With President Obama’s second term secured, he should offer Iran security guarantees and economic incentives in exchange for limitations and full transparency on its nuclear program, as well as a commitment to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue within a positive-sum framework.
U.S. security guarantees would include a commitment not to attempt to overthrow the Iranian government or attack Iran’s nuclear program as long as Iran adhered to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Additional Protocol.
Economic incentives would include a commitment to secure congressional support for a phased lifting of sanctions, an end to U.S. opposition of oil and gas investments and pipeline routes through Iran, and the prospect of future trade agreements, scientific exchanges, and access to alternative energy technology and financing.
Iran would be expected to comply fully with the NPT and Additional Protocol and immediately cap its uranium enrichment activities at the 20 percent level to a quantity determined by the IAEA as necessary for its legitimate medical applications.
Though the Israeli-Palestinian issue should not be a sticking point in U.S.-Iran negotiations, Iran should also be asked to participate in negotiations for a two-state solution along 1967 lines. The Obama administration would itself first have to demonstrate a firm commitment to this, however, and would need to convince senior Iranian leaders of the greater wisdom and justice of a negotiated two-state- versus forced one-state solution: security first, then economic development and mutual prosperity under the two-state scenario versus the risk of civil war under Iran’s favored one-state framework.
Inadequacy of the Current Negotiating Terms
From the Iranian perspective, it is difficult to see how current U.S. offers of minimal sanctions alleviation would be viewed as anything but acquiescence on its rights under the NPT and a demonstration of its lack of resolve in the face of continuing threats. Iran’s responses are rational and reasonable when considered within the context of its own analysis of U.S. intentions, which it is at best highly skeptical of.
Critics of rapprochement will argue that placing security guarantees and economic incentives on the table will be viewed conversely as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States. That might be the case only if the U.S. unilaterally withdrew current economic pressures and the ultimate threat of military force.
Iranian leaders are undoubtedly well aware that the United States could overthrow them by force if it so resolved, albeit at a very high cost. If they perceive that they are being backed into a corner, however, they will be much more likely to maintain a posture of defiance nevertheless because their alternative—surrender—would be unthinkable.
The argument that Iranian leaders are most threatened by rapprochement with the United States is unproven by the historical record. U.S. policymakers might best support the Iranian people by taking a more poised, strategically patient approach on Iranian political and economic liberalization, allowing this evolution to proceed organically on its own time line, which might ultimately be faster than what outside pressures are able to induce.
If Iranian hardliners are unable to point to subversive foreign powers as the culprits behind their gradual loss of political influence, they will have a much more difficult time repressing advocates for liberalization within Iranian civil society because the basis for their attacks will be more difficult to substantiate. Therefore their tactics will lose support from key elements of the Iranian body politic.
Another fear of lifting sanctions is that Iranian leaders would eventually demonstrate duplicity by pursuing parallel secret nuclear activities. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, however, that “[the Intelligence Community] assess[es] Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of [weapons grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.” Iranian leaders would be keenly aware, moreover, that they would be inviting military action against themselves by pursuing such a foolish and unnecessary course of action.
Now is the time to place all of the United States’ cards on the table and engage in direct negotiations with Iranian leaders—ideally Khamenei himself and others within the inner circle of Iranian policymakers to minimize political opacity and the potential for miscommunication. Continuing to engage in diplomacy within a zero-sum framework, in which the Obama administration seeks to maximize what Iran must sacrifice while aiming to minimize what the U.S. will concede, will risk running out the diplomatic clock in a series of self-fulfilling prophecies ending in military confrontation. As U.S. national security experts have made clear, that confrontation would have no guarantee of remaining an antiseptic “shock and awe” type air and naval campaign but would rather likely provoke a strong Iranian military response, potentially leading to a rapid escalation of hostilities and another costly war.
Thomas Buonomo a former U.S. Army Intelligence Officer and graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy with a dual degree in Political Science and Middle East Studies, and he is pursuing a graduate degree in Middle East Studies at George Washington University.
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In Iran Negotiations, Time to Put Everything on the Table
June 7, 2013
With President Obama’s second term secured, he should offer Iran security guarantees and economic incentives in exchange for limitations and full transparency on its nuclear program, as well as a commitment to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue within a positive-sum framework.
U.S. security guarantees would include a commitment not to attempt to overthrow the Iranian government or attack Iran’s nuclear program as long as Iran adhered to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Additional Protocol.
Economic incentives would include a commitment to secure congressional support for a phased lifting of sanctions, an end to U.S. opposition of oil and gas investments and pipeline routes through Iran, and the prospect of future trade agreements, scientific exchanges, and access to alternative energy technology and financing.
Iran would be expected to comply fully with the NPT and Additional Protocol and immediately cap its uranium enrichment activities at the 20 percent level to a quantity determined by the IAEA as necessary for its legitimate medical applications.
Though the Israeli-Palestinian issue should not be a sticking point in U.S.-Iran negotiations, Iran should also be asked to participate in negotiations for a two-state solution along 1967 lines. The Obama administration would itself first have to demonstrate a firm commitment to this, however, and would need to convince senior Iranian leaders of the greater wisdom and justice of a negotiated two-state- versus forced one-state solution: security first, then economic development and mutual prosperity under the two-state scenario versus the risk of civil war under Iran’s favored one-state framework.
Inadequacy of the Current Negotiating Terms
From the Iranian perspective, it is difficult to see how current U.S. offers of minimal sanctions alleviation would be viewed as anything but acquiescence on its rights under the NPT and a demonstration of its lack of resolve in the face of continuing threats. Iran’s responses are rational and reasonable when considered within the context of its own analysis of U.S. intentions, which it is at best highly skeptical of.
Critics of rapprochement will argue that placing security guarantees and economic incentives on the table will be viewed conversely as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States. That might be the case only if the U.S. unilaterally withdrew current economic pressures and the ultimate threat of military force.
Iranian leaders are undoubtedly well aware that the United States could overthrow them by force if it so resolved, albeit at a very high cost. If they perceive that they are being backed into a corner, however, they will be much more likely to maintain a posture of defiance nevertheless because their alternative—surrender—would be unthinkable.
The argument that Iranian leaders are most threatened by rapprochement with the United States is unproven by the historical record. U.S. policymakers might best support the Iranian people by taking a more poised, strategically patient approach on Iranian political and economic liberalization, allowing this evolution to proceed organically on its own time line, which might ultimately be faster than what outside pressures are able to induce.
If Iranian hardliners are unable to point to subversive foreign powers as the culprits behind their gradual loss of political influence, they will have a much more difficult time repressing advocates for liberalization within Iranian civil society because the basis for their attacks will be more difficult to substantiate. Therefore their tactics will lose support from key elements of the Iranian body politic.
Another fear of lifting sanctions is that Iranian leaders would eventually demonstrate duplicity by pursuing parallel secret nuclear activities. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, however, that “[the Intelligence Community] assess[es] Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of [weapons grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.” Iranian leaders would be keenly aware, moreover, that they would be inviting military action against themselves by pursuing such a foolish and unnecessary course of action.
Now is the time to place all of the United States’ cards on the table and engage in direct negotiations with Iranian leaders—ideally Khamenei himself and others within the inner circle of Iranian policymakers to minimize political opacity and the potential for miscommunication. Continuing to engage in diplomacy within a zero-sum framework, in which the Obama administration seeks to maximize what Iran must sacrifice while aiming to minimize what the U.S. will concede, will risk running out the diplomatic clock in a series of self-fulfilling prophecies ending in military confrontation. As U.S. national security experts have made clear, that confrontation would have no guarantee of remaining an antiseptic “shock and awe” type air and naval campaign but would rather likely provoke a strong Iranian military response, potentially leading to a rapid escalation of hostilities and another costly war.
Thomas Buonomo a former U.S. Army Intelligence Officer and graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy with a dual degree in Political Science and Middle East Studies, and he is pursuing a graduate degree in Middle East Studies at George Washington University.
