hile the war between Israel and Hamas over the Gaza Strip rages on, Russia seeks to achieve local tactical gains in Ukraine. The Kremlin reportedly hopes that the conflict in the Middle East will shift the global attention away from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which would give Moscow more room for various political and military maneuvers.
On 13 October 2023, just days after the war between Israel and Hamas broke out, Russia launched a local offensive in the Donbass, aiming to capture the town of Avdiivka—a move that would allow it to protect (at least to a certain extent) neighboring Donetsk from Ukrainian shelling. Although both sides suffer significant losses near Avdiivka, reports suggest that Russian forces have made small gains, while Ukrainian political and military leadership seems to be preoccupied with its internal problems, namely the alleged discord between President Volodymyr Zelensky and his top general Valery Zaluzhny.
More importantly, Ukraine's long-awaited counteroffensive, launched in early June 2023, has resulted in rather small territorial gains and heavy losses, which is why it is widely believed that the conflict in the Eastern European nation has reached stalemate. Zelensky, however, denies such allegations, although he admits that “everyone is getting tired” of the Ukraine war.
What also worries Ukrainian leadership is the fact that some of its allies—namely Poland and Slovakia—have stopped transferring any weapons to the war-torn country, and that the idea of a frozen conflict between Russia and Ukraine is no longer a taboo topic in the West. Given that western public opinion has been distracted by the war between Israel and Hamas, and that developments in the Eastern European country are not the top news in the global media anymore, Ukraine reportedly fears that it might be eventually abandoned by the West.
On 3 October 2023 the U.S. Congress did not include the $6 billion in military assistance that Kyiv said it urgently needed, while two days later the European Union leaders said the 27-nation bloc “would not be able to fully replace American support for the war-torn country.” Russia, on the other hand, seems to be preparing to fight a long war, which is why Ukraine expects the West to continue providing it with both military and financial assistance.
The coming months will show—especially if the United States gets preoccupied with the conflict in the Middle East—if the EU has capacity to increase its aid to Kyiv, and if the Ukrainian Armed Forces can continue their counteroffensive against the Russian military. Meanwhile, Russia will undoubtedly seek to benefit from the Israel-Hamas war, hoping that the unrest in the Middle East will divert western support from Ukraine. Such an outcome would allow Moscow to consolidate its territorial control over parts of the one-time Soviet republic.
But since the Kremlin does not seem to have the political will to fight “until victory,” such a strategy could bring only short-term success for Russia. Sooner or later, Ukraine will start to receive more sophisticated western-made weapons, including F-16 fighter jets. Once they become fully operational, the Ukrainian army might be in a position to achieve at least some of its ambitious military objectives, or even spoil the Kremlin’s plans to hold a presidential election in the Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory.
In the meantime, the two nations will likely continue fighting a de facto positional war— excluding sporadic local offensive military operations—while the world is expected to remain focused on the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Politically, the Kremlin will avoid openly taking sides in that war, even though its propaganda seems to have adopted an anti-Israel rhetoric.
That, however, does not mean that Moscow will ever take a pro-Palestine political stance, nor that its military in Syria will stop turning a blind eye to Israel’s airstrikes on the Syrian Army, as well as on Iran-backed militias’ positions in the Middle Eastern country. The Kremlin hopes that Israel, for its part, will continue implementing its current policy regarding Ukraine, meaning that it will not supply Kyiv with weapons.
If however, the Jewish State eventually decides to change its course, and starts selling air defense systems to Ukraine, Moscow will almost certainly use its well-known rhetoric and accuse its Israeli partners of “deceiving” Russia. Although such an outcome would have an impact on Israeli-Russian relations, it is not very probable that the Kremlin would risk seriously jeopardizing ties with the country that hosts some very influential Russian oligarchs.
Zelensky, for his part, is very interested in strengthening Ukraine’s relations with the Jewish state. It is not surprising that Kyiv openly supported Israeli actions in Gaza, while Zelensky accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of backing Hamas. Although Russian officials hosted a delegation from Hamas in Moscow on 26 October 2023, such a move did not have serious implications on relations between Russia and Israel, which indicates that the Israeli authorities did not take Zelensky’s accusations seriously.
Finally, the fact that the Ukrainian president still has not gotten the green light to visit Israel and show solidarity with the Jewish state suggests that policy makers in Jerusalem likely plan to remain neutral during the Ukraine war. Quite aware of that, the Kremlin is expected to preserve its “delicate balancing act” regarding the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, hoping that the war in the Middle East will allow it to achieve at least some of its goals in Ukraine.
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Global Attention on Israel-Hamas a Boon for Russia, For Now
Image by Henryk Niestrój from Pixabay
November 18, 2023
Russia has been taking advantage of how the world’s attention is focused on Israel and Hamas to maneuver more freely with its war on Ukraine. However, the benefits from this diverted attention may not be long-lasting, writes Nikola Mikovic.
W
hile the war between Israel and Hamas over the Gaza Strip rages on, Russia seeks to achieve local tactical gains in Ukraine. The Kremlin reportedly hopes that the conflict in the Middle East will shift the global attention away from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which would give Moscow more room for various political and military maneuvers.
On 13 October 2023, just days after the war between Israel and Hamas broke out, Russia launched a local offensive in the Donbass, aiming to capture the town of Avdiivka—a move that would allow it to protect (at least to a certain extent) neighboring Donetsk from Ukrainian shelling. Although both sides suffer significant losses near Avdiivka, reports suggest that Russian forces have made small gains, while Ukrainian political and military leadership seems to be preoccupied with its internal problems, namely the alleged discord between President Volodymyr Zelensky and his top general Valery Zaluzhny.
More importantly, Ukraine's long-awaited counteroffensive, launched in early June 2023, has resulted in rather small territorial gains and heavy losses, which is why it is widely believed that the conflict in the Eastern European nation has reached stalemate. Zelensky, however, denies such allegations, although he admits that “everyone is getting tired” of the Ukraine war.
What also worries Ukrainian leadership is the fact that some of its allies—namely Poland and Slovakia—have stopped transferring any weapons to the war-torn country, and that the idea of a frozen conflict between Russia and Ukraine is no longer a taboo topic in the West. Given that western public opinion has been distracted by the war between Israel and Hamas, and that developments in the Eastern European country are not the top news in the global media anymore, Ukraine reportedly fears that it might be eventually abandoned by the West.
On 3 October 2023 the U.S. Congress did not include the $6 billion in military assistance that Kyiv said it urgently needed, while two days later the European Union leaders said the 27-nation bloc “would not be able to fully replace American support for the war-torn country.” Russia, on the other hand, seems to be preparing to fight a long war, which is why Ukraine expects the West to continue providing it with both military and financial assistance.
The coming months will show—especially if the United States gets preoccupied with the conflict in the Middle East—if the EU has capacity to increase its aid to Kyiv, and if the Ukrainian Armed Forces can continue their counteroffensive against the Russian military. Meanwhile, Russia will undoubtedly seek to benefit from the Israel-Hamas war, hoping that the unrest in the Middle East will divert western support from Ukraine. Such an outcome would allow Moscow to consolidate its territorial control over parts of the one-time Soviet republic.
But since the Kremlin does not seem to have the political will to fight “until victory,” such a strategy could bring only short-term success for Russia. Sooner or later, Ukraine will start to receive more sophisticated western-made weapons, including F-16 fighter jets. Once they become fully operational, the Ukrainian army might be in a position to achieve at least some of its ambitious military objectives, or even spoil the Kremlin’s plans to hold a presidential election in the Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory.
In the meantime, the two nations will likely continue fighting a de facto positional war— excluding sporadic local offensive military operations—while the world is expected to remain focused on the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Politically, the Kremlin will avoid openly taking sides in that war, even though its propaganda seems to have adopted an anti-Israel rhetoric.
That, however, does not mean that Moscow will ever take a pro-Palestine political stance, nor that its military in Syria will stop turning a blind eye to Israel’s airstrikes on the Syrian Army, as well as on Iran-backed militias’ positions in the Middle Eastern country. The Kremlin hopes that Israel, for its part, will continue implementing its current policy regarding Ukraine, meaning that it will not supply Kyiv with weapons.
If however, the Jewish State eventually decides to change its course, and starts selling air defense systems to Ukraine, Moscow will almost certainly use its well-known rhetoric and accuse its Israeli partners of “deceiving” Russia. Although such an outcome would have an impact on Israeli-Russian relations, it is not very probable that the Kremlin would risk seriously jeopardizing ties with the country that hosts some very influential Russian oligarchs.
Zelensky, for his part, is very interested in strengthening Ukraine’s relations with the Jewish state. It is not surprising that Kyiv openly supported Israeli actions in Gaza, while Zelensky accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of backing Hamas. Although Russian officials hosted a delegation from Hamas in Moscow on 26 October 2023, such a move did not have serious implications on relations between Russia and Israel, which indicates that the Israeli authorities did not take Zelensky’s accusations seriously.
Finally, the fact that the Ukrainian president still has not gotten the green light to visit Israel and show solidarity with the Jewish state suggests that policy makers in Jerusalem likely plan to remain neutral during the Ukraine war. Quite aware of that, the Kremlin is expected to preserve its “delicate balancing act” regarding the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, hoping that the war in the Middle East will allow it to achieve at least some of its goals in Ukraine.
