n late August 2023, protests erupted in Syria's Druze-majority southwestern city of As-Suwayda, an area under the control of the Bashar al-Assad regime since the civil war outbreak in 2011.
Most of the Druze community remained loyal to the regime during the civil war, even if many did not join Assad's army. Their greatest fear was jihadist Islam, especially after the massacres of Druze by extremist militants in a small village close to Idlib in 2015.
The president has relied for years on Syria's religious minorities to strengthen his role and legitimacy. One of them is the Alawite community—to which Assad's family belongs—which accounts for about 10-13% of the country's population.
In As-Suwayda, people are reported to have shouted choruses like "Bashar out, Syria free!" while others showed banners that read slogans like "Syria is not a farm, we are not sheep." Similar protests have also started in other cities, including Raqqa, Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa.
According to New York Times Middle East correspondent Raja Abdulrahim, "The protests grew out of anger over increasing economic hardships that boiled over into demands for a political settlement to the war, which is largely at a stalemate."
The protest's catalyst was the government's decision to reduce gasoline subsidies earlier in the month, which has doubled its price. However, the people taking to the streets are going further by calling for the end of the Assad regime, not just the restoration of subsidies.
Some analysts argue that we are witnessing a new revolutionary wave, as already happened during the Arab Spring of 2011. Political commentator Robin Yassin-Kassab said, "Individuals from minority communities have opposed Assad previously, but not a minority community en masse. [...] Assad's main strategy has been to [...] scare minority groups to sell them the lie that only Assad can protect them from the Sunnis."
Others believe that the protests are limited to an economic dimension and that there are no existential threats to the Assad regime. Joseph Daher, professor at the European University Institute in Florence, told the Associated Press, "You can't say [the protests] would have a real effect on the regime unless there would be a collaboration between (protesters in) different cities."
The Syrian regime does not have much room to respond. The state budget is collapsing, and Assad's recent diplomatic normalization process with the Arab world has not brought the expected immediate benefits to the population.
The regime has already begun using one of its common tools—incite extremist groups against the country's ethnic-religious minorities to justify its use of force, as already occurred in mid-2018 when the Islamic State attacked As-Suwayda, killing about 200 Druze. In addition, Assad will continue to deploy security forces to counter the growing protests and prevent the emergence of others.
The protests in As-Suwayda evidenced how the regime's control over the country is unstable, with consequences both for the Syrian civil society and the Middle Eastern region.
The most crucial issue is the Syrian migration flow toward neighboring countries. In 2022, about 5.4 million Syrians lived as refugees in the region, a data which has further increased after the February 2023 earthquake that hit the Turkish-Syrian border.
Also, Syria is the key hub of Captagon smuggling in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Assad family has a role in the trade of this highly addictive amphetamine, widespread in many Arab countries.
Due to these security reasons, countries in the region are constantly monitoring what happens in Syria, with Assad's closer allies—Russia and Iran—less ready than they once were to intervene to help the regime.
The invasion of Ukraine and related U.S. sanctions have strongly limited the capabilities of Tehran and Moscow to deploy troops outside their national borders. This situation has been only partly balanced by the Syrian regime's recent rapprochement with other Arab countries in the Middle East.
The country still remains an epicenter of instability worldwide. Earlier this year, U.S. President Joe Biden decided to retaliate against Iranian targets in Syria after the killing of a U.S. civilian contractor. Even if the competition with China and the invasion of Ukraine will be central to the upcoming presidential election, the Syrian issue remains relevant to U.S. domestic opinions and foreign policy in the coming years.
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In the Shadow of Regime Change, New Protests in Southern Syria
Alley in Aleppo, which is among the cities where there have been protests against the Assad regime. Photo by Fadi Alagi on Unsplash
September 14, 2023
In recent weeks, protests have broken out across Syria, signaling the further erosion of support for the government and the ongoing civil war. Experts disagree over whether these protests threaten the Assad regime, but Syria seems poised for continued instability, writes Elia Preto Martini.
I
n late August 2023, protests erupted in Syria's Druze-majority southwestern city of As-Suwayda, an area under the control of the Bashar al-Assad regime since the civil war outbreak in 2011.
Most of the Druze community remained loyal to the regime during the civil war, even if many did not join Assad's army. Their greatest fear was jihadist Islam, especially after the massacres of Druze by extremist militants in a small village close to Idlib in 2015.
The president has relied for years on Syria's religious minorities to strengthen his role and legitimacy. One of them is the Alawite community—to which Assad's family belongs—which accounts for about 10-13% of the country's population.
In As-Suwayda, people are reported to have shouted choruses like "Bashar out, Syria free!" while others showed banners that read slogans like "Syria is not a farm, we are not sheep." Similar protests have also started in other cities, including Raqqa, Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa.
According to New York Times Middle East correspondent Raja Abdulrahim, "The protests grew out of anger over increasing economic hardships that boiled over into demands for a political settlement to the war, which is largely at a stalemate."
The protest's catalyst was the government's decision to reduce gasoline subsidies earlier in the month, which has doubled its price. However, the people taking to the streets are going further by calling for the end of the Assad regime, not just the restoration of subsidies.
Some analysts argue that we are witnessing a new revolutionary wave, as already happened during the Arab Spring of 2011. Political commentator Robin Yassin-Kassab said, "Individuals from minority communities have opposed Assad previously, but not a minority community en masse. [...] Assad's main strategy has been to [...] scare minority groups to sell them the lie that only Assad can protect them from the Sunnis."
Others believe that the protests are limited to an economic dimension and that there are no existential threats to the Assad regime. Joseph Daher, professor at the European University Institute in Florence, told the Associated Press, "You can't say [the protests] would have a real effect on the regime unless there would be a collaboration between (protesters in) different cities."
The Syrian regime does not have much room to respond. The state budget is collapsing, and Assad's recent diplomatic normalization process with the Arab world has not brought the expected immediate benefits to the population.
The regime has already begun using one of its common tools—incite extremist groups against the country's ethnic-religious minorities to justify its use of force, as already occurred in mid-2018 when the Islamic State attacked As-Suwayda, killing about 200 Druze. In addition, Assad will continue to deploy security forces to counter the growing protests and prevent the emergence of others.
The protests in As-Suwayda evidenced how the regime's control over the country is unstable, with consequences both for the Syrian civil society and the Middle Eastern region.
The most crucial issue is the Syrian migration flow toward neighboring countries. In 2022, about 5.4 million Syrians lived as refugees in the region, a data which has further increased after the February 2023 earthquake that hit the Turkish-Syrian border.
Also, Syria is the key hub of Captagon smuggling in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Assad family has a role in the trade of this highly addictive amphetamine, widespread in many Arab countries.
Due to these security reasons, countries in the region are constantly monitoring what happens in Syria, with Assad's closer allies—Russia and Iran—less ready than they once were to intervene to help the regime.
The invasion of Ukraine and related U.S. sanctions have strongly limited the capabilities of Tehran and Moscow to deploy troops outside their national borders. This situation has been only partly balanced by the Syrian regime's recent rapprochement with other Arab countries in the Middle East.
The country still remains an epicenter of instability worldwide. Earlier this year, U.S. President Joe Biden decided to retaliate against Iranian targets in Syria after the killing of a U.S. civilian contractor. Even if the competition with China and the invasion of Ukraine will be central to the upcoming presidential election, the Syrian issue remains relevant to U.S. domestic opinions and foreign policy in the coming years.
