.
The G7 summit in Germany this year will again convene in the shadow of the war in Ukraine—a war in Europe that is intractable and a vexing problem for German leadership, which will undoubtedly be center state at the summit. Russia, the country unceremoniously booted from the G8 for its annexation of Crimea, appears undeterred by the West, while Germany’s European neighbors quietly descend into fear. European nations, long accustomed to living in peace, without even the semblance of a territorial threat, have begun to actively plan for such contingencies. They are not doing this under German leadership or NATO leadership, but individually. The G7 is hardly the ideal forum to tackle this problem, but as a spotlight on German leadership in 2015, it will be hard to not notice the one area where it has not produced successful results, in addressing Russia’s war in Ukraine and convincing Europeans to stick together behind a common approach to this conflict.
Increasingly European nations are looking to their own defenses. Countries nearest to Russia have always publicly fretted about Moscow’s intentions, but they did not seriously invest in their forces before. Since the threat has materialized, Baltic States have drastically increased their defense spending, while Finland has issued letters to reservists outlining plans in the event of a national crisis. In Poland paramilitary groups have seen a resurgence of popularity, a home guard of sorts, born from those anxieties after Russian aggression in next-door Ukraine. Europeans are bracing for worst-case scenarios. Confidence in their collective ability to resolve the conflict in Ukraine is visibly absent. More to the point, a passive assessment appears to have taken place of how the West is managing this crisis, and the results lend European nations east of Germany to rethink their defensive capabilities.
Germany too has taken a closer look at the state of its armed forces and found them to be in woeful condition. Ironically, battered Ukraine likely has more tanks in active service, and engaged in combat, than Germany can field today. The German army has withered since the Cold War, barely fielding 225 armored vehicles, a force unprepared for a conventional conflict in Europe. Although the largest economy, and the most powerful political entity in Europe, Germany’s military is undoubtedly its’ weakest and least used arm. As a consequence, German armed forces have announced plans in April to restore 100 mothballed tanks back to active service. A token budgetary victory for the army, but an important sign that even German leaders for the first time are starting to think about backup options and consider worst case alternatives. Simply speaking, a year into this war, Berlin seems uncertain that its own diplomacy will be sufficient to contain the situation.
The reason for this nervous hedging behavior is that few expect the war in Ukraine to freeze this year. Hopes that Minsk II would lead to a ceasefire have largely been dashed. No other path to political settlement is in sight, and the one Minsk II set out is not being followed. Europeans are not afraid of Russian invasion. Most European states, with the exception of those traditionally apprehensive of Moscow, believe that Russian revisionism is limited to the contest over Ukraine. For them the problem is not Russian annexation of Crimea, or its invasion of the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine. They see this as a Ukrainian tragedy, but not a direct military threat to their nations. After all, most European countries are in NATO, and ultimately count on the U.S. for conventional deterrence and protection. The problem as they see it is that even with the political and military support of the U.S., European leaders (read that for Germany) have thus far been unable to resolve this conflict. Wars have a nasty tendency over time to suck in bordering states, followed by regional powers, and often major powers, if left unchecked.
As fighting between the Ukrainian army, Russian-backed separatists, and the Russian army drags on over this summer, European anxieties will only increase. While European leaders may proclaim that this conflict has revived NATO and given European defense a newfound sense of purpose, the reality is that privately they fear that the war in Ukraine could prove to be the death of the alliance. The oft-proclaimed unity screens a series of unfolding self-interested plays. Lithuania is arming the Ukrainian army, in what appears to be a unilateral policy of proxy war. Poland is also providing military support. The two have even formed a joint three-nation brigade with Ukraine, whose international implications are somewhat unclear were it to be used against Russia. Britain and the U.S. have sent military trainers, while other NATO members have provided an assortment of non-lethal military aid. The war in Ukraine is visibly spiraling out, and while NATO as an organization does not appear to have any visible role, outside reassuring its members, many of them are unilaterally “dribbling in” their involvement.
Germany is the country most responsible for keeping Europeans unified in maintaining sanctions against Russia, and behind a common policy designed to isolate Vladimir Putin, but it too is part of a separate block of nations who oppose sending weapons to Ukraine. In this it has American support, for now, but Eastern European states have already ventured ahead with their own policy. German leadership throughout this crisis has been quite forceful, reflective of an increasingly active foreign policy and the personal leadership of Angela Merkel, but it has not been successful. Berlin seems unable to maintain unity on much beyond sanctions, which steadily appear to be a punitive policy without much consequence. More worrisome is that Germany is unable to secure Ukrainian cooperation, despite holding all the leverage in the relationship.
Angela Merkel expended considerable political capital pressuring Ukrainian and Russian leaders to sign the Minsk II agreement, which proved magnitudes more favorable to Moscow than it was to Kiev. The ceasefire was not honored in February, has barely held through March, and is fraying into collapse. Russia prepares only for the resumption of hostilities, and turning the separatists into a more proper fighting force, while Ukraine’s leaders seem solely interested in this deal to rearm for the next battle. In March, the Ukrainian Rada passed laws that effectively rewrite the sequencing of the political settlement component of the Minsk II agreement, in the complete reverse order that was stipulated in the deal Germany brokered. Since the first part fell on Ukraine to implement, Ukrainian leaders chose not to wait for Moscow to break its word, which Vladimir Putin surely would have if given the opportunity. Instead Ukraine reneged on the terms first. Angela Merkel’s efforts in February to halt Russia’s winter offensive, and save Kiev from further loss of territory, appear to have largely been a fool’s errand.
Ukraine looks to Germany this year to save it from bankruptcy. Kiev also needs strong German leadership to suppress the individual policies of countries sympathetic to Russia, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Greece, in order to keep the sanctions regime in place. However, this seemingly existential dependency seems to translate poorly for German influence in Ukraine. Ukraine’s elites continue to hope that they can make the U.S. an active party to the war, and thus press for lethal weapons in Washington, DC, where such policies enjoy substantial support. Between Russian violations of the ceasefire and Ukrainian “rewriting” of the deal the second Minsk agreement has been rendered institutionally meaningless. What was a largely German plan for freezing the war in Ukraine appears to now be derelict, subject to the whims of Russian belligerence, Ukrainian intransigence, and the machinations of other European states.
Later this year, fellow members of the European Union and Ukrainians alike will look to German leadership for a renewed effort to halt the fighting. Ironically, they are all making individual decisions that make German leadership increasingly difficult, and reduce the chances that there can be a sustained common policy. Germany has few good options moving forward. It has convinced Europeans to extend sanctions until December, but unilateral pursuits by fellow Europeans will make sanctions the least relevant policy in the conflict by the end of the year. Berlin has three prospective choices: join those calling for a proxy war with Russia, by sending weapons to Ukraine, pressure Ukraine into accommodating Moscow and its separatist proxies, or steadily walk away from the entire affair, leaving Ukraine to muddle through, and for others to make a mess of it. This is not an exhaustive list of alternatives and scenarios. The only certainty is that Germany’s leadership will be tested throughout 2015. Organizing the G7 summit will prove to be the easiest of the challenges it faces this year.
Editor’s Note: This article is the Cover Story of Diplomatic Courier’s special print G7 Summit 2015 Edition.
Photo Credit: Pete Souza, the White House.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Germany’s G7 Summit and Russia
June 3, 2015
The G7 summit in Germany this year will again convene in the shadow of the war in Ukraine—a war in Europe that is intractable and a vexing problem for German leadership, which will undoubtedly be center state at the summit. Russia, the country unceremoniously booted from the G8 for its annexation of Crimea, appears undeterred by the West, while Germany’s European neighbors quietly descend into fear. European nations, long accustomed to living in peace, without even the semblance of a territorial threat, have begun to actively plan for such contingencies. They are not doing this under German leadership or NATO leadership, but individually. The G7 is hardly the ideal forum to tackle this problem, but as a spotlight on German leadership in 2015, it will be hard to not notice the one area where it has not produced successful results, in addressing Russia’s war in Ukraine and convincing Europeans to stick together behind a common approach to this conflict.
Increasingly European nations are looking to their own defenses. Countries nearest to Russia have always publicly fretted about Moscow’s intentions, but they did not seriously invest in their forces before. Since the threat has materialized, Baltic States have drastically increased their defense spending, while Finland has issued letters to reservists outlining plans in the event of a national crisis. In Poland paramilitary groups have seen a resurgence of popularity, a home guard of sorts, born from those anxieties after Russian aggression in next-door Ukraine. Europeans are bracing for worst-case scenarios. Confidence in their collective ability to resolve the conflict in Ukraine is visibly absent. More to the point, a passive assessment appears to have taken place of how the West is managing this crisis, and the results lend European nations east of Germany to rethink their defensive capabilities.
Germany too has taken a closer look at the state of its armed forces and found them to be in woeful condition. Ironically, battered Ukraine likely has more tanks in active service, and engaged in combat, than Germany can field today. The German army has withered since the Cold War, barely fielding 225 armored vehicles, a force unprepared for a conventional conflict in Europe. Although the largest economy, and the most powerful political entity in Europe, Germany’s military is undoubtedly its’ weakest and least used arm. As a consequence, German armed forces have announced plans in April to restore 100 mothballed tanks back to active service. A token budgetary victory for the army, but an important sign that even German leaders for the first time are starting to think about backup options and consider worst case alternatives. Simply speaking, a year into this war, Berlin seems uncertain that its own diplomacy will be sufficient to contain the situation.
The reason for this nervous hedging behavior is that few expect the war in Ukraine to freeze this year. Hopes that Minsk II would lead to a ceasefire have largely been dashed. No other path to political settlement is in sight, and the one Minsk II set out is not being followed. Europeans are not afraid of Russian invasion. Most European states, with the exception of those traditionally apprehensive of Moscow, believe that Russian revisionism is limited to the contest over Ukraine. For them the problem is not Russian annexation of Crimea, or its invasion of the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine. They see this as a Ukrainian tragedy, but not a direct military threat to their nations. After all, most European countries are in NATO, and ultimately count on the U.S. for conventional deterrence and protection. The problem as they see it is that even with the political and military support of the U.S., European leaders (read that for Germany) have thus far been unable to resolve this conflict. Wars have a nasty tendency over time to suck in bordering states, followed by regional powers, and often major powers, if left unchecked.
As fighting between the Ukrainian army, Russian-backed separatists, and the Russian army drags on over this summer, European anxieties will only increase. While European leaders may proclaim that this conflict has revived NATO and given European defense a newfound sense of purpose, the reality is that privately they fear that the war in Ukraine could prove to be the death of the alliance. The oft-proclaimed unity screens a series of unfolding self-interested plays. Lithuania is arming the Ukrainian army, in what appears to be a unilateral policy of proxy war. Poland is also providing military support. The two have even formed a joint three-nation brigade with Ukraine, whose international implications are somewhat unclear were it to be used against Russia. Britain and the U.S. have sent military trainers, while other NATO members have provided an assortment of non-lethal military aid. The war in Ukraine is visibly spiraling out, and while NATO as an organization does not appear to have any visible role, outside reassuring its members, many of them are unilaterally “dribbling in” their involvement.
Germany is the country most responsible for keeping Europeans unified in maintaining sanctions against Russia, and behind a common policy designed to isolate Vladimir Putin, but it too is part of a separate block of nations who oppose sending weapons to Ukraine. In this it has American support, for now, but Eastern European states have already ventured ahead with their own policy. German leadership throughout this crisis has been quite forceful, reflective of an increasingly active foreign policy and the personal leadership of Angela Merkel, but it has not been successful. Berlin seems unable to maintain unity on much beyond sanctions, which steadily appear to be a punitive policy without much consequence. More worrisome is that Germany is unable to secure Ukrainian cooperation, despite holding all the leverage in the relationship.
Angela Merkel expended considerable political capital pressuring Ukrainian and Russian leaders to sign the Minsk II agreement, which proved magnitudes more favorable to Moscow than it was to Kiev. The ceasefire was not honored in February, has barely held through March, and is fraying into collapse. Russia prepares only for the resumption of hostilities, and turning the separatists into a more proper fighting force, while Ukraine’s leaders seem solely interested in this deal to rearm for the next battle. In March, the Ukrainian Rada passed laws that effectively rewrite the sequencing of the political settlement component of the Minsk II agreement, in the complete reverse order that was stipulated in the deal Germany brokered. Since the first part fell on Ukraine to implement, Ukrainian leaders chose not to wait for Moscow to break its word, which Vladimir Putin surely would have if given the opportunity. Instead Ukraine reneged on the terms first. Angela Merkel’s efforts in February to halt Russia’s winter offensive, and save Kiev from further loss of territory, appear to have largely been a fool’s errand.
Ukraine looks to Germany this year to save it from bankruptcy. Kiev also needs strong German leadership to suppress the individual policies of countries sympathetic to Russia, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Greece, in order to keep the sanctions regime in place. However, this seemingly existential dependency seems to translate poorly for German influence in Ukraine. Ukraine’s elites continue to hope that they can make the U.S. an active party to the war, and thus press for lethal weapons in Washington, DC, where such policies enjoy substantial support. Between Russian violations of the ceasefire and Ukrainian “rewriting” of the deal the second Minsk agreement has been rendered institutionally meaningless. What was a largely German plan for freezing the war in Ukraine appears to now be derelict, subject to the whims of Russian belligerence, Ukrainian intransigence, and the machinations of other European states.
Later this year, fellow members of the European Union and Ukrainians alike will look to German leadership for a renewed effort to halt the fighting. Ironically, they are all making individual decisions that make German leadership increasingly difficult, and reduce the chances that there can be a sustained common policy. Germany has few good options moving forward. It has convinced Europeans to extend sanctions until December, but unilateral pursuits by fellow Europeans will make sanctions the least relevant policy in the conflict by the end of the year. Berlin has three prospective choices: join those calling for a proxy war with Russia, by sending weapons to Ukraine, pressure Ukraine into accommodating Moscow and its separatist proxies, or steadily walk away from the entire affair, leaving Ukraine to muddle through, and for others to make a mess of it. This is not an exhaustive list of alternatives and scenarios. The only certainty is that Germany’s leadership will be tested throughout 2015. Organizing the G7 summit will prove to be the easiest of the challenges it faces this year.
Editor’s Note: This article is the Cover Story of Diplomatic Courier’s special print G7 Summit 2015 Edition.
Photo Credit: Pete Souza, the White House.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
