In summer 2003, in northern Mali's sweltering desert of Azawad, Iyad ag Ghali was negotiating the liberation of 14 western hostages from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In May 2012, AQIM joined Iyad ag Ghali, now leader of Salafist Tuaregs of Ansar Dine, to destroy Timbuktu, the UNESCO heritage site of Azawad. Until 2010 he was the official interlocutor between Tuaregs, the Malian central government, and international actors. Today he is the most wanted enemy for each of them: he holds the entire Azawad population hostage.
For the past year, the northern region of Mali has been undergoing a crisis. Azawad is now in the hands of Salafist extremists linked to al Qaeda, and the humanitarian crisis has reached a peak: 1.6 million in famine; 460,000 displaced; and recurring violence against women since the application of Shari’a, the Islamic law. The UN Security Council voted for Resolution 2071 on October 12th, giving a mandate to regional actors and Mali partners to frame a joint military plan of intervention. The Economic Community of Western African States is ready to deploy soldiers; France will give intelligence and logistical support. Only Algeria and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Africa Union president, are considering negotiations to be likely.
"Recurring Nightmare", "Desert Lion", "unreliable", "respected", "enigmatic", "wise"--these are the range of adjectives used for Iyad ag Ghali, a Tuareg from Ifora’s tribe and a native from Kidal, an autonomous region located along the Malian border with Algeria. Originally Sufi, like most of the Tuaregs, he eventually converted to Salafism. However, his motivation is anything but faith. A Wikileaks cable affirmed that “you can find him wherever there is a money transaction between Tuaregs and governments”. His story is a warlord manual, as he acted as a dealer and negotiator in every Western Saharan insurgency.
Iyad ag Ghali made his fortune leading Tuareg rebels against the Malian government in the early 1990s. He was also one of the first Tuaregs to negotiate with their enemy, pushing for the 1996 Peace Talks, where he was the Tuareg representative. He disappeared for a while, presumable running trafficking schemes in the borderless Azawad desert. Due to his secret contacts, he was the point negotiator for foreign governments with AQIM in 2003 and 2008. In 2006, once again he led another Tuareg upheaval against Bamako. The next year he was dispatched as a diplomatic envoy to the Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The location was not a coincidence--Jeddah’s King Abdulaziz University is the brain centre of Islamic fundamentalism, through which al-Azzam, al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden passed.
After he was declared a persona non grata by the Saudi government for his Jihadist links, Iyad ag Ghali went back to Mali. Once again, he aimed to lead the last Tuareg insurgency, resulting from the spillover effect of the Libyan war as fighters returned home.
However, this time he failed: the continual switching of sides and the al-Qaeda links diminished his authority among Tuaregs. In order to maintain his power among the rebels, he established the Islamist group Ansar Dine, meaning "Defenders of the Faith". Initially, he backed the Tuaregs of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad against the Malian central government. When they unilaterally declared independence, Iyad ag Ghali, along with al Qaeda-linked groups, repressed their aspirations and seized Azawad strongholds, imposing Sharia law.
Some academics are claiming that this is only a strategy of tension created by the U.S. and a main ally in the Global War on Terror, Algeria. There is a series of Wikileaks cables reporting meetings between U.S. agents and Iyad ag Ghali when he was their informer and negotiator with AQIM and the Tuareg rebels led by Bahanga. However, this theory does not really match the character of Iyad ag Ghali, who has wanted to play the role of supreme leader in Azawad since 1990.
Despite his Jihadist proclaims about Holy War, everybody knows that he has different aims in holding Azawad and its population hostage. Likely, he is just attempting to re-legitimize his authority as the main interlocutor between Tuaregs and international governments, as well as AQIM. In this case, he would also find economic returns. For this reason, an international military intervention would be counter to his interests. Consequently, his strategic advisors suggested he send envoys to Algeria and Burkina Faso for initiating Peace Talks.
This latter choice seems to open the likelihood of Iyad ag Ghali as the chief of the Islamist political party at the negotiation rounds in Bamako. Thus, he rejected his linkage with AQIM, which recently changed leadership, resulting in the Mauritanian group MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa) becoming the main terrorist power in Azawad.
Although Iyad ag Ghali lost legitimacy among rebels of any side, he holds the balance of power. If he switches sides once again, Tuareg rebel supporters will turn against AQIM and MOJWA. War or peace, once again the stability and the future of Mali rests on Iyad ag Ghali.
Alessandro Casarotti is a freelance political and security analyst and writer. He previously interned at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's Terrorism Prevention Unit.
Photo by Matthew Paulson (cc).
Editors' Note: This article previously incorrectly identified MOJWA as a "Mauritian" group. It has been corrected to "Mauritanian".
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Iyad ag Ghali: the Negotiator Holding Mali Hostage
November 26, 2012
In summer 2003, in northern Mali's sweltering desert of Azawad, Iyad ag Ghali was negotiating the liberation of 14 western hostages from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In May 2012, AQIM joined Iyad ag Ghali, now leader of Salafist Tuaregs of Ansar Dine, to destroy Timbuktu, the UNESCO heritage site of Azawad. Until 2010 he was the official interlocutor between Tuaregs, the Malian central government, and international actors. Today he is the most wanted enemy for each of them: he holds the entire Azawad population hostage.
For the past year, the northern region of Mali has been undergoing a crisis. Azawad is now in the hands of Salafist extremists linked to al Qaeda, and the humanitarian crisis has reached a peak: 1.6 million in famine; 460,000 displaced; and recurring violence against women since the application of Shari’a, the Islamic law. The UN Security Council voted for Resolution 2071 on October 12th, giving a mandate to regional actors and Mali partners to frame a joint military plan of intervention. The Economic Community of Western African States is ready to deploy soldiers; France will give intelligence and logistical support. Only Algeria and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Africa Union president, are considering negotiations to be likely.
"Recurring Nightmare", "Desert Lion", "unreliable", "respected", "enigmatic", "wise"--these are the range of adjectives used for Iyad ag Ghali, a Tuareg from Ifora’s tribe and a native from Kidal, an autonomous region located along the Malian border with Algeria. Originally Sufi, like most of the Tuaregs, he eventually converted to Salafism. However, his motivation is anything but faith. A Wikileaks cable affirmed that “you can find him wherever there is a money transaction between Tuaregs and governments”. His story is a warlord manual, as he acted as a dealer and negotiator in every Western Saharan insurgency.
Iyad ag Ghali made his fortune leading Tuareg rebels against the Malian government in the early 1990s. He was also one of the first Tuaregs to negotiate with their enemy, pushing for the 1996 Peace Talks, where he was the Tuareg representative. He disappeared for a while, presumable running trafficking schemes in the borderless Azawad desert. Due to his secret contacts, he was the point negotiator for foreign governments with AQIM in 2003 and 2008. In 2006, once again he led another Tuareg upheaval against Bamako. The next year he was dispatched as a diplomatic envoy to the Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The location was not a coincidence--Jeddah’s King Abdulaziz University is the brain centre of Islamic fundamentalism, through which al-Azzam, al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden passed.
After he was declared a persona non grata by the Saudi government for his Jihadist links, Iyad ag Ghali went back to Mali. Once again, he aimed to lead the last Tuareg insurgency, resulting from the spillover effect of the Libyan war as fighters returned home.
However, this time he failed: the continual switching of sides and the al-Qaeda links diminished his authority among Tuaregs. In order to maintain his power among the rebels, he established the Islamist group Ansar Dine, meaning "Defenders of the Faith". Initially, he backed the Tuaregs of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad against the Malian central government. When they unilaterally declared independence, Iyad ag Ghali, along with al Qaeda-linked groups, repressed their aspirations and seized Azawad strongholds, imposing Sharia law.
Some academics are claiming that this is only a strategy of tension created by the U.S. and a main ally in the Global War on Terror, Algeria. There is a series of Wikileaks cables reporting meetings between U.S. agents and Iyad ag Ghali when he was their informer and negotiator with AQIM and the Tuareg rebels led by Bahanga. However, this theory does not really match the character of Iyad ag Ghali, who has wanted to play the role of supreme leader in Azawad since 1990.
Despite his Jihadist proclaims about Holy War, everybody knows that he has different aims in holding Azawad and its population hostage. Likely, he is just attempting to re-legitimize his authority as the main interlocutor between Tuaregs and international governments, as well as AQIM. In this case, he would also find economic returns. For this reason, an international military intervention would be counter to his interests. Consequently, his strategic advisors suggested he send envoys to Algeria and Burkina Faso for initiating Peace Talks.
This latter choice seems to open the likelihood of Iyad ag Ghali as the chief of the Islamist political party at the negotiation rounds in Bamako. Thus, he rejected his linkage with AQIM, which recently changed leadership, resulting in the Mauritanian group MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa) becoming the main terrorist power in Azawad.
Although Iyad ag Ghali lost legitimacy among rebels of any side, he holds the balance of power. If he switches sides once again, Tuareg rebel supporters will turn against AQIM and MOJWA. War or peace, once again the stability and the future of Mali rests on Iyad ag Ghali.
Alessandro Casarotti is a freelance political and security analyst and writer. He previously interned at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's Terrorism Prevention Unit.
Photo by Matthew Paulson (cc).
Editors' Note: This article previously incorrectly identified MOJWA as a "Mauritian" group. It has been corrected to "Mauritanian".
