The Tunisian Revolution was exceptional for two key reasons: firstly, it revealed widespread popular discontent to a surprising degree, without having been preplanned or driven by another dimension, whether ideological or religious in nature. Perhaps the most significant fact about this revolution was exported very rapidly and the recipe proved to be almost identical in several Middle Eastern countries. In the midst of such unexpected events, economists have exercised a surprising restraint. We haven’t heard about their explanations of this unfolding political drama. It appears that they for an instant forgot that there is a panoply of “economic theories” on revolution that are very relevant in revealing the dynamics of this historical period on at least four main points.
The first key point is the destabilizing effect of important and quick economic growth. Tunisia and Egypt, being the first countries in the limelight, are among the Arab countries whose growth had been the strongest and most consistent during the 2000s, prior to the global economic crisis. In 1963, Mancur Olson, a well-known political scientist, highlighted the politically destabilizing aspects of long-term economic growth: it initially upsets economic structures, which then multiplies the number of “winners and losers;” secondly, it creates overly optimistic expectations, which in case of an economic slowdown require painful adjustments; and thirdly, it increases people's expectations vis-à-vis the government to provide direction and manage the economy.
The second point is that the transformation of popular discontent into mass revolt in an autocracy is an exceptional occurrence. According to Gordon Tullock, a retired Professor of Law and Economics at the George Mason University School of Law and a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Economics for 2003, revolutions are rare, and their chances of success are minimal at best. They may actually be considered as the private provider of a “public good”, as an individual knows that he or she will benefit from it, even if they are not directly involved in revolutionary activities. Hence an individual has no “rational” interest in, or motives for participating in the revolutionary movement, especially when the personal risks involved are fully considered. Also, governments by definition have a considerable advantage in effectively being in position to use physical violence and other violent methods (provided they are willing to bear the consequences). Thus, autocracies can only be toppled when a schism appears within the ruling class, as was the case with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (although in these instances the internal problems within the ruling class were much more a consequence of the unanticipated popular demonstrations than the root cause of these uprisings.
The third point is that the unpredictability of revolutions in autocratic regimes can be explained by specific reasons. Inspired by the experience of the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979), Timur Kuran, Professor of Economics and Political Science at Duke University, based his economic analysis of social revolutions on an ingenious distinction between private and public preferences in explaining how “a spark can start a prairie fire” (Mao Zedong, 1930). Within an autocratic regime, displaying one’s true preferences is a very risky endeavor. Individuals will then display “strategic” public preferences, that is, public preferences more in line with the traditional and official political culture of their country. However, when the gap between private and public preferences exceeds a certain threshold, an abrupt and sudden adjustment will soon occur. The gap between private and public preferences then evaporates. Most people will come to the realization that they actually share the same aspirations. The so-called “surprise effect” can simply be explained within an autocratic regime by the almost total lack of accurate information on true individual preferences – neither the government nor the opposition, or even the populace. The government and the crowds are in no way privy to real individual preferences on events that are actually unfolding on the ground.
There is a fourth and final point, which is not incorporated in these economic theories on revolution: the role played by the on-going information and multimedia “revolution.” This was first clearly demonstrated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and, more specifically, the pivotal role played by the West German television in East Germany. Cascading effects are not new phenomena in themselves. They are generally explained very simply by the process of imitation: What a particular country is able to achieve, another one can also accomplish it under similar circumstances (if these are similar). However, we are living in different times, and with access to Internet, satellites and sophisticated mobile phones, individuals can now transmit a vast array of information anywhere and at anytime. This technology allows demonstrators and dissidents not only to send stories worldwide but also to effectively coordinate the activities of protesters’ in real time, “live” – like armies organizing field operations – and in a quasi anonymous format.
Many theories can provide satisfactory accounts on why a high level of political dissatisfaction can turn into a popular exasperation that people are no longer willing to repress, to “keep inside.” These ‘economic’ theories’ are insightful since, for a revolution to take place, they insist on the force factor, without which one can only hope for uncoordinated riots. Insofar as it impacts people’s lives, hopes and aspirations, the economic factor plays a crucial role. In addition, and perhaps more predominantly, takes into account access to information and the media. Internet spreads information faster than little slips of paper passed from hand-to-hand.
Any analyst who is in the business of predicting the likelihood of such social events must rely on two kinds of data to be successful: First, the potential of a revolutionary situation that can range from a weaken dictatorial regime, the existence of flagrant and unjustifiable social and economic inequality, a lack of future prospects, a credible opposition, albeit repressed by state apparatus, and a concentration of discontent towards a tyrannical and unpopular leader; second, the cocking of triggering factors such as a promised political reform poorly implemented, a serious economic downturn, or a shift in the national army’s loyalty and support away from the ruling class.
All that is needed for a revolt to happen is some courageous and highly-motivated people ready to pay the price, to stick to their guns. In the Middle East, there was no shortage of valid reasons to turn out into the streets and attempt to toss out the political leadership. The conditions were ripe: large-scale and abject poverty, millions of unemployed young people, (many with university degrees) widespread inequity and blatant discrimination, corruption, lack of freedoms, and a collective “dismal future” for the millions. No doubt, “economic” theories on revolution will be refined in the wake of the “Arab Spring” and may soon find application in other regions of the world that are suffering the same plight under undemocratic and corrupt regimes.
Richard Rousseau, Ph.D. is a professor of international relations at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku.
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Arab Spring and Economic Theories on Revolution
April 14, 2011
The Tunisian Revolution was exceptional for two key reasons: firstly, it revealed widespread popular discontent to a surprising degree, without having been preplanned or driven by another dimension, whether ideological or religious in nature. Perhaps the most significant fact about this revolution was exported very rapidly and the recipe proved to be almost identical in several Middle Eastern countries. In the midst of such unexpected events, economists have exercised a surprising restraint. We haven’t heard about their explanations of this unfolding political drama. It appears that they for an instant forgot that there is a panoply of “economic theories” on revolution that are very relevant in revealing the dynamics of this historical period on at least four main points.
The first key point is the destabilizing effect of important and quick economic growth. Tunisia and Egypt, being the first countries in the limelight, are among the Arab countries whose growth had been the strongest and most consistent during the 2000s, prior to the global economic crisis. In 1963, Mancur Olson, a well-known political scientist, highlighted the politically destabilizing aspects of long-term economic growth: it initially upsets economic structures, which then multiplies the number of “winners and losers;” secondly, it creates overly optimistic expectations, which in case of an economic slowdown require painful adjustments; and thirdly, it increases people's expectations vis-à-vis the government to provide direction and manage the economy.
The second point is that the transformation of popular discontent into mass revolt in an autocracy is an exceptional occurrence. According to Gordon Tullock, a retired Professor of Law and Economics at the George Mason University School of Law and a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Economics for 2003, revolutions are rare, and their chances of success are minimal at best. They may actually be considered as the private provider of a “public good”, as an individual knows that he or she will benefit from it, even if they are not directly involved in revolutionary activities. Hence an individual has no “rational” interest in, or motives for participating in the revolutionary movement, especially when the personal risks involved are fully considered. Also, governments by definition have a considerable advantage in effectively being in position to use physical violence and other violent methods (provided they are willing to bear the consequences). Thus, autocracies can only be toppled when a schism appears within the ruling class, as was the case with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (although in these instances the internal problems within the ruling class were much more a consequence of the unanticipated popular demonstrations than the root cause of these uprisings.
The third point is that the unpredictability of revolutions in autocratic regimes can be explained by specific reasons. Inspired by the experience of the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979), Timur Kuran, Professor of Economics and Political Science at Duke University, based his economic analysis of social revolutions on an ingenious distinction between private and public preferences in explaining how “a spark can start a prairie fire” (Mao Zedong, 1930). Within an autocratic regime, displaying one’s true preferences is a very risky endeavor. Individuals will then display “strategic” public preferences, that is, public preferences more in line with the traditional and official political culture of their country. However, when the gap between private and public preferences exceeds a certain threshold, an abrupt and sudden adjustment will soon occur. The gap between private and public preferences then evaporates. Most people will come to the realization that they actually share the same aspirations. The so-called “surprise effect” can simply be explained within an autocratic regime by the almost total lack of accurate information on true individual preferences – neither the government nor the opposition, or even the populace. The government and the crowds are in no way privy to real individual preferences on events that are actually unfolding on the ground.
There is a fourth and final point, which is not incorporated in these economic theories on revolution: the role played by the on-going information and multimedia “revolution.” This was first clearly demonstrated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and, more specifically, the pivotal role played by the West German television in East Germany. Cascading effects are not new phenomena in themselves. They are generally explained very simply by the process of imitation: What a particular country is able to achieve, another one can also accomplish it under similar circumstances (if these are similar). However, we are living in different times, and with access to Internet, satellites and sophisticated mobile phones, individuals can now transmit a vast array of information anywhere and at anytime. This technology allows demonstrators and dissidents not only to send stories worldwide but also to effectively coordinate the activities of protesters’ in real time, “live” – like armies organizing field operations – and in a quasi anonymous format.
Many theories can provide satisfactory accounts on why a high level of political dissatisfaction can turn into a popular exasperation that people are no longer willing to repress, to “keep inside.” These ‘economic’ theories’ are insightful since, for a revolution to take place, they insist on the force factor, without which one can only hope for uncoordinated riots. Insofar as it impacts people’s lives, hopes and aspirations, the economic factor plays a crucial role. In addition, and perhaps more predominantly, takes into account access to information and the media. Internet spreads information faster than little slips of paper passed from hand-to-hand.
Any analyst who is in the business of predicting the likelihood of such social events must rely on two kinds of data to be successful: First, the potential of a revolutionary situation that can range from a weaken dictatorial regime, the existence of flagrant and unjustifiable social and economic inequality, a lack of future prospects, a credible opposition, albeit repressed by state apparatus, and a concentration of discontent towards a tyrannical and unpopular leader; second, the cocking of triggering factors such as a promised political reform poorly implemented, a serious economic downturn, or a shift in the national army’s loyalty and support away from the ruling class.
All that is needed for a revolt to happen is some courageous and highly-motivated people ready to pay the price, to stick to their guns. In the Middle East, there was no shortage of valid reasons to turn out into the streets and attempt to toss out the political leadership. The conditions were ripe: large-scale and abject poverty, millions of unemployed young people, (many with university degrees) widespread inequity and blatant discrimination, corruption, lack of freedoms, and a collective “dismal future” for the millions. No doubt, “economic” theories on revolution will be refined in the wake of the “Arab Spring” and may soon find application in other regions of the world that are suffering the same plight under undemocratic and corrupt regimes.
Richard Rousseau, Ph.D. is a professor of international relations at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku.
