In Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Strategic Vision, he describes the nature of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy: “a backward-looking combination of assertive nationalism, thinly veiled hostility toward America for its victory in the Cold War, and nostalgia for both modernity and superpower status.”
As evidenced by recent events in Crimea, Mr. Putin successfully has pandered to Russian exceptionalism and fomented popular fears to gain popular support for his aggressive policies. The Levada Center’s latest poll numbers show presidential approval at 80 percent in late March, a three year high. Mr. Putin’s use of nationalism as a political tool is nothing new—his approval ratings shot up during the South Ossetia War in 2008, as well as the beginning of the U.S.-Iraq War campaign in 2003.
Consider Vladimir Putin’s 2013 New York Times op-ed, where he defended the UN Security Council veto of the proposed U.S. strike in Syria: “It is alarming that military intervention has become commonplace for the United States... millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under the slogan ‘you’re either with us or against us.’”
This statement represents a belief held by many Russians since the end of the Cold War: that the United States “is bent on maintaining and increasing its hegemony at Russia’s expense.” However, Mr. Putin’s manipulation of Russian opinion does not end with blatant political rhetoric; further examples include the manipulation of social institutions, state education, and media outlets.
In 2005, the Kremlin endorsed the creation of the Nashi youth movement, which receives criticism for intimidating, bullying, and harassing rival youth organizations and Mr. Putin’s political opponents. Ariel Cohen describes Nashi as “a loyal mob to act against possible public protestors,” reminiscent of Komsomol, the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Under Mr. Putin’s tenure, high school textbooks were rewritten to minimize Josef Stalin’s destructive policies, while emphasizing his “strong leadership [in building] a great nation.” Kremlin-sponsored teaching manuals portray the Soviet Union’s collapse as a mistake that hindered Russian progress: “The Soviet Union was not a democracy, but it was an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society.” Finally, an uptick in anti-American documentaries on state television has primed the Russian public to respond to nationalistic rhetoric. State-controlled television has propagated countless U.S. plots which involve support of fascist and nationalist groups plotting to overthrow the Kremlin, as well as the transport of heroin from Afghanistan to increase the number of drug users and instance of HIV infections in Russia.
According to Cohen, Russian leaders “use foreign policy as a tool to buttress domestic support and to foster a perception that Russia is surrounded by enemies at a time when its democratic legitimacy is deteriorating.” Under this framework, political leaders attempt to exploit pre-existing nationalism during international crises through the use of diversionary tactics. Mr. Putin’s latest diversion involves the ‘rally around the flag’ effect in Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea. As the 2014 Ukrainian protests ensued, Russians were “subjected to an intense, aggressive, and blunt disinformation campaign in which they were bombarded by images of violence, chaos, fascism in Ukraine, sinister plotting by the West [i.e., the United States], and evidence of Russia’s strength and nobility in response.”
The “propaganda machine,” headed by Dmitry Kiselev, portrayed the Maidan protestors as fascists and anti-Semites, spread false stories of Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Russia, and made the case for reclaiming Russia’s historic lands. The official state-media narrative caused a convincing shift in public opinion over the course of two months. According to the Levada Center, as many as 75 percent of Russians were opposed to military intervention in Ukraine in early February 2014; however, the numbers reversed by mid-March, when Mr. Putin enjoyed a 74 percent approval rating on his handling of Crimea (post-military intervention and annexation). In further analysis, Levada found that Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine earned him an eight percent boost in approval, while the perceived successes of the Sochi Olympics generated only four percent. After Mr. Putin’s annexation of Crimea, the percentage of Russians who believed their country was a “great power” reached a fifteen-year high at 63 percent.
Much of Mr. Putin’s success depends on propagating the existence of internal and external threats. Given pre-existing historical cleavages and the current geopolitical climate, the United States is the perfect candidate; it is no surprise that Mr. Putin’s popularity increases at the expense of U.S. popularity. Mid-March Levada polls revealed that 56 percent of Russians viewed the United States negatively, up from 44 percent in January 2014. Antipathy toward the United States has increased under Mr. Putin’s administration, but did not really begin rising until NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1998. According to Levada, less than ten percent of Russians viewed the United States negatively after the fall of the Soviet Union. These numbers validate the effectiveness of Vladimir Putin’s propaganda campaign, not only in the past three months, but in the past fourteen years.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's special edition G7 ebook. The full ebook can be purchased here.
Photo: Reuters.
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From Russia With No Love
June 18, 2014
In Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Strategic Vision, he describes the nature of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy: “a backward-looking combination of assertive nationalism, thinly veiled hostility toward America for its victory in the Cold War, and nostalgia for both modernity and superpower status.”
As evidenced by recent events in Crimea, Mr. Putin successfully has pandered to Russian exceptionalism and fomented popular fears to gain popular support for his aggressive policies. The Levada Center’s latest poll numbers show presidential approval at 80 percent in late March, a three year high. Mr. Putin’s use of nationalism as a political tool is nothing new—his approval ratings shot up during the South Ossetia War in 2008, as well as the beginning of the U.S.-Iraq War campaign in 2003.
Consider Vladimir Putin’s 2013 New York Times op-ed, where he defended the UN Security Council veto of the proposed U.S. strike in Syria: “It is alarming that military intervention has become commonplace for the United States... millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under the slogan ‘you’re either with us or against us.’”
This statement represents a belief held by many Russians since the end of the Cold War: that the United States “is bent on maintaining and increasing its hegemony at Russia’s expense.” However, Mr. Putin’s manipulation of Russian opinion does not end with blatant political rhetoric; further examples include the manipulation of social institutions, state education, and media outlets.
In 2005, the Kremlin endorsed the creation of the Nashi youth movement, which receives criticism for intimidating, bullying, and harassing rival youth organizations and Mr. Putin’s political opponents. Ariel Cohen describes Nashi as “a loyal mob to act against possible public protestors,” reminiscent of Komsomol, the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Under Mr. Putin’s tenure, high school textbooks were rewritten to minimize Josef Stalin’s destructive policies, while emphasizing his “strong leadership [in building] a great nation.” Kremlin-sponsored teaching manuals portray the Soviet Union’s collapse as a mistake that hindered Russian progress: “The Soviet Union was not a democracy, but it was an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society.” Finally, an uptick in anti-American documentaries on state television has primed the Russian public to respond to nationalistic rhetoric. State-controlled television has propagated countless U.S. plots which involve support of fascist and nationalist groups plotting to overthrow the Kremlin, as well as the transport of heroin from Afghanistan to increase the number of drug users and instance of HIV infections in Russia.
According to Cohen, Russian leaders “use foreign policy as a tool to buttress domestic support and to foster a perception that Russia is surrounded by enemies at a time when its democratic legitimacy is deteriorating.” Under this framework, political leaders attempt to exploit pre-existing nationalism during international crises through the use of diversionary tactics. Mr. Putin’s latest diversion involves the ‘rally around the flag’ effect in Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea. As the 2014 Ukrainian protests ensued, Russians were “subjected to an intense, aggressive, and blunt disinformation campaign in which they were bombarded by images of violence, chaos, fascism in Ukraine, sinister plotting by the West [i.e., the United States], and evidence of Russia’s strength and nobility in response.”
The “propaganda machine,” headed by Dmitry Kiselev, portrayed the Maidan protestors as fascists and anti-Semites, spread false stories of Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Russia, and made the case for reclaiming Russia’s historic lands. The official state-media narrative caused a convincing shift in public opinion over the course of two months. According to the Levada Center, as many as 75 percent of Russians were opposed to military intervention in Ukraine in early February 2014; however, the numbers reversed by mid-March, when Mr. Putin enjoyed a 74 percent approval rating on his handling of Crimea (post-military intervention and annexation). In further analysis, Levada found that Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine earned him an eight percent boost in approval, while the perceived successes of the Sochi Olympics generated only four percent. After Mr. Putin’s annexation of Crimea, the percentage of Russians who believed their country was a “great power” reached a fifteen-year high at 63 percent.
Much of Mr. Putin’s success depends on propagating the existence of internal and external threats. Given pre-existing historical cleavages and the current geopolitical climate, the United States is the perfect candidate; it is no surprise that Mr. Putin’s popularity increases at the expense of U.S. popularity. Mid-March Levada polls revealed that 56 percent of Russians viewed the United States negatively, up from 44 percent in January 2014. Antipathy toward the United States has increased under Mr. Putin’s administration, but did not really begin rising until NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1998. According to Levada, less than ten percent of Russians viewed the United States negatively after the fall of the Soviet Union. These numbers validate the effectiveness of Vladimir Putin’s propaganda campaign, not only in the past three months, but in the past fourteen years.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's special edition G7 ebook. The full ebook can be purchased here.
Photo: Reuters.
