.
I

n his first public statement following his victory, President-elect Joe Biden declared: “I pledge to be a President who seeks not to divide, but to unify. Who doesn’t see red and blue states, but a United States…Let us be the nation that we know we can be. A nation united. A nation strengthened. A nation healed”.

As if it were necessary, this statement sets the tone for the priorities of the upcoming Biden administration: to reunite a deeply fractured nation. Taking back control of the pandemic is also an understandable, significant priority. While this may mean there is little attention given to overall foreign policy, including relations with the European Union (EU), it does give tremendous hope to the future of these relations which, as a result, will be grounded in a more pacified democracy.

Also, with the risk of stating the obvious as well as understating the truth, much hope has been invested into the vision of a renewed, trustworthy, and appeased diplomacy; something which has been dearly missed over the last four years. And, in addition to the now confirmed President, some familiar and reassuring faces in key posts, such as francophone Tony Blinken, are present to validate these hopes for Europe.  

So, what will or should be done in the first 100 days of this long-awaited administration vis-à-vis relations with the European Union? And what can we expect to see as a result taking place in the EU in 2021?

First and foremost, a renewed interest in multilateralism should frame future relations at the outset; signs of this are already to be found in the Biden-Harris pledge to: “re-join the Paris Climate Accord on day one and lead a major diplomatic push to raise the ambitions of countries’ climate targets”. This also puts climate change as a key priority for the new administration, as it is for the EU. Re-joining the Paris Climate Accord also tells America’s allies that responsible officials with a respect for science are in charge, and ready to cooperate with them to address this common threat to the planet. Further, withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) might also be quickly re-considered.

The same may apply to the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the hope that more U.S.-EU coordination applies, and with the view of accelerating towards the resolution of this major crisis. In this regard, the EU made initial proposals to the U.S. in December 2020, such as teaming up to fund the development and equitable global distribution of vaccines, tests, and treatments. This began with the collaboration and contribution to ACT-A and COVAX initiatives; developing a “pandemic playbook for preparedness and response and step up cooperation and data sharing between our respective agencies”.

Another major sign of geopolitical convergence was seen when President-elect Biden also said he would re-enter the historic Iran nuclear deal—negotiated by the Obama-Biden administration alongside European allies and other world nations—if Tehran returns to compliance with the deal.

The future of U.S.-EU relations will also hinge on the way both regions want to deal with the elephant in the (global) room, i.e. China. Both desire to have a unified front when it comes to tackling what the EU described in its December 2020 Communication “A new EU-U.S. agenda for global change” in response to “the strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.”

The future of U.S.-EU relations will also hinge on the way both regions want to deal with the elephant in the (global) room, i.e. China. Both desire to have a unified front when it comes to tackling what the EU described in its December 2020 Communication “A new EU-U.S. agenda for global change” in response to “the strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.”

In line with these upcoming and potential changes, it is fair to say the recent success in Georgia on January 5th also gives Biden more leeway to implement these promises.

The way the new administration deals with NATO related matters, while not strictly U.S.-EU related (21 out of 27 Member States of the European Union are also members of NATO), will also have a major impact on the relationship between them; whereas the Europeans count on the reaffirmation of America’s commitment to the key mutual defence guarantee, the somewhat modest military spending by European countries—especially by Germany as a key member of the EU when it comes to relations with the U.S.—will remain a concern. A date will be soon set for the next NATO summit, to be held in Brussels in early 2021.

The future of U.S.-EU relations will also hinge on the way both regions want to deal with the elephant in the (global) room, i.e. China. Both desire to have a unified front when it comes to tackling what the EU described in its December 2020 Communication “A new EU-U.S. agenda for global change” in response to “the strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.”

Economic, trade, and policy issues will matter too. Will the 15+ years of trade war between Boeing and Airbus finally find a resolution? Will tariffs on EU steel and aluminium be lifted in the early part of the presidency, as the EU is expecting? Will the dormant World Trade Organization (WTO) be reformed? These issues may not be resolved during Biden’s first 100 days, but we will surely begin to see a more structured and constructive dialogue about them than we have seen previously.

When talking about Big Tech, questions have arisen on if EU and U.S. regulators will agree on the way to tackle the challenges posed. While similar concerns exist on the two sides of the Atlantic, some divergence remains. This is particularly true on the taxation front, which is seeing some additional traction since the COVID-19 crisis.

At the time of the publication of its December Communication, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, called on Washington to allow for the taxing of large digital companies (mostly American), which "came out of the crisis more profitable and with a larger market share than ever." She, and most European leaders, resent the fact that tech giants benefit from the single market but do not pay taxes where they should.

Biden was also very clear about his desire to “pursue a foreign policy for the middle class”. Anything not falling within this grid will come outside of his first 100 days, and perhaps his longer-term priorities as well. As several experts point out, it may be an opportunity for the EU to pursue its “strategic independence”; a reflection it started some time ago and which saw an acceleration under Donald Trump’s presidency. Here, it started to become real, with the adoption of the first, massive EU recovery plan, embraced in the midst of the pandemic.

About
Claire Boussagol
:
Claire Boussagol is president of APCO Worldwide’s Europe region. She previously served as managing director of APCO’s Brussels and Paris offices and is a member of the firm’s Global Leadership Team.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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www.diplomaticourier.com

First 100 Days: The Future of U.S.-EU Relations

Photo via Unsplash.

January 19, 2021

I

n his first public statement following his victory, President-elect Joe Biden declared: “I pledge to be a President who seeks not to divide, but to unify. Who doesn’t see red and blue states, but a United States…Let us be the nation that we know we can be. A nation united. A nation strengthened. A nation healed”.

As if it were necessary, this statement sets the tone for the priorities of the upcoming Biden administration: to reunite a deeply fractured nation. Taking back control of the pandemic is also an understandable, significant priority. While this may mean there is little attention given to overall foreign policy, including relations with the European Union (EU), it does give tremendous hope to the future of these relations which, as a result, will be grounded in a more pacified democracy.

Also, with the risk of stating the obvious as well as understating the truth, much hope has been invested into the vision of a renewed, trustworthy, and appeased diplomacy; something which has been dearly missed over the last four years. And, in addition to the now confirmed President, some familiar and reassuring faces in key posts, such as francophone Tony Blinken, are present to validate these hopes for Europe.  

So, what will or should be done in the first 100 days of this long-awaited administration vis-à-vis relations with the European Union? And what can we expect to see as a result taking place in the EU in 2021?

First and foremost, a renewed interest in multilateralism should frame future relations at the outset; signs of this are already to be found in the Biden-Harris pledge to: “re-join the Paris Climate Accord on day one and lead a major diplomatic push to raise the ambitions of countries’ climate targets”. This also puts climate change as a key priority for the new administration, as it is for the EU. Re-joining the Paris Climate Accord also tells America’s allies that responsible officials with a respect for science are in charge, and ready to cooperate with them to address this common threat to the planet. Further, withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) might also be quickly re-considered.

The same may apply to the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the hope that more U.S.-EU coordination applies, and with the view of accelerating towards the resolution of this major crisis. In this regard, the EU made initial proposals to the U.S. in December 2020, such as teaming up to fund the development and equitable global distribution of vaccines, tests, and treatments. This began with the collaboration and contribution to ACT-A and COVAX initiatives; developing a “pandemic playbook for preparedness and response and step up cooperation and data sharing between our respective agencies”.

Another major sign of geopolitical convergence was seen when President-elect Biden also said he would re-enter the historic Iran nuclear deal—negotiated by the Obama-Biden administration alongside European allies and other world nations—if Tehran returns to compliance with the deal.

The future of U.S.-EU relations will also hinge on the way both regions want to deal with the elephant in the (global) room, i.e. China. Both desire to have a unified front when it comes to tackling what the EU described in its December 2020 Communication “A new EU-U.S. agenda for global change” in response to “the strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.”

The future of U.S.-EU relations will also hinge on the way both regions want to deal with the elephant in the (global) room, i.e. China. Both desire to have a unified front when it comes to tackling what the EU described in its December 2020 Communication “A new EU-U.S. agenda for global change” in response to “the strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.”

In line with these upcoming and potential changes, it is fair to say the recent success in Georgia on January 5th also gives Biden more leeway to implement these promises.

The way the new administration deals with NATO related matters, while not strictly U.S.-EU related (21 out of 27 Member States of the European Union are also members of NATO), will also have a major impact on the relationship between them; whereas the Europeans count on the reaffirmation of America’s commitment to the key mutual defence guarantee, the somewhat modest military spending by European countries—especially by Germany as a key member of the EU when it comes to relations with the U.S.—will remain a concern. A date will be soon set for the next NATO summit, to be held in Brussels in early 2021.

The future of U.S.-EU relations will also hinge on the way both regions want to deal with the elephant in the (global) room, i.e. China. Both desire to have a unified front when it comes to tackling what the EU described in its December 2020 Communication “A new EU-U.S. agenda for global change” in response to “the strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.”

Economic, trade, and policy issues will matter too. Will the 15+ years of trade war between Boeing and Airbus finally find a resolution? Will tariffs on EU steel and aluminium be lifted in the early part of the presidency, as the EU is expecting? Will the dormant World Trade Organization (WTO) be reformed? These issues may not be resolved during Biden’s first 100 days, but we will surely begin to see a more structured and constructive dialogue about them than we have seen previously.

When talking about Big Tech, questions have arisen on if EU and U.S. regulators will agree on the way to tackle the challenges posed. While similar concerns exist on the two sides of the Atlantic, some divergence remains. This is particularly true on the taxation front, which is seeing some additional traction since the COVID-19 crisis.

At the time of the publication of its December Communication, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, called on Washington to allow for the taxing of large digital companies (mostly American), which "came out of the crisis more profitable and with a larger market share than ever." She, and most European leaders, resent the fact that tech giants benefit from the single market but do not pay taxes where they should.

Biden was also very clear about his desire to “pursue a foreign policy for the middle class”. Anything not falling within this grid will come outside of his first 100 days, and perhaps his longer-term priorities as well. As several experts point out, it may be an opportunity for the EU to pursue its “strategic independence”; a reflection it started some time ago and which saw an acceleration under Donald Trump’s presidency. Here, it started to become real, with the adoption of the first, massive EU recovery plan, embraced in the midst of the pandemic.

About
Claire Boussagol
:
Claire Boussagol is president of APCO Worldwide’s Europe region. She previously served as managing director of APCO’s Brussels and Paris offices and is a member of the firm’s Global Leadership Team.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.