With the European Parliament elections just days away, the mood of the European electorate is anything but celebratory. Having spent much of the young 21st century celebrating Europe’s various achievements, the perennial questions in Brussels and Strasbourg were whether to deepen or widen the European Union. Yet only seven years after Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001, the global financial crisis erupted in the United States and spread to Europe. Today, previously unthinkable scenarios have become common discussion points in Brussels, London and many other European capitals. The question now is not whether the Eurozone will expand to other member states or candidate countries, but whether it will survive the test of time and what the consequences for the European Union will be based on the election results in May.
European voters are focused on almost every issue through the prism of economic issues, including concern over a Greek exit from the Eurozone and a British exit from Europe altogether, not to mention the economic consequences of a new state in Scotland or Catalonia. While Europe has been able to avoid disaster and disintegration to date, the crisis has greatly humbled core constituencies; meanwhile others have been empowered and once peripheral players such as Ukraine and Turkey have been made directly relevant to Europe given the global consequences of their association, as seen in Crimea and elections in Turkey. Seen from Washington, European interests seem to be shrinking as British, German, French, and even Polish interests have been emphasized, at their expense over bilateral disputes such as the NSA leaks or shared objectives in trouble spots such as the Middle East or Ukraine. However, even more troubling in the run up to the European elections is the type of anti-European and otherwise dismissive sentiment that can often be heard in Ankara, Cairo, Doha, Riyadh, and even Washington being spouted by candidates toward the very institutions they seek elected office for in Brussels and Strasbourg.
Triggered by global financial crises, as well as deepened by the crisis of the Eurozone and most currently the plight of Ukraine, questions about Western leadership have only increased. Reluctance on the part of the United States to assume its traditional assertive global leadership role in crises from Libya to Syria in the face of rising involvement of Russia, Iran, and China has only exacerbated doubts about the future of the West. In an ironic twist of fate at precisely the moment in which European leadership is being questioned globally, regional actors in the Middle East such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have emerged that will determine the future direction of Egypt and the broader region; these regional actors have been both decried and welcomed as a sign of more engaged partners that could determine the future direction of European foreign policy and Europe as a global or parochial power. As the United States discusses its “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia and Europe continues to be consumed by its own existential crisis, the Middle East remains the key area for trans-Atlantic cooperation and region most affected by European foreign policy.
The so-called “Arab Spring” captured the global imagination and attention of policy makers far more than the “European Fall,” yet the consequences of the revolutions that shook the Middle East to its core have been far less understood than the economic slowdown in Europe. While there are many factors including the disposition of current governments in contrast to previous administrations, the greatest impediment for Europe has been its own modesty and lack of imagination and strategic vision for engaging its southern neighbors. Despite having once been a part of the same colonial, Roman, and Mediterranean empires, Europe looks at the Middle East and North Africa as if there is very little to learn from the tragic past that this year commemorates: the centennial of World War I. While Europe has successfully moved beyond the eras of World Wars through painful reconciliation and European integration, it was not able to do this on its own, and it took persistent trans-Atlantic leadership and economic engagement such as the Marshall Plan from America.
At a moment in which American leadership is being questioned and sectarian tensions continue in the Middle East, the timing has never been more opportune to refocus on the core principles and universal values that Europe has championed since the inception of the European Community. Coordination and policy on the Middle East and North Africa continues to affect vital interests far beyond Brussels and Strasbourg that ideally must be synchronized with national interests and societies at large even if there is short-term turbulence between these two. Despite record levels of communication and travel between top leaders in Europe and the Middle East, the societal and institutional connections are still in need of revitalization and strengthening.
The EU is no longer the sole driver of reform in candidate countries such as Turkey, yet it is needed as an anchor and aspiration far beyond its current borders. In fact, the idea of Europe is needed more today than ever before in Turkey and its region, especially in order to encourage the pro-Western business communities that need access to the world’s largest market to pragmatically reform their own societies and systems. These coalitions are now in disarray in almost every single country that the EU once offered partnership to in one form or another. EU mechanisms and partnerships for strengthening civil society and key domestic institutions such as the judiciary, media, military, and parliament in countries from Morocco to Turkey are critical.
Reinvigorating Europe’s relations with the Middle East continues to represent the best guarantee that countries like Turkey have for domestic transformation that will culminate in a standard of democracy that will create a guiding light in the Middle East. The trans-Atlantic anchor provided through NATO, for example, can inject the Turkish military with the necessary confidence to embark upon reforms. Likewise, in order to fulfill its Middle Eastern promise, Turkey’s EU process must not be allowed to expire. It is not that in the absence of an EU anchor Turkey will morph into the Islamic Republic of Iran. Turkey’s historical and contemporary experiences and specificity, as well as economic, social, and religious make-up and set-up, mean such fears are profoundly misplaced. However, like many of its neighbors—and among more than a few of its EU counterparts—the lure of populism and streaks of intolerance are strong. In fact, the danger is more that a Turkey with no EU prospects comes to resemble an increasingly authoritarian Russia. Similarly, as its Arab and Muslim neighbors watch how Turkey is treated in its European Union bid, this process is seen as a proxy for how engaged Europe will be in its own “near abroad.” Russia has already demonstrated to the world its “commitment” to its near abroad by its actions in Crimea; so the question for Europe is, will it respond by being a critical partner for its southern neighbors or close itself off as a fortress? European voters will decide for themselves on May 22nd as the world watches.
In a series of articles, Diplomatic Courier and APCO Worldwide are partnering to cover the 2014 European Union elections. Find more information about this series here, and read all the articles in this series here. Follow @EPElections for daily news and updates from APCO’s team in Brussels.
Dr. Joshua W. Walker is Director of Global Programs at APCO Worldwide and a former senior advisor to the U.S. State Department.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's May/June 2014 print edition.
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Europe’s Global Elections: A View from Washington
May 9, 2014
With the European Parliament elections just days away, the mood of the European electorate is anything but celebratory. Having spent much of the young 21st century celebrating Europe’s various achievements, the perennial questions in Brussels and Strasbourg were whether to deepen or widen the European Union. Yet only seven years after Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001, the global financial crisis erupted in the United States and spread to Europe. Today, previously unthinkable scenarios have become common discussion points in Brussels, London and many other European capitals. The question now is not whether the Eurozone will expand to other member states or candidate countries, but whether it will survive the test of time and what the consequences for the European Union will be based on the election results in May.
European voters are focused on almost every issue through the prism of economic issues, including concern over a Greek exit from the Eurozone and a British exit from Europe altogether, not to mention the economic consequences of a new state in Scotland or Catalonia. While Europe has been able to avoid disaster and disintegration to date, the crisis has greatly humbled core constituencies; meanwhile others have been empowered and once peripheral players such as Ukraine and Turkey have been made directly relevant to Europe given the global consequences of their association, as seen in Crimea and elections in Turkey. Seen from Washington, European interests seem to be shrinking as British, German, French, and even Polish interests have been emphasized, at their expense over bilateral disputes such as the NSA leaks or shared objectives in trouble spots such as the Middle East or Ukraine. However, even more troubling in the run up to the European elections is the type of anti-European and otherwise dismissive sentiment that can often be heard in Ankara, Cairo, Doha, Riyadh, and even Washington being spouted by candidates toward the very institutions they seek elected office for in Brussels and Strasbourg.
Triggered by global financial crises, as well as deepened by the crisis of the Eurozone and most currently the plight of Ukraine, questions about Western leadership have only increased. Reluctance on the part of the United States to assume its traditional assertive global leadership role in crises from Libya to Syria in the face of rising involvement of Russia, Iran, and China has only exacerbated doubts about the future of the West. In an ironic twist of fate at precisely the moment in which European leadership is being questioned globally, regional actors in the Middle East such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have emerged that will determine the future direction of Egypt and the broader region; these regional actors have been both decried and welcomed as a sign of more engaged partners that could determine the future direction of European foreign policy and Europe as a global or parochial power. As the United States discusses its “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia and Europe continues to be consumed by its own existential crisis, the Middle East remains the key area for trans-Atlantic cooperation and region most affected by European foreign policy.
The so-called “Arab Spring” captured the global imagination and attention of policy makers far more than the “European Fall,” yet the consequences of the revolutions that shook the Middle East to its core have been far less understood than the economic slowdown in Europe. While there are many factors including the disposition of current governments in contrast to previous administrations, the greatest impediment for Europe has been its own modesty and lack of imagination and strategic vision for engaging its southern neighbors. Despite having once been a part of the same colonial, Roman, and Mediterranean empires, Europe looks at the Middle East and North Africa as if there is very little to learn from the tragic past that this year commemorates: the centennial of World War I. While Europe has successfully moved beyond the eras of World Wars through painful reconciliation and European integration, it was not able to do this on its own, and it took persistent trans-Atlantic leadership and economic engagement such as the Marshall Plan from America.
At a moment in which American leadership is being questioned and sectarian tensions continue in the Middle East, the timing has never been more opportune to refocus on the core principles and universal values that Europe has championed since the inception of the European Community. Coordination and policy on the Middle East and North Africa continues to affect vital interests far beyond Brussels and Strasbourg that ideally must be synchronized with national interests and societies at large even if there is short-term turbulence between these two. Despite record levels of communication and travel between top leaders in Europe and the Middle East, the societal and institutional connections are still in need of revitalization and strengthening.
The EU is no longer the sole driver of reform in candidate countries such as Turkey, yet it is needed as an anchor and aspiration far beyond its current borders. In fact, the idea of Europe is needed more today than ever before in Turkey and its region, especially in order to encourage the pro-Western business communities that need access to the world’s largest market to pragmatically reform their own societies and systems. These coalitions are now in disarray in almost every single country that the EU once offered partnership to in one form or another. EU mechanisms and partnerships for strengthening civil society and key domestic institutions such as the judiciary, media, military, and parliament in countries from Morocco to Turkey are critical.
Reinvigorating Europe’s relations with the Middle East continues to represent the best guarantee that countries like Turkey have for domestic transformation that will culminate in a standard of democracy that will create a guiding light in the Middle East. The trans-Atlantic anchor provided through NATO, for example, can inject the Turkish military with the necessary confidence to embark upon reforms. Likewise, in order to fulfill its Middle Eastern promise, Turkey’s EU process must not be allowed to expire. It is not that in the absence of an EU anchor Turkey will morph into the Islamic Republic of Iran. Turkey’s historical and contemporary experiences and specificity, as well as economic, social, and religious make-up and set-up, mean such fears are profoundly misplaced. However, like many of its neighbors—and among more than a few of its EU counterparts—the lure of populism and streaks of intolerance are strong. In fact, the danger is more that a Turkey with no EU prospects comes to resemble an increasingly authoritarian Russia. Similarly, as its Arab and Muslim neighbors watch how Turkey is treated in its European Union bid, this process is seen as a proxy for how engaged Europe will be in its own “near abroad.” Russia has already demonstrated to the world its “commitment” to its near abroad by its actions in Crimea; so the question for Europe is, will it respond by being a critical partner for its southern neighbors or close itself off as a fortress? European voters will decide for themselves on May 22nd as the world watches.
In a series of articles, Diplomatic Courier and APCO Worldwide are partnering to cover the 2014 European Union elections. Find more information about this series here, and read all the articles in this series here. Follow @EPElections for daily news and updates from APCO’s team in Brussels.
Dr. Joshua W. Walker is Director of Global Programs at APCO Worldwide and a former senior advisor to the U.S. State Department.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's May/June 2014 print edition.
