech Proficiency
The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) represents the modernized evolution of the U.S. military's command and control construct. The objective of the ABMS is to securely fuse information sharing across all levels of the national security enterprise in a conflict. While the potential of this system is absolutely critical for power competition in the 21st century, the defense department should not give in to temptation and sacrifice contingency planning and decentralization in exchange for the fallibility of technology. No matter how tantalizing the potential for the ABMS architecture may be, the capability of operating in a denied environment against a power rival will be the difference between success and failure. In conflict, technology will fail, which is why the special operations enterprise should investigate the ways and means of maintaining its low-tech lethality in a high-tech environment.
As stated, the application of a truly fused information sharing system is necessary in the modern warfighting environment. Battlespaces are becoming increasingly complex, and no longer a remote, insulated paradigm. As such, the need for timely and relevant information which can be securely passed up and down the echelons of command, and between warfighting components, is critical for aligning capabilities against power rivals.
But the litmus test for the U.S. military in the next conflict will not be measured in the capacity of command and control architecture, nor the technological ambition of those systems. The time and place of the next conflict will certainly not be determined by the United States either, which means the environment is all but guaranteed to be denied. The actor who is able to operate in denied conditions has certainly reduced the technological advantage of their adversary.
While controversial, this statement is necessarily addressed as a bitter lesson after 18 years of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. For all of the technological superiority of the U.S. military compared to extremist networks abroad, these terror groups persisted for years by operating on a low-tech paradigm in order to counter the technology arrayed against them. As the systems advanced in capability, the tactics of the insurgents became more austere as a counter.
Low-Tech Supremacy Beats High-Tech Dependency
The department of defense appears set on this path towards modernizing the command and control architecture through the Advanced Battle Management System, and as such, this analysis is not arguing to forego these efforts. Rather, the drive to create a revolutionary wholesale system should be augmented by the warfighters’ ability to function in its absence. This applies in particular to the special operations enterprise, who will be inexorably tied to facilitating command and control in the early phases of the next conflict through those other core competencies better suited to great power competition.
In short, creating new advanced systems is only part of the answer to the great powers conflict problem, and the special operations enterprise should also make copacetic efforts to avoid an induced battlespace handicap- one where operations fail because these systems are denied. The risk of creating a technological architecture that replaces independent thinking with system dependency is great, and portends a fatal departure from decentralized control and execution- key characteristics in the department of defense, and especially the special operations warfighting capability.
In the event of a great powers conflict, the special operations enterprise needs to function at greater decentralization and less system-dependence in a dynamic, multi-domain conflict. In order to accomplish this, special operations must shift efforts from the direct-action preponderance of effort, and emphasize its traditional core competencies.
a global affairs media network
Low-Tech Supremacy in High-Tech Warfare
September 18, 2020
T
his analysis continues the research on the role of Special Operations forces in the Great Powers Competition construct of the 21st century. The following will expound on traditional special operations core competencies, which include countering weapons of mass destruction, unconventional warfare, and preparation of the battlespace for mass conventional forces introduction. Following, an explanation for the necessity for transitioning away from counter-terror mission sets (direct action) and revitalizing enterprise proficiency in a denied construct. Finally, this space will correlate the ongoing efforts to modernize the defense departments command and control architecture through the Advanced Battle Management System, arguing for the need to combine this new command and control system with proficiency in the aforementioned core competencies as a low-tech counter to denied environments.
Obsoletion in Crossover
As previous entries have specified here, the paradigm of the global counter-terrorism conflict has led to a consolidation of the roster of special operations units into the direct-action mission set. The Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations manual defines the direct-action mission as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments”. While this mission became the banner for special operations in the war on terror, it is a myopic exclusion of existing core competencies that define the enterprise’s myriad of capabilities.
Early notable participants in the war on terror were drawn from the breadth of the defense departments special operations teams—U.S. Army Special Forces teams (of “12 Strong” fame), U.S. Navy SEALs, (“Lone Survivor”), and the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment (“Objective Rhino”). The U.S. Air Force’s Special Tactics community has been involved in every aspect of the war's special operations effort, by way of multiple line units embedded with joint partners. Additionally, the intelligence community and its clandestine services have been deeply involved in the conflict since its opening days. Further, the Marines had critical roles throughout the conflict despite not having a formal special operations component until later in the war, chiefly the responsibility for Fallujah in Iraq and Helmand in Afghanistan, two of the bloodiest environs in theater.
It is important to identify the traditional (read: doctrinal) core competencies of these units, in order to better explain the amalgamation into the direct-action obsession over the previous two decades. The crossover of these specialized units drove the special operations efforts throughout the conflict, which has now resulted in a GPC vulnerability.
U.S. Army Special Forces
Often referred to by the “green beret” moniker, these Operational Detachment Alpha, or ODA Teams, cover a variety of mission sets unique to the conflict in which they are deployed. Core competencies include Security Force Assistance—training and developing partner-nation security forces against geographic and institutional instability; Unconventional Warfare—the cornerstone of Special Forces, creating and developing an insurgent force to overthrow a government through guerilla warfare; Special Reconnaissance—data collection in politically sensitive environments; as well as counter-insurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, and Direct-Action. Despite a full tool-kit and team-specific task-organization to these specialties, the preponderance of Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have all trended towards the Direct-Action mission.
U.S. Navy SEALs
Decidedly similar to their Army counterparts, SEAL teams operate across similar mission sets mentioned above, but often oriented towards a maritime theme. The baseline and traditional nature of their specialized training centers on underwater demolitions, and as land-locked Afghanistan dictated, this required a significant adaptation of skills for these teams, but one resulting in a direct-action emphasis.
75th Ranger Regiment
The U.S. Army’s premier light infantry (airborne) component. The primary responsibility of the regiment involves Joint Forcible Entry, or Airfield seizure, which enables the bulk of a conventional force access to a denied strategic theater. The invasion of Grenada in 1983, dubbed “Operation Urgent Fury”, is still replicated annually by the Ranger Regiment as part of its repeating training cycle. Despite this key competency, the Regiment adapted to the demands of the global war on terror and became one of the key players in the direct-action mission, along with its deeply embedded U.S. Air Force Special Warfare partners.
MARSOF
The Marine Corps special operations contingent has gone through multiple developmental iterations, but is built along similar doctrinal organization as its Special Forces and SEAL equivalents. Unique to the MARSOF construct is a specific mission dedication for Preparation of the Environment, oriented against its amphibious mobility force requirements. Despite this, the Marines have conducted themselves with equal fervor in counter-terror and direct-action missions along GWOT fault lines.
Air Force Special Warfare
The role of the Special Tactics operators is uniquely joint in its organization. As experts in air power, these operators core competencies include global access, search and rescue, special reconnaissance, and precision strike as a means of enabling the other joint special operations units to conduct their missions. These Air Commandos primarily integrate air power into the ground scheme of maneuver, and while independent operators, they are task organized to attach directly to their joint special operations partner teams as force multipliers.
By doctrine, there are only two units whose core missions graft primarily towards counter-terrorism and its often close-ties to WMD counter proliferation: the highly secretive ‘tier one’ units of the Joint Special Operations Command. These units include the Navy’s Special Warfare Developmental Group (“DEVGRU"), the Army’s Combat Applications Group (“DELTA FORCE”), and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron. By doctrine, these units are specifically arrayed against terrorist threats stemming from the heyday of airplane hijackings in the late 20th century and the failed Iran hostage rescue mission of 1980 (Operation EAGLE CLAW). While the missions of these units are highly classified, some glimpses into their direct-action expertise have seen the light of day by way of the Osama Bin Laden raid in 2011, and the raid to eliminate Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.
What unfolded over the 18 years of conflict in the locales of Afghanistan and Iraq were special mission units employed near-exclusively in the direct-action capacity, often to the exclusion of their assorted core competencies. As covered previously, operating in a counter-terror paradigm relies on uncontested battlespace, meaning supremacy across all domains, with an established support architecture absent the constraint of denial by a competent adversary.
In order to array proper strategic influence against rival powers such as the Chinese Communist Party and Russia’s liminal destabilizing efforts, the special operations enterprise must retract from this wholesale engagement in the direct-action arena, and re-invigorate expertise in the above core competencies, in preparation (and hopeful deterrence) against the outbreak of hostilities in regions abroad.
Of particular value will be the enterprise regaining its prioritization of unconventional warfare, likely for the function of retaking a compromised Taiwan from PLA invasion, or responding to Russian interference in satellite locales such as Venezuela, Ukraine, or sites in Africa vulnerable to such interference. Special reconnaissance, global access, joint forcible entry, and preparation of the environment will be of equal value for introduction of mass conventional forces, as the special operations enterprise cannot fight the next war on its own, nor as the main effort as the war on terror devolved into. As future environments of conflict are all but certain to be denied, the need for special operations to perform these roles in a limited command and control (technology dependent) manner is even more critical.
Modernized Command and Control and Low-Tech Proficiency
The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) represents the modernized evolution of the U.S. military's command and control construct. The objective of the ABMS is to securely fuse information sharing across all levels of the national security enterprise in a conflict. While the potential of this system is absolutely critical for power competition in the 21st century, the defense department should not give in to temptation and sacrifice contingency planning and decentralization in exchange for the fallibility of technology. No matter how tantalizing the potential for the ABMS architecture may be, the capability of operating in a denied environment against a power rival will be the difference between success and failure. In conflict, technology will fail, which is why the special operations enterprise should investigate the ways and means of maintaining its low-tech lethality in a high-tech environment.
As stated, the application of a truly fused information sharing system is necessary in the modern warfighting environment. Battlespaces are becoming increasingly complex, and no longer a remote, insulated paradigm. As such, the need for timely and relevant information which can be securely passed up and down the echelons of command, and between warfighting components, is critical for aligning capabilities against power rivals.
But the litmus test for the U.S. military in the next conflict will not be measured in the capacity of command and control architecture, nor the technological ambition of those systems. The time and place of the next conflict will certainly not be determined by the United States either, which means the environment is all but guaranteed to be denied. The actor who is able to operate in denied conditions has certainly reduced the technological advantage of their adversary.
While controversial, this statement is necessarily addressed as a bitter lesson after 18 years of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. For all of the technological superiority of the U.S. military compared to extremist networks abroad, these terror groups persisted for years by operating on a low-tech paradigm in order to counter the technology arrayed against them. As the systems advanced in capability, the tactics of the insurgents became more austere as a counter.
Low-Tech Supremacy Beats High-Tech Dependency
The department of defense appears set on this path towards modernizing the command and control architecture through the Advanced Battle Management System, and as such, this analysis is not arguing to forego these efforts. Rather, the drive to create a revolutionary wholesale system should be augmented by the warfighters’ ability to function in its absence. This applies in particular to the special operations enterprise, who will be inexorably tied to facilitating command and control in the early phases of the next conflict through those other core competencies better suited to great power competition.
In short, creating new advanced systems is only part of the answer to the great powers conflict problem, and the special operations enterprise should also make copacetic efforts to avoid an induced battlespace handicap- one where operations fail because these systems are denied. The risk of creating a technological architecture that replaces independent thinking with system dependency is great, and portends a fatal departure from decentralized control and execution- key characteristics in the department of defense, and especially the special operations warfighting capability.
In the event of a great powers conflict, the special operations enterprise needs to function at greater decentralization and less system-dependence in a dynamic, multi-domain conflict. In order to accomplish this, special operations must shift efforts from the direct-action preponderance of effort, and emphasize its traditional core competencies.
