n 21 October 2022, the president of the Italian Republic appointed the government headed by Giorgia Meloni and supported by a coalition of populist and right-wing parties, such as Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), Lega (League) and Forza Italia (Go Italy).
Local and international media eagerly watched the new government's foreign policy path. Prime Minister Meloni succeeded Mario Draghi, marking a sharp contrast to his predecessor's pro-European, multilateral agenda. Frictions with some EU allies, particularly Emmanuel Macron's France, and formal support towards Ukraine characterized Italy's first months of 2023.
Meloni is facing the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine at home. Italy, one of the European countries most dependent on Russian natural gas, has been forced to restructure its energy import sources. In July 2022, then-Prime Minister Draghi traveled to Algeria to expand gas imports to 30 billion cubic meters, an increase of about 30% from the previous year.
Following the same path, Meloni announced the Mattei Plan soon after her appointment. "I believe that Italy should be the promoter of a 'Mattei plan' for Africa, a virtuous model of collaboration and growth between the European Union and African nations [...]. We would thus like to recover our strategic role in the Mediterranean after years in which we preferred to retreat," she stated in the Italian Parliament.
The plan is extremely vague in its goals and tools. It focuses on two key pillars: making Italy an energy hub in the Mediterranean, and effectively managing migration flows. In early 2023, Meloni and Claudio Descalzi, CEO of the national oil company ENI, paid state visits to Algeria and Libya.
In Algeria, ENI and Sonatrach, the Algerian owned-state oil company, signed new deals to increase gas exports to Italy and build a new undersea electrical cable. Also, both companies pledged to reduce CO2 emissions in hydrocarbon production facilities to emphasize a "green" intention.
In Libya, ENI and its counterpart NOC (National Oil Company) signed "a historic" $8 billion deal to increase Libya's gas production by developing two offshore gas fields. In addition, foreign and economic ministers signed two agreements to "strengthen capacity and cooperation with the Libyan authority in relation to the coastguard."
After its civil war erupted in 2011, Libya became a critical point of departure for North African migrants. This issue indirectly impacted domestic politics in Italy and its relationship with other European countries, especially during the migrant crisis of 2015, which fueled strong anti-European sentiments.
Libya is still politically unstable, with different factions trying to gain power and lead the country. The international community's efforts to lead a domestic peace process have failed several times. Conversely, Algeria is experiencing a relatively quiet phase, especially if compared to the domestic protests experienced in the last few years.
This fact represents the biggest weakness of Italy's foreign policy. Regime changes and revolutions are common in North African nations, with dangerous consequences within and outside the Mediterranean region. The government's ambitions—to make Italy a gas hub and manage migration flows—could vanish in case of political turmoil.
In addition, commentators and Meloni's opposition criticized the Mattei Plan for being "anachronistic" due to its reliance on natural gas, a relatively low-polluting fossil fuel but still a fossil fuel. Despite these claims, this foreign policy strategy and the green transition are not necessarily incompatible. Maximizing gas imports is a short-term need while transitioning to renewable sources requires a longer time.
For this reason, a government setback is not expected, and Meloni will probably reinforce the government’s commitment to the Mattei Plan in the next few months. The next country involved is Azerbaijan, with the Italian minister of enterprises, Adolfo Urso, flying to Baku to increase gas imports through the Tap pipeline. European allies, meanwhile, are cautiously monitoring Italian achievements and failures in the Mediterranean region.
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Italy's Mattei Plan an Energy Gamble
Italian Mediterranean Sea. Photo by Ernesto Solla on Unsplash
March 5, 2023
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni wants to build energy security in part by becoming an energy hub for the Mediterannean-the Mattei Plan. The plan is ambitious and vague, and has drawn criticism for its reliance on natural gas, but remains a key government priority, writes Elia Preto Martini.
I
n 21 October 2022, the president of the Italian Republic appointed the government headed by Giorgia Meloni and supported by a coalition of populist and right-wing parties, such as Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), Lega (League) and Forza Italia (Go Italy).
Local and international media eagerly watched the new government's foreign policy path. Prime Minister Meloni succeeded Mario Draghi, marking a sharp contrast to his predecessor's pro-European, multilateral agenda. Frictions with some EU allies, particularly Emmanuel Macron's France, and formal support towards Ukraine characterized Italy's first months of 2023.
Meloni is facing the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine at home. Italy, one of the European countries most dependent on Russian natural gas, has been forced to restructure its energy import sources. In July 2022, then-Prime Minister Draghi traveled to Algeria to expand gas imports to 30 billion cubic meters, an increase of about 30% from the previous year.
Following the same path, Meloni announced the Mattei Plan soon after her appointment. "I believe that Italy should be the promoter of a 'Mattei plan' for Africa, a virtuous model of collaboration and growth between the European Union and African nations [...]. We would thus like to recover our strategic role in the Mediterranean after years in which we preferred to retreat," she stated in the Italian Parliament.
The plan is extremely vague in its goals and tools. It focuses on two key pillars: making Italy an energy hub in the Mediterranean, and effectively managing migration flows. In early 2023, Meloni and Claudio Descalzi, CEO of the national oil company ENI, paid state visits to Algeria and Libya.
In Algeria, ENI and Sonatrach, the Algerian owned-state oil company, signed new deals to increase gas exports to Italy and build a new undersea electrical cable. Also, both companies pledged to reduce CO2 emissions in hydrocarbon production facilities to emphasize a "green" intention.
In Libya, ENI and its counterpart NOC (National Oil Company) signed "a historic" $8 billion deal to increase Libya's gas production by developing two offshore gas fields. In addition, foreign and economic ministers signed two agreements to "strengthen capacity and cooperation with the Libyan authority in relation to the coastguard."
After its civil war erupted in 2011, Libya became a critical point of departure for North African migrants. This issue indirectly impacted domestic politics in Italy and its relationship with other European countries, especially during the migrant crisis of 2015, which fueled strong anti-European sentiments.
Libya is still politically unstable, with different factions trying to gain power and lead the country. The international community's efforts to lead a domestic peace process have failed several times. Conversely, Algeria is experiencing a relatively quiet phase, especially if compared to the domestic protests experienced in the last few years.
This fact represents the biggest weakness of Italy's foreign policy. Regime changes and revolutions are common in North African nations, with dangerous consequences within and outside the Mediterranean region. The government's ambitions—to make Italy a gas hub and manage migration flows—could vanish in case of political turmoil.
In addition, commentators and Meloni's opposition criticized the Mattei Plan for being "anachronistic" due to its reliance on natural gas, a relatively low-polluting fossil fuel but still a fossil fuel. Despite these claims, this foreign policy strategy and the green transition are not necessarily incompatible. Maximizing gas imports is a short-term need while transitioning to renewable sources requires a longer time.
For this reason, a government setback is not expected, and Meloni will probably reinforce the government’s commitment to the Mattei Plan in the next few months. The next country involved is Azerbaijan, with the Italian minister of enterprises, Adolfo Urso, flying to Baku to increase gas imports through the Tap pipeline. European allies, meanwhile, are cautiously monitoring Italian achievements and failures in the Mediterranean region.
