uch has been hypothesized about how Coronavirus will affect global geopolitics. As the global economy halts, policymakers focus on internal affairs more than international issues, nations enter into recessions, unemployment soars, and borders are reopening at a snail’s pace. The future of the relationship between Central Asian states and China will remain complex due to overlapping issues including ever-important trade and investment, geopolitical ambitions, and security interests.
COVID-19 has appeared at a time when Central Asian populations are becoming more outspoken about Chinese influence in their homelands. Kazakhstan is a revealing example. In late 2019 there were unprecedented protests by Kazakhs against Chinese investment in the country—their concerns were, and continue to be, that Chinese companies hire too few Kazakhs and pay them too little, while there is a growing number of Chinese workers in the country. Similarly, in February, Kyrgyz citizens protested the planned construction of a Chinese project near the At-Bashi village. The project is a logistics center that will house small businesses. Concerns are growing that Belt and Road projects will make Central Asian states indebted to Beijing, while unfinished Chinese projects in some countries are another source of anger.
These protests come on top of anger at the imprisonment of ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in so-called Chinese re-education camps as part of Beijing’s wider crackdown on the Uyghur population of Xinjiang (East Turkestan). U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s memorable visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan earlier this year centered on this tragic situation, as he met with family members of individuals who have been imprisoned in these camps.
But while local populations are becoming more vocal about their opinion regarding China’s role in their respective countries, Central Asian governments have to be cautious. After all, Beijing and Chinese companies are major investors throughout Central Asia.
Case in point, the Uzbek government and the Chinese megacity of Chongqing recently signed an agreement to maintain friendly relations and promote trade—trade in 2019 between the Central Asian country and this megacity alone reached USD $31.9 million. For comparison, trade between Uzbekistan and the United States was only USD $315 million in 2018. Trade between Kazakhstan and China reached USD $19 billion in 2018, while trade with the U.S. was USD $2.1 billion. This data demonstrates that no Central Asian government can afford, quite literally, to cut trade ties with Beijing as a way to criticize some of its policies.
Nevertheless, COVID-19 will have an effect on this relationship as the Chinese government is planning to cut down on oil and other energy imports as its economy slows down. This will impact countries that export energy to the Asian giant, including countries in Central Asia. “China requested a cut [of energy deliveries], but indicated that any reduction in gas supplies would be carried out proportionally between Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan," Mekhriddin Abdullaev, CEO of the Uzbekneftegaz state oil and gas company, has been quoted as saying.
On the other hand, some analysts have argued that Beijing-Central Asia ties could actually increase, as regional governments have to look to China for trade and investment opportunities as other trade partners (such as Europe) modify or halt trade projects due to the effects of COVID-19 in their economies.
Overall, COVID-19 is not going to affect China’s basic interests in Central Asia, namely energy supplies; preventing a spread of extremism out of Afghanistan to the region; and having friendly governments that generally share China’s foreign policy ambitions. This last point means having a region with a pro-Beijing attitude, and one that is not close to either Moscow or Washington.
The problem for China is that unfulfilled investment projects, the belief that Chinese workers are taking jobs away from Central Asian citizens in their own homeland, and the imprisonment of ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz in Xinjiang, are alienating Central Asian citizens. While regional governments will continue to seek cordial and friendly ties with Beijing, it is impossible not to notice a popular change of attitude towards China.
COVID-19 will affect Sino-Central Asian ties, particularly in energy exports, but we should not expect a 180 degree turn in how Central Asian governments approach Beijing. The pandemic will alter global geopolitics, but it cannot alter geography.
a global affairs media network
Central Asia and China in the Post-Pandemic World
July 2, 2020
M
uch has been hypothesized about how Coronavirus will affect global geopolitics. As the global economy halts, policymakers focus on internal affairs more than international issues, nations enter into recessions, unemployment soars, and borders are reopening at a snail’s pace. The future of the relationship between Central Asian states and China will remain complex due to overlapping issues including ever-important trade and investment, geopolitical ambitions, and security interests.
COVID-19 has appeared at a time when Central Asian populations are becoming more outspoken about Chinese influence in their homelands. Kazakhstan is a revealing example. In late 2019 there were unprecedented protests by Kazakhs against Chinese investment in the country—their concerns were, and continue to be, that Chinese companies hire too few Kazakhs and pay them too little, while there is a growing number of Chinese workers in the country. Similarly, in February, Kyrgyz citizens protested the planned construction of a Chinese project near the At-Bashi village. The project is a logistics center that will house small businesses. Concerns are growing that Belt and Road projects will make Central Asian states indebted to Beijing, while unfinished Chinese projects in some countries are another source of anger.
These protests come on top of anger at the imprisonment of ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in so-called Chinese re-education camps as part of Beijing’s wider crackdown on the Uyghur population of Xinjiang (East Turkestan). U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s memorable visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan earlier this year centered on this tragic situation, as he met with family members of individuals who have been imprisoned in these camps.
But while local populations are becoming more vocal about their opinion regarding China’s role in their respective countries, Central Asian governments have to be cautious. After all, Beijing and Chinese companies are major investors throughout Central Asia.
Case in point, the Uzbek government and the Chinese megacity of Chongqing recently signed an agreement to maintain friendly relations and promote trade—trade in 2019 between the Central Asian country and this megacity alone reached USD $31.9 million. For comparison, trade between Uzbekistan and the United States was only USD $315 million in 2018. Trade between Kazakhstan and China reached USD $19 billion in 2018, while trade with the U.S. was USD $2.1 billion. This data demonstrates that no Central Asian government can afford, quite literally, to cut trade ties with Beijing as a way to criticize some of its policies.
Nevertheless, COVID-19 will have an effect on this relationship as the Chinese government is planning to cut down on oil and other energy imports as its economy slows down. This will impact countries that export energy to the Asian giant, including countries in Central Asia. “China requested a cut [of energy deliveries], but indicated that any reduction in gas supplies would be carried out proportionally between Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan," Mekhriddin Abdullaev, CEO of the Uzbekneftegaz state oil and gas company, has been quoted as saying.
On the other hand, some analysts have argued that Beijing-Central Asia ties could actually increase, as regional governments have to look to China for trade and investment opportunities as other trade partners (such as Europe) modify or halt trade projects due to the effects of COVID-19 in their economies.
Overall, COVID-19 is not going to affect China’s basic interests in Central Asia, namely energy supplies; preventing a spread of extremism out of Afghanistan to the region; and having friendly governments that generally share China’s foreign policy ambitions. This last point means having a region with a pro-Beijing attitude, and one that is not close to either Moscow or Washington.
The problem for China is that unfulfilled investment projects, the belief that Chinese workers are taking jobs away from Central Asian citizens in their own homeland, and the imprisonment of ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz in Xinjiang, are alienating Central Asian citizens. While regional governments will continue to seek cordial and friendly ties with Beijing, it is impossible not to notice a popular change of attitude towards China.
COVID-19 will affect Sino-Central Asian ties, particularly in energy exports, but we should not expect a 180 degree turn in how Central Asian governments approach Beijing. The pandemic will alter global geopolitics, but it cannot alter geography.
