.

Territorial disputes between China and its neighbors over oil and gas resources are prominent flashpoints, as evidenced by China’s recent declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. However, another important point of contention has received relatively little media attention: China’s construction of dams along several key rivers in South and Southeast Asia.

Though most media attention on Chinese dam construction centers on the Three Gorges Dam, China’s unique geographic role as the gatekeeper of the Tibetan Plateau’s headwaters allows Beijing to control the flow of the Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, Salween, and Mekong river systems. China’s potential “hydro-hegemony” is best seen in the Mekong River.

Currently, Chinese engineers are building eight dams along the Mekong—most notably, Xiaowan and Nuozhadu. These dams are an important source of hydroelectric power and freshwater for a rapidly developing, resource-hungry China. They also give Beijing the ability to alter the flow of nutrients, silt, and fish downstream, potentially threatening the livelihood of 60 million people in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam who depend on the Mekong for their income, fishing commerce, agriculture, and freshwater. Additionally, these dams give Beijing the ability to upset the hydroelectric viability of downstream dams in Cambodia that will serve as an important future source of electricity for the region.

To date, China has refused to cooperate with its neighbors and with intergovernmental organizations in the management of the Mekong River. According to columnist Brahma Chellaney, China, “Has given the cold shoulder to multilateral cooperation among basin nations...and rebuffed efforts by states sharing its rivers to seek bilateral water-sharing agreements.” In 2009, the United States established the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) to encourage information sharing among Mekong river basin countries. Beijing, however, has refused to release data on the operation of its dams to the Mekong River Commission and the LMI. Given China’s aggressive posturing in the region, constructive actions like information sharing in a multilateral setting are unlikely.

China’s construction of dams along the Mekong and other regional rivers gives Beijing a powerful coercive lever. By the end of this decade, China’s ability to control the water tap for South and Southeast Asia will be a significant factor in the calculations of Mekong river states. In a scenario where Beijing does restrict the flow of its rivers to coerce cooperation from its riparian neighbors, it is difficult to imagine an organized, unified response from LMI members.

Even if China does not exploit this lever, Beijing’s potential mismanagement of the river could affect the lives of millions downstream and serve as a prominent source of resentment and conflict in the region. In a climate of nationalistic saber rattling, growing military expenditures, and increasing freshwater scarcity, China’s future decisions will have widespread effects on regional security in the coming decades.

Photo: PVCG (cc).

Infographic: Infrastructure MENA (cc).

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Beijing’s Hydroelectric Policies: Tensions on the Mekong [Infographic]

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February 17, 2014

Territorial disputes between China and its neighbors over oil and gas resources are prominent flashpoints, as evidenced by China’s recent declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. However, another important point of contention has received relatively little media attention: China’s construction of dams along several key rivers in South and Southeast Asia.

Though most media attention on Chinese dam construction centers on the Three Gorges Dam, China’s unique geographic role as the gatekeeper of the Tibetan Plateau’s headwaters allows Beijing to control the flow of the Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, Salween, and Mekong river systems. China’s potential “hydro-hegemony” is best seen in the Mekong River.

Currently, Chinese engineers are building eight dams along the Mekong—most notably, Xiaowan and Nuozhadu. These dams are an important source of hydroelectric power and freshwater for a rapidly developing, resource-hungry China. They also give Beijing the ability to alter the flow of nutrients, silt, and fish downstream, potentially threatening the livelihood of 60 million people in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam who depend on the Mekong for their income, fishing commerce, agriculture, and freshwater. Additionally, these dams give Beijing the ability to upset the hydroelectric viability of downstream dams in Cambodia that will serve as an important future source of electricity for the region.

To date, China has refused to cooperate with its neighbors and with intergovernmental organizations in the management of the Mekong River. According to columnist Brahma Chellaney, China, “Has given the cold shoulder to multilateral cooperation among basin nations...and rebuffed efforts by states sharing its rivers to seek bilateral water-sharing agreements.” In 2009, the United States established the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) to encourage information sharing among Mekong river basin countries. Beijing, however, has refused to release data on the operation of its dams to the Mekong River Commission and the LMI. Given China’s aggressive posturing in the region, constructive actions like information sharing in a multilateral setting are unlikely.

China’s construction of dams along the Mekong and other regional rivers gives Beijing a powerful coercive lever. By the end of this decade, China’s ability to control the water tap for South and Southeast Asia will be a significant factor in the calculations of Mekong river states. In a scenario where Beijing does restrict the flow of its rivers to coerce cooperation from its riparian neighbors, it is difficult to imagine an organized, unified response from LMI members.

Even if China does not exploit this lever, Beijing’s potential mismanagement of the river could affect the lives of millions downstream and serve as a prominent source of resentment and conflict in the region. In a climate of nationalistic saber rattling, growing military expenditures, and increasing freshwater scarcity, China’s future decisions will have widespread effects on regional security in the coming decades.

Photo: PVCG (cc).

Infographic: Infrastructure MENA (cc).

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.