he West must ask itself “how does the war in Ukraine end?” What is the grand strategy—enabled by coherent political, diplomatic, and other tools of national power—to get there? If Kyiv and the West do not have an answer to that question (which should have been asked and answered at the early stages of the conflict), now is the time to start thinking about off-ramps from conflict escalation.
Failure to do so means that Russia—which has a vote on how this crisis ends—could be pressured into the East vs. West showdown feared by NATO leaders since February, regardless of any desire to avoid it. Even Russian leaders like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have openly stated the need to avoid confrontation with nuclear powers for fear of escalation. But unless Kyiv and the West define what an acceptable end-state looks like, that risk remains in effect. Moscow perpetuates the conflict amidst losses and increasing domestic resistance, but until it understands that Ukraine will fight to a determinable end-state—whatever that may be—there is little reason to think that it will change its behavior.
Grand political strategy informs military, economic, financial, and other subsequent strategic doctrine. In Ukraine, the past 10 months have focused on simple survival, the end-state of this conflict and a strategy to get there has not been defined. Kyiv needs to determine how it wants this war to end, and it needs to be a rational, achievable outcome. That end doesn’t need to be complicated either—there is the definitive territory which Russia seized in February, half of which Ukrainian forces have already retaken. Sovereign borders are as good of an objective as any when it comes to defining an end-state for military and political objectives. Anything more than reclaiming what Kyiv rightfully asserts as Ukrainian is no longer defense of “home,” but a counter invasion into Russia, which is certain to invite escalation. There are of course the separatist republics (Donetsk and Luhansk) which have broken from sovereign Ukraine as a result of years of political and asymmetric warfare and subterfuge by Moscow. That variable complicates the end-state, but benefits from the absence of any clear objectives in Kyiv. This in turn benefits Russia’s efforts to hold what remains of the territory it has taken and remains a threat to Ukraine’s future security.
Regardless of the parameters of what Kyiv seeks to regain from this conflict, whether it accepts the “loss” of the separatist republics, or its ambitions include pre-2014 Crimea’s seizure, until those goals are made clear, Ukraine and the West cannot strategize and allocate resources to achieve it. Pressing forward with this war—with the West continuing to add one aid package after another absent a coherent strategy or stated outcome—undermines the very national security strategy set-forth by the Biden administration just a few weeks ago, which calls for building a collective capacity to solve myriad challenges that the United States cannot face alone. The same reality is true for NATO, who this summer revised the “strategic concept” for its military force-shaping: deepen security ties, address multi-polar threats, and expand the areas of vulnerability coverage with military capabilities. NATO cannot do so if it remains submerged in the Ukraine quagmire that has no clear outcome.
The ongoing Russian retrograde from key regions combined with the long-range strikes further highlights the need to consider how to achieve an outcome that doesn’t push Russia closer to fears of a humiliating defeat. It’s precisely why the West has limited the weapons capabilities of military aid packages—fear that overly aggressive Ukrainian tactical commanders will target Russian sovereignty, rather than simply reclaiming legitimate Ukrainian territory.
Kyiv has failed to define an end-state in any language more specific than “survival,” while the Western Alliance has willingly deferred proposing such an end-state, sustaining a war on inference alone. The lack of clarity easily plays into Moscow’s asymmetric mastery of information as a shaping operation. Mixed messaging—like the misrepresented comments by General Mark Milley about the winter fighting lull presenting a negotiation opportunity—are a result of the unclear end-state in this war. It gives the impression that the Western front is not as stable and unified as it is in reality. The Russian-manufactured missile that impacted in Poland, which tragically killed two civilians near the Ukraine border, were quickly fraught with hyperbole—Kyiv called it an escalation, Polish and American leaders refrained from any conclusive statements—all the while the very real possibility of NATO mobilization hangs in the delicate balance.
In wars of the present and future, shaping that strategic information matters more than ever before. The longer this war goes on, Russia benefits, even amidst mounting casualties and losses closer to the core of its society, which only harden the rhetoric and ethos that prompted this conflict.
The positions of the antagonists are relevant. Russia has proven that it is not a first-rate power, but one that needs to be considered by the West. NATO seems revitalized a few years after “brain death.” Ukraine has demonstrated the willpower for self-determination, and may one day credibly join NATO if it achieves this undefined end-state and overcomes its own corruption. NATO possesses the upper hand today yet faces the question about its military investment in the future and how it will array itself for future threats.
So, what is the future strategy as the battlefield advantage continues to shift? As Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels have failed to define the war’s end-state, the next few months are critical, but it will be unclear if success will have been achieved.
What are the options for a Western/Ukraine strategy? Suggesting that NATO employs its military force to initiate regime change in Moscow is out of the question, such confrontation is precisely the fateful confrontation that Western leaders hope to avoid. And so much of Putin’s mindset is rooted in national shame at the Soviet Union’s loss in the Cold War, that as Russian forces are pushed further and further back from Ukraine’s front lines, he may well perceive the walls closing in around him, forcing a violent and irrational reaction. This stands as a possibility if coherent strategy and policy to de-escalate is not crafted soon and articulately.
This analysis is not arguing for easing pressure on Moscow by reducing sanctions, decreasing isolation, or undoing the deepening bonds of the Western alliances before that end-state is defined and achieved. Nor should the West curtail support for Ukraine’s sovereignty as a legitimate actor in regional stability.
Instead, Western and Ukrainian leaders need to dictate the terms of the end, before the risk of a confrontation with Moscow exceeds what NATO can restrain. This is a conventional war that NATO would almost certainly win, but at what cost? Rather, the West needs to give the actors involved a means of steadily and realistically stepping back from this brink. An outcome that ensures Ukrainian sovereignty and territory is unquestioned, but there must be incentive for Moscow to forego this endeavor and rediscover the benefits of re-entering the global system. The journey back from financial ruin and economic carnage will be long, but made easier if Russia is integrated as a potential partner with the West, and not an antagonist.
But if the end remains undefined by Ukraine, how long does this war go on? And when Moscow has been backed into a corner with no recourse or certain humiliating defeat, should Washington, Kyiv or Brussels expect a meek supplicant suing for peace? That is unreasonable when dealing with a realist power broker like Vladimir Putin and his nest of vipers. The West can continue to apply pressure to clearly make Ukraine’s subsummation into Russia impossible, but if pressed beyond reasonable (and clearly stated) political and strategic goals, then what other course of action should we expect from Moscow?
What will the West—and more importantly, Ukraine—gain by pushing Moscow into a box instead of defining an end, and a path towards de-escalating the crisis? The off-ramp to this conflict needs to be defined so that the military and diplomatic capabilities can be organized to achieve such an end. The last time a major Western power failed to define specific, measurable, attainable political goals in a costly war, it became mired in Afghanistan for twenty years. The political end in Afghanistan was never determined as a national policy. This resulted in 20 years of fighting seasons, rotational deployments, $2 trillion, and thousands of servicemembers killed, with hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. The end-state was never determined, offering no rational path to get there.
Ukraine is no Afghanistan, to be certain, but the lessons to be learned from that war have failed to influence the West’s approach as it becomes more entangled in the present conflict. The lack of strategy and stated outcomes is an irrational road to an uncertain outcome.
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Lack of Clear Strategic Goals in Ukraine Risks Escalation
Photo by Benjamin Marder via Unsplash.
December 8, 2022
The West must ask itself how does the war in Ukraine end? If Kyiv and the West do not have an answer to that question, which should have been asked and answered at the early stages of the conflict, now is the time to start thinking about off-ramps from conflict escalation, writes Ethan Brown.
T
he West must ask itself “how does the war in Ukraine end?” What is the grand strategy—enabled by coherent political, diplomatic, and other tools of national power—to get there? If Kyiv and the West do not have an answer to that question (which should have been asked and answered at the early stages of the conflict), now is the time to start thinking about off-ramps from conflict escalation.
Failure to do so means that Russia—which has a vote on how this crisis ends—could be pressured into the East vs. West showdown feared by NATO leaders since February, regardless of any desire to avoid it. Even Russian leaders like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have openly stated the need to avoid confrontation with nuclear powers for fear of escalation. But unless Kyiv and the West define what an acceptable end-state looks like, that risk remains in effect. Moscow perpetuates the conflict amidst losses and increasing domestic resistance, but until it understands that Ukraine will fight to a determinable end-state—whatever that may be—there is little reason to think that it will change its behavior.
Grand political strategy informs military, economic, financial, and other subsequent strategic doctrine. In Ukraine, the past 10 months have focused on simple survival, the end-state of this conflict and a strategy to get there has not been defined. Kyiv needs to determine how it wants this war to end, and it needs to be a rational, achievable outcome. That end doesn’t need to be complicated either—there is the definitive territory which Russia seized in February, half of which Ukrainian forces have already retaken. Sovereign borders are as good of an objective as any when it comes to defining an end-state for military and political objectives. Anything more than reclaiming what Kyiv rightfully asserts as Ukrainian is no longer defense of “home,” but a counter invasion into Russia, which is certain to invite escalation. There are of course the separatist republics (Donetsk and Luhansk) which have broken from sovereign Ukraine as a result of years of political and asymmetric warfare and subterfuge by Moscow. That variable complicates the end-state, but benefits from the absence of any clear objectives in Kyiv. This in turn benefits Russia’s efforts to hold what remains of the territory it has taken and remains a threat to Ukraine’s future security.
Regardless of the parameters of what Kyiv seeks to regain from this conflict, whether it accepts the “loss” of the separatist republics, or its ambitions include pre-2014 Crimea’s seizure, until those goals are made clear, Ukraine and the West cannot strategize and allocate resources to achieve it. Pressing forward with this war—with the West continuing to add one aid package after another absent a coherent strategy or stated outcome—undermines the very national security strategy set-forth by the Biden administration just a few weeks ago, which calls for building a collective capacity to solve myriad challenges that the United States cannot face alone. The same reality is true for NATO, who this summer revised the “strategic concept” for its military force-shaping: deepen security ties, address multi-polar threats, and expand the areas of vulnerability coverage with military capabilities. NATO cannot do so if it remains submerged in the Ukraine quagmire that has no clear outcome.
The ongoing Russian retrograde from key regions combined with the long-range strikes further highlights the need to consider how to achieve an outcome that doesn’t push Russia closer to fears of a humiliating defeat. It’s precisely why the West has limited the weapons capabilities of military aid packages—fear that overly aggressive Ukrainian tactical commanders will target Russian sovereignty, rather than simply reclaiming legitimate Ukrainian territory.
Kyiv has failed to define an end-state in any language more specific than “survival,” while the Western Alliance has willingly deferred proposing such an end-state, sustaining a war on inference alone. The lack of clarity easily plays into Moscow’s asymmetric mastery of information as a shaping operation. Mixed messaging—like the misrepresented comments by General Mark Milley about the winter fighting lull presenting a negotiation opportunity—are a result of the unclear end-state in this war. It gives the impression that the Western front is not as stable and unified as it is in reality. The Russian-manufactured missile that impacted in Poland, which tragically killed two civilians near the Ukraine border, were quickly fraught with hyperbole—Kyiv called it an escalation, Polish and American leaders refrained from any conclusive statements—all the while the very real possibility of NATO mobilization hangs in the delicate balance.
In wars of the present and future, shaping that strategic information matters more than ever before. The longer this war goes on, Russia benefits, even amidst mounting casualties and losses closer to the core of its society, which only harden the rhetoric and ethos that prompted this conflict.
The positions of the antagonists are relevant. Russia has proven that it is not a first-rate power, but one that needs to be considered by the West. NATO seems revitalized a few years after “brain death.” Ukraine has demonstrated the willpower for self-determination, and may one day credibly join NATO if it achieves this undefined end-state and overcomes its own corruption. NATO possesses the upper hand today yet faces the question about its military investment in the future and how it will array itself for future threats.
So, what is the future strategy as the battlefield advantage continues to shift? As Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels have failed to define the war’s end-state, the next few months are critical, but it will be unclear if success will have been achieved.
What are the options for a Western/Ukraine strategy? Suggesting that NATO employs its military force to initiate regime change in Moscow is out of the question, such confrontation is precisely the fateful confrontation that Western leaders hope to avoid. And so much of Putin’s mindset is rooted in national shame at the Soviet Union’s loss in the Cold War, that as Russian forces are pushed further and further back from Ukraine’s front lines, he may well perceive the walls closing in around him, forcing a violent and irrational reaction. This stands as a possibility if coherent strategy and policy to de-escalate is not crafted soon and articulately.
This analysis is not arguing for easing pressure on Moscow by reducing sanctions, decreasing isolation, or undoing the deepening bonds of the Western alliances before that end-state is defined and achieved. Nor should the West curtail support for Ukraine’s sovereignty as a legitimate actor in regional stability.
Instead, Western and Ukrainian leaders need to dictate the terms of the end, before the risk of a confrontation with Moscow exceeds what NATO can restrain. This is a conventional war that NATO would almost certainly win, but at what cost? Rather, the West needs to give the actors involved a means of steadily and realistically stepping back from this brink. An outcome that ensures Ukrainian sovereignty and territory is unquestioned, but there must be incentive for Moscow to forego this endeavor and rediscover the benefits of re-entering the global system. The journey back from financial ruin and economic carnage will be long, but made easier if Russia is integrated as a potential partner with the West, and not an antagonist.
But if the end remains undefined by Ukraine, how long does this war go on? And when Moscow has been backed into a corner with no recourse or certain humiliating defeat, should Washington, Kyiv or Brussels expect a meek supplicant suing for peace? That is unreasonable when dealing with a realist power broker like Vladimir Putin and his nest of vipers. The West can continue to apply pressure to clearly make Ukraine’s subsummation into Russia impossible, but if pressed beyond reasonable (and clearly stated) political and strategic goals, then what other course of action should we expect from Moscow?
What will the West—and more importantly, Ukraine—gain by pushing Moscow into a box instead of defining an end, and a path towards de-escalating the crisis? The off-ramp to this conflict needs to be defined so that the military and diplomatic capabilities can be organized to achieve such an end. The last time a major Western power failed to define specific, measurable, attainable political goals in a costly war, it became mired in Afghanistan for twenty years. The political end in Afghanistan was never determined as a national policy. This resulted in 20 years of fighting seasons, rotational deployments, $2 trillion, and thousands of servicemembers killed, with hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. The end-state was never determined, offering no rational path to get there.
Ukraine is no Afghanistan, to be certain, but the lessons to be learned from that war have failed to influence the West’s approach as it becomes more entangled in the present conflict. The lack of strategy and stated outcomes is an irrational road to an uncertain outcome.
