nternational law and global governance are at a crossroads. Observers and governments increasingly question the utility of international organizations, with some governments leaving and others cutting funding. While we are aware of efforts by the likes of China and Russia to unsettle the global governance structure, the United States—and other nations that helped create the Post–World War II order—also takes actions that undermine the current system and encourage rising powers to seek to replace it.
While U.S. frustrations with the international system are not new, the “rise of the rest” has also led countries to view U.S. actions on the world stage more critically. U.S. actions that force countries to choose sides in new geopolitical conflicts, ignore the perspectives of other nations, and selectively accept international law undermine global governance and open the door to alternative world orders that may run counter to U.S. interests. If U.S. policymakers are serious about fortifying the international order in the pursuit of national interests, they need to be careful in how they approach the current system and make the necessary reforms.
Forcing Sides
The United States risks undermining the global order by interacting with regional and international organizations through the lens of geopolitical competition. This is most clear in how the U.S. has approached global competition with China in recent years. Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Daniel Runde warned that “…when the U.S. disengages…we allow worse actors to fill the void,” and that this plays “straight into Beijing’s playbook.”
While Runde is right to call on the United States to engage in global institutions, the call is also symptomatic of how the U.S. often leverages institutions as foreign policy tools rather than a global governance good. Meanwhile, for many countries—particularly those in the Global South—the draw of international institutions is that they constrain the worst tendencies of great power competition and to achieve clear and recognizable outcomes.
By forcing international and regional organizations to choose a side in a Cold War–style conflict with China, the U.S. risks undermining itself. For instance, development organizations—like the Inter–American Development Bank—run the risk of being viewed as biased development partner if forced into ‘choosing sides.’ This can lead to member states being less interested in collaborating with these institutions, which in turn limits their ability to deliver development outcomes–negatively impacting U.S. interests. The U.S. should engage with and fund these organizations to ensure that bad actors do not fill the void. However, this support should not be framed as part of its efforts to constrain China, otherwise other member states may simply lose faith in that institution.
Selective Acceptance of Global Governance
Further complicating U.S. engagement in global governance initiatives is the U.S. leaders’ uneven acceptance of global governance initiatives. While the United States often supports international law and has supported the development of various global governance mechanisms, at times the U.S. will make the political decision to shift position. This uneven acceptance of global governance norms has consequences for the expansion and acceptance of international law.
For instance, while the United States has regularly leaned into the United Nations as a tool for condemning international aggression, the U.S. ignored the UN in its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Likewise, U.S. preferences surrounding trade subsidies—particularly agricultural subsidies—have driven a wedge when trying to seek the expansion of global trade governance. Another recent example of this comes in the Biden administration’s unequal acceptance of rulings from the International Criminal Court (ICC). While the Biden administration was quick to welcome rulings from the ICC calling for the arrest of Vladmir Putin, the administration denounced similar positions as it related to Israel. While the politics and specifics of each of these cases are different and the context is important, the selective acceptance of international rulings has implications for how much faith other member states feel able to put into these institutions.
The realities of an anarchic international system and realpolitik are ever present and every country seeks to bend international law toward its own preferences. However, these actions echo the notorious line of Peruvian General Óscar Benavides—"For My Friends Anything; For my enemies, the law.” Choosing to side with international law as it relates to opponents, but not when applied to allies weakens the legitimacy of global governance. For Rule of Law to function—either at the international or domestic level—courts must be able to apply laws equally to different actors and have their decisions accepted.
Ignoring Other Voices
In addition to limiting global governance institutions by challenging their legitimacy and role, the United States often ignores calls from other countries to reform key components of the international order. The world was a very different place at the end of World War II when many large global governance institutions were created—and rules suited to those times are baked into the governance structures of many of these organizations.
Rising powers and countries from the Global South have regularly called for reforms to these institutions that more accurately reflect today’s world. However, the United States and others have been reticent to reform or restructure these institutions—particularly given that the current rules are in their own interest. This has been particularly clear at the World Bank, where countries have called for changes in voting rules at the World Bank and the IMF. Ignoring these calls undermines support for these bodies and opens the door to the formation of new, alternative global institutions that countries view as more accountable to their own preferences.
Opening the Door to the Alternative Order
U.S. reticence to accept the decisions of international organizations, its unwillingness to engage in institutional reform, and desire to place global institutions within the framework of intensified conflict with China not only undermines U.S. leadership, but risks U.S. interests by opening the door for an alternative global order to emerge. This includes the deepening of the BRICS global institutions—including their recent expansion and the development of a BRICS Bank to parallel the World Bank—as well as the development of alternative regional forum such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The development of new institutions can hinder global governance by creating a space of “contested multilateralism” where countries are able to “forum shop” for institutions that serve their own ends.
U.S. leadership was instrumental in the development of the existing global order at the end of World War II. However, viewing these organizations as tools of U.S. foreign policy and only engaging with them for this purpose runs the risk of undermining global governance and opening the door to an alternative world order. While the existing international order is flawed and there are critical steps that should be taken to improve existing institutions, these challenges require engaging with these institutions in good faith. While it would be naïve to believe that the United States—or any country—does not use international organizations to pursue its own strategic interests, the unabashed and unequal acceptance of global norms and governance harm the legitimacy of these organizations and global perceptions of the U.S.. As this legitimacy wanes and perceptions of the United States deteriorate, the global order itself runs the risk of collapse or replacement.
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Of geopolitical competition and global governance
Go Game. Photo by Elena Popova from Unsplash.
August 5, 2024
International law and global governance face major challenges as nations question international organizations. Rising geopolitical tensions and actions by the U.S., China, and Russia threaten the post–WWII order. The U.S. must make the necessary reforms, writes Adam Ratzlaff.
I
nternational law and global governance are at a crossroads. Observers and governments increasingly question the utility of international organizations, with some governments leaving and others cutting funding. While we are aware of efforts by the likes of China and Russia to unsettle the global governance structure, the United States—and other nations that helped create the Post–World War II order—also takes actions that undermine the current system and encourage rising powers to seek to replace it.
While U.S. frustrations with the international system are not new, the “rise of the rest” has also led countries to view U.S. actions on the world stage more critically. U.S. actions that force countries to choose sides in new geopolitical conflicts, ignore the perspectives of other nations, and selectively accept international law undermine global governance and open the door to alternative world orders that may run counter to U.S. interests. If U.S. policymakers are serious about fortifying the international order in the pursuit of national interests, they need to be careful in how they approach the current system and make the necessary reforms.
Forcing Sides
The United States risks undermining the global order by interacting with regional and international organizations through the lens of geopolitical competition. This is most clear in how the U.S. has approached global competition with China in recent years. Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Daniel Runde warned that “…when the U.S. disengages…we allow worse actors to fill the void,” and that this plays “straight into Beijing’s playbook.”
While Runde is right to call on the United States to engage in global institutions, the call is also symptomatic of how the U.S. often leverages institutions as foreign policy tools rather than a global governance good. Meanwhile, for many countries—particularly those in the Global South—the draw of international institutions is that they constrain the worst tendencies of great power competition and to achieve clear and recognizable outcomes.
By forcing international and regional organizations to choose a side in a Cold War–style conflict with China, the U.S. risks undermining itself. For instance, development organizations—like the Inter–American Development Bank—run the risk of being viewed as biased development partner if forced into ‘choosing sides.’ This can lead to member states being less interested in collaborating with these institutions, which in turn limits their ability to deliver development outcomes–negatively impacting U.S. interests. The U.S. should engage with and fund these organizations to ensure that bad actors do not fill the void. However, this support should not be framed as part of its efforts to constrain China, otherwise other member states may simply lose faith in that institution.
Selective Acceptance of Global Governance
Further complicating U.S. engagement in global governance initiatives is the U.S. leaders’ uneven acceptance of global governance initiatives. While the United States often supports international law and has supported the development of various global governance mechanisms, at times the U.S. will make the political decision to shift position. This uneven acceptance of global governance norms has consequences for the expansion and acceptance of international law.
For instance, while the United States has regularly leaned into the United Nations as a tool for condemning international aggression, the U.S. ignored the UN in its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Likewise, U.S. preferences surrounding trade subsidies—particularly agricultural subsidies—have driven a wedge when trying to seek the expansion of global trade governance. Another recent example of this comes in the Biden administration’s unequal acceptance of rulings from the International Criminal Court (ICC). While the Biden administration was quick to welcome rulings from the ICC calling for the arrest of Vladmir Putin, the administration denounced similar positions as it related to Israel. While the politics and specifics of each of these cases are different and the context is important, the selective acceptance of international rulings has implications for how much faith other member states feel able to put into these institutions.
The realities of an anarchic international system and realpolitik are ever present and every country seeks to bend international law toward its own preferences. However, these actions echo the notorious line of Peruvian General Óscar Benavides—"For My Friends Anything; For my enemies, the law.” Choosing to side with international law as it relates to opponents, but not when applied to allies weakens the legitimacy of global governance. For Rule of Law to function—either at the international or domestic level—courts must be able to apply laws equally to different actors and have their decisions accepted.
Ignoring Other Voices
In addition to limiting global governance institutions by challenging their legitimacy and role, the United States often ignores calls from other countries to reform key components of the international order. The world was a very different place at the end of World War II when many large global governance institutions were created—and rules suited to those times are baked into the governance structures of many of these organizations.
Rising powers and countries from the Global South have regularly called for reforms to these institutions that more accurately reflect today’s world. However, the United States and others have been reticent to reform or restructure these institutions—particularly given that the current rules are in their own interest. This has been particularly clear at the World Bank, where countries have called for changes in voting rules at the World Bank and the IMF. Ignoring these calls undermines support for these bodies and opens the door to the formation of new, alternative global institutions that countries view as more accountable to their own preferences.
Opening the Door to the Alternative Order
U.S. reticence to accept the decisions of international organizations, its unwillingness to engage in institutional reform, and desire to place global institutions within the framework of intensified conflict with China not only undermines U.S. leadership, but risks U.S. interests by opening the door for an alternative global order to emerge. This includes the deepening of the BRICS global institutions—including their recent expansion and the development of a BRICS Bank to parallel the World Bank—as well as the development of alternative regional forum such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The development of new institutions can hinder global governance by creating a space of “contested multilateralism” where countries are able to “forum shop” for institutions that serve their own ends.
U.S. leadership was instrumental in the development of the existing global order at the end of World War II. However, viewing these organizations as tools of U.S. foreign policy and only engaging with them for this purpose runs the risk of undermining global governance and opening the door to an alternative world order. While the existing international order is flawed and there are critical steps that should be taken to improve existing institutions, these challenges require engaging with these institutions in good faith. While it would be naïve to believe that the United States—or any country—does not use international organizations to pursue its own strategic interests, the unabashed and unequal acceptance of global norms and governance harm the legitimacy of these organizations and global perceptions of the U.S.. As this legitimacy wanes and perceptions of the United States deteriorate, the global order itself runs the risk of collapse or replacement.
