rmenia—Russia’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—is turning its back on Moscow. Quite aware that the Kremlin cannot (or is not willing to) protect not only ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Armenia itself, Yerevan is trying to strengthen its political and military ties with the United States, hoping that such a strategy will help it improve its positions vis-à-vis Azerbaijan.
Ever since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in 2020, Yerevan and Baku have been trying to normalize relations. The process stalled following recent tensions in the region—from the Lachin corridor crisis that erupted last winter, to Azerbaijani large-scale military offensive in Karabakh, launched by the energy-rich nation on 19 September 2023.
As a result of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, also known as the 44-Day War, some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers have been deployed to the mountainous region internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, although it has been under ethnic Armenian forces’ control since the early 1990s. But the Russian troops proved unable to ensure the only connection of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia—the Lachin corridor. More importantly, they did not even attempt to prevent Azerbaijan’s most recent military operation in the region.
After Armenia foreign ministry spokesperson Ani Badalyan said on 31 August 2023 that Russia’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh have caused “confusion and disappointment,” it became obvious that Yerevan no longer counts on Russian protection of some 120,000 Karabakh Armenians. Previously, on 29 August 2023, Karabakh Armenians reportedly attacked Russian peacekeepers, while on 16 August 2023 they blocked the Russian base in the region.
Even in Armenia there seems to be a growing anti-Russian sentiment. On 08 January 2023, dozens of activists attempted to block entrance to a Russian military base in the northwestern Armenian town of Gyumri, calling for the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh to be replaced with international forces. Moreover, on 31 August 2023, the Armenian Foreign Ministry accused Russia of "absolute indifference" towards what it described as Azerbaijani attacks on its territory.
Two months before Azerbaijan launched its own “special military operation” in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stressed that another war in the region is “very likely.” In his view, Russia is in the process of leaving the wider South Caucasus region, which means that it cannot ensure Armenia’s security. According to the Armenian leader, Yerevan’s policy of solely relying on Russia to guarantee Armenia’s security was a “strategic mistake.” The former Soviet republic is now trying to find another ally.
Despite being a CSTO member, Armenia is reportedly developing a close military cooperation with India. Yerevan has recently purchased six 155-millimeter (a NATO-standard artillery shell) Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) from New Delhi. It has also held a joint military exercise with the United States, while the U.S. embassy in Yerevan welcomed Maj. Gen. Gregory Anderson, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, and Brig. Gen. Patrick Ellis, deputy chief of staff for operations of U.S. Army Europe and Africa.
From the Armenian perspective, the United States, as the only superpower, is the only global actor that can prevent Azerbaijan from a potential attack on the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan was likely hoping that the U.S. would prevent Baku from launching a large-scale operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
“The U.S. will not countenance any action or effort—short-term or long-term—to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh,” said U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Yuri Kim on 14 September 2023, calling on Baku to open the Lachin corridor.
Her statement indicates that Baku did not get a green light from Washington to launch a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. But in spite of that, Azerbaijan, strongly backed by its ally Turkey, decided to unilaterally resolve the Karabakh conflict in its favor.
Over the years, the energy-rich South Caucasus nation has been developing very close military ties not only with NATO member Turkey, but also with Israel—a major American non-NATO ally. It also established strong energy cooperation with Washington’s European allies. Therefore, it is not surprising that the U.S. seeks to create a delicate balance in its South Caucasus policy, and does not aim to openly side with any of the two archenemies. Crowding Russia out the strategically important region seems to be Washington’s top long-term in the region.
Under the current geopolitical circumstances, there is not much the Kremlin can do to keep Armenia in its orbit. The former Soviet republic is expected to continue distancing itself from Russia and gravitating toward the United States, regardless of the American pragmatic approach vis-à-vis both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fact that angry protesters in Yerevan blocked the Russian, rather than the U.S. embassy on 19 September 2023, clearly suggests that a significant part of the Armenian population blames the Kremlin, not Washington, for the situation in Karabakh.
Thus, even though Pashinyan seems to have completely abandoned Yerevan’s ambitions to preserve the de facto control over the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh (Artsakh being Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh), and has decided to stay aside while Azerbaijan shells Armenian positions in the region, in the eyes of many Armenians, Russia’s “betrayal” will likely be portrayed as the major reason for Yerevan’s defeats.
a global affairs media network
‘Betrayed’ by Russia, Armenia Looks to the U.S.
Orthodox chapel in Armenia. Image by Denis Streltsov from Pixabay
September 28, 2023
In Armenia, both the government and the public seem to be souring on relations with Russia, in part due to a sense that Russia is not fulfilling its security commitments. The Armenian government has responded by looking elsewhere—India and the U.S.—to strengthen security ties, writes Nikola Mikovic.
A
rmenia—Russia’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—is turning its back on Moscow. Quite aware that the Kremlin cannot (or is not willing to) protect not only ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Armenia itself, Yerevan is trying to strengthen its political and military ties with the United States, hoping that such a strategy will help it improve its positions vis-à-vis Azerbaijan.
Ever since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in 2020, Yerevan and Baku have been trying to normalize relations. The process stalled following recent tensions in the region—from the Lachin corridor crisis that erupted last winter, to Azerbaijani large-scale military offensive in Karabakh, launched by the energy-rich nation on 19 September 2023.
As a result of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, also known as the 44-Day War, some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers have been deployed to the mountainous region internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, although it has been under ethnic Armenian forces’ control since the early 1990s. But the Russian troops proved unable to ensure the only connection of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia—the Lachin corridor. More importantly, they did not even attempt to prevent Azerbaijan’s most recent military operation in the region.
After Armenia foreign ministry spokesperson Ani Badalyan said on 31 August 2023 that Russia’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh have caused “confusion and disappointment,” it became obvious that Yerevan no longer counts on Russian protection of some 120,000 Karabakh Armenians. Previously, on 29 August 2023, Karabakh Armenians reportedly attacked Russian peacekeepers, while on 16 August 2023 they blocked the Russian base in the region.
Even in Armenia there seems to be a growing anti-Russian sentiment. On 08 January 2023, dozens of activists attempted to block entrance to a Russian military base in the northwestern Armenian town of Gyumri, calling for the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh to be replaced with international forces. Moreover, on 31 August 2023, the Armenian Foreign Ministry accused Russia of "absolute indifference" towards what it described as Azerbaijani attacks on its territory.
Two months before Azerbaijan launched its own “special military operation” in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stressed that another war in the region is “very likely.” In his view, Russia is in the process of leaving the wider South Caucasus region, which means that it cannot ensure Armenia’s security. According to the Armenian leader, Yerevan’s policy of solely relying on Russia to guarantee Armenia’s security was a “strategic mistake.” The former Soviet republic is now trying to find another ally.
Despite being a CSTO member, Armenia is reportedly developing a close military cooperation with India. Yerevan has recently purchased six 155-millimeter (a NATO-standard artillery shell) Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) from New Delhi. It has also held a joint military exercise with the United States, while the U.S. embassy in Yerevan welcomed Maj. Gen. Gregory Anderson, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, and Brig. Gen. Patrick Ellis, deputy chief of staff for operations of U.S. Army Europe and Africa.
From the Armenian perspective, the United States, as the only superpower, is the only global actor that can prevent Azerbaijan from a potential attack on the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan was likely hoping that the U.S. would prevent Baku from launching a large-scale operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
“The U.S. will not countenance any action or effort—short-term or long-term—to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh,” said U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Yuri Kim on 14 September 2023, calling on Baku to open the Lachin corridor.
Her statement indicates that Baku did not get a green light from Washington to launch a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. But in spite of that, Azerbaijan, strongly backed by its ally Turkey, decided to unilaterally resolve the Karabakh conflict in its favor.
Over the years, the energy-rich South Caucasus nation has been developing very close military ties not only with NATO member Turkey, but also with Israel—a major American non-NATO ally. It also established strong energy cooperation with Washington’s European allies. Therefore, it is not surprising that the U.S. seeks to create a delicate balance in its South Caucasus policy, and does not aim to openly side with any of the two archenemies. Crowding Russia out the strategically important region seems to be Washington’s top long-term in the region.
Under the current geopolitical circumstances, there is not much the Kremlin can do to keep Armenia in its orbit. The former Soviet republic is expected to continue distancing itself from Russia and gravitating toward the United States, regardless of the American pragmatic approach vis-à-vis both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fact that angry protesters in Yerevan blocked the Russian, rather than the U.S. embassy on 19 September 2023, clearly suggests that a significant part of the Armenian population blames the Kremlin, not Washington, for the situation in Karabakh.
Thus, even though Pashinyan seems to have completely abandoned Yerevan’s ambitions to preserve the de facto control over the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh (Artsakh being Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh), and has decided to stay aside while Azerbaijan shells Armenian positions in the region, in the eyes of many Armenians, Russia’s “betrayal” will likely be portrayed as the major reason for Yerevan’s defeats.
