.
On June 23 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. There are significant voices in other EU member states calling for a similar referendum. With the European Union at this pivotal juncture, many hoped that NATO could serve as a unifying force for the Western alliance. However, the NATO Summit in Warsaw on the weekend of July 8th and 9th gave no clear answers. The Summit showed NATO to have certain advantages over the European Union as an alliance system, but the fundamental differences between NATO as a military alliance and the European Union as a politico-economic union means that NATO’s lessons are not easily transferable to the European Union.
Probably the most notable decision at the Summit was the commitment of four battalions of 1,000 troops in the three Baltic states and Poland to deter Russian aggression. This brings a tangible benefit to these four countries and should tie them more closely to NATO. It is unclear whether this will have any impact on local sentiments regarding EU membership. The Baltic states greatly benefit from access to the European goods and labor markets, and generally hold a positive view of the European Union. On the contrary, Poland, although a net receiver of EU funds, feels manhandled by the Western Europeans. Recent Western European accusations of changes to the separation of powers in Poland violating EU principles lend support to the arguments of Polish Eurosceptics. Criticism from Germany, the historical invader and now the economic and political driver in the European Union, was received especially poorly. Thus, for Poland, the largely beneficial NATO membership may not be an indicator for its desire to remain in the European Union.
Nevertheless, the Summit brought positive news as well. There was a broad consensus to strengthen cyber capabilities, reinforce the fight against ISIL, and maintain a troop presence in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Balkan state of Montenegro was invited to join NATO, while Georgia and Ukraine’s long-standing membership requests are still being considered. Although the latter two countries have little chance of being accepted into the alliance, this shows that NATO still has the ability to attract new members.
Sadly, this does not necessarily mean that Western liberal values are convincing. Rather than joining NATO so that all member states can benefit from cooperation, as liberals would have it, the desire for membership stems from a purely realist impetus that does not necessarily translate to the European Union context. The target 2% of GDP that each NATO member state is supposed to dedicate to defense spending is a soft target, and the non-compliance of members is frequently lamented – most commonly by the United States, by far the greatest spender on defense within the alliance both in absolute terms and in relation to GDP. However, this flexibility means that especially small Eastern European countries gain tremendously from joining NATO at little cost. The same cannot be said for the European Union. While most Eastern European countries are net receivers of EU funds, the costs are high in that a multitude of EU rules and regulations need to be implemented, and small countries with small populations (and therefore few seats in the European Parliament) feel underrepresented. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis of EU membership is fundamentally different from that of NATO membership.
Prior to the Warsaw Summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized the importance of close collaboration with the European Union. It seems that, rather than just cooperating with the European Union, NATO may actually serve as a warning signal for the European Union in the face of the Brexit referendum: NATO is perceived as providing an important benefit to its member states without undue restrictions or impositions. The European Union needs to do the same or risks losing members.
The irony is that EU and NATO membership have a rather similar cost-benefit analysis for the donor countries. Within NATO, the United States believes that it is in its own geopolitical interest to have troops stationed near the Russian border and maintain a large, highly capable military – at the cost of free-riding within the alliance. Germany and France (with the exception of a growing minority of far right movements in both countries) can be said to have similar sentiments toward the European Union: membership is expensive and they are net donor countries, but in terms of geopolitics, remembering the post-WW2 historical goal to preserve peace in Europe, it is worth it in the long term.
Rather than highlighting unity and cohesion among Western countries as many had hoped the NATO Summit would do, or maybe precisely by doing that, the NATO Summit highlighted weaknesses the European Union needs to focus on going forward. Overall, the future trajectory of NATO that the Summit outlined does little to assuage the uncertainties of Brexit.
About the author: Sarah Lohschelder is pursuing a Master of Science in Foreign Service and a Juris Doctor at Georgetown University. She is a Defense Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Lessons for the EU from the NATO Summit
July 28, 2016
On June 23 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. There are significant voices in other EU member states calling for a similar referendum. With the European Union at this pivotal juncture, many hoped that NATO could serve as a unifying force for the Western alliance. However, the NATO Summit in Warsaw on the weekend of July 8th and 9th gave no clear answers. The Summit showed NATO to have certain advantages over the European Union as an alliance system, but the fundamental differences between NATO as a military alliance and the European Union as a politico-economic union means that NATO’s lessons are not easily transferable to the European Union.
Probably the most notable decision at the Summit was the commitment of four battalions of 1,000 troops in the three Baltic states and Poland to deter Russian aggression. This brings a tangible benefit to these four countries and should tie them more closely to NATO. It is unclear whether this will have any impact on local sentiments regarding EU membership. The Baltic states greatly benefit from access to the European goods and labor markets, and generally hold a positive view of the European Union. On the contrary, Poland, although a net receiver of EU funds, feels manhandled by the Western Europeans. Recent Western European accusations of changes to the separation of powers in Poland violating EU principles lend support to the arguments of Polish Eurosceptics. Criticism from Germany, the historical invader and now the economic and political driver in the European Union, was received especially poorly. Thus, for Poland, the largely beneficial NATO membership may not be an indicator for its desire to remain in the European Union.
Nevertheless, the Summit brought positive news as well. There was a broad consensus to strengthen cyber capabilities, reinforce the fight against ISIL, and maintain a troop presence in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Balkan state of Montenegro was invited to join NATO, while Georgia and Ukraine’s long-standing membership requests are still being considered. Although the latter two countries have little chance of being accepted into the alliance, this shows that NATO still has the ability to attract new members.
Sadly, this does not necessarily mean that Western liberal values are convincing. Rather than joining NATO so that all member states can benefit from cooperation, as liberals would have it, the desire for membership stems from a purely realist impetus that does not necessarily translate to the European Union context. The target 2% of GDP that each NATO member state is supposed to dedicate to defense spending is a soft target, and the non-compliance of members is frequently lamented – most commonly by the United States, by far the greatest spender on defense within the alliance both in absolute terms and in relation to GDP. However, this flexibility means that especially small Eastern European countries gain tremendously from joining NATO at little cost. The same cannot be said for the European Union. While most Eastern European countries are net receivers of EU funds, the costs are high in that a multitude of EU rules and regulations need to be implemented, and small countries with small populations (and therefore few seats in the European Parliament) feel underrepresented. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis of EU membership is fundamentally different from that of NATO membership.
Prior to the Warsaw Summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized the importance of close collaboration with the European Union. It seems that, rather than just cooperating with the European Union, NATO may actually serve as a warning signal for the European Union in the face of the Brexit referendum: NATO is perceived as providing an important benefit to its member states without undue restrictions or impositions. The European Union needs to do the same or risks losing members.
The irony is that EU and NATO membership have a rather similar cost-benefit analysis for the donor countries. Within NATO, the United States believes that it is in its own geopolitical interest to have troops stationed near the Russian border and maintain a large, highly capable military – at the cost of free-riding within the alliance. Germany and France (with the exception of a growing minority of far right movements in both countries) can be said to have similar sentiments toward the European Union: membership is expensive and they are net donor countries, but in terms of geopolitics, remembering the post-WW2 historical goal to preserve peace in Europe, it is worth it in the long term.
Rather than highlighting unity and cohesion among Western countries as many had hoped the NATO Summit would do, or maybe precisely by doing that, the NATO Summit highlighted weaknesses the European Union needs to focus on going forward. Overall, the future trajectory of NATO that the Summit outlined does little to assuage the uncertainties of Brexit.
About the author: Sarah Lohschelder is pursuing a Master of Science in Foreign Service and a Juris Doctor at Georgetown University. She is a Defense Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
