The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has demonstrated great promise in its accomplishments since its creation in 2004. However, the ODNI is not able to reform the intelligence community (IC) in the manner intended because it lacks executive authority and has not been granted an adequately exclusive mission-space among its IC partners. The efficacy of the ODNI, the quality of analysis, and the integration of U.S. intelligence could be improved by updating the IRTPA and EO 12333. Helpful updates would include elevating the DNI to a cabinet position, granting the DNI more budgetary and management powers over the IC, making the DNI operational within a better clarified and more exclusive mission-space, and requiring more streamlined rules be instituted regarding how foreign and domestic intelligence is collected and integrated. These revisions would strengthen the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and make possible the more streamlined process of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination that was intended in the wake the September 11th terrorist attacks.
The ODNI Today
Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) in December 2004 in an attempt to improve organizational challenges within the U.S. intelligence community that contributed to the intelligence failure surrounding the September 11th terrorist attacks. The IRTPA created the ODNI and charged it with acting as a clearinghouse for U.S. intelligence gathered by the sixteen other agencies within the intelligence community. The Act also named the DNI as “head” of the IC and principal intelligence advisor to the President and Congress. Also in 2004, President Bush amended Executive Order 12333, which clarifies goals, roles, and responsibilities within the IC. Best known for prohibiting assassinations, Executive Order 12333 has served as the intelligence community’s guiding document since 1981. To account for the IRTPA’s intelligence reorganization, however, Executive Order 12333 was amended to state that the IC falls under the “leadership” of the newly-formed ODNI.
Despite this, the language in the IRTPA and Executive Order 12333 grants the DNI few explicit authorities, giving it only partial budgetary control of the IC and mandating considerable deference to those purportedly under the DNI’s leadership. The indeterminate powers of the DNI position have been exacerbated by the short tenure of the four DNIs (and one “acting DNI”) who have served over the past eight years, and the continued “turf battles” among agencies and department heads over what specific functions and responsibilities the DNI should assume. Indeed, calls for reform of the ODNI are not new; two DNIs have openly called for further reform of the office, and the current DNI allegedly argued against the value and strength of the office when previously employed at the Department of Defense.
Accomplishments and Constraints
The ODNI has had some significant accomplishments. For instance, it has improved technical interoperability among the IC, led the development of important biometric data programs, and crafted products that incorporate analysis from across a wider spectrum of the IC than previously. By successfully addressing these challenges and others, the ODNI has in some measure demonstrated that its creation was sensible and that it can be effective at this new mission. Nevertheless, as a result of the compromise language found within the IRTPA and EO 12333, the ODNI’s accomplishments remain limited as compared to the office’s potential and the legislation’s initial intent.
The IRTPA and EO 12333 undermine the potential value of the ODNI in two ways. First, the spirit of these documents imply that the ODNI mission includes leadership, initiative, and wide-reaching engagement with all members of the IC. However, the documents’ explicit language grants the ODNI only a more restricted role. This role is limited to the creation and dissemination of integrated intelligence products and the ability to fund certain programs that IC agencies can be cajoled into participating in. No operational authorities are granted to the ODNI. Furthermore, despite the September 11th terrorist attacks highlighting the need for better integration of foreign and domestic intelligence without threatening civil liberties, the IRTPA “sidesteps” this issue and provides the ODNI little guidance or authority as to how to streamline and best manage this process.
The second challenge facing the ODNI is its lack of executive authority. This challenge is subtly different from the first, but compounds its effects. The ODNI has no direct authority over any of the IC agencies it is supposed to “lead,” and thus it cannot enlist their help in directly supporting the ODNI’s mission. The ODNI can offer funding and an element of prestige in return for IC participation in its chosen programs, however these tools have not proven sufficient to fully overcome “turf-guarding” and noncooperation by IC members. Moreover, as DNIs have sought to take ownership of their mission and moved to integrate the intelligence community, they have discovered that when segments of the community–for instance, the Defense Department’s Defense Intelligence Agency or the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)–resist, they are funded and defended by powerful cabinet officials. Resistance by such figures cannot be easily overcome by the DNI, a non-cabinet official with only partial control over these agencies’ budgets.
Recommendations
In order to strengthen the ODNI and better allow it to fulfill its mission, the IRTPA and EO 12333 be changed in the following ways:
- The DNI should be elevated to cabinet position. It is necessary that the IC is composed of a broad array of agencies with specialized expertise. For example, it is sensible that INR be located in the Department of State, and it follows that INR is mutually responsible to both the DNI and the Secretary of State. For this joint ownership to be healthy, however, these two officials must be on equal footing. Only then can INR be expected to adequately follow its dual mission as part of the State Department and the IC, and can “turf fights” be settled more equitably and productively. Though this move places the DNI in a policy-making sphere, this could be countered by requiring the position be non-partisan and/or a fixed term.
- The DNI should be granted more explicit budgetary and management powers over the IC. Section 1018 of the IRTPA and the clause referencing it in EO 12333 should be removed, as should the vague language which names the ODNI the “head” of the IC and instructs it to accommodate the IC department heads. The CIA should be brought directly under the control of the ODNI and new parameters should clarify how dual ownership of certain IC agencies will work. Most importantly, the ODNI must be granted explicit authority that allows it to impose reasonable collection requirements on IC members and thus fulfill its important mission of ensuring “full and free exchange” of information among the community.
- The role and mission-space of the ODNI should be clarified and made operational. The ODNI’s and CIA’s overlapping operational authorities should be divided as the ODNI sees fit. Though an element of intelligence overlap is reasonable and useful, too much can be confusing and counterproductive. This is the case with the ODNI’s “uncertain control over terrorism analysis,” and counterterrorism responsibilities should be streamlined so that various agencies–especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)–are no longer stepping on one another’s toes.
- The IRTPA or EO 12333 should be updated to explicitly define or give the ODNI the power to define how foreign and domestic intelligence can be collected and compiled. The reorganization of the IC was ordered as a result of the September 11th attacks and with future counterterrorism efforts in mind. Specifically, the 9/11 terrorists exploited the wall between the U.S.’s foreign and domestic intelligence collection efforts, and yet the IRTPA and EO 12333 avoid the issue of how to best integrate foreign and domestic intelligence while minimizing the threat to civil liberties. This manner in which the U.S. separates its foreign and domestic intelligence collection is particularly exploitable by terrorists and non-state actors–those currently posing one of the most serious threats to national security. To ensure both the best intelligence integration possible as well as the defense of civil liberties, clear and sensible rules should be formed which dictate how intelligence from these two spheres is collected and in what way and at what level it is integrated and disseminated.
Michael D. Rettig recently earned his master’s degree in international relations at New York University, where he specialized in national security and sub-Saharan Africa. He has served as a research assistant at National Defense University’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies and also has supported economic policy efforts at the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs.
Official White House photo by Pete Souza.
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Incomplete Intelligence Reform: Why the U.S. Intelligence Community needs an Empowered ODNI
February 12, 2013
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has demonstrated great promise in its accomplishments since its creation in 2004. However, the ODNI is not able to reform the intelligence community (IC) in the manner intended because it lacks executive authority and has not been granted an adequately exclusive mission-space among its IC partners. The efficacy of the ODNI, the quality of analysis, and the integration of U.S. intelligence could be improved by updating the IRTPA and EO 12333. Helpful updates would include elevating the DNI to a cabinet position, granting the DNI more budgetary and management powers over the IC, making the DNI operational within a better clarified and more exclusive mission-space, and requiring more streamlined rules be instituted regarding how foreign and domestic intelligence is collected and integrated. These revisions would strengthen the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and make possible the more streamlined process of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination that was intended in the wake the September 11th terrorist attacks.
The ODNI Today
Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) in December 2004 in an attempt to improve organizational challenges within the U.S. intelligence community that contributed to the intelligence failure surrounding the September 11th terrorist attacks. The IRTPA created the ODNI and charged it with acting as a clearinghouse for U.S. intelligence gathered by the sixteen other agencies within the intelligence community. The Act also named the DNI as “head” of the IC and principal intelligence advisor to the President and Congress. Also in 2004, President Bush amended Executive Order 12333, which clarifies goals, roles, and responsibilities within the IC. Best known for prohibiting assassinations, Executive Order 12333 has served as the intelligence community’s guiding document since 1981. To account for the IRTPA’s intelligence reorganization, however, Executive Order 12333 was amended to state that the IC falls under the “leadership” of the newly-formed ODNI.
Despite this, the language in the IRTPA and Executive Order 12333 grants the DNI few explicit authorities, giving it only partial budgetary control of the IC and mandating considerable deference to those purportedly under the DNI’s leadership. The indeterminate powers of the DNI position have been exacerbated by the short tenure of the four DNIs (and one “acting DNI”) who have served over the past eight years, and the continued “turf battles” among agencies and department heads over what specific functions and responsibilities the DNI should assume. Indeed, calls for reform of the ODNI are not new; two DNIs have openly called for further reform of the office, and the current DNI allegedly argued against the value and strength of the office when previously employed at the Department of Defense.
Accomplishments and Constraints
The ODNI has had some significant accomplishments. For instance, it has improved technical interoperability among the IC, led the development of important biometric data programs, and crafted products that incorporate analysis from across a wider spectrum of the IC than previously. By successfully addressing these challenges and others, the ODNI has in some measure demonstrated that its creation was sensible and that it can be effective at this new mission. Nevertheless, as a result of the compromise language found within the IRTPA and EO 12333, the ODNI’s accomplishments remain limited as compared to the office’s potential and the legislation’s initial intent.
The IRTPA and EO 12333 undermine the potential value of the ODNI in two ways. First, the spirit of these documents imply that the ODNI mission includes leadership, initiative, and wide-reaching engagement with all members of the IC. However, the documents’ explicit language grants the ODNI only a more restricted role. This role is limited to the creation and dissemination of integrated intelligence products and the ability to fund certain programs that IC agencies can be cajoled into participating in. No operational authorities are granted to the ODNI. Furthermore, despite the September 11th terrorist attacks highlighting the need for better integration of foreign and domestic intelligence without threatening civil liberties, the IRTPA “sidesteps” this issue and provides the ODNI little guidance or authority as to how to streamline and best manage this process.
The second challenge facing the ODNI is its lack of executive authority. This challenge is subtly different from the first, but compounds its effects. The ODNI has no direct authority over any of the IC agencies it is supposed to “lead,” and thus it cannot enlist their help in directly supporting the ODNI’s mission. The ODNI can offer funding and an element of prestige in return for IC participation in its chosen programs, however these tools have not proven sufficient to fully overcome “turf-guarding” and noncooperation by IC members. Moreover, as DNIs have sought to take ownership of their mission and moved to integrate the intelligence community, they have discovered that when segments of the community–for instance, the Defense Department’s Defense Intelligence Agency or the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)–resist, they are funded and defended by powerful cabinet officials. Resistance by such figures cannot be easily overcome by the DNI, a non-cabinet official with only partial control over these agencies’ budgets.
Recommendations
In order to strengthen the ODNI and better allow it to fulfill its mission, the IRTPA and EO 12333 be changed in the following ways:
- The DNI should be elevated to cabinet position. It is necessary that the IC is composed of a broad array of agencies with specialized expertise. For example, it is sensible that INR be located in the Department of State, and it follows that INR is mutually responsible to both the DNI and the Secretary of State. For this joint ownership to be healthy, however, these two officials must be on equal footing. Only then can INR be expected to adequately follow its dual mission as part of the State Department and the IC, and can “turf fights” be settled more equitably and productively. Though this move places the DNI in a policy-making sphere, this could be countered by requiring the position be non-partisan and/or a fixed term.
- The DNI should be granted more explicit budgetary and management powers over the IC. Section 1018 of the IRTPA and the clause referencing it in EO 12333 should be removed, as should the vague language which names the ODNI the “head” of the IC and instructs it to accommodate the IC department heads. The CIA should be brought directly under the control of the ODNI and new parameters should clarify how dual ownership of certain IC agencies will work. Most importantly, the ODNI must be granted explicit authority that allows it to impose reasonable collection requirements on IC members and thus fulfill its important mission of ensuring “full and free exchange” of information among the community.
- The role and mission-space of the ODNI should be clarified and made operational. The ODNI’s and CIA’s overlapping operational authorities should be divided as the ODNI sees fit. Though an element of intelligence overlap is reasonable and useful, too much can be confusing and counterproductive. This is the case with the ODNI’s “uncertain control over terrorism analysis,” and counterterrorism responsibilities should be streamlined so that various agencies–especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)–are no longer stepping on one another’s toes.
- The IRTPA or EO 12333 should be updated to explicitly define or give the ODNI the power to define how foreign and domestic intelligence can be collected and compiled. The reorganization of the IC was ordered as a result of the September 11th attacks and with future counterterrorism efforts in mind. Specifically, the 9/11 terrorists exploited the wall between the U.S.’s foreign and domestic intelligence collection efforts, and yet the IRTPA and EO 12333 avoid the issue of how to best integrate foreign and domestic intelligence while minimizing the threat to civil liberties. This manner in which the U.S. separates its foreign and domestic intelligence collection is particularly exploitable by terrorists and non-state actors–those currently posing one of the most serious threats to national security. To ensure both the best intelligence integration possible as well as the defense of civil liberties, clear and sensible rules should be formed which dictate how intelligence from these two spheres is collected and in what way and at what level it is integrated and disseminated.
Michael D. Rettig recently earned his master’s degree in international relations at New York University, where he specialized in national security and sub-Saharan Africa. He has served as a research assistant at National Defense University’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies and also has supported economic policy efforts at the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs.
Official White House photo by Pete Souza.
