With the recent increase of its accident rating to level 7—the highest on the International Nuclear Radiological Event Scale (INES)—the Fukushima nuclear accident has taken on another attribute of Chernobyl, the world’s worst nuclear disaster and the only other one in history to receive a level 7 “major disaster” rating.
On the whole, however, Fukushima is not as severe as Chernobyl: when the latter exploded, radioactive debris and parts of fuel rods shot upwards of thirty thousand feet into the atmosphere and spread across the globe. The initial explosion and radiation exposure killed about 30 personnel and nuclear fallout from the Ukrainian plant has been linked to thousands of cases of cancer. By contrast, Fukushima’s release of radioactive material into the atmosphere is currently estimated to be about 10% of the Chernobyl accident, according to Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and no one appears to have died from exposure to radiation. Though it will take decades to fully understand the health implications of Fukushima, as of now the analogy to Chernobyl appears weak.
A stronger comparison between the two disasters, however, looks to be the implications for international nuclear safety standards and nuclear response efforts. In the wake of Chernobyl, a stricter emergency response framework was promptly put in place and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), a key multilateral safety treaty that guides today’s 72 nuclear energy powers, was adopted.
Only 10 days after Fukushima, Director General of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yukiya Amano, reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that “the current international emergency response framework needs to be reassessed. It was designed largely in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, before the information revolution. It reflects the realities of the 1980s, not of the 21st century.” A week later, he called for a high-level IAEA Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in Vienna in June.
The 9.0 earthquake that triggered the devastating tsunami responsible for the Fukushima nuclear disaster occurred, ironically, at an opportune time to implement Mr. Amano’s calls for reform. From April 4 -14, less than a month after radiation began to leak from the stricken reactors, the world’s 72 countries operating land-based atomic power plants held their triennial convention at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna to discuss industry safety issues. In normal times, the powers would simply exchange and discuss country reports they are obliged to submit as Contracting Parties to the CNS. In the wake of Fukushima, however, the contracting parties devoted a considerable portion of the meeting to far reaching safety reforms.
Initial Conclusions
Following the ten-day, UN-sponsored meeting at IAEA headquarters, conclusions and measures to be taken by contracting parties include the following: completing safety reviews of their nuclear facilities; reconsidering safety measures that protect against “extreme external events,” such as tsunamis; strategizing on how to overcome obstacles in recruiting the next generation of nuclear professionals; increasing international nuclear cooperation; and networking opportunities relating to emergency management and operating experience. The contracting members also pledged their support for Mr. Amano’s initiative to convene a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June and, in spite of CNS protocol to meet once every three years, agreed to convene a special meeting next year to follow up on Fukushima.
Considering it has only been slightly over a month since the Fukushima nuclear disaster started, the preliminary conclusions and preventative measures that have been formulated are significant. Part of the rapid response stems from Mr. Amano’s early calls for reform of what he observed, while touring Japan in mid-March, were shortcomings in the present disaster response framework. Another part is simply the result of the disaster occurring less than one month prior to a triennial meeting of the world’s nuclear power plant operators. Whatever its precise causal composition, the early momentum is strong due to those two factors.
And the momentum should continue to build at three upcoming events. The G8 Summit, whose members make up the majority of the world’s nuclear energy community, is scheduled for the end of May in nuclear-powered France and chaired by President Nicolas Sarkozy, who is pressing for deep reforms of the international safety framework. Mr. Sarkozy has even promised to convene a special meeting of the G20 the same month in Paris to discuss his plans. And the following month, Mr. Amano’s Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety will convene.
Long-term Conclusions
In a recent interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, John Ahearne, former head of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked about the likelihood of reforms after Fukushima. He replied, “After Three Mile Island and after Chernobyl, it took several years of analyzing what happened before one could really reach a conclusion about what could have been done to prevent it, and we are a long way away from having that kind of knowledge about the Japanese systems.” However, he urged countries to proceed with current safety reviews discussed in the CNS meeting as soon as possible to placate a nuclear-wary public.
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Fukushima, Chernobyl and UN-Sponsored Nuclear Safety Reforms
April 16, 2011
With the recent increase of its accident rating to level 7—the highest on the International Nuclear Radiological Event Scale (INES)—the Fukushima nuclear accident has taken on another attribute of Chernobyl, the world’s worst nuclear disaster and the only other one in history to receive a level 7 “major disaster” rating.
On the whole, however, Fukushima is not as severe as Chernobyl: when the latter exploded, radioactive debris and parts of fuel rods shot upwards of thirty thousand feet into the atmosphere and spread across the globe. The initial explosion and radiation exposure killed about 30 personnel and nuclear fallout from the Ukrainian plant has been linked to thousands of cases of cancer. By contrast, Fukushima’s release of radioactive material into the atmosphere is currently estimated to be about 10% of the Chernobyl accident, according to Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and no one appears to have died from exposure to radiation. Though it will take decades to fully understand the health implications of Fukushima, as of now the analogy to Chernobyl appears weak.
A stronger comparison between the two disasters, however, looks to be the implications for international nuclear safety standards and nuclear response efforts. In the wake of Chernobyl, a stricter emergency response framework was promptly put in place and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), a key multilateral safety treaty that guides today’s 72 nuclear energy powers, was adopted.
Only 10 days after Fukushima, Director General of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yukiya Amano, reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that “the current international emergency response framework needs to be reassessed. It was designed largely in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, before the information revolution. It reflects the realities of the 1980s, not of the 21st century.” A week later, he called for a high-level IAEA Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in Vienna in June.
The 9.0 earthquake that triggered the devastating tsunami responsible for the Fukushima nuclear disaster occurred, ironically, at an opportune time to implement Mr. Amano’s calls for reform. From April 4 -14, less than a month after radiation began to leak from the stricken reactors, the world’s 72 countries operating land-based atomic power plants held their triennial convention at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna to discuss industry safety issues. In normal times, the powers would simply exchange and discuss country reports they are obliged to submit as Contracting Parties to the CNS. In the wake of Fukushima, however, the contracting parties devoted a considerable portion of the meeting to far reaching safety reforms.
Initial Conclusions
Following the ten-day, UN-sponsored meeting at IAEA headquarters, conclusions and measures to be taken by contracting parties include the following: completing safety reviews of their nuclear facilities; reconsidering safety measures that protect against “extreme external events,” such as tsunamis; strategizing on how to overcome obstacles in recruiting the next generation of nuclear professionals; increasing international nuclear cooperation; and networking opportunities relating to emergency management and operating experience. The contracting members also pledged their support for Mr. Amano’s initiative to convene a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June and, in spite of CNS protocol to meet once every three years, agreed to convene a special meeting next year to follow up on Fukushima.
Considering it has only been slightly over a month since the Fukushima nuclear disaster started, the preliminary conclusions and preventative measures that have been formulated are significant. Part of the rapid response stems from Mr. Amano’s early calls for reform of what he observed, while touring Japan in mid-March, were shortcomings in the present disaster response framework. Another part is simply the result of the disaster occurring less than one month prior to a triennial meeting of the world’s nuclear power plant operators. Whatever its precise causal composition, the early momentum is strong due to those two factors.
And the momentum should continue to build at three upcoming events. The G8 Summit, whose members make up the majority of the world’s nuclear energy community, is scheduled for the end of May in nuclear-powered France and chaired by President Nicolas Sarkozy, who is pressing for deep reforms of the international safety framework. Mr. Sarkozy has even promised to convene a special meeting of the G20 the same month in Paris to discuss his plans. And the following month, Mr. Amano’s Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety will convene.
Long-term Conclusions
In a recent interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, John Ahearne, former head of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked about the likelihood of reforms after Fukushima. He replied, “After Three Mile Island and after Chernobyl, it took several years of analyzing what happened before one could really reach a conclusion about what could have been done to prevent it, and we are a long way away from having that kind of knowledge about the Japanese systems.” However, he urged countries to proceed with current safety reviews discussed in the CNS meeting as soon as possible to placate a nuclear-wary public.
