t was an exercise in political expediency and populism. In November, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov's GERB government used its status as leaders of a European Union member state to veto neighboring Republic of North Macedonia’s bid to join the bloc, which helps consolidate the rule of law, improve governance, and, most important, brings Western values to countries seeking accession. Borisov’s myopia might leave him feeling powerful and increase his appeal with far-right, anti-Western voters—but blocking Republic of North Macedonia’s chances of joining the EU threatens to destroy relations between the two friendly nations, could ignite broader regional instability, and, in fact, leaves both the Republic of North Macedonia and Bulgaria weaker.
Borisov’s veto was rooted in the exploitation of historical differences as his government insisted that Brussels not recognize Macedonian as an official EU language. It also came on the 132nd day of mass anti-corruption demonstrations, at a time when the Bulgarian government is striving to shore up its domestic support, and North Macedonia is seen as an effective tool for achieving this. According to the Borisov government, Skopje must immediately accept that the Republic of North Macedonia, its language, and its culture are a Bulgarian derivative. Full stop.
The reasons for Borisov’s unilateral veto are not just ill-timed and dangerous, they contradict his previously stated positions. In 2017, Borisov signed with his North Macedonian counterpart the historic Treaty on Friendship, which promised closer bilateral relations and, crucially, stated that Bulgaria would support the Republic of North Macedonia’s EU accession. Now, Borisov’s volte face risks isolating Bulgaria among EU member states, the majority of whom, including Germany, are eager to reward Skopje for its reforms and recent compromise with Greece in the form of the Prespa Agreement. But given the coronavirus crisis and its economic consequences, the EU’s current expansionist sentiment may wane, which could invite political instability in Bulgaria’s neighboring states in the Western Balkans, all of which are aiming for EU membership.
To resolve this mutually destructive impasse, the two governments should launch a clear process to implement the Treaty on Friendship. By establishing such a framework, each side could hold the other accountable while working toward the goals they both agreed to pursue nearly four years ago. For example, Bulgarians would have a forum to address any outstanding historical grievances, while North Macedonians would be able to engage with Bulgarians regarding the country’s lack of a strategy for working with its neighbors in a pan-European context. In pursuing this path, Borisov would be re-engaging with a leader—North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev—whose government has shown ample goodwill in resolving longstanding issues between the countries.
In many ways, Western Balkans stability—or lack thereof—hinges on whether Borisov chooses to engage with the Republic of North Macedonia and promote its EU ambitions.
While Bulgaria enjoys the benefits afforded to EU states, two of the five countries that border Bulgaria are stuck in EU accession purgatories. By definition, countries that vie for EU membership are seeking increased domestic stability, friendlier relations with other EU members, and increased chances at foreign direct investment. Looking at Bulgaria’s neighborhood, it is clear that each country in the region would benefit from more countries there joining the EU. This is especially true of the bilateral relationship between the Republic of North Macedonia and Bulgaria.
Brussels is careful to avoid adding members that cannot prove their own stability and the official initiation of North Macedonian membership to the EU would kick off a process in which Skopje would need to prove that it can meet EU governance, regulatory and financial standards. Just as other states across the globe promote stability in their region in order to entrench domestic placidity, increased North Macedonian stability would be an unqualified benefit for Bulgaria.
Should the Republic of North Macedonia join the EU, there also would likely be tangible benefits for Bulgaria. According to the most recent World Bank data, the Republic of North Macedonia is only Bulgaria’s 17th largest export market. It’s not hard to see how the Republic of North Macedonia’s acceptance to the EU would lead to increased Bulgarian prosperity. Requisite market and governance reforms in the Republic of North Macedonia would make the country more accessible to foreign investors—including Bulgarians; the Republic of North Macedonia would have uninhibited market access to EU countries and vice-versa; and the Republic of North Macedonia would be eligible for EU funding that could be crucial for improving domestic and regional infrastructure. The result of these inevitabilities would be a wealthier Republic of North Macedonia that could then consume more Bulgarian goods.
The Republic of North Macedonia’s elevation to the EU is also seen as a key that could unlock further EU integration. Other Balkan countries are in various stages of applying for EU membership as well. Like the Republic of North Macedonia’s potential inclusion in the EU, those countries’ joining the bloc would provide Bulgaria the same tangible economic benefits. The Republic of North Macedonia, though, is as close or closer than those countries to meeting EU standards and could provide the region with a blueprint for successful accession, if given the chance.
Resolving these issues, surely, will take time. A region as diverse as the Balkans is bound to have historical disputes, and both the Republic of North Macedonia and Bulgaria have much in their histories of which to be proud. Living in the past is a choice—one that benefits no one but those too proud to look to the future.
a global affairs media network
Bulgaria Must Show Leadership in the Western Balkans
Skopje, Macedonia. Photo via Pixabay.
December 14, 2020
I
t was an exercise in political expediency and populism. In November, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov's GERB government used its status as leaders of a European Union member state to veto neighboring Republic of North Macedonia’s bid to join the bloc, which helps consolidate the rule of law, improve governance, and, most important, brings Western values to countries seeking accession. Borisov’s myopia might leave him feeling powerful and increase his appeal with far-right, anti-Western voters—but blocking Republic of North Macedonia’s chances of joining the EU threatens to destroy relations between the two friendly nations, could ignite broader regional instability, and, in fact, leaves both the Republic of North Macedonia and Bulgaria weaker.
Borisov’s veto was rooted in the exploitation of historical differences as his government insisted that Brussels not recognize Macedonian as an official EU language. It also came on the 132nd day of mass anti-corruption demonstrations, at a time when the Bulgarian government is striving to shore up its domestic support, and North Macedonia is seen as an effective tool for achieving this. According to the Borisov government, Skopje must immediately accept that the Republic of North Macedonia, its language, and its culture are a Bulgarian derivative. Full stop.
The reasons for Borisov’s unilateral veto are not just ill-timed and dangerous, they contradict his previously stated positions. In 2017, Borisov signed with his North Macedonian counterpart the historic Treaty on Friendship, which promised closer bilateral relations and, crucially, stated that Bulgaria would support the Republic of North Macedonia’s EU accession. Now, Borisov’s volte face risks isolating Bulgaria among EU member states, the majority of whom, including Germany, are eager to reward Skopje for its reforms and recent compromise with Greece in the form of the Prespa Agreement. But given the coronavirus crisis and its economic consequences, the EU’s current expansionist sentiment may wane, which could invite political instability in Bulgaria’s neighboring states in the Western Balkans, all of which are aiming for EU membership.
To resolve this mutually destructive impasse, the two governments should launch a clear process to implement the Treaty on Friendship. By establishing such a framework, each side could hold the other accountable while working toward the goals they both agreed to pursue nearly four years ago. For example, Bulgarians would have a forum to address any outstanding historical grievances, while North Macedonians would be able to engage with Bulgarians regarding the country’s lack of a strategy for working with its neighbors in a pan-European context. In pursuing this path, Borisov would be re-engaging with a leader—North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev—whose government has shown ample goodwill in resolving longstanding issues between the countries.
In many ways, Western Balkans stability—or lack thereof—hinges on whether Borisov chooses to engage with the Republic of North Macedonia and promote its EU ambitions.
While Bulgaria enjoys the benefits afforded to EU states, two of the five countries that border Bulgaria are stuck in EU accession purgatories. By definition, countries that vie for EU membership are seeking increased domestic stability, friendlier relations with other EU members, and increased chances at foreign direct investment. Looking at Bulgaria’s neighborhood, it is clear that each country in the region would benefit from more countries there joining the EU. This is especially true of the bilateral relationship between the Republic of North Macedonia and Bulgaria.
Brussels is careful to avoid adding members that cannot prove their own stability and the official initiation of North Macedonian membership to the EU would kick off a process in which Skopje would need to prove that it can meet EU governance, regulatory and financial standards. Just as other states across the globe promote stability in their region in order to entrench domestic placidity, increased North Macedonian stability would be an unqualified benefit for Bulgaria.
Should the Republic of North Macedonia join the EU, there also would likely be tangible benefits for Bulgaria. According to the most recent World Bank data, the Republic of North Macedonia is only Bulgaria’s 17th largest export market. It’s not hard to see how the Republic of North Macedonia’s acceptance to the EU would lead to increased Bulgarian prosperity. Requisite market and governance reforms in the Republic of North Macedonia would make the country more accessible to foreign investors—including Bulgarians; the Republic of North Macedonia would have uninhibited market access to EU countries and vice-versa; and the Republic of North Macedonia would be eligible for EU funding that could be crucial for improving domestic and regional infrastructure. The result of these inevitabilities would be a wealthier Republic of North Macedonia that could then consume more Bulgarian goods.
The Republic of North Macedonia’s elevation to the EU is also seen as a key that could unlock further EU integration. Other Balkan countries are in various stages of applying for EU membership as well. Like the Republic of North Macedonia’s potential inclusion in the EU, those countries’ joining the bloc would provide Bulgaria the same tangible economic benefits. The Republic of North Macedonia, though, is as close or closer than those countries to meeting EU standards and could provide the region with a blueprint for successful accession, if given the chance.
Resolving these issues, surely, will take time. A region as diverse as the Balkans is bound to have historical disputes, and both the Republic of North Macedonia and Bulgaria have much in their histories of which to be proud. Living in the past is a choice—one that benefits no one but those too proud to look to the future.
