The October 27th Georgian presidential elections will mark the end of the Mikheil Saakashvili era in the country. Georgia’s territory is slightly smaller than Ireland, with a population of 4.5million; it was among the smallest republics of the former USSR. Nevertheless, it remains today at the center of the political competition between Russia and the West. In Russia the official propaganda did its job: according to the Russian Levada-Center (June 2013), 33 percent of Russians consider Georgia the most unfriendly country (Georgia was at the top of this list with 41 percent in June 2012). The Georgian government, and Georgian population are pro-Western now. According to the NDI polls, 70 to 80 percent of Georgians see Russia as a threat; 70 percent of Georgians want to have better relations with Russia, but not at the cost of reduced sovereignty, and their attitude towards NATO and EU is overwhelmingly positive.
Georgia is the key to the entire South Caucasus region, separating Russia from its key ally in the region, Armenia. Russia needs a ground link to Armenia badly. If Georgia were to become pro-Russian, Russia could then establish a railway link down to Iran's and Turkey's borders with Georgia and Armenia—isolating Azerbaijan by blocking Central Asia’s access to ship oil to Europe. Russian goods (and weapons) would be able to travel by rail all the way to the Persian Gulf. At the same time the possibility of a pro-Russian Georgia exists only in the minds of the Kremlin strategists. The transportation routes for Azerbaijan's, Kazakhstan's, and possibly Turkmenistan's oil and gas to Europe go through Georgia, with no realistic alternative. These routes are already in the sights of the long-range Russian Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), which are deployed in South Ossetia, and Russia intends to keep it this way.
Saakashvili's Legacy: His Achievements
Ten years of Saakashnili's rule transformed Georgia. The country chose democracy—the majority of Georgians (73 percent in a September 2013 NDI poll) intend to vote in the presidential elections; people obviously believe in the power of the public vote. It is a young democracy which still faces growing pains, but already 81 percent of Georgians believe in the importance of a strong political opposition. The amount of people,who are satisfied versus not satisfied with the state of democracy in Georgia is approximately equal, hovering around 44 percent. Georgians want more democracy, not less.
The traditional Soviet belief in the “New Good Leader Who Will Do It Right” is mostly gone. The naive belief on the part of the electorate that Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the 2012 Parliament election winner, the Georgian Dream movement, will use his wealth to improve life in Georgia contributed to his electoral victory, but it was only one of the factors that decided the election. When Ivanishvili did not live up to expectations, it was a sobering moment. But the transfer of power from Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) to Georgian Dream was civilized. The establishment of democratic traditions in Georgia is a key part of Saakashvili's legacy.
There are also unquestionable achievements in the economy. The country broke its dependence on the Russian gas, and is now energy independent. Georgia receives natural gas from Azerbaijan's SOCAR at a very favourable price of $167/1000cu. m., and only 10 percent of the country's gas supply comes from Russia—a payment for the transit of the Russian gas to Armenia. Russia has no way to use the energy resources as political leverage in its relations with Georgia. Early in Saakashvili's term, Minister of Economy Kakha Bendukidze declared the administration’s plan was “to sell everything besides conscience and integrity”, bringing in foreign investors. The country now operates the BTC oil pipeline, which takes Azerbaijani oil to the Mediterranean, and BTE natural gas pipeline, which takes the Caspian gas to Turkey. Both pipelines are internationally owned. Georgia and Azerbaijan jointly constructed the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, which connects Azerbaijani oil deposits to the Georgian Black Sea oil terminal in Supsa and further west. Under Saakashvili, Georgia's economy became open to foreign investments, which are relatively safe in the country. Even major Russian companies safely operate in Georgia despite its conflict with Russia. Saakashvili did not succumb to the temptation to follow Putin's tactics of bullying the private businesses to settle political scores with neighbors.
Finally, Saakashvili's crowning achievement is suppression of the culture of the petty corruption. One needs to remember Soviet Georgia to realize what a giant leap it is that Georgian police or government officials no longer take bribes. Saakashvili made the first crucial step in this direction at the beginning of his first term, when he simply collected and deported all the known bosses of the criminal underground, without bothering about any legal proceedings. As the result, organized crime in Georgia has lost its power, while ethnic Georgians are freed from one of the most powerful criminal groups in Russia. The suppression of the corruption was achieved at the cost of the creation of the dangerously powerful Ministry of Interior, but so far this potential risk has not materialized as an active threat to democracy. Saakashvili credits this achievement to his right-hand man, former Minister of Internal Affairs and former Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, who was the right man for the job: very effective, and with no Lavrentiy Beria ambitions. Vano Merabishvili was arrested in May 2013 on the weakest charges. This brings us to Saakashvili's failures.
Saakashvili's Legacy: His Failures
Following the creation of the powerful Ministry of Interior, Saakashvili had to balance it with the equally influential Ministry of Justice. The former Minister of Justice, Zurab Adeishvili, was as influential as Merabishvili, but failed to bring the judicial system to civilized standards. As a result, the total number of applications from Georgia to the European Human Rights Court in 2012 reached 2883. This is twice as many as from Croatia, which has about the same population numbers, and over 100 times more than from Ireland. Poor conditions in Georgia's prisons provoked the prison riots and further outcries about human rights abuses. Shortly before the 2012 elections, the Georgian Dream released a very graphic video of prison guard brutality; this video turned the election. There were well-grounded allegations that the video was falsified, but known brutality in Georgian jails made it believable for the public. While petty bribes and corruption were eliminated from Georgia life, overall white-collar crime has not: some construction projects of the past few years bear the signs of government corruption.
Saakashvili inherited the very difficult Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, and failed to resolve them. Certainly progress was made with Abkhazia until June 2008, but the solution was blocked by Moscow. The 2008 war made things much worse. Now there is no solution in sight for South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’s situation is very difficult. The conflicts cannot not be resolved without Russia's goodwill, but after ten years of Saakashvili's rule, Georgia is further from restoring its territorial integrity, than it was in 2003.
Georgia: What's Next?
From a practical standpoint the presidential elections on October 27th are not critical for the country's future. The Georgian Constitution was revised in October 2010, leaving the president a mostly ceremonial role. These changes entered into force in October 2012. The real power in Georgia is now in the hands of the Prime Minister. Current Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili plans to resign from this position before the end of 2013, but will have someone whom he trusts to appoint as his successor. The most likely candidate is Minister of Interior Irakly Garibashvili. Ivanishvili brought him to the government from his Georgian CARTU GROUP, and he is very loyal to Ivanishvili.
After Georgian Dream won the Parliamentary elections, observers speculated about Irakly Alasania as the successor of Ivanishvili. He combined the positions of Minister of Defence and Vice Prime Minister in the new government, and was clearly respected by Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili also bankrolled Alasania's lobbyists in Washington, DC. After four months of service in the Vice Prime Minister position, he was stripped of this title by Ivanishvili; no reasons were ever provided. The popular speculation is that Ivanishvili discovered disloyalty from Alasania, closing any future political opportunities for him, including presidential candidate for Georgian Dream.
Another potential candidate, who also was passed over for nomination, is the former soccer star Kakha Kaladze, who is now the Minister of Energy. On May 8th he hinted to the media the possibility of importing more Russian gas, to almost everyone's surprise, including Ivanishvili, Saakashvili, and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev. Kaladze's statement was immediately disavowed by Ivanishvili. The idea of the deeper cooperation with GAZPROM is not justified economically, and could imply possible corruption plans. This unsanctioned and odd move by Kaladze explains his absence from the presidential elections.
Ivanishvili's candidate for the president is Minister of Education Georgi Margelashvili. He is not very well known; his ultimate advantage at the polls is that he is seen as Ivanishvili's man. The candidate from Saakashvili's UNM is the former Speaker of the Parliament David Bakradze. He is well known, and has the lowest disapproval rating among the leaders of the opposition. He also was not implicated in any real or alleged scandal during the Saakashvili's years. The third candidate is another former Speaker of the Parliament, Nino Burdzhanadze. She has a stable and justified reputation as a candidate backed by Vladimir Putin. Her approval rating had slightly improved during 2013, but remains low. According to a September 2013 NDI poll, 39 percent favor Margelashvili; 16 percent favor Bakradze; and 7 percent favor Burdzhanadze. This balance promises a second round of elections. In a two-way race between Margelashvili and Bakradze, the former can count on appoximately 49 percent support, and Bakradze can expect 24 percent. In a two-way race between Margelashivili and Burdzhanadze, he wins with 3:1, 50 percent over 17 percent.
Georgia Dream's support has slowly declined (from 52 percent in June to 50 percent in September), while the UNM gained support (from 10 percent to 12 percent), and Burdzhanadze's Democratic Movement—United Georgia grew from 1 percent in June to 4 percent in September. The overall dynamics of the polls are unfavourable for Georgia Dream, but it still has a big advantage over the opponents. Unless something unexpected happens, it is likely Georgi Margelashvili will be the winner, while Bakradze will have decent result as well. Bakradze's victory is theoretically possible, but the chances are very slim. Current poll data suggest that emergence of Burdzhanadze as a winner of the overall race can be the case only under some extraordinary conditions.
All things considered, Saakashvili turned the country around. The changes are now in the fabric of Georgian nation's mentality, and can hardly be reversed.
Dr. Andrew Zhalko-Tytarenko is the former Head of the National Space Agency of Ukraine and an ex-member of the National Committee for Disarmament. He was a vital participant in the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, and presided over the process of the international integration of the Ukrainian Space industry. He is currently an independent consultant living in Toronto, Canada.
Photo: Roxana Bravo/World Bank.
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Georgia: Elections Mark the End of the Saakashvili Era
October 27, 2013
The October 27th Georgian presidential elections will mark the end of the Mikheil Saakashvili era in the country. Georgia’s territory is slightly smaller than Ireland, with a population of 4.5million; it was among the smallest republics of the former USSR. Nevertheless, it remains today at the center of the political competition between Russia and the West. In Russia the official propaganda did its job: according to the Russian Levada-Center (June 2013), 33 percent of Russians consider Georgia the most unfriendly country (Georgia was at the top of this list with 41 percent in June 2012). The Georgian government, and Georgian population are pro-Western now. According to the NDI polls, 70 to 80 percent of Georgians see Russia as a threat; 70 percent of Georgians want to have better relations with Russia, but not at the cost of reduced sovereignty, and their attitude towards NATO and EU is overwhelmingly positive.
Georgia is the key to the entire South Caucasus region, separating Russia from its key ally in the region, Armenia. Russia needs a ground link to Armenia badly. If Georgia were to become pro-Russian, Russia could then establish a railway link down to Iran's and Turkey's borders with Georgia and Armenia—isolating Azerbaijan by blocking Central Asia’s access to ship oil to Europe. Russian goods (and weapons) would be able to travel by rail all the way to the Persian Gulf. At the same time the possibility of a pro-Russian Georgia exists only in the minds of the Kremlin strategists. The transportation routes for Azerbaijan's, Kazakhstan's, and possibly Turkmenistan's oil and gas to Europe go through Georgia, with no realistic alternative. These routes are already in the sights of the long-range Russian Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), which are deployed in South Ossetia, and Russia intends to keep it this way.
Saakashvili's Legacy: His Achievements
Ten years of Saakashnili's rule transformed Georgia. The country chose democracy—the majority of Georgians (73 percent in a September 2013 NDI poll) intend to vote in the presidential elections; people obviously believe in the power of the public vote. It is a young democracy which still faces growing pains, but already 81 percent of Georgians believe in the importance of a strong political opposition. The amount of people,who are satisfied versus not satisfied with the state of democracy in Georgia is approximately equal, hovering around 44 percent. Georgians want more democracy, not less.
The traditional Soviet belief in the “New Good Leader Who Will Do It Right” is mostly gone. The naive belief on the part of the electorate that Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the 2012 Parliament election winner, the Georgian Dream movement, will use his wealth to improve life in Georgia contributed to his electoral victory, but it was only one of the factors that decided the election. When Ivanishvili did not live up to expectations, it was a sobering moment. But the transfer of power from Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) to Georgian Dream was civilized. The establishment of democratic traditions in Georgia is a key part of Saakashvili's legacy.
There are also unquestionable achievements in the economy. The country broke its dependence on the Russian gas, and is now energy independent. Georgia receives natural gas from Azerbaijan's SOCAR at a very favourable price of $167/1000cu. m., and only 10 percent of the country's gas supply comes from Russia—a payment for the transit of the Russian gas to Armenia. Russia has no way to use the energy resources as political leverage in its relations with Georgia. Early in Saakashvili's term, Minister of Economy Kakha Bendukidze declared the administration’s plan was “to sell everything besides conscience and integrity”, bringing in foreign investors. The country now operates the BTC oil pipeline, which takes Azerbaijani oil to the Mediterranean, and BTE natural gas pipeline, which takes the Caspian gas to Turkey. Both pipelines are internationally owned. Georgia and Azerbaijan jointly constructed the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, which connects Azerbaijani oil deposits to the Georgian Black Sea oil terminal in Supsa and further west. Under Saakashvili, Georgia's economy became open to foreign investments, which are relatively safe in the country. Even major Russian companies safely operate in Georgia despite its conflict with Russia. Saakashvili did not succumb to the temptation to follow Putin's tactics of bullying the private businesses to settle political scores with neighbors.
Finally, Saakashvili's crowning achievement is suppression of the culture of the petty corruption. One needs to remember Soviet Georgia to realize what a giant leap it is that Georgian police or government officials no longer take bribes. Saakashvili made the first crucial step in this direction at the beginning of his first term, when he simply collected and deported all the known bosses of the criminal underground, without bothering about any legal proceedings. As the result, organized crime in Georgia has lost its power, while ethnic Georgians are freed from one of the most powerful criminal groups in Russia. The suppression of the corruption was achieved at the cost of the creation of the dangerously powerful Ministry of Interior, but so far this potential risk has not materialized as an active threat to democracy. Saakashvili credits this achievement to his right-hand man, former Minister of Internal Affairs and former Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, who was the right man for the job: very effective, and with no Lavrentiy Beria ambitions. Vano Merabishvili was arrested in May 2013 on the weakest charges. This brings us to Saakashvili's failures.
Saakashvili's Legacy: His Failures
Following the creation of the powerful Ministry of Interior, Saakashvili had to balance it with the equally influential Ministry of Justice. The former Minister of Justice, Zurab Adeishvili, was as influential as Merabishvili, but failed to bring the judicial system to civilized standards. As a result, the total number of applications from Georgia to the European Human Rights Court in 2012 reached 2883. This is twice as many as from Croatia, which has about the same population numbers, and over 100 times more than from Ireland. Poor conditions in Georgia's prisons provoked the prison riots and further outcries about human rights abuses. Shortly before the 2012 elections, the Georgian Dream released a very graphic video of prison guard brutality; this video turned the election. There were well-grounded allegations that the video was falsified, but known brutality in Georgian jails made it believable for the public. While petty bribes and corruption were eliminated from Georgia life, overall white-collar crime has not: some construction projects of the past few years bear the signs of government corruption.
Saakashvili inherited the very difficult Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, and failed to resolve them. Certainly progress was made with Abkhazia until June 2008, but the solution was blocked by Moscow. The 2008 war made things much worse. Now there is no solution in sight for South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’s situation is very difficult. The conflicts cannot not be resolved without Russia's goodwill, but after ten years of Saakashvili's rule, Georgia is further from restoring its territorial integrity, than it was in 2003.
Georgia: What's Next?
From a practical standpoint the presidential elections on October 27th are not critical for the country's future. The Georgian Constitution was revised in October 2010, leaving the president a mostly ceremonial role. These changes entered into force in October 2012. The real power in Georgia is now in the hands of the Prime Minister. Current Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili plans to resign from this position before the end of 2013, but will have someone whom he trusts to appoint as his successor. The most likely candidate is Minister of Interior Irakly Garibashvili. Ivanishvili brought him to the government from his Georgian CARTU GROUP, and he is very loyal to Ivanishvili.
After Georgian Dream won the Parliamentary elections, observers speculated about Irakly Alasania as the successor of Ivanishvili. He combined the positions of Minister of Defence and Vice Prime Minister in the new government, and was clearly respected by Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili also bankrolled Alasania's lobbyists in Washington, DC. After four months of service in the Vice Prime Minister position, he was stripped of this title by Ivanishvili; no reasons were ever provided. The popular speculation is that Ivanishvili discovered disloyalty from Alasania, closing any future political opportunities for him, including presidential candidate for Georgian Dream.
Another potential candidate, who also was passed over for nomination, is the former soccer star Kakha Kaladze, who is now the Minister of Energy. On May 8th he hinted to the media the possibility of importing more Russian gas, to almost everyone's surprise, including Ivanishvili, Saakashvili, and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev. Kaladze's statement was immediately disavowed by Ivanishvili. The idea of the deeper cooperation with GAZPROM is not justified economically, and could imply possible corruption plans. This unsanctioned and odd move by Kaladze explains his absence from the presidential elections.
Ivanishvili's candidate for the president is Minister of Education Georgi Margelashvili. He is not very well known; his ultimate advantage at the polls is that he is seen as Ivanishvili's man. The candidate from Saakashvili's UNM is the former Speaker of the Parliament David Bakradze. He is well known, and has the lowest disapproval rating among the leaders of the opposition. He also was not implicated in any real or alleged scandal during the Saakashvili's years. The third candidate is another former Speaker of the Parliament, Nino Burdzhanadze. She has a stable and justified reputation as a candidate backed by Vladimir Putin. Her approval rating had slightly improved during 2013, but remains low. According to a September 2013 NDI poll, 39 percent favor Margelashvili; 16 percent favor Bakradze; and 7 percent favor Burdzhanadze. This balance promises a second round of elections. In a two-way race between Margelashvili and Bakradze, the former can count on appoximately 49 percent support, and Bakradze can expect 24 percent. In a two-way race between Margelashivili and Burdzhanadze, he wins with 3:1, 50 percent over 17 percent.
Georgia Dream's support has slowly declined (from 52 percent in June to 50 percent in September), while the UNM gained support (from 10 percent to 12 percent), and Burdzhanadze's Democratic Movement—United Georgia grew from 1 percent in June to 4 percent in September. The overall dynamics of the polls are unfavourable for Georgia Dream, but it still has a big advantage over the opponents. Unless something unexpected happens, it is likely Georgi Margelashvili will be the winner, while Bakradze will have decent result as well. Bakradze's victory is theoretically possible, but the chances are very slim. Current poll data suggest that emergence of Burdzhanadze as a winner of the overall race can be the case only under some extraordinary conditions.
All things considered, Saakashvili turned the country around. The changes are now in the fabric of Georgian nation's mentality, and can hardly be reversed.
Dr. Andrew Zhalko-Tytarenko is the former Head of the National Space Agency of Ukraine and an ex-member of the National Committee for Disarmament. He was a vital participant in the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, and presided over the process of the international integration of the Ukrainian Space industry. He is currently an independent consultant living in Toronto, Canada.
Photo: Roxana Bravo/World Bank.
