ne year since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his so-called special military operation in Ukraine, the Kremlin has not achieved any of its military and political goals in the Eastern European country. Judging by the current developments on the ground, especially the increased Western weapon supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Moscow’s defeat seems inevitable. But what will be the fate of a postwar Russia?
On 24 February 2022, Putin said Russia aims to “protect the Donbas,” “denazify and demilitarize” Ukraine, and force Kyiv to accept a neutral status, which means it would officially give up on its NATO aspirations. One year later, significant parts of the Donbas are still under Ukrainian control, and civilians on both sides of the frontline have learned to live under constant artillery fire. Despite Putin’s alleged ambitions to demilitarize Ukraine, the Eastern European nation’s armed forces continue receiving all kinds of weapons from around the globe. Moreover, on 30 September 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy submitted an "accelerated" application to join the NATO military alliance.
In other words, the opposite of what Putin announced on 24 February 2022 has happened. But what will happen if the Western-backed Ukraine manages to eventually defeat the Russian military and establish full control over its territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea?
Looking to the Future
Authorities in a postwar Russia will almost certainly have to recognize Ukraine’s 1991 borders. Since Kyiv has already started filing cases against suspected Russian war criminals, a postwar Russia will likely have to extradite them either to Ukraine or to the Hague. Moscow will also be under pressure to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by the full-scale Russian invasion. If Russian policy makers and strategic planners do decide to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Kyiv and quite possibly the West will firmly insist on “denuclearization” of the Russian Federation after the war.
The Western powers, for their part, are not expected to completely lift all the sanctions they imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, at least while Putin is in charge in the Kremlin. Meanwhile, sanctions will continue to have a serious impact on the Russian economy. As a result, Moscow may not be in a position to continue buying stability in its restive regions—from the North Caucasus to the Ural Mountains—which means that separatist movements all over Russia will begin to grow.
On 7 January 2023, the Congress of Supporters of Ingushetia’s Independence was held in Istanbul. Its representatives made a statement in which they emphasized the necessity of “consolidating the Ingush society around the idea of independence, as well as striving to preserve cultural and religious identity.” Since the Ukrainian parliament recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as an independent state in October 2022, it is entirely possible that Ukraine will be the first country to recognize the independence of Ingushetia—a republic of the Russian Federation located in the North Caucasus.
Given that the Russian North Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Dagestan—where ethnic minorities make up the majority of the population—remain heavily dependent on subsidies from the federal government, an economic crisis in Russia could lead to destabilization of the regions. Presently, the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, remains loyal to Putin, but a Russian defeat in Ukraine could easily break his alliance with the Kremlin, and lead to a Third Chechen War.
A postwar Russian government will likely have a hard time preserving Tatarstan—a region in the east-central part of European Russia where ethnic Tatars make up 53% of the population—in Moscow’s political orbit. Tatarstan is the only region of Russia that is still led by a president, even though in October 2021 the Russian State Duma passed legislation required all regional leaders to go by the official title “glava“ (head) instead of president. The incumbent leader of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, will be named "president" until his term of office expires in 2025. After that, the new name of the top official in Tatarstan will be "the head - Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan," or "Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan" (“rais” is an Arabic term meaning “leader”). Such a symbolic move indicates that the process of derussification of Tatarstan has already begun.
Tatarstan has formed two battalions that are taking part in Putin’s war in Ukraine. Their names are in Tatar, rather than in Russian—”Alga” and “Timer,” meaning “forward” and “iron”—which is not surprising given that Tatarstan authorities seem to want to improve the prominence of the Tatar language in the region. In November 2022, a picket was held in Kazan, the republic’s capital, demanding the equality of the Tatar and Russian languages. One of the posters read: “Tatars demand the return of compulsory study of the Tatar language!” A Russian defeat in Ukraine could lead not only to more demands regarding the status of the Tatar language, but also regarding the very status of the region.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the predominantly Muslim republic held a referendum in 1992 in which most residents voted in favor of becoming a “sovereign state.” Tatarstan remained a subject of the Russian Federation, where foreign policy is run by the country’s foreign ministry and president. But amid the Ukraine War in 2022, its leader, Minnikhanov, made several official visits to various nations. In December, he met with Qatari officials, as well as with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Previously, in November, he traveled to Azerbaijan to meet with the South Caucasus country’s President Ilham Aliyev. Such visits indicate that Tatarstan attempts to develop close ties with Muslim states, which is a path that many other leaders of Russian “ethnic republics” could follow.
The central government of a postwar Russia will undoubtedly have to find a way to improve relations with the West, since remaining under isolation will additionally jeopardize Russia’s position in the global arena. Regardless of the war with NATO-backed Ukraine, some members of Putin’s elite have managed to preserve ties with certain Western countries. For instance, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s grandson lives in Latvia, while the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova’s granddaughter lives in Spain. Also, Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s son lives in France, while a grandson of Viktor Zolotov, the Director of the National Guard of Russia, lives in England. Moreover, several Russian oligarchs have strong business links either directly with Western nations, or with countries that are politically close to the West, namely Israel and Turkey. Thus, in order to protect their own business interests, they are expected to push the Kremlin to normalize relations with the United States and the European Union.
If the U.S. and the EU aim to eventually incorporate Russia into what former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once described as a “cooperative larger West,” sooner or later Moscow, Washington, and Brussels will need to become partners again. However, Russia will first have to go through a radical transformation that may include “de-Putinization” of the country. And that will be the final result of Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
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Imagining a Postwar Russia
Photo by Sasha Matveeva via Unsplash.
February 25, 2023
We don't know what the outcome of the Ukraine conflict will be, but Russia has clearly failed in its initial goals. Imagining a postwar Russia, Nikola Mikovic predicts a "de-Putinized" Russia with growing separatist fervor among Russia's many ethnic republics.
O
ne year since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his so-called special military operation in Ukraine, the Kremlin has not achieved any of its military and political goals in the Eastern European country. Judging by the current developments on the ground, especially the increased Western weapon supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Moscow’s defeat seems inevitable. But what will be the fate of a postwar Russia?
On 24 February 2022, Putin said Russia aims to “protect the Donbas,” “denazify and demilitarize” Ukraine, and force Kyiv to accept a neutral status, which means it would officially give up on its NATO aspirations. One year later, significant parts of the Donbas are still under Ukrainian control, and civilians on both sides of the frontline have learned to live under constant artillery fire. Despite Putin’s alleged ambitions to demilitarize Ukraine, the Eastern European nation’s armed forces continue receiving all kinds of weapons from around the globe. Moreover, on 30 September 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy submitted an "accelerated" application to join the NATO military alliance.
In other words, the opposite of what Putin announced on 24 February 2022 has happened. But what will happen if the Western-backed Ukraine manages to eventually defeat the Russian military and establish full control over its territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea?
Looking to the Future
Authorities in a postwar Russia will almost certainly have to recognize Ukraine’s 1991 borders. Since Kyiv has already started filing cases against suspected Russian war criminals, a postwar Russia will likely have to extradite them either to Ukraine or to the Hague. Moscow will also be under pressure to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by the full-scale Russian invasion. If Russian policy makers and strategic planners do decide to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Kyiv and quite possibly the West will firmly insist on “denuclearization” of the Russian Federation after the war.
The Western powers, for their part, are not expected to completely lift all the sanctions they imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, at least while Putin is in charge in the Kremlin. Meanwhile, sanctions will continue to have a serious impact on the Russian economy. As a result, Moscow may not be in a position to continue buying stability in its restive regions—from the North Caucasus to the Ural Mountains—which means that separatist movements all over Russia will begin to grow.
On 7 January 2023, the Congress of Supporters of Ingushetia’s Independence was held in Istanbul. Its representatives made a statement in which they emphasized the necessity of “consolidating the Ingush society around the idea of independence, as well as striving to preserve cultural and religious identity.” Since the Ukrainian parliament recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as an independent state in October 2022, it is entirely possible that Ukraine will be the first country to recognize the independence of Ingushetia—a republic of the Russian Federation located in the North Caucasus.
Given that the Russian North Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Dagestan—where ethnic minorities make up the majority of the population—remain heavily dependent on subsidies from the federal government, an economic crisis in Russia could lead to destabilization of the regions. Presently, the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, remains loyal to Putin, but a Russian defeat in Ukraine could easily break his alliance with the Kremlin, and lead to a Third Chechen War.
A postwar Russian government will likely have a hard time preserving Tatarstan—a region in the east-central part of European Russia where ethnic Tatars make up 53% of the population—in Moscow’s political orbit. Tatarstan is the only region of Russia that is still led by a president, even though in October 2021 the Russian State Duma passed legislation required all regional leaders to go by the official title “glava“ (head) instead of president. The incumbent leader of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, will be named "president" until his term of office expires in 2025. After that, the new name of the top official in Tatarstan will be "the head - Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan," or "Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan" (“rais” is an Arabic term meaning “leader”). Such a symbolic move indicates that the process of derussification of Tatarstan has already begun.
Tatarstan has formed two battalions that are taking part in Putin’s war in Ukraine. Their names are in Tatar, rather than in Russian—”Alga” and “Timer,” meaning “forward” and “iron”—which is not surprising given that Tatarstan authorities seem to want to improve the prominence of the Tatar language in the region. In November 2022, a picket was held in Kazan, the republic’s capital, demanding the equality of the Tatar and Russian languages. One of the posters read: “Tatars demand the return of compulsory study of the Tatar language!” A Russian defeat in Ukraine could lead not only to more demands regarding the status of the Tatar language, but also regarding the very status of the region.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the predominantly Muslim republic held a referendum in 1992 in which most residents voted in favor of becoming a “sovereign state.” Tatarstan remained a subject of the Russian Federation, where foreign policy is run by the country’s foreign ministry and president. But amid the Ukraine War in 2022, its leader, Minnikhanov, made several official visits to various nations. In December, he met with Qatari officials, as well as with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Previously, in November, he traveled to Azerbaijan to meet with the South Caucasus country’s President Ilham Aliyev. Such visits indicate that Tatarstan attempts to develop close ties with Muslim states, which is a path that many other leaders of Russian “ethnic republics” could follow.
The central government of a postwar Russia will undoubtedly have to find a way to improve relations with the West, since remaining under isolation will additionally jeopardize Russia’s position in the global arena. Regardless of the war with NATO-backed Ukraine, some members of Putin’s elite have managed to preserve ties with certain Western countries. For instance, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s grandson lives in Latvia, while the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova’s granddaughter lives in Spain. Also, Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s son lives in France, while a grandson of Viktor Zolotov, the Director of the National Guard of Russia, lives in England. Moreover, several Russian oligarchs have strong business links either directly with Western nations, or with countries that are politically close to the West, namely Israel and Turkey. Thus, in order to protect their own business interests, they are expected to push the Kremlin to normalize relations with the United States and the European Union.
If the U.S. and the EU aim to eventually incorporate Russia into what former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once described as a “cooperative larger West,” sooner or later Moscow, Washington, and Brussels will need to become partners again. However, Russia will first have to go through a radical transformation that may include “de-Putinization” of the country. And that will be the final result of Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
