n Azerbaijan, presidential elections are anything but uncertain. The country’s leader Ilham Aliyev, who has been ruling the energy rich South Caucasus nation since 2003, will undoubtedly win another term in office. But what comes after the vote scheduled for 7 February 2024?
In the eyes of many Azerbaijanis, Aliyev represents a symbol of the country’s victory over its archenemy Armenia. Indeed, unlike his father Heydar Aliyev, who could not keep Nagorno–Karabakh in Azerbaijani hands in the 1990s, the current president managed to recapture the territory that had been under Armenian control for nearly three decades.
Thanks to Azerbaijan's victory over Armenia in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, as well as the September 2023 military operation that resulted in the end of the Yerevan–backed self–proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, Aliyev enjoys real popularity in Azerbaijani society. It is, therefore, not surprising that he, riding high on a wave of public support, decided to call an early presidential election—the first ever to be held in Karabakh.
But when it comes to foreign policy, Aliyev is expected to face numerous challenges. Although the Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe (OSCE) announced its intention to closely monitor all aspects of the upcoming vote, relations between Baku and certain European nations remain tense. Azerbaijani officials accuse France—a nation that has traditionally good ties with Armenia—of pursuing an “anti–Azerbaijani policy,” as Baku is reportedly irritated by Paris’ support for Yerevan.
Bilateral ties between Azerbaijan and France are at the lowest level, and the two nations have recently expelled each other’s diplomats, while Azerbaijani’s parliamentary commission on 18 January 2024 called for the expulsion of French companies from the oil–rich country. More importantly, relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union seem to have started to deteriorate after EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell warned there would be “severe consequences” if Armenia’s territorial integrity was violated.
“The latest territorial claims by President Aliyev are very concerning, and any violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity would be unacceptable and will have severe consequences for our relations with Azerbaijan,” Borrell stated.
Baku’s decision to suspend its cooperation with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) over Europe's legislative body’s alleged “Azerbaijanophobia,” clearly shows that Aliyev does not plan to back down, and that he does not take EU’s threats too seriously.
Although the energy–rich nation is unlikely to invade Armenia (at least in the foreseeable future), it will almost certainly seek to resolve border disputes with Yerevan in its favor. Quite aware of that, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on 15 January 2024 that Azerbaijani proposals regarding a border delimitation could “legitimize future wars.”
There are growing fears in Yerevan that Baku aims to establish a de facto control over Armenia’s Syunik province—a key point on the Zangezur corridor (also known as Nakhchivan corridor) that should connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan, and further with its ally Turkey. On 10 January 2024, Aliyev emphasized that the realization of the Zangezur corridor project is an Azerbaijani condition for opening the country’s border with Armenia.
Given that Baku, as a clear war winner, has significant leverage over Yerevan, it will almost certainly continue pressuring Armenian officials to build the Zangezur corridor through southern Armenia on Azerbaijani terms. In other words, Baku expects Yerevan to create a passport–free zone without any border control along its section of the Nakhchivan corridor.
Since Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan, does not seem to have any allies, and cannot count on full Western support, Yerevan will likely have to continue making concessions to Baku, even if that means the loss of sovereignty in the south, along the country’s border with Iran. Azerbaijan, for its part, aims to maximize gains and additionally strengthen its position in the region.
Aliyev seems to feel powerful enough to indirectly question the very existence of Armenia as a state. On 14 January 2024 he stressed that “in the 20th century the lands of Azerbaijan were given to Armenia in parts,” which could be interpreted as election rhetoric. However, given that the Azerbaijani leader is the overwhelming frontrunner among seven candidates contesting the February 7 presidential election, and will almost certainly win the majority of votes, his statement suggests that Baku may eventually attempt to capture what it sees as Azerbaijani’s historic lands.
Thus, under the current circumstances, Azerbaijan and Armenia seem to be in a state of limbo, between normalization of relations and a new war. Such a position allows Baku to demonstrate that it has the upper hand over Yerevan, and that Armenia, in order to avoid another military defeat, may have to sign a peace treaty under Aliyev’s terms. The fact that the landlocked country of around 2.8 million people hinted that it could soon transfer new data on landmines in Nagorno–Karabakh to Azerbaijan, perfectly indicates that Yerevan will continue to gradually fulfill if not all then most of Aliyev’s requests.
As a result, Azerbaijan will continue positioning itself as a powerful regional state that is not afraid of defying major European nations, while Aliyev will remain the South Caucasus nation’s indisputable leader.
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Amid Azerbaijan elections, a tough stance on the EU
Baku, Azerbaijan. Image by Faik Nagiyev from Pixabay
January 29, 2024
The outcome of Azerbaijan’s upcoming presidential elections seem settled—Ilham Aliyev will almost certainly win another term in office—but the what the country’s foreign policy will look like is uncertain. In particular, souring relations with Europe will prove a challenge, writes Nikola Mikovic.
I
n Azerbaijan, presidential elections are anything but uncertain. The country’s leader Ilham Aliyev, who has been ruling the energy rich South Caucasus nation since 2003, will undoubtedly win another term in office. But what comes after the vote scheduled for 7 February 2024?
In the eyes of many Azerbaijanis, Aliyev represents a symbol of the country’s victory over its archenemy Armenia. Indeed, unlike his father Heydar Aliyev, who could not keep Nagorno–Karabakh in Azerbaijani hands in the 1990s, the current president managed to recapture the territory that had been under Armenian control for nearly three decades.
Thanks to Azerbaijan's victory over Armenia in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, as well as the September 2023 military operation that resulted in the end of the Yerevan–backed self–proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, Aliyev enjoys real popularity in Azerbaijani society. It is, therefore, not surprising that he, riding high on a wave of public support, decided to call an early presidential election—the first ever to be held in Karabakh.
But when it comes to foreign policy, Aliyev is expected to face numerous challenges. Although the Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe (OSCE) announced its intention to closely monitor all aspects of the upcoming vote, relations between Baku and certain European nations remain tense. Azerbaijani officials accuse France—a nation that has traditionally good ties with Armenia—of pursuing an “anti–Azerbaijani policy,” as Baku is reportedly irritated by Paris’ support for Yerevan.
Bilateral ties between Azerbaijan and France are at the lowest level, and the two nations have recently expelled each other’s diplomats, while Azerbaijani’s parliamentary commission on 18 January 2024 called for the expulsion of French companies from the oil–rich country. More importantly, relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union seem to have started to deteriorate after EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell warned there would be “severe consequences” if Armenia’s territorial integrity was violated.
“The latest territorial claims by President Aliyev are very concerning, and any violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity would be unacceptable and will have severe consequences for our relations with Azerbaijan,” Borrell stated.
Baku’s decision to suspend its cooperation with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) over Europe's legislative body’s alleged “Azerbaijanophobia,” clearly shows that Aliyev does not plan to back down, and that he does not take EU’s threats too seriously.
Although the energy–rich nation is unlikely to invade Armenia (at least in the foreseeable future), it will almost certainly seek to resolve border disputes with Yerevan in its favor. Quite aware of that, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on 15 January 2024 that Azerbaijani proposals regarding a border delimitation could “legitimize future wars.”
There are growing fears in Yerevan that Baku aims to establish a de facto control over Armenia’s Syunik province—a key point on the Zangezur corridor (also known as Nakhchivan corridor) that should connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan, and further with its ally Turkey. On 10 January 2024, Aliyev emphasized that the realization of the Zangezur corridor project is an Azerbaijani condition for opening the country’s border with Armenia.
Given that Baku, as a clear war winner, has significant leverage over Yerevan, it will almost certainly continue pressuring Armenian officials to build the Zangezur corridor through southern Armenia on Azerbaijani terms. In other words, Baku expects Yerevan to create a passport–free zone without any border control along its section of the Nakhchivan corridor.
Since Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan, does not seem to have any allies, and cannot count on full Western support, Yerevan will likely have to continue making concessions to Baku, even if that means the loss of sovereignty in the south, along the country’s border with Iran. Azerbaijan, for its part, aims to maximize gains and additionally strengthen its position in the region.
Aliyev seems to feel powerful enough to indirectly question the very existence of Armenia as a state. On 14 January 2024 he stressed that “in the 20th century the lands of Azerbaijan were given to Armenia in parts,” which could be interpreted as election rhetoric. However, given that the Azerbaijani leader is the overwhelming frontrunner among seven candidates contesting the February 7 presidential election, and will almost certainly win the majority of votes, his statement suggests that Baku may eventually attempt to capture what it sees as Azerbaijani’s historic lands.
Thus, under the current circumstances, Azerbaijan and Armenia seem to be in a state of limbo, between normalization of relations and a new war. Such a position allows Baku to demonstrate that it has the upper hand over Yerevan, and that Armenia, in order to avoid another military defeat, may have to sign a peace treaty under Aliyev’s terms. The fact that the landlocked country of around 2.8 million people hinted that it could soon transfer new data on landmines in Nagorno–Karabakh to Azerbaijan, perfectly indicates that Yerevan will continue to gradually fulfill if not all then most of Aliyev’s requests.
As a result, Azerbaijan will continue positioning itself as a powerful regional state that is not afraid of defying major European nations, while Aliyev will remain the South Caucasus nation’s indisputable leader.
