024 is a momentous year for American grand strategy. War continues in Ukraine and Gaza. China is more aggressive in the Pacific. Russian warships are in Cuba. Elections in France and the United Kingdom create uncertainty. Americans will go to the polls in November. Whoever wins the election will put their stamp on American grand strategy for years to come. There are five grand strategy options: dominion, collective security, isolationism, offshore balancing, and selective engagement. Of these, selective engagement remains the soundest choice because of the realities of American domestic politics, diplomacy, and international relations.
As a grand strategy, “dominion” means exercising hegemony across a large swath of the world. It implies American control over foreign and domestic policy for many countries to keep them in line with American interests. Such an approach would destroy the fabric of mutually beneficial and consensual collaboration, rendering American power both unpopular and brittle. The United States should not seek this sort of “empire” and such a grand strategy is neither desirable nor feasible, particularly as other countries continue their economic and demographic rise.
Collective security represents a grand strategy dedicated to preserving and furthering the “liberal world order.” It implies a strategy based on supporting the values of Western democracies: “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security… progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law.” Under a liberal world order, the U.S. would be responsible for everything, everywhere, all at once, stretching American resources and creating unnecessary friction through intervention around the world. Nations cannot and do not agree sufficiently to make collective security feasible. States will always pursue their own interests and those interests remain the primary “values” in international politics.
Collective security also has limited appeal in the U.S. because it asks Americans to surrender sovereignty through the institutionalization of American power. The U.S. would reap few of the benefits of attempting to enforce a global international order, while incurring most of the costs. Furthermore, the U.S. would be torn in instances where allied interests and those of the international community more broadly did not align.
But America’s allies have even greater concerns as they consider what an “America first” grand strategy would look like. In its most extreme form, it means a new isolationism. This policy might seem sound and feasible. America has non-threatening neighbors and abundant natural resources. It could exploit domestically or trade internationally for everything it needs. Security would be assured through its nuclear arsenal.
Entrapment is the greatest fear for isolationists and an isolationist grand strategy would guard against entrapment through the abandonment or at hollowing out of multilateral commitments like NATO and bilateral commitments like the American alliance with Japan. Isolationism would also mean the end of American economic and financial mechanisms to protect broader economic interests. Isolationism would mean reductions in foreign aid and disengagement from international organizations dealing with everything from public health to international security. Shorn of these levers of power, it would also reduce the influence of American diplomacy and resources for the State Department.
Isolationism comes with risks. In the 20th century, American isolationism contributed to the outbreak of both world wars. American actions proved too little and too late to deter the acts of aggression which plunged the world into war. Abandoning international structures is likely to weaken, not strengthen the U.S. Those structures help the U.S. to coordinate policy and enhance its resources. Without them, the U.S. would shrink in power and reputation, surrendering the ability to influence geopolitics to rivals like China or Russia.
If isolationism appears too radical, its cousin, offshore balancing, holds some appeal. Offshore balancers believe that the U.S. should deploy its power only to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon in areas of the world where America has critical national interests—usually Western Europe and East Asia. Conflicts between Israel and its neighbors, threats by North Korea against South Korea, or Russian aggression against American “partners” who are not “allies” like Ukraine or Georgia would not make the list of foreign policy priorities.
Offshore balancers chide allies as free–riders on American–provided security. They want regional powers to “do as much of the heavy lifting as possible” when confronted with an aspiring hegemon. America’s role is not to lead, but to “pass the buck,” offering support “if… regional power balances look to be failing.”
By dismissing allies as free–riders and reducing them to the role of American proxies who might become allies only in times of need, offshore balancing undermines the entire concept of alliances based on shared interests and coordinated policy. Such a dismissive strategy provides no guarantee that regional powers would do any heavy–lifting on America’s behalf or join it for the potential decisive showdown. Regional powers are just as likely to view America’s retreat as symptomatic of America’s lack of interest and remain neutral in any future contest or even align with an American rival.
Since partnerships and alliances are a source of American power and remain important to many American political leaders and voters alike, another option—selective engagement—represents a promising grand strategy. Selective engagement is predicated on identifying several core areas of national interest and deploying American power in those areas. It has a broader purview than offshore balancing, without the total obligation required by collective security. Selective engagement recognizes that multilateral alliances like NATO or bilateral alliances should be considered key areas of interest in themselves. By providing structure for coordination and cooperation—and moving beyond transactional interactions—the American alliance system provides enormous benefits.
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America’s options in a world of strategic competition
Image by Marco Montoya from Pixabay
July 12, 2024
Whoever wins the presidency this year will have an outsize impact on American grand strategy for years to come. But whoever wins, strong alliances must be a core concern, writes Andrew R. Novo.
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024 is a momentous year for American grand strategy. War continues in Ukraine and Gaza. China is more aggressive in the Pacific. Russian warships are in Cuba. Elections in France and the United Kingdom create uncertainty. Americans will go to the polls in November. Whoever wins the election will put their stamp on American grand strategy for years to come. There are five grand strategy options: dominion, collective security, isolationism, offshore balancing, and selective engagement. Of these, selective engagement remains the soundest choice because of the realities of American domestic politics, diplomacy, and international relations.
As a grand strategy, “dominion” means exercising hegemony across a large swath of the world. It implies American control over foreign and domestic policy for many countries to keep them in line with American interests. Such an approach would destroy the fabric of mutually beneficial and consensual collaboration, rendering American power both unpopular and brittle. The United States should not seek this sort of “empire” and such a grand strategy is neither desirable nor feasible, particularly as other countries continue their economic and demographic rise.
Collective security represents a grand strategy dedicated to preserving and furthering the “liberal world order.” It implies a strategy based on supporting the values of Western democracies: “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security… progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law.” Under a liberal world order, the U.S. would be responsible for everything, everywhere, all at once, stretching American resources and creating unnecessary friction through intervention around the world. Nations cannot and do not agree sufficiently to make collective security feasible. States will always pursue their own interests and those interests remain the primary “values” in international politics.
Collective security also has limited appeal in the U.S. because it asks Americans to surrender sovereignty through the institutionalization of American power. The U.S. would reap few of the benefits of attempting to enforce a global international order, while incurring most of the costs. Furthermore, the U.S. would be torn in instances where allied interests and those of the international community more broadly did not align.
But America’s allies have even greater concerns as they consider what an “America first” grand strategy would look like. In its most extreme form, it means a new isolationism. This policy might seem sound and feasible. America has non-threatening neighbors and abundant natural resources. It could exploit domestically or trade internationally for everything it needs. Security would be assured through its nuclear arsenal.
Entrapment is the greatest fear for isolationists and an isolationist grand strategy would guard against entrapment through the abandonment or at hollowing out of multilateral commitments like NATO and bilateral commitments like the American alliance with Japan. Isolationism would also mean the end of American economic and financial mechanisms to protect broader economic interests. Isolationism would mean reductions in foreign aid and disengagement from international organizations dealing with everything from public health to international security. Shorn of these levers of power, it would also reduce the influence of American diplomacy and resources for the State Department.
Isolationism comes with risks. In the 20th century, American isolationism contributed to the outbreak of both world wars. American actions proved too little and too late to deter the acts of aggression which plunged the world into war. Abandoning international structures is likely to weaken, not strengthen the U.S. Those structures help the U.S. to coordinate policy and enhance its resources. Without them, the U.S. would shrink in power and reputation, surrendering the ability to influence geopolitics to rivals like China or Russia.
If isolationism appears too radical, its cousin, offshore balancing, holds some appeal. Offshore balancers believe that the U.S. should deploy its power only to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon in areas of the world where America has critical national interests—usually Western Europe and East Asia. Conflicts between Israel and its neighbors, threats by North Korea against South Korea, or Russian aggression against American “partners” who are not “allies” like Ukraine or Georgia would not make the list of foreign policy priorities.
Offshore balancers chide allies as free–riders on American–provided security. They want regional powers to “do as much of the heavy lifting as possible” when confronted with an aspiring hegemon. America’s role is not to lead, but to “pass the buck,” offering support “if… regional power balances look to be failing.”
By dismissing allies as free–riders and reducing them to the role of American proxies who might become allies only in times of need, offshore balancing undermines the entire concept of alliances based on shared interests and coordinated policy. Such a dismissive strategy provides no guarantee that regional powers would do any heavy–lifting on America’s behalf or join it for the potential decisive showdown. Regional powers are just as likely to view America’s retreat as symptomatic of America’s lack of interest and remain neutral in any future contest or even align with an American rival.
Since partnerships and alliances are a source of American power and remain important to many American political leaders and voters alike, another option—selective engagement—represents a promising grand strategy. Selective engagement is predicated on identifying several core areas of national interest and deploying American power in those areas. It has a broader purview than offshore balancing, without the total obligation required by collective security. Selective engagement recognizes that multilateral alliances like NATO or bilateral alliances should be considered key areas of interest in themselves. By providing structure for coordination and cooperation—and moving beyond transactional interactions—the American alliance system provides enormous benefits.
